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Women's Collection from Marketing to Counter-Marketing

Subject: Review of Transcript From April 14, 1994 Oversight Hearing on Tobacco Products

Date: 22 Apr 1994
Length: 17 pages
2023194867-2023194883
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Abstract

Summarizes transcript testimony from April 14, 1994 Waxman hearing on tobacco products. Capsulizes opening remarks made by tobacco company representatives, Congressional representatives, and other government officials. Discusses topics concerning youth access, advertising and promotion, nicotine concentrations and addiction, fire safe cigarettes, tobacco reconstitution and flavoring, DeNoble study findings, smoker behavior, and tar and nicotine yields. Includes references to page numbers in transcript document.

Fields

Type
Memorandum
Company
Philip Morris
Gender
Gender mentioned, no differentiation possible
Author
Nicoli, D.
Named Person
Wyden
Benowitz, N., Dr.
Bliley
Bryant
Campbell, W.
Charles, J.
DeNoble, Victor J., Ph.D. (PM Behavioral Research (1980-84))
Associate Senior Scientist at PM Behavioral Research (83). Senior Researcher at Philip Morris from 1980-1984. Performed in-house PM rat studies on nicotine and addiction; was later fired by PM because of sensitive nature of what studies revealed about nicotine addiction.
Ellis, Cathy Lynn, Ph.D. (PM VP of Worldwide Scientific Affairs)
Director of Research at Philip Morris U.S.A. in 1994. In 1997 was Senior VP of R&D at PM (2505370877). Osdene protégé.
Ellis, Cathy Lynn, Ph.D. (PM VP of Worldwide Scientific Affairs)
Director of Research at Philip Morris U.S.A. in 1994. In 1997 was Senior VP of R&D at PM (2505370877). Osdene protégé.
Gori, Gio Batta, Ph.D. (Tobacco Consultant, formerly w/ NCI, Industry Expert)
1993 Started career at NCI and then went to work for the industry. Believed a safer cigarette could be made, and that there were safe threshold levels for exposure to the chemicals in cigarette smoke.
Johnston
Kessler, David A., M.D., J.D. (Former FDA Commissioner)
appointed FDA Commissioner by President George Bush in December 1990.
Kornegay, H.
Kreider
McMillan
Panzer, F.
Speers, Dr.
Suber
Synar
Taddeo
Tisch
Waxman, H.
Named Organization
American Lung Association
United States Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (U.S. Federal public health agency)
Estimated the costs of smoking to society in medical expenses, estimating in 1994 that about $2.06 per pack of cigarettes was spent on the associated medical care costs for smokers.
Centers for Disease Control
CNN
Department of Justice
EPA
FDA
Federal Trade Commission
Federal Trade Commission (Enforcement agency for laws against deceptive advertising)
Enforces laws against false and deceptive advertising, including ads for tobacco products. Ensures proper display of health warnings in ads and on tobacco products;collects and reports to Congress information concerning cigarette and smokeless tobacco advertising, sales expenditures, and the tar, nicotine, and carbon monoxide content of cigarettes.
HHS
London Times
Lorillard Inc. (American cigarette manufacturer)
American cigarette manufacturer
National Cancer Institute
National Institute of Drug Abuse
New England Journal of Medicine
Quick Trip Stores
R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.
Roper Organization
Smokeless Tobacco Research Council
Tobacco Institute
U.S. Tobacco Company
University of Rochester
US Dept of Agriculture
UTS
American Medical Association (physicians group)
Professional trade group representing American physicians.
Operation/Project
Marlboro Express
Project Hamlet (Fire Safe Cigarette)
Region
Canada
United States
Brand
Merit (PM)
MERIT ULTIMA
Virginia Slims (PM)
Thesaurus Term
Hearings
Youth
Advertising
Fire Safe Cigarettes
Addiction
Tar Level
Nicotine Level

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Page 1: 2023194867
ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT - PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL PHILIP MORRIS COMPANIF~ INC. INTER-OFFICE CORRESPONDENCE 1341 G STREET, N.W., SUITE 900, WASHINGTON, DC 20005 To: From: Subj ect: Fries Date:: April 22, 1994 David Nicoli Review of Transcript From April 14, 1994 Oversight Hearing On Tobacco Products Waxman states that the Subcommittee will soon act on H.R. 3434, "and it will consider other measures as well." (p. 3) McMillan states "that several members of this Congress in the North Carolina delegation, who are extremely affected by this issue, were not allowed to testify today." (p. 7} Waxman states "I do want to note that our colleagues from North Carolina were here to testify at our last hearing. We will have their statements in the record." (p. 9) Wyden states "In a few years, all of you, the executives that are sitting at the witness table are going to be using advertising -- like Joe Camel -- to try and hook my kids and addict them to tobacco products... I just can't understand how each of you engage in an enterprise that is sure to kill some of our children. I hope today that you will tell us how you all can live with such a killing record on your conscience." (p. 10) Wyden refers to a letter from the Centers For Disease Control concerning ingredients that he says states as follows: Wv'e cannot categorically state that any of the ingredients are either safe or hazardous without a reference with specific doses, and we are unable to determine hazardous risk for any of the substances." {p. 11) Representative Waxman places the industry executives under oath. {p. 15) Waxman notes for the record that he has agreed to allow Mr. Campbell and Mr. Johnston an additional five minutes to complete their oral remarks, because of a request from Mr. Bliley. (p. 17)
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Waxman notes that the Subcommittee received a number of requests from other Members who desired to present oral testimony -- but that the schedule prohibited expanding the witness list. Therefore, Waxman said that the record would be held open to receive testimony from those colleagues who requested to testify. (p. 17-18) Bill Campbell extends an invitation to Waxman and other members of the Subcommittee to come see Philip Morris' manufacturing process first hand as the FDA has already done. (p. 31) Tisch states during his opening statement that "The level of nicotine in products manufactured and sold by Lorillard is solely determined by the tobacco that we buy and the blending of the different tobaccos used in our manufacturing." (p. 46) Waxman states as follows: "In my view at the center of this entire debate over tobacco is nicotine. This ingredient in tobacco has an enormous impact on humans. At our last hearing Mr. Speers told the Subcommittee that nicotine is an important flavor. In contrast, Dr. Kessler said the taste of nicotine is actually bitter and can be replicated through the addition of pepper. Dr. Kessler also told the Subcommittee that he was unaware of any purpose for the inclusion of nicotine in a tobacco product except for its addictive effect. (p. 79-80) RJR presents data to refute the Kessler nicotine yield charts from 1982-91. (p. 86-87) Note, too, that RJR says that they "went back and calculated for that 10-year period every single one of the 500 brand styles times their exact tar and nicotine numbers times their exact sales in the marketplace." Dr. Ellis from Philip Morris tells Representative Wyden that she does "not believe that there is a consensus in the scientific community on the criteria necessary to classify a substance as addictive." (p. 101-103) Dr. Ellis offers to Representative Waxman to supply a list of any major health organizations that agree with her opinion on addiction as well as other information that's in the scientific literature that supports the industry view. Waxman also states that '%Ve specifically want you to submit to us your research data that indicates this is not addicting." (p. 105) Waxman also asks for "your research data, showing it's not addictive.., and any research data from you that shows it is addictive." Campbell says he sees no problem with supplying material, and that he will get the appropriate people together -2-
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from our side with the appropriate people from Waxman's side to see how it can be handed over, (p. 106) Representative McMillan asks "vVhy was nicotine not included on the list of 600 items that were disclosed?'': Significantly, Johnston apparently answers as follows: "it's because nicotine is a natural component of tobacco. Nicotine sulfate was on the list." (p. 108) [Should we speak to RJR on this point?] Johnston also states to McMillan: "A prior Chairman of this company testified before Congress in 1964, and offered our ingredient list to Congress thirty years ago this year." (p. 109) Johnston claims, in talking to McMillan, that RJR's nicotine yield chart "shows that tar and nicotine has admittedly slowed down in terms of average consumption, but it's still going down and nicotine and tar are going down together, as they always have." (p. 11o) Waxman reiterates to Campbell a request for documents on nicotine and addiction as follows: 'XVhat we are requesting of you is any report, memorandum or other document describing research conducted by Philip Morris on nicotine and addiction, regardless of whether the document shows nicotine is addictive or that it is not addictive. If you need to have our staffs meet about that, we'll certainly make our staff available." Campbell responds that he has no problem giving the Subcommittee any of the material "if it,s not in some way involved in active litigation at this time." Waxman states "that litigation is not a reason not to give the Congress of the United States information. We expect to get it." (p. 1 14-1 15) Interestingly, Synar followed up Waxman'S statement by saying "Your lawyers are familiar that proprietary information provided to Congress does not make it public. It will be handled in a confidential form." (p. 115-116) As Synar questions Campbell, Synar states "I don't think any of us are ever going to fmd, Mr. Campbell, a study that shows rats or any other animals will self administer saccharine or water intravenously in the way they do nicotine." Synar says this in response to the Philip Morris press release concerning Dr. DeNoble. (p. 117) Synar then refers to Exhibit 7, and tells Campbell that it's a letter from the Director of the National Institute of Drug Abuse regarding the DeNoble study. Synar says that the letter states as follows: "I'hese findings from the DeNoble study indicate that nicotine has reinforcing properties, one of the hallmarks of addictive substances." (p. 117-118) -3-
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Synar asks Campbell whether Dr. DeNoble's work was part of "your company's effort to develop a nicotine analog, which are chemicals which would have addicting or reinforcing features without any of some of the nicotine side effects? Yes or no?" Campbell responded: '"Yes." (p. 118) Synar then refers to Exhibit 8. He describes it as a "1980 internal memorandum" written by J. L. Charles. Synar claims that the memorandum describes nicotine receptor research that Philip Morris was funding at the University of Rochester. He asks whether this was related to DeNoble°s work -- and Campbell states that it was after consulting with Dr. Ellis. (p. 119) Synar says "My question to you did Philip Morris, its attorneys, or any of its employees, threaten a court injunction that would be sought against Dr. DeNoble if the journal or the article was published?" Campbell responds: "Not to my knowledge, sir, and I have investigated to some extent." (p. 121) Synar follows up that response by asking whether Philip Morris had a "written memo on that investigation from" its staff. Campbell responded that he did not think so and Synar asked if Campbell would make it available for the record and submit it. Campbell did not respond orally. (p. 122) Campbell states, in response to a Synar question "that in early 1984 Philip Morris abruptly closed down the research laboratory of Dr. DeNoble and his colleagues and the employees were told to I'md other jobs." Campbell then denies that "Philip Morris took that action because of the adverse research findings that were being found in the laboratory." (p. 122) Campbell agrees to Synar's request that Philip Morris provide to the Subcommittee "copies of any of Dr. DeNoble's studies, reports, notes or any other documents I~erta, ining to the work he performed or any other documents p__ert_ainin~ to his animal research." (p. 122) Campbell agrees to release DeNoble from his confidentiality agreement with the company so that he can appear before the Subcommittee to testify. (p. 123-124) Synar asks Johnston whether RJR currently has animal research going on its laboratories and Johnston responds in the affirmative. (p. 125) After a colloquy, Synar asks Johnston and each of the other tobacco company representatives with the exception of Campbell to provide the Subcommittee with "all the tests, reports and notes from all animal laboratory testing that you are presently or have formerly been involved in." Johnston squabbles with Waxman and Synar and does not give a clear -4-
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commitment -- although Waxman states that '~rou will submit the data."' (p. 128) Synar and Wamnan then get commitments from the other companies to turn over such documents, to extent they exist. Note, too, that Synar again says during this colloquy that "The providing of proprietary information, does not constitute making that information public, therefore violating any formulas or particular private information that you may have.": (p. 127) Representative Bryant asks whether one of the defenses the tobacco companies always assert in product liability litigation is that people smoke as a matter of free choice and that they therefore assume the risk of diseases which are associated with smoking. Johnston admits that "that is part of the litigating these issues." (p. 131) Johnston goes on to say that it is part of the usual defense that tobacco companies are not responsible for any damages suffered by smokers because of these facts. (p. 132) Waxman asks Johnston whether he believes "that nicotine administered through a patch is pleasurable?" Johnston replies that he does not know, but that "it has a mild, pharmacological intent. Those products are marketed as a drug. And the reason -- this is very important, Mr. Chairman -- the reason that many people do not stay with nicotine patches, which provides nicotine just like a cigarette does, is that there,s something more to smoking than lust nicotine. It's the ritual; it the way we associate it after a meal, or with a cup of coffee so to say that people take nicotine through gum or patches, if it was only nicotine, they'd stay with it. But there is something more to smoking; there is pleasure and enjoyment out of smoking." (p. 141) Representative Kreidler asks Campbell whether he would want a loved one to take up smoking. Campbell stated, among other things, that "I think the important thing is that our children -- everyone -- get as much information as possible." (p. 145) Kreidler then pursues a line of questioning on nicotine. First, he says that it is not true that the FTC nicotine yield has been dropping for the last 10 years. Second, he says that the grC's nicotine yields are an unreliable measure of how much nicotine is "consumed in smoking a particular cigarette.''~ (p. 146) Kreidler claims that the government, independent experts and "even the industry's own consultants" have concluded that there is virtually no relationship between the measured FTC: yield and the amount of nicotine actually inhaled by smokers. (p. 146) Kreidler then questions Dr. Speers concerning his chart on FTC nicotine yields. Speers" chart is Exhibit 16; the Surgeon General's 1989 chart is Exhibit 17; Kreidler then says that he has an exhibit and a poster that is taken directly from the 1989 -5-
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Surgeon General's report and from the chart Speers submitted to the Committee on March 25, which is Exhibit 18. Kreidler then makes the claim that Speers' chart is incorrect. Speers enters into a colloquy with both Waxman and Kreidler to try and explain what appears to be discrepancies between Speers' March 25 chart and the chart Kreidler prepared. (p. 153) Waxman then turns to Speers'~ 1981 article where he writes as follows: "higher nicotine levels can be achieved by decreasing the stem and tobacco sheet and increasing the burley and upper stock position of both the flue-cured and the burley tobacco." (p. 154) Speers then responds by reading a statement into the record where, among other things, he makes the point that nicotine concentration in tobacco should not be confused with nicotine smoke yields as measured by the FTC method. He states "Ultra low tar cigarettes are also ultra low smoke nicotine cigarettes. The nicotine concentration in the tobacco is not correlated to FTC tar and smoke nicotine yields; that is, differences in tobacco nicotine concentrations are not correlated to the smoke nicotine yields in cigarettes. The filter, the f'flter tip ventilation -- tobacco are the principle factors that control the nicotine smoke yield." (p. 1561 In Speers' statement, he also states "Cigarette tobacco blends are formulated to try to achieve taste acceptance, brand distinction and preference within the smoker franchise. The fact that nicotine concentrations vary among the compounds and components used to formulate a blend has been discussed in the Surgeon General's report, and many other publications beside my 1981 paper... This centuries-old practice is well-known, and cannot be construed as a manipulation of nicotine, for the purposes of this Committee or those of Dr. Kessler." (p. 157) Speers also responds to the staff report accompanying his 1981 article and says that the staff report indicated that he noted that there was ongoing research in the industry to raise the nicotine level of tobacco so that nicotine would be higher than tar. He stated that it had "nothing to do with the manufacturers or this industry" -- rather he believed that it was work that came out of the tobacco working group of the National Cancer Institute, which was being conducted by the USDA and the land grant universities in the tobacco growing states; (p. 158) Waxman asks Speers whether he agrees "that cigarette makers can adjust the level of nicotine in cigarettes through the process of blending different types of tobacco." Speers responds by saying that "People will get different nicotine concentrations from the tobacco, depending on the specific blend, yes." (p. 159-60) Waxman asks if everyone else on the panel agreed with Speers' -6-
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statement. Everyone on the panel agreed with Speers' statement. (p. 160-61) Waxman next refers to nicotine concentrations or levels through blending. He then says he wants to know from each panelist whether or not their companies actually exercise control over these two factors. (p. 161) Waxman first turns to Johnston, who attempts to explain that the issue is not that simple. Waxman then refers to an appearance by an RJR official -- Mr. Suber -- on CNN the evening before. Wamnan claims that Suber stated as follows: "In order to deliver to the consumer a product that he wants, a consistent level of nicotine, we have to blend the tobaccos accordingly. So we do controlling." Waxman then asks Johnston whether he agrees with Suber's statement that "you do control nicotine levels." Johnston states that he disagrees with the wording of Suber's statement. (p. 163) Waxman continues a colloquy with Johnston and Speers concerning whether nicotine follows tar or whether in fact the industry, through articles, statements and otherwise, had indicated that those two factors can follow different paths. Speers repeatedly tells Waxman the conclusion that he,s drawing from his article is incorrect. Waxman indicates severe confusion on this point when he states as follows: "let's not confuse it any further. When you say the nicotine content of the smoke is separate from the cigarette, that seems to me a very strange notion." (p. 170) Waxman argues that: "it defies any body's understanding of a concentration of a higher level of nicotine in a cigarette. It may or may not be reflected in the smoke; it could be different in the FTC numbers as opposed to the concentration in the cigarette, and both of these can be different than what the smoker in fact inhales." Speers then proceeds to explain the fundamentals surrounding this issue -- that one has to understand the distinctions involved with the concentration of nicotine in a cigarette; the actual weight level of the filler in the rod and how that affects the absolute amount of nicotine in the cigarette; and Finally the actual nicotine yield in the smoke to the smoker. (p. 171-172) Speers' explanation is undoubtedly correct, the question is only whether the explanation was communicated clearly so that people could understand his point. Waxman then shows the panelists Exhibit 21, which was an article by Dr. Nell Benowitz and others entitled "Smokers Of Low Yield Cigarettes Do Not Consume Less Nicotine." Waxman stated that the article is from the New England Journal of Medicine. (p. 171-172) Speers disputes the points Waxman is trying to make with the study, saying that how people actually smoke cigarettes, is separate from the average or standard numbers that are reflected by the FIE method. (p. 173) -7-
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Bliley raises confidentiality concerns with Waxman as follows: "I'd like to demand that any documents that this Subcommittee has requested be subject to strict confidentiality procedures by the Subcommittee and its staff, and the receipt, review and use of the materials which have been requested, by all Subcommittee members. There are obvious proprietary concerns, and others that we request that these procedures be strictly followed."' Waxman responds by stating: Wv'hen we get these documents and there, is a request for confidentiality, we will review, that with the members of the Subcommittee, but I'm certainly not going to agree that eve~g's going to be kept confidential because the tobacco industry wants to keep it confidential .... So I will not agree to that proposition, but we can discuss it when the time arises." (p. 174) Representative Bliley and Johnston and Campbell engage in a friendly colloquy on underage smoking and what the industry is doing to curb that phenomenon. (p. 177-180) Bliley asks Johnston to submit for the record how much RJR spends for such efforts. (p. 178) Bliley then proceeds to ask the various manufacturers whether they use. any of the patents that Commissioner Kessler referred to in his March 25 testimony. Campbell responds that Philip Morris does not use any patents which describe processes that would maintain or increase the level of nicotine in cigarettes. He did say that Philip Morris has used the patents that relate to the reduction of nicotine through the denicotinization process. (p. 181) Note as well that Johnston says RJR does not use any of the patents Kessler described. He goes on to state, however, that "there wouldn't be anything wrong with it if we did use those patents. There have been calls from governments, from scientists, all over the world, including the United States, for the industry to provide lower tar cigarettes while maintaining nicotine yields. The theory behind that being people -- the tar is the risk factor here, that people will smoke fewer cigarettes. Our company is being actively encouraged outside the U.S: to produce those products and look what, s happening in this room today. (p. 181-182) Bliley then engages in a colloquy with the panelists to ask them whether any of them spike their cigarettes with nicotine. Everyone on the panel uniformly denied this fact. (p. 183-184) Synar then pursues a line of questioning concerning advertising to youth and Joe Camel. (p. 185) Synar's questions begin with a reference to focus group data from RJR. [This may be an indication, that Synar has received documents from the FTC that RJR provided to the agency.] -8-
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Synar then asks Johnston to submit to the Subcommittee "all the documents and other materials produced in connection with the Joe Camel advertising campaign from your company and your advertising firm since its inception, including internal memos, reports, presentations of any kind, storyboards, results of focus groups and marketing surveys, and any material within that description." Johnston says he will provide such materials to the Subcommittee. He notes, however, that "to help minimize any environmental impact, I can direct you to where those documents are already supplied" to the United States Government. (p. 187-188) Synar asks Campbell whether Philip Morris has done research of any kind on the Joe Camel advertising campaign and its effectiveness. Campbell states that he's not acquainted with anything specifically and none of the other companies indicate that they've done any research on the Joe Camel campaign. In questioning Johnston, Synar makes the following statement: "There are 50 million smokers. We know that only 5% of all smokers switch, which means 2,5 million people per year. So your spending by our calculations roughly $1,840 per person to get them to switch." (p. 189) Johnston states that he will not pull the Joe Camel advertising campaign in response to an inquiry from Synar. He notes that RJR has replicated through the Roper Organization research that the AMA has conducted, only using much larger sample bases. Johnston intimated that the Roper study indicated that teenagers are not smoking Camel in the way that the AMA indicated that they were and he offered to submit this data for the record. (p. ~191) Synar tells Campbell that the AMA has found that the initiation rates increased rapidly in girls under 17 as a result of the Virginia Slims ads. He claimed that the showed in 1973, the initiation rates for girls under 17 increased 110% over 1967's rate. Synar then shows Campbell a Virginia Slims ad and asks him who the ad was "pointed to." Campbell stated that it was to attract women smokers over the age of 20, 25, something like that." (p. 192) Synar asks Taddeo from UST about studies that UST has funded. He indicates that he has funded a number of studies through the Smokeless Tobacco Research Council and agrees to provide those studies for the record and also make them public in response to Synar's request. (p. 194) -9-
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Synar reads a letter from a young girl in his district where she claims that a convenience store named Quick Trip had a "bunch of cigarettes sitting on the shelf, and a sign that said, 'free, take one.' " Johnston says that he will investigate this story immediately and would submit for the record what RJR found and what actions they've taken if his company, was involved in any. way. Synar said he had been in such stores over the last two weeks and that he saw the same thing that the girl who wrote the letter saw. The transcript is not clear, but it appears that Bill Campbell may have made the same commitment. (p. 201) McMillan posits the interesting question as to why someone isn't producing a high nicotine product specifically to take advantage of the fact that nicotine is supposedly addictive. Johnston responds by stating that "if some of the suggestions that have been offered in the days leading up to this hearing were seriously taken, that's what we would all be producing. If we just chop up the tobacco and roll it into a piece of paper, the amount of nicotine then provided to smokers will go up 300-400°/6. Yet we have this remarkable record of reducing nicotine and somehow we're challenged about it. I don't get it." (p. 205) Johnston responds to a question from McMillan concerning black market cigarette sales if cigarettes were banned in this country. Johnston states that in Canada "they found people drifting to higher tar, higher nicotine cigarettes because of the price. Consumers naturally m0v¢ that way. saving that 'I can smoke fewer cigarettes.' " McMillan then questions Speers, noting as follows: "You were accused publicly of making misrepresentations to this Subcommittee the last time you appeared. Specifically, this charge arose from a 1981 article that you authored, that told how the level of nicotine in a tobacco product can be changed by blending different types of tobacco which have differing nicotine content. This discussion from your article was presented as conclusive proof that cigarette manufacturers manipulate nicotine in cigarettes and you stand accused of hiding this supposed 'secret' fact. Dr. Speers, if you would turn to your written statement from the March 25 hearing, ff you have it and read the last sentence on the first page." Speers says that he does not have it and McMillan reads it for him as follows: 'The level of nicotine in the tobacco of our products is solely determined by the tobacco that we buy and blending of the different tobaccos during manufacturing. The tar and nicotine yields of our products are determined by a combination of the tobacco blends and the construction of the cigarette, i.e., length, circumference, filter, tip ventilation, tobacco density, etc. The Federal Trade Commission has reported the result of tar and - 10-

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