USC Tobacco Industry Monitoring Project Collection
ALLIES: THE ACLU AND THE TOBACCO INDUSTRY
Abstract
Article by Morton Mintz published by the Advocacy Institute. Asserts that the ACLU has a conflict of interest: "At the same time that it takes money from the tobacco industry, it allies itself with the tobacco industry to fight legislation intended to ban or restrict tobacco advertising and promotion--but it does not inform its approximately 300,000 members of either activity." Reveals that the ACLU has "received a half-million dollars in annual grants from PHILIP MORRIS 1987 though 1992." Notes that PHILIP MORRIS "spends fortunes to boast of its financial support of social causes and sports and cultural events."
Fields
- Target Market
- None
- Strategy
- Yes
- Message
- Liberty
- Subject
- Free Speech
- marketing
- Philanthropy
- secondhand smoke
- Sports
- advertising
Document Images
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ALLIES:
The ACLU and
the TOBACCO INDUSTRY
by
Mortan Mintz
Published by:
. . muffin=1730 Rhode Island Avenue, NW
Suite 600
Washington, DC 20036
202/659-8475
II ` . July 1993

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The sponsors of "ALLIES: The ACLU and the TOBACCO INDUSTRY," a report
by Morton Mintz, arc the Center for Science in the Public Interest, the Coalition on
Smoking OR Health (comprised of the American Cancer Society, the American Heart
Association, and the American Lung Association), Ralph Nader, Public Citizen Inc., and the
Trauma Foundation. The Advocacy Institute is publisher of the report. All of the sponsoring
organizations are nonprofit public-interest groups.
Morton Mintz, a free-lance writer, conceivc,d and executed the report independently
of the aforementioned organizations, which became sponsors after he had completed it.
He began covering tobacco isstm for the Wasiwcgton Post, where he was a staff writer
for nearly 30 years, in 1965, and has also written about them. for The Nation, 7Yse New
Republic, The Pnvgre=ve, Nteman Report4 Legal7tmer, and The Non-Proj'u ?frrtes. In 1990
he was the only Ame;ican reporter to cover the Seventh World Conference on Tobacco and
Health in Perth, Australia.
His most recent book isAtAny Cost: Corporate Gre4 Women, and the Dalkon Shield.
He is a winner of the Columbia [University] Journalism Award; the Worth Bingha.m,
Heywood Broun, Raymond Qapper, and George Polk Memorial Awards, and the
Washington-Baltimore Newspaper Guild award for Public Service (twice). He lives in Chevy
Chase, Maryland.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Executive Summary (Pp. i-iv)
Part I(Introduction): The American Civil Liberties Union has a conflict of interest: At the
same time that it takes money from the tobacco industry, it allies itself with the tobacco
industry to fight legislation intended to ban or restrict tobacco advertising and
promotion-but does not inform its approxinmatefy 300,00d members of either activity. The
driving force is First Amendment absolutism, not financial impropriety. (Pp. 1-2)
Part II: The ACL.U's fundraising letters do not disclose that it has made a cause of
protecting the speech of eorporations_ The author interviewed the ACLU's top officers about
this and other key issues. (Pp. 2-3)
Part III: Executive Director Ira Glasser reveals that the ACLU has received a half-mtllion
dollars in annual grants from Philip Morris 1987 through 1992. In publicly welcoming
Mafioso John Gotti to contribute ($10,000 was suggested), Glasser invites the'ciuestion
whether anyone (Hitler, Stalin, Pol Pot, Saddam Hussein) would be an unac,ceptable donor.
The ACLU doctrine on contributions is concisely defined by former legal director Burt
Neuborne: "It's self-destructive to turn away money for constructive projects." In fact, the
ACLU has in fact done just that. (Pp. 3-5)
Part TV: Glasser discloses that he solicited Philip Morris for grants. In doing so, the ACLU
does not and cannot plead poverty: Philip Morris's 1990 grant accounted for less than a half
of one percent of that year's revenues (RJR Nabisco also contributed; the amount wasn't
divulged). (Pp. S-6) O
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Part V: Three foundations turn out to have given $5.8 million to the ACLU in the four years
1987-1990. Glasser and ACLU president Nadine Strosscn defend the nonreporting of
revenue sources. (Pp. 6-7)
Part VI: Philip Morris spends fortunes to boast of its financial support of social causes and
sports and cultural events. Yet it did not respond to queries as to why it doesn't disclose its
grants to the ACLU. ACLU leaders vigorously defend the acceptance of tobacco money.
Former ACLU official Matthew Myers says the ACLU should do what it urges government
to do: be "very public" about how it conducts its business. ACLU former legal director
Neuborne says, "Sure, they should disclose" their acceptance of tobacco money. (Pp. 8-10)
Part VII: Glasscr: "In a fair contest between medical facts and the industry's self-serving
propaganda, the facts will win." But while the facts were allegedly winning, millions were
dying of tobacco-induced diseases, and mi'ilions more were becoming addicted. (Pp.10.12)
Part VYII: The tobacco industry spends $11 million a day on advertising and promotion and
invests more millions in politicians. So why does the ACLU find it necessary to dedicate any
resources to fighting for an industry cause? Glasser. Because the government cannot be
allowed to choose targets for exceptions to the F'ust Amendment. As an industry ally, the
ACLU picks up chits it can call in when it wants industry help on legislation in which it has
an interest. Morton Halperin, former head of the ACLU's Washington office, tells the
director of Public Citizen's Congress Watch that the ACLU would support a hypothetical
bill to legalize the sale of poisoned meat--a matter on which it takes no stand-if the bill
contained a provision the ACLU wanted. (Pp. 12-14)
Part IX: How the ACLU catne to advocate the tobacco industry's cause. (Pp.14-15) ~~
O
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Part X: ACLU spokesmen-principally, 1-Ialperin and Barry Lynn, his former CD
subordinate-make extreme statements to Congress, such as, 'The First Amendment simply ~
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does not countenance government content control of advertising of lawful products_" But it
does, and it has for decades. In addition, the ACLU explicitly approves of
consumer-protection laws empowering thc government to control the content of ads for
lawful products, including prescription drugs and securities. (Pp. 15-17)
Part XI: ACLU spokesmen also make extreme claims to Congress about the protection of
commercial speech supposedly afforded by the First Amendment--claims disputed by some
constitutional experts and, in some cases, factually incorrect and misleading or farcical.
(Pp. 17-20)
Part XII: A chronicle of the ACLU's determined and successful battle to defeat a Senate
biU to curb tobacco advertising not with direct restrictions on corporate speech, but simply
by reducing the. deductability of tobacco advertising to the level of deductability for a
business meal. In a little-noted admission, the right-wing Washington Legal Foundation said
that it gets about 3 percent of its income from the tobacco industry. (Pp. 20-21)
PArt 7fIII: While disclaiming expertise of which products are dangerous, ACLU spokesmen
nonetheless express undocumented doubts about the hazards of cigarettes, including
addiction, and the effectiveness of tobacco advertising, particularly the advertising targeted
at children. The evidence that the industry targets under-18 youngsters is overwhelming.
(Pp. 21-24)
Part lW: Despite his lack of scientific credentials, Lynn goes overboard in casting doubt on
the evidence incriminating secondhand smoke. Yet even Glasser has "no doubt that
environmental smoke is a problem." (Pp. 24-27)
Part XV: Adopting an industry position whole, Halperin declared at a 1990 Senate hearing ~
"that there is simply no evidence that tobacco advertising increases the level of smoking." w
Almost simultaneously this claim was shaken by a report from Norway, the first nation to ~
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ban such advertising. Two years later, the claim was dealt a still more deadly blow by an
official British analysis-little-noted in the United States-of the effects of tobacco ad bans
in Norway, Finland, Canada, and New Zealand. The analysis led the Health Committee of
the House of Commons in London to "accept that the burden of proof for the contention
that tobacco advertising incrcases tobacco consumption has been met..." (Pp. 27-29)
Part XVI: ACLU officials argue, without substantiating evidence, that a ban on tobacco ads '
would put the nation on a"stippery slope" leading to bans' of ads for cars and other producu,
and, finally, to the burial of our political freedoms. The argument is ridiculed by two former
top officials of the ACLU: Melvin wulf, legal director 1962 to 1977, and Aryeh Neier,
executive director 1970 to 1978. (Pp. 30-31)
Part XVII: The ACLU is indifferent to corporate, as opposed to government, suppression
of speech, including the minimizing of critical reports on smoking by many magazines that
take cigarette ads. (P. 31)
Part XVII[: Soon after quitting as ACLU legal director, Burt Neuborne testified on Capitol
Hill for the Tobacco Institute. But he quickly "wallced away" because he felt "a moral taint."
(Pp. 31-33)
Part JfYX: The ACLU extends its alliance with the tobacco industry across the Atlantic.
(Pp. 33-34)
Part XX: Tlu ACLU trivializes the First Amettdment by valuing it equally for corporations
and human beings. In doing so the ACLU treads on the constitutional quicksand of a
Supreme Court decision that usurped legislative authority. (Pp. 35-M)
Part JtX[: The bottom word: disclosure. (P. 36)
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EXECUTIVE SUNtMARY
In 1986, sixtysix years after its founding as the guardian of the Constitution and the
Bill of Rights, the American Civil Liberties Union became an open ally of the tobacco
industry in its unceasing war against legislation to ban or restrict advertising and promotion
of cigarettes.
In the following year, the ACLU secretly began to take substantial sums of money
from the industry-most importantly, $500,000 from Philip Morris Ina in the six years
1987-1992. ACLU Executive Director Ira Glasser says he solicited Philip Morris for the
money.
Poverty is not and could not be the ACLU's defense for taking tobacco money. In
1990, for example, the Philip Morris contribution amounted to less than one-half of one
percent of ACLU revenues. (RJR Nabisco also contributed, but Glasser did not specify how
much.) f
The advocacy of an industry cause and acceptance of industry money have not been
disclosed by the ACLU to its approximately 300,000 members, either in Civil Liberties, the
ACLU's quarterly newsletter, or in fundraising ietters. This silence was vigorously defended
by ACLU leaders--president (chairman) Nadine Strossen, former Washington office director
Morton H. Halperin, and Glasser-in an interview. But there's dissension in the ranks:
Former legal director Burt Neuborne says of the ACLU's acceptance of tobacco money,
"Sure, they should disclose (itr
The effect of nondisclosure is to add concealment to what in shorthand may be called
advocacy and tnoney. Standing alone, any of the three-advocacy, money, or
concealment-could doubtless be defended. A combination of any two would raise ethical
questions. The troika is a clear conflict of interest. The conflict doesn't trouble ACLU
leaders. At bottom their position is that if it's the ACLU that has the conflict, it's ok.
Conflict of interest is only one of numerous issues raised by the alliance:
* In taking tobacco money, the ACLU is motivated not by financial impropriety, of
which there is no trace, but absolutism. The ACLU's absolute is that the defense of
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corporate speech which promotes massive addiction and death is no vice. The way the
ACLU reads the First Amendment is akin to the way National Rifle Association reads the
Second Amendment, which is to justify a jihad against each and every government effort to
restrict the "right" of anyone to buy guns for any purpose at any time.
" Ira Glasser says he would welcome a $10,000 contribution from Mafioso John Gotti.
Having done this-in a conversation reported by New York Times columnist Anna '
Quindlen-the ACLU cannot draw a guideline under which any source of money-Hitler,
Stalin, Pot Pot, Saddam Hussein-could be so odious as to warrant shunning by a"good"
cause. This is because the ACL.U's fund-raising philosophy, as concisely formulated by Burt
Neuborne, is that "[1]t's self-destructive to turn away money for constructive projects."
(At least once, however, the ACLU did turn away money for a constructive
project-because its executive committee, according to former member David Carliner, a
Washington lawyer, imputed sexasm to the man who would be honored by the First
Amendment award the gift would have funded: Hugh Hefner, founder of Playboy magazine.)
* For nearly 40 years, the tobacco industry has executed a strategy for shaking public
confidence and trust in the mountains of evidence, including at least 50.000 scientific studies,
that incriminate its products in an ever-widening array of diseases, including addiction. A key
element of the strategy, acknowledged in a Tobacco Institute internal document, is, "Creating
doubt about the health charge without actually denying it." This is essentially what ACLU
lawyer and lead lobbyist Barry W. Lynn has done on Capitol Hill in unsubstantiated
testimony casting doubt on and scorning the evidence establishing that environmental
tobacco smoke causes disease that kills non-smokers.
The scientific evidence has also incriminated environmental tobacco smoke (ETS),
as has an Australian judge in a court ease of which few Americans are aware. Notably, Ira
GlassCr has "no doubt that environmental smoke is a problem." But Barry Lynn has testified ~~
that it has not been shown to be dangerous. C?
" In more unsubstantiated congressional testimony, the ACLU has cast doubt on and W
disputed evidence that tobi cco-industry advertising and promotion targets children and ~
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increases smoking overall. Yet the evidence for both propositions is immense, although some
of it has gone unreported in the mainstream press. In a 1990 Senate hearing, Morton
Halperin went so far as to claim that "there is simply no evidence that tobacco advertising
increases the level of smoking." Almost simultaneously, a report from Norway, the first
nation to ban tobacco advertising, severely damaged Halperin's claim.
Last year, Halperin's claim was all but demolished by an official British government '
analysis of the results of tobacco-advertising bans in countries that now have them, Norway,
Canada, Finland, and New Zealand. Importantly, the analysis--iittie noted in the United
States--fed the Health Committee of the House of Commons in London to "accept that the
burden of proof for the contention that tobacco advertising increases tobacco consumption
has been met..."
' The ACLU's extreme statements to Congress include this one by Barry Lynn: "I'he
First Amendment simply does not countenance gbvernment content control of advertising
of lawful products." But it does, and it has for decades. For example, the Food and Drng
Administration must approve the labeling of a prescription drug before it can be sold, and
the advertising of the drug must faithfully reflect the labeling. This is prior restraint, and the
ACLU accepts it, just as it accepts the "government content control" imposed by the
securities, postal-fraud, and other consumer-protection laws.
* Again without substantiating evidence, ACLU spokesmen in House hearings have
argued that a ban on tobacco advertising and promotion would put the country on a
"slippery slope" leading to bans on ads for products such as automobile and butter and
finally to the evisceration of the First Amendment. Stz;ldngly, the argument is ridicnled by
two former top ACLU officials: Melvin Wult legal director 1962 to 1977, and Aryeh Neier,
executive director 1970 to 1978.
* The ACLU's fight against the proposed bills to restrain tobacco advertising and
promotion-even a bill to reduce its deductability to the level of a business meal-is rooted
in a shaky constitutional proposition, a trivialization of the First Amendment. It is that a
corporation is a "person" and that in consequence its speech is fully protectcd Yet not a
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word in the legislativc history of the Fourteenth Amendment shows that the Framers
intcndcd to define a paper entity as human flesh and blood. Although the ACLU doesn't
say so, the Supreme Court usurped legislative power when, in 1886, it transformed the
corporation into a person constitutionally entitled to the equal protection of the laws.
The bottom word is, disclosure. Disclosure is the sunlight that would disinfect the
ACh,U's conflict of interest in taking tobacco-industry money while advocating a
tobacco-industry cause; and it would fairly test the doctrine that it is self-destructive to turn
away money from any source for a constructive cause.
AL{.[ES:'rELE AGUJ AND TBE TOMCCO [Nl1USI7tV
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