Tobacco Documents Online

9O Affidavit de Neil E. Collishaw, le 21 octobre 1988 AFFIDAVIT i0 20 30 40 Je, soussign4, Neil E. Collishaw, chef de l'Unit4 des produits du tabac, direction g4n4rale, protection de la sant4 au Ministate de la Sant4 et du Bien-~tre social Canada, domicili4 et r4sidant au 134, avenue Caroline, Ottawa, 4tant d0ment asserment4 sur les Saints ~vangiles, d4clare et dis que: I. Je suis chef ~ l'Unit4 des produits du tabac, direction g4n4rale, protection de la sant4 au Ministate de la Sant4 et du Bien-~tre social Canada; 2. ~ ce titre, je suis responsable de ce qui concerne la Loi r4glementant les produits du tabac; 3. Au courant de i'4t4 1988, j'ai 4t4 inform4 que la compagnie Rothman, Benson & Hedges Inc. contestait devant la Cour f4d4rale du Canada, divisioin de premiere instance la Loi r4glementant les produits du tabac; 4. D~s la fin du mois d'ao~t 1988, j'ai entrepris des d4marches afin de recruter des experts dans le domaine m4dical et dans le domaine de la publicit4; 5. Du let au 15 septembre 1988, j'ai contact4 ~ plusieurs reprises mes homologues du Gouvernement am4ricain afin d'identifier d'autres personnes pouvant agir comme expert dans le litige portant sur la Loi r4glementant les produits du tabac; 6. Du 14 au 23 septembre 1988, j'ai contact4 plusieurs personnes, notamment: a) M. Richard Pollay Professeur en marketing et Communication Faculty of Commerce and Business Administration British Columbia (Lequel m'a mentionn4 ~tre int4ress4 ~ agir comme expert) b) M. Lynn Kozlowski Psychologue Addiction Research Foundation Toronto (Lequel m'a mentionn4 ~tre int4ress4 ~ agir comme expert)

91 Affidavit de Nell E. Collishaw, le 21 octobre 1988 i0 2O 30 40 c) M. Allen Best Psychologue University of Waterloo Sp4cialiste en pr4vention du tabagisme (Lequel m'a mentionn4 ~tre int4ress~ ~ agir comme expert) d) William Leiss Professeur et sp4cialiste en communication et publicit4 Simon Fraser University (Lequel m'a mentionn4 ~tre int4ress4 ~ agir comme expert) e) Neville Lefcoe Pneumologue Facult4 de M4decine Western, Ontario (Lequel m'a mentionn4 ~tre int4ress4 ~ agir comme expert) f) Kenneth Warner ~conomiste Sp4cialiste sur la publicit4 du tabac University of Michigan (Lequel m'a inform4 ne pouvoir d4terminer sa disponibilit4 avant le mois de janvier 1989) g) Anthony Miller ~pid4miologue Universit4 de Toronto (Lequel m'a mentionn4 ~tre int4ress4 ~ agir comme expert) 7. Le ou vers le 26 septembre 1988, j'ai transmis une lettre aux cinq (5) premieres personnes mentionn4es au paragraphe pr4c4dent et au Dr. Miller leur demandant de me faire parvenir leur Curriculum Vitae dans les plus brefs d41ais; 8. Le 27 septembre 1988, j'ai retenu les services du Docteur Laurent Marcoux pour m'aider ~ identifier des experts francophones en mati~re m4dicale et les recruter comme expert;

92 Affidavit de Neil E. Collishaw, le 21 octobre 1988 i0 20 30 4O 9. Le 29 septembre 1988, j'ai exp4di4 ii lettres faisant suite ~ de nombreux appels t414phoniques aux personnes ci-apr~s nomm4es leur demandant s'ils pouvaient agir comme expert: a) Dr. Kjell Bjartveit M4decin de Oslo en Norv~ge (pays o~ la publicit4 est prohib4 depuis 1976) Sp4cialiste sur le tabac (J'ai 4t4 contact4 par t414phone le 18 octobre 1988 par le Dr. Bjartveit qu'il aimerait pouvoir collaborer avec moi, mais qu'en raison des courts d41ais, il ne pouvait pr4parer un rapport et t4moigner, 4tant donn4 qu'il n'4tait pas disponible avant la mi-novembre 1988) b) Dr. Nicolas Anthonisen Pneumologue Universit4 du Manitoba, Winnipeg (Ii n'a pas encore fait connaitre sa r4ponse) c) David Burns M4decin Facult4 de M4decine Californie San Diego Sp4cialiste dans les effets du tabac R4dacteur en chef scientifique de plusieurs rapports du chirurgien g4n4ral (US) sur le tabac et la sant4 (Ii n'a pas encore fait connaftre sa r4ponse) d) Kenneth Warner (mentionn4 au paragraphe 15f) (Ii n'a pas encore fait connaitre sa r4ponse) e) W. Kannel Chief Section of Preventive Medicine and Epidemiology Boston, Medical Center (Ii n'a pas encore fait connaitre sa r4ponse)

93 Affidavit de Neil E. Collishaw, le 21 octobre 1988 i0 20 3O 4O f) D.W. Spitzer ~pid4miologue Montreal General Hospital (Lequel a refus4 en raison d'un manque de disponibilit4) g) G. Gorn Professeur Marketing & Communication Faculty of Commerce and Business Administration University of British Columbia h) J. McCarthy ~pid4miologue Harvard School Public Health Boston (Ii n'a pas encore fait connaitre sa r4ponse) i) Jack Siematycki ~pid4miologue Montr4al (Lequel m'a inform4 ~tre int4ress4 lots d'une conversation t414phonique eta confirm4 par 4crit son int4r~t en indiquant que le temps allou4 ~ la pr4paration de son rapport 4tait le facteur d4terminant entre un sommaire et une 4tude exhaustive) j) Jonathan Samet Professeur ~ la Facult4 de M4decine University of Mexico k) W. Rickert Chimiste ~ l'Universit4 de Waterloo Analyse de la fum4e du tabac (Ii m'a r4f4r4 ~ monsieur A. Castonguay) I0. Du 3 au 5 octobre 1988, je me suis rendu ~ Washington afin de rencontrer mes homologues du Gouvernement des ~tats-Unis afin d'identifier d'autres experts que je pourrais contacter et retenir pour agir comme experts, j'ai obtenu plusieurs noms de r4f4rences; Ii. Du 6 au 7 octobre 1988, j'ai identifi4 avec l'aide du Docteur Laurent Marcoux les experts suivants

94 Affidavit de Neil E. Collishaw, le 21 octobre 1988 I0 20 30 40 et je lui ai demand4 de retenir leurs services comme expert: a) Marcel Boulanger, cardiologue de Montr4al; (subs4quemment monsieur Boulanger a refus4 d'agir comme expert, 4rant donn4 qu'il ne pouvait pr4parer un rapport pour le mois de novembre et qu'il sera ~ l'ext4rieur du pays au cours de cette p4riode et subs4quemment, soit le 18 octobre 1988, il a 4t4 inform4 que deux (2) autres cardiologues contact4s par le Docteur Laurent Marcoux ont refus4 d'agir comme expert en raison des courts d41ais) b) c) d) e) Gaston Ostiguy, pneumologue de Montr4al Fernand Turcotte, 4pid4miologue de Qu4bec; Jacques Brisson, 4pid4miologue de Qu4bec; Andr4 Castonguay, chimiste de Qu4bec. 12. Du i0 au 13 octobre 1988, j'ai contact4 et retenu les services des personnes suivantes pour agir comme expert: Richard Pollay Lynn Kozlowski Roberta Ferrence Anthony Miller (il est actuellement en Argentine jusqu'au 31 octobre 1988 et apr~s avoir contact~ sa secr4taire, j'ai 4t4 inform4 qu'il ne pouvait ~tre rejoint) 13. de: Le 17 octobre 1988, j'ai retenu les services Allan Best Don Wigle Neville Lefcoe Jerry Goodis 14. Le 18 octobre 1988, j'ai 4t4 inform4 que Mme Diane H4on oeuvrant dans le domaine de la publicit4 ~ Montr4al ne pouvait agir comme expert vules courts d41ais. De plus, M. Kenneth Warner ne pourra agir comme expert et je doute que le Docteur Anthony Miller ait le temps de pr4parer un rapport 4crit pour le 7 novembre 1988, 4tant donn4 qu'il est ~ l'ext4rieur du pays et ne sera de retour qu'~ la fin du mois d'octobre 1988; 15. Ii m'est impossible de recruter d'autres experts et j'ai 4t4 inform4 par certains des experts qui ont accept4

95 Affidavit de Neil E. Collishaw, le 21 octobre 1988 i0 de pr4parer un rapport, que le court d41ai de pr4paration allou4 4tait inad4quat; 16. Je sais qu'il y a d'autres experts de grande r~putation dont j'aimerais retenir les services pour agir comme expert, ce que je ne peux faire en raison des courts d41ais d'audition; ET J'AI SIGN~: NEIL E. COLLISHAW NEIL E. COLLISHAW 2O ASSERMENT~ DEVANT MOI, ~ OTTAWA, ce 21i~me jour d'octobre 1988 (S): R. STUART ARCHIBALD Commissaire ~ l'assermentation pour le district d'Ottawa COPIE CONFORME: COTE & OUELLET COTE & OUELLET 3O 40

96 Affidavit de Claude Joyal, le 21 octobre 1988 AFFIDAVIT i0 Je, soussign4, Claude Joyal, avocat, domicili4 et r4sidant au 59, rue Gingras, Repentigny, 4tant d6ment asserment4 sur les Saints ~vangiles, d4clare et dis que: Je suis avocat au Ministate f4d4ral de la Justice et j'ai charge du pr4sent dossier; J'ai lu la requite pour permission d'appeler d'un jugement interlocutoire et tousles faits mentionn4s aux paragraphes 6, 7, 8, 9, i0, ii, 12, 26, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 38, 39, 40, 41, 45 et 46 sont vrais. 20 ET J'AI SIGN~: CLAUDE JOYAL CLAUDE JOYAL 30 ASSERMENT~ DEVANT MOI, ~ MONTREAL, ce 21i~me jour d'octobre 1988 (S): LINDA CARTIER Commissaire ~ l'assermentation pour le district de Montr4al COPIE CONFORME: COTE & OUELLET COTE & OUELLET 4O

97 Avis de pr4sentation, le 21 octobre 1988 AVIS DE PRESENTATION i0 2O Me Simon V. Potter OGILVY, RENAULT 1981, av. McGill College Montr4al, Qu4bec PRENEZ AVIS que la pr4sente requite sera pr4sent4e pour adjudication devant la Cour d'appel du Qu4bec du district de Montr4al, si4geant en division de pratique, le 26 octobre 1988 ~ 10h00 ou aussit~t que Conseil pourra ~tre entendu, au Palais de Justice de Montreal, 1 est, rue Notre-Dame, en la salle 17.07. VEUILLEZ AGIR EN CONSEQUENCE. MONTREAL, ce 21i~me jour d'octobre 1988 (s): COTE & OUELLET COTE & OUELLET Procureurs de l'Intim4 3O COPIE CONFORME C~TE & OUELLET COTE & OUELLET 4O

98 Jugement de la Cour d'Appel, le 30 novembre 1988 JUGEMENT DE LA COUR D'APPEL i0 2O 3O 40 LA COUR, statuant sur un pourvoi ~ l'encontre d'un jugement interlocutoire rendu le 18 octobre 1988 par l'honorable Jean-Jude Chabot de la Cour sup4rieure (district de Montr4al) qui rendait diverses ordonnances sur des requites form4es en vertu des articles 455 et 398 C.p.c. et relatives aux mesures d'instruction d'une requite pour jugement d4claratoire pr4sent4e par l'Intim4e, dat4e le let septembre 1988, et dont les conclusions recherch4es se lisent: ACCUEILLIR la pr4sente requite; D~CLARER que les articles 4, 5, 6 et 8 de la Loi r4glementant les produits du tabac, S.C. 1988 c. 20 sont ultra vires des comp4tences 14gislatives du Parlement du Canada aux termes de la Loi constitutionnelle de 1867; D~CLARER que les articles 4, 5, 6 et 8 de la Loi r4glementant les produits du tabac, S.C. 1988 c. 20, enfreignent l'article 2b) de la Charte canadienne des droits et libert4s, 4tant la Pattie I de la Loi constitutionnelle de 1982; D~CLARER que les articles 4,5, 6 et 8 de la Loi r4@lementant les produits du tabac, S.C. 1988 c. 20 sont inop4rants, nuls et de nul effet; D~CLARER que la Requ4rante et toute personne au Canada ont le droit, ~ moins et jusqu'~ ce que ce jugement ne soit renvers4 ou modifi4, de faire la publicit4 des produits du tabac et d'utiliser toute marque de commerce, enregistr4e ou non, en liaison avec des produits du tabac conform4ment aux Lois applicables, autres que les articles 4, 5, 6 et 8 de la Loi r4glementant les produits du tabac, S.C. 1988 c. 20; LE TOUT AVEC D~PENS. CONSID~RANT l'autorisation de se pourvoir qui a 4t4 accord4e le 2 novembre 1988 par le Juge unique; Apr~s examen du dossier et des affidavits produits, audition et d41ib4r4;

99 Jugement de la Cour d'Appel, le 30 novembre 1988 i0 20 30 40 CONSID~RANT l'affirmation des avocats de la pattie Intim4e ~ l'effet que la date retenue par le Juge de premiere instance pour l'audition, soit le 14 novembre 1988, ne fut pas celle sugg4r4e par eux mais qu'ils avaient plut6t sugg4r4 une date post4rieure vules circonstances particuli~res de l'esp~ce; CONSID~RANT que les avocats du Procureur G4n4ral du Canada ont repr4sent4 qu'il leur 4tait n4cessaire d'obtenir un certain d41ai avant l'audition pour, entre autres, proc4der ~ des interrogatoires pr~liminaires, ~ l'examen de certains documents pertinents et ~ la pr4paration de diverses expertises; CONSID~RANT les circonstances tr~s particuli~res de ce dossier, de la preuve requise et des conclusions recherch4es par la requite pour jugement d4claratoire; Nous sommes d'avis que le calendrier impos4 le 18 octobre 1988 4tait susceptible de causer un pr4judice s4rieux et irr4parable ~ la pattie appelante (Procureur G4n4ral du Canada) en ce qu'il avait pour effet d~ ne pas lui donner l'occasion de pr4senter sa preuve. Toutefois, les 4ch4ances sont maintenant d4pass4es et l'appel a perdu son premier objet. Reste la conclusion qui apparaft ~ l'inscription en appel et qui vise ~ obtenir une ordonnance de cette Cour indiquant au Tribunal de premiere instance de ne fixer l'audition que lorsque le dossier sera pr~t. Cette conclusion ne peut ~tre accord4e parce qu'elle aurait pour effet pratique de traiter la proc4dure utilis4e -une requite- comme s'il s'agisssait d'une action, contrairement au jugement rendu par le Juge de premiere instance le 4 octobre 1988 sur la requite en irrecevabilit4 portant sur cette question pr4cise; elle constituerait aussi en ce moment et en l'esp~ce, une ing4rence non justifi4e dans le r61e que doit exercer le Tribunal de premiere instance quant ~ la conduite du proc~s. CONSID~RANT l'article 455 C.p.c.; PAR CES MOTIFS: ACCUEILLE l'appel; i) Voir Les Entreprises Roger Faucher Inc. c. Banque Royale du Canada, (1985) R.D.J. 263.

i00 Jugement de la Cour d'Appel, le 30 novembre 1988 i0 CASSE les ordonnances du 18 octobre 1988 dont appel; R~F~RE le dossier ~ la Cour sup4rieure du Qu4bec ~ Montr4al pour la fixation d'un nouveau calendrier en vue de l'audition, FRAIS ~ suivre l'issue. GERALD McCARTY MELVIN L. ROTHMAN LOUISE MAILHOT jj. c.a. 20 30 40

i01 Judgment on Applicant's objection to the production of a book written by Dr. Kenneth E. Warner, Selling Smoke, Cigarette Advertising and Public Health, published in October 1986, by the American Public Health Association in Washington, October 23rd, 1989 i0 CAUSES: 500-05-009755-883 C.s.M. 500-05-009760-883 C.s.M. TRANSCRIPT OF THE REASONS FOR JUDGMENT The Court is seized with Applicants' objection to the production of a book written by Dr. Kenneth E. Warner, Selling Smoke, Cigarette Advertising and Public Health, 20 3O 40 published in October, 1986 by the American Public Health Association in Washington. The objection arose in the course of Respondent's cross-examination of one of the Applicants' expert witnesses, Dr. Leonard Reid. In order to fully understand the nature of the objection and the reasons in support of the request for production of the book it is necessary to outline the context in which the objection is made. I - THE CONTEXT A - GENERAL CONTEXT Applicant, RJR-Macdonald Inc., hereinafter "RJR," seeks, by way of motion for declaratory judgment, a decla- ration that the Act to prohibit the advertising and promotion and respecting the labelling and monitoring of tobacco pro- ducts, cited as the "Tobacco Products Control Act," (Statutes of Canada, 1988, Chapter C-20), is outside the legislative authority of the Parliament of Canada and, in addition, that it is inoperative under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms as it infringes on the right of freedom of expres- sion of the tobacco companies to advertise their products. On its part, Imperial Tobacco Ltd., hereinafter "Imperial," by way of a separate motion for declaratory judgment, challenges only the sections 4, 5, 6 and 8 of the Act, based upon the same grounds as those of RJR. In substance the Act purports to ban all forms of advertisement of tobacco products as of January ist, 1989, except for certain transitional measures and some exemptions. The Act also contains limitations on sponsorship of events and use of trademarks in relation to non-tobacco

102 Judgment on Applicant's objection to the production of a book written by Dr. Kenneth E. Warner, Selling Smoke, Cigarette Advertising and Public Health, published in October 1986, by the American Public Health Association in Washington, October 23rd, 1989 i0 20 30 40 products. At the outset of the trial the Court ordered that the two motions be tried at the same time, that the evidence in one be used in the other, and that the two motions be decided on the same evidence. The first aspect of Applicants' challenge of the Act rests on the division of powers, Applicants arguing that the regulation of advertising is a class of subjects which falls within the legilation authority of the provinces under Section 92, paragraph 13 of the Constitution Act, 1867. In response, the Attorney General contends that the Act falls, on the one hand, within the "Peace, Order and Good Government" Clause of Section 91 of the Constitution Act and, on the second hand, within the power of Parliament of Canada to legislate in matters of criminal law. The second ground of Applicants' challenge of the Act is that it infringes their right of freedom of expression, which is guaranteed by Section 2(b) of the Charter. They argue that commercial expression is included in the guarantee of freedom of expression and that a ban on advertising consti- tutes a violation of that freedom. They add that such a violation cannot be justified in a free and democratic society within the meaning a Section 1 of the Charter. In response, Respondent argues firstly that tobacco products are toxic and highly detrimental to health and consequently that the advertising of tobacco products is not an activity which falls within the conduct protected by freedom of expression. Secondly and subsidiarily, in the event that such conduct is considered as being pro- tected, Respondent adds that the limitations imposed upon the tobacco companies can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society. This is the general context within which the issues were joined.

103 Judgment on Applicant's objection to the production of a book written by Dr. Kenneth E. Warner, Selling Smoke, Cigarette Advertising and Public Health, published in October 1986, by the American Public Health Association in Washington, October 23rd, 1989 i0 20 3O 4O B - SPECIFIC CONTEXT Prior to the trial, numerous pre-trial conferences were held with the parties and orders were made for the holding of discoveries and exchange of documents and expert reports between the parties. At the beginning of the trial representatives of the Applicants at first were heard. Followed Dr. Leonard Reid, who was called as an expert witness by the Applicants. Dr. Reid is one of the experts mentioned in Applic- ants' list of experts and his written report was communicated to Respondent before trial. Dr. Reig was heard in chief and filed his report as Exhibit RJR-16. His report deals with mass communication and its effects on consumers, actual or potential. Drawing a distinction between "mature" versus "new" markets, Dr. Reid testified that in mature markets the purposes of advertising was not to stimulate demand of a generic product but rather to promote brand switching and to retain brand loyalty within the generic product. In cross-examination Dr. Reid was asked whether, in his opinion, the Canadian cigarette market was a mature market and his answer was, "yes, it was." He was then asked, what was the basis of his opinion. To which he answered that it was based on a number of sources, i.e. American popular press, newspapers, studies and reports in academic journals and on his general knowledge of marketing and adverti- Sement. He was then requested to name one of the authors he had read in forming his opinion. To what, Dr. Reid volun- teered the name of Dr. Kenneth Warner. Later in cross-examination Dr. Reid was shown a book presumably written by Dr. Warner, titled Seeling Smoke: Cigarette Advertising and Puvlic Heahth, and was asked to read in Court the following extract found at page 61: "Logic and experience: Advertising executives say that market expansion is invariably a purpose of advertising, even for a mature industry, and they note that few advertising experts claim that their trade serves exclusively a

104 Judgment on Applicant's objection to the production of a book written by Dr. Kenneth E. Warner, Selling Smoke, Cigarette Advertising and Public Health, published in October 1986, by the American Public Health Association in Washington, October 23rd, 1989 i0 20 3O market-share function, except in a self- serving case like that of cigarettes. Emerson Foote, former chairman of the board of McCann-Erickson, the world's second largest advertising agency, once responsible for $20 million in cigarette accounts, put it this way: "(T)he cigarette industry has been artfully maintaining that cigarette advertising has nothing to do with total sales ... (T)his is complete and utter nonsense. The industry knows it is nonsense ... I am always amused by the suggestion that advertising, a function that has been shown to increase consumption of viritually every other product, somehow miraculously fails to work for tobacco products." Dr. Reig was asked if he agreed with the proposition so read. He disagreed, he was then asked if market expansion was invariably a purpose of advertising? To what Dr. Reid answered that it depended on the nature of the market, the nature of the products and the nature of predispositions of the targets. It is then that Dr. Reid was asked to file the book; thus the objection. It shoudl be noted that Dr. Reid testified also never having seen the book before. He could only recall by looking at the index to the book, reading one of the articles therein listed and written by Dr. Warner, i.e. the article indicated at footnote 119, titled, Tobacco Industry Response to Public Health Concerns, A content Analysis 40 of Cigarette Ads. The basis of the objection is that Dr. Reid, not having read the book and not recognizing it as authoritative, cannot be cross-examined on it nor asked to comment on opi- nions or statements contained therein, leave alone producing it.

i0 20 30 40 105 Judgment on Applicant's objection to the production of a book written by Dr. Kenneth E. Warner, Selling Smoke, Cigarette Advertising and Public Health, published in October 1986, by the American Public Health Association in Washington, October 23rd, 1989 In answer, Respondent argues that if Applicants did not object to him filing page 61 of the book, he sure could file the whole book. He adds that the witness, having referred to the name of Dr. Warner, it is open to the cross- examiner to ask questions on Dr. Warner and to test the witness' opinions against the opinions of Dr. Warner. At the end of his argument, Respondent added that, this case being a constitutional case, production of the book should be allowed, in any event, as extrinsic evidence. In view of this latter argument, further arguments were heard and counsel for all parties provided the Court with a wealth of authorities on the issues. The very able arguments of counsels on the topic are contained at length in volume 12 and 13 of the transcript, and the Court does not intend to restate them here. In answering the objection the Court will deal at first with the production of Dr. Warner's book in cross- examination. Secondly, the Court will address the question of admissibility of the book as extrinsic evidence. II - USE OF THE BOOK IN CROSS-EXAMINATION AND FILING BY THE WITNESS. In the Court's view it is clear that the use of and the production of Dr. Warner's book in cross- examination of Dr. Reid is improper and inadmissible. Dr. Warner's name came out in Dr. Reid's testimony with refer- ence to the cigarette market in Canada being a mature market. This is found in pages 1517 and 1518 of the transcript. Dr. Reid never read the book, nor does he recognize it as authoritative. Therefore, it is plain that the book cannot be filed neither for the purpose of weakening Dr. Reid's credibility, nor for the purpose of diminishing the probative value of his testimony. Finally, it cannot be used or filed as proof of its content. The authorities cited by counsel for RJR are conclusive in that regard:

106 Judgment on Applicant's objection to the production of a book written by Dr. Kenneth E. Warner, Selling Smoke, Cigarette Advertising and Public Health, published in October 1986, by the American Public Health Association in Washington, October 23rd, 1989 i0 20 30 40 "The oft quoted words of Wigmore that cross-examination is "beyond any doubt the greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth" indicate its great value in the conduct of litigation. Three purposes are generally attributed to cross- examination: (i) To weaken, qualify or destroy the opponent's case; (2) To support the party's own case through the testimony of the opponent's witnesses; (3) To discredit the witness. To accomplish these ends, counsel is given wide latitude and there are accordingly very few restrictions placed on him as tot he questions he asks and the manner in which he asks these questions. Any question which is material to the substantive issues or to the witness' credibility is allowed. It appears that the scope of cross- examination is wide enough to permit questions which suggest facts which cannot be proved by other evidence." (i) That is not to say that any and all questions may be put to a witness in cross-examination. Particularly in the case of an expert witness, cross-examination may extend to the use of treatises or works of other experts in the field but only to the extent that the witness knows of them or recognizes their authority: (i) Lederman & Sopinka, The Law of Evidence in Civil Cases, Butterworth, pp. 496-497

107 Judgment on Applicant's objection to the production of a book written by Dr. Kenneth E. Warner, Selling Smoke, Cigarette Advertising and Public Health, published in October 1986, by the American Public Health Association in Washington, October 23rd, 1989 i0 20 30 40 "Learned treatises may be used in a similar way in cross-examination of the expert to confront him with an authoritative opinion which contradicts the view expressed by him on the stand. By so doing the treatise is not used for the hearsay purpose of proving the truth of the opinion contained therein, but as a means of testing the value of the expert witness' conclusion. It becomes not positive evidence, but as in the case of the cross-examining tool of prior inconsistent statements, it is utilized to challenge the expert's credibility, to test whether the witness has intelligently and competently read and applied what has been authoritatively written on the subject. The witness.can be confronted with such work only if he first recognizes it as authoritative. Harvey C.J. put it this way: 'On cross-examination the Judge should be careful to see that an improper Use is not made of textbooks, practically to give in evidence opinions of absent authors at variance with those of the witness. It is quite apparent that if the witness is asked about a text book and he expresses ignorance of it, or denies its authority, no further use of it can be made by reading extracts from it, for that would be in effect making it evidence, but if he admits its authority, he then in a sense confirms it by his own testimony, and then may be quite properly asked for explanation of any apparent diffences between its

108 Judgment on Applicant's objection to the production of a book written by Dr. Kenneth E. Warner, Selling Smoke, Cigarette Advertising and Public Health, published in October 1986, by the American Public Health Association in Washington, October 23rd, 1989 i0 2O 30 opinion and that stated by him' "(2) The same rule was applied in the case of MIUF-25.(3) In conclusion to this part, Applicants' objection in that regard is sustained. III - ADMISSIBILITY AS EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE A - THE ARGUMENTS Counsel for Respondent argues that the book may nevertheless be produced as extrinsic evidence, being evi- dence in support of a justification under Section 1 of the Charter. He contends that in Charter cases involving the issue of justification under Section 1 of the Charter, the Crown must adduce evidence to satisfy what is referred to as the Oakes (4) test: first he must establish that the limit is "of sufficient importance to warrant overriding a constitionally protected right" and, second, he must meet the proportionality test which is composoed of three ele- ments: (a) the legislative measures must be rationally connected to the objectives; (b) the measures should impair minimally the right, and (c) proportionality between the effects of the measures and the objective of the Act. The thrust of Respondent's contention is that in order to discharge his burden he intends to prove that health is a fundamental value in our society, that the use of tobacco is one of the major preventable causes of death in Canada, that the objective of the Canadian Parliament was to protect the health of Canadians against the seducive and manipulative techniques used in the advertising and marketing of tobacco products and to promote non-smoking, that similar measures have been resorted to in other countries, that 40 (2) ibid., pp. 327-328 (Rex v. Anderson, (1914) 16 D.L.R. 203, Alberta S.C., Appellate Division, Harvey C.J., at pp. 206-207) (3) M.I.U.F.-25, 1988 R.D.J. 497, Hurtubise J. See also: M.I.U.F.-26, 1988 R.D.J. 498 and M.I.U.F.-31, 1988 R.D.J. 509 (4) R. v. Oakes, (1986) 1S.C.R. 103, at p. 139. See also: R. v. Big M. Drug Mart Ltd., (1985) 1S.C.R. 295, at p. 352

109 Judgment on Applicant's objection to the production of a book written by Dr. Kenneth E. Warner, Selling Smoke, Cigarette Advertising and Public Health, published in October 1986, by the American Public Health Association in Washington, October 23rd, 1989 I0 20 30 40 advertising and marketing has a direct effect on the con- sumption of tobacco products, that the measures are part of a program aimed at eliminating the consumption of tobacco products, that the measures are necessary in order to achieve that aim and that the measures will minimally impair the rights of the tobacco companies. He argues that studies, researches and experts' opinions, such as contained in Dr. Warner's book, are admissible of right in constitutional cases to prove the constitutional facts surrounding the legislation. The Applicants do not contest, per se, the use of extrinsic material in constitutional cases, but argue that extrinsic evidence is one which will help a Court to understand the background or the purpose or the object or the intended effect of an Act, which evidence they refer to as legislative facts by opposition to adjudicative facts. However, in their view extrinsic evidence does not comprehend the views of a potential witness on one of the major issues of facts being debated before the Court. Such experts' opinions should be made by the testimony at Court of the expert, who could then be cross-examined at length and not by the filing of an unsworn book. B - DISCUSSION I~ the Court's view, the real issue is not whether so-called extrinsic evidence is admissible in constitutional cases or not, but rather what evidence is admissible, when and under what conditions. In the Court's view many of the concepts and notions advanced in dealing with matters of so-called extrinsic evidence are needlessly confusing and lead to the kind of argument that the Court has to decide today. In that regard the Court shall deal with the con- cept of "adjudicative" versus "legislative" facts, with the concept of "Brandeis' briefs" and, finally, with the concept of "extrinsic evidence" itself in relation to its admissibility at trial level. (i) Concept of "adjudicative" versus "legislative" facts

ii0 Judgment on Applicant's objection to the production of a book written by Dr. Kenneth E. Warner, Selling Smoke, Cigarette Advertising and Public Health, published in October 1986, by the American Public Health Association in Washington, October 23rd, 1989 i0 20 3O 40 That concept was developed by Professor Kenneth Culp Davis in an article published in 1942. The article is called, "An approach to Problems of Evidence in the Administrative Process." The article deals, it should be stressed, with problems of evidence in administrative matters in the U.S. The concept is stated as follows: "When an agency finds facts concerning immediate parties -- what the parties did, what the circumstances were, what the background conditions were -- the agency is performing an adjudicative function and the facts may conveniently be called adjudicative facts. When an agency wrestles with a question of law or policy, it is acting legislatively, just as judges have created the common law through judicial legislation, and the facts which inform its legislative judgment may conveniently be denominated legislative facts. The distinction is important; the traditional rules of evidence are designed for adjudicative f~,cts, and unnecessary confusion results from attempting to apply the traditional rules to legislative facts. The Courts have generally treated legislative facts differently from adjudicative facts, even though the distinction has not been clearly articulated and explanations have been beclouded by an erroneous use of the concept of judicial notice. The distinction between legislative and adjudicative facts apparently has been clearly recognized only in constitutional cases, in which a category of "constitutional facts" has emerged. Often referred to as, "social and economic data", constitutional facts are those which assist a court in forming a judgment on a question of

iii Judgment on Applicant's objection to the production of a book written by Dr. Kenneth E. Warner, Selling Smoke, Cigarette Advertising and Public Health, published in October 1986, by the American Public Health Association in Washington, October 23rd, 1989 I0 20 30 40 constitutional law." (5) With respect, in the Court's view, such a concept is confusing and useless. Confusing in the sense that, semantically, facts cannot be adjudicative nor legislative. Facts are facts, they do not legislate nor adjudicate. Legislators legislate, Courts adjudicate. Confusing and, at the very least, questionable in Canadian law the notion that Courts legislate when they, to use the words of Pro- fessor Davis, "wrestle with a question of law or policy" Even when it decides on the question of justification under Section 1 of the Charter, the Court does not assess the opportunity of a political decision, it assesses the reason- ableness under light of the rights and values guaranteed by the Charter, of the grounds behind the legislation and the effect of that legislation. The Charter is the supreme law of Canada and it overrides any other laws in Canada. In Charter cases the Courts do not create law, they apply and they interpret the law as it is. There are borderline cases, indeed, maybe, such as abortion, but in the final analysis, the judicial decision always revolves around the question as to whether or not the Charter recognizes a right or a freedom, the extent of that recognition and whether or not a legislation mea- sure infringes upon that right or freedom. If indeed the measure infringes upon a right, the Court will determine if such infringement prescribed by law can be under Section 1 demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society. As pointed out by Mr. Justice Lamer in the Motor Vehicle Reference: "In neither case, be it before or after the Charter, have the Courts been enabled to decide upon the appropriateness of policies underlying (5) Kenneth Culp Davis, An approach to problems of evidence in the administrative process, (1941-42) 55 Harvard Law Review, 364, at pp. 402-403

112 Judgment on Applicant's objection to the production of a book written by Dr- Kenneth E. Warner, Selling Smoke, Cigarette Advertising and Public Health, published in October 1986, by the American Public Health Association in Washington, October 23rd, 1989 i0 20 3O 40 legislative enactments. In both instances, however, the Courts are empowered, indeed required, to measure the content of legislation against the guarantees of the Constitution. The word of Dixon J., (as he then was) in Amax Potash Ltd. v. Government of Saskatchewan, (1977) 2 S.C.R., 576 at p. 590, continue to govern: 'The Courts will not question the wisdom of enactments ... but it is the high duty of this Court to ensure that the legislatures do not transgress the limits of their constitutional mandate and engage in the illegal exercise of power'." (6) To the same effect the case of Public Service Alliance of Canada v. Manitoba: "In my opinion, courts must exercise considerable caution when confronted with difficult questions of economic policy. It is not our judicial role to assess the effectiveness or wisdom of various government strategies for solving pressin economic problems(...) The role of the judiciary in such situation lies primarily in ensuring that the selected legislative strategy is fairly implemented with a little interference as is reasonably possible with the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Charter."(7) (6) (7) Motor Vehicle Reference, (1985) 2 S.C.R. 486, at pp. 496-497 Public Service Aliance of Canada v. A.G. Manitoba, S.C.C., 89/4/9. Dickson C.J., at pp. 13-14

113 Judgment on Applicant's objection to the production of a book written by Dr. Kenneth E. Warner, Selling Smoke, Cigarette Advertising and Public Health, published in October 1986, by the American Public Health Association in Washington, October 23rd, 1989 i0 20 3O 40 Confusing and useless also the concept of legislative versus adjudicative facts because it is closely related to the American experience of the American constitution. And the American constitution does not have such a provision as our Section 1 of the Charter. The rational basis test applied in U.S. constitutional cases is not the same test as that of our Section 1 of the Charter. Useless also in the sense that all facts that are necessary and relevant to the question in issue must be proved and all the facts that are legally before the Court will be assessed in the judgment process. If the facts that have to be established consist of a violation of a right guaranteed by the Charter, that fact must be proved to the satisfaction of the Court and the Court will adjudicate upon it. A justification under Section 1 is no more than a series of facts that indicate the background, the object, the purpose or the effect of the measures adopted by a given legislation. It is not the qualification of the fact as being legislative that will make that fact more or less provable. Even if the proof of facts behind a justification under Section 1 may, in some instances, be difficult as it involves social or economic data, it does not matter. Such facts must still be proved in the best manner possible and on a balance of probabilities: "The standard of proof under s. 1 is the civil standard, namely, proof by a preponderance of probability. The alternative criminal standard, proof beyond a reasonable doubt, would, in my view, be unduly onerous on the party seeking to limit. Concepts such as "reasonableness," "justifiability" and "free and democratic society" are simply not amenable to such a standard. Nevertheless, the preponderance of probability test must be applied rigorously. Indeed, the phrase, "demonstrably justified," in s. 1 of the Charter supports this conclusion.

i0 20 30 40 114 Judgment on Applicant's objection to the production of a book written by Dr. Kenneth E. Warner, Selling Smoke, Cigarette Advertising and Public Health, published in October 1986, by the American Public Health Association in Washinqton, October 23rd, 1989 Within the broad category of the civil standard, there exist different degrees of probability, depending on the nature of the case (...) Having regard to the fact that s. 1 is being invoked for the purpose of justifying a violation of the constituional rights and freedoms the Charter was designed to protect, a very high degree of probability will be, in the words of Lord Denning, "commensurate with the occasion." Where evidence is required in order to prove the constituent elements of a So 1 inquiry, and this will generally be the case, it should be cogent and persuasive and make clear to the Court the consequences of imposing or not imposing the limit."(8) As pointed out by the Honourable Chief Justice, the standard of proof under Section 1 is the civil standard and evidence has to be cogent and persuasive. Therefore, such facts having to be proved, they must be introduced in evidence as any other fact. Thus, inaccurate and mislead- ing in Canadian constitutional law the statement that proof of so-called legislative facts does not require the same strictness of proof as so-called adjudicative facts. The reference to legislative facts as opposed to adjudicative facts is of no value in determining the admis- sibility of a given piece of evidence since such material will still have to be measured in reference to its relevancy with the issue, its reliability and its general admissibility under the civil rules of evidence as will be discussed later in Section 4. In the Court's view, at least at the first instance level, the concept of legislative facts should be banned (8) R. v. Oakes, supra note 4, pp. 137-138

115 Judgment on Applicant's objection to the production of a book written by Dr. Kenneth E. Warner, Selling Smoke, Cigarette Advertising and Public Health, published in October 1986, by the American Public Health Association in Washington, October 23rd, 1989 i0 2O 30 40 constitutional Canadian Law and should not be used as some mysterious password to some magical kingdom of constitutional evidence. (2) Brandeis briefs Brandeis briefs are closely associated with the concept of "adjudicative" versus "legislative" facts. Their use is justified in the United States as being an extension of the doctrine of judicial notice. Even though, as was seen earlier, Professor Davis criticizes such extension of the judicial notice: "The Brandeis brief is a tool used by United States courts to bring social science materials to the attention of the court. Such a brief puts before the court legislative facts of the broadest nature, which are not in the form of sworn testimony and which are not subject to cross-examination. The brief was first used in the case of Muller v. Oregon (1908, 28 S. Ct. 324) and represents a substantial relaxation of the limits of judicial notice of findings of legislative fact ... The Brandeis briefs is used for two (2) purposes: first, "to establish the alleged facts by the court taking judicial notice of them"; and second, "to demonstrate (pursuant to the American test) that a body of information exists from which legislators could conclude that the impugned statute is desirable." There are two justifications for such use. First, it is often the only realistic "way to inform the Court of (a wide) range of professional opinion (or practice) on a particular point of social science. (While) expert opinion

116 Judgment on Applicant's objection to the production of a book written by Dr. Kenneth E. Warner, Selling Smoke, Cigarette Advertising and Public Health, published in October 1986, by the American Public Health Association in Washington, October 23rd, 1989 i0 20 30 40 evidence could be adduced ... on many topics no one expert or group of experts could easily canvass the entire range of professional opinion." To do so by ordinary means would be both time- consuming and expensive. The second justifiction relates to the nature of judicial review in constitutional cases. The adoption of either the rational basis test as in the United States, or the section 1 test, as suggested earlier, does not require the same strictness of proof that accompanies issues of adjudicative fact" (9) As can be seen from this citation, there is already controversy between the father of the legislative facts who questions the resort to the judicial notice doctrine to justify the admissibility of legislative facts and the disciples of Brandeis briefs to justify the admissibility of legislative facts through judicial notice. Brandeis briefs, it must be remembered, were developed initially for use in the Supreme Court of the United States for consti- tutional cases. Conceptually, at least, there is a differ- ence between Davis' legislative facts and legislative facts behind Brandeis briefs. Davis' theory is directed to admi- nistrative agencies and is based on the premise that adminis- trative agencies are not adjudicating, i.e. acting judicially, when they deal with legislative facts, but instead they are legislating, ie. exerting a legislative judgement. Indeed, if the agency is not acting in a judicial capacity when informing itself of the legislative facts, why bother with the judicial rules of evidence? "Through adjudication administrative agencies create law and determine policy as well as make findings which concern (9) Yves L.J. Fricot, The Challenge of legislation by means of the Charter; Evidentiary Issues, (1984) 16 Ottawa Law Review 565, at pp. 593-594

117 Judgment on Applicant's objection to the production of a book written by Dr. Kenneth E. Warner, Selling Smoke, Cigarette Advertising and Public Health, published in October 1986, by the American Public Health Association in Washington, October 23rd, 1989 i0 20 3O 40 only the parties to a specific case. Creation of law and determination of policy usually do not rest upon uninformed a priori judgements having only an ethical or a logical basis. Frequently agencies' choices of law or policy must depend on fact-finding. But the fact-finding process for such purposes is different from the process of finding facts which concern only the parties to a particular case and calls for different rules of evidence." (i0) So, in dealing with the justification of Brandeis briefs, one should be cautious not to mingle the so-called legislation facts, those of Professor Davis and those used in Brandeis briefs. Be that as it may, the expression Brandeis brief means nothing per se. It is used to describe certain pieces of material which are submitted en bloc as unsworn testimony and not subject to cross-examination. It is the content of such briefs which is mind-boggling. The material ranges from statistical data, legislative practice, governmental reports, polls and surveys to Royal enquiries, numerous materials ~ollected from libraries, analytical reports, analytcal and scholarly works by private groups, argumentative scholar or expert writings, sociological reports, psychologic- al reports, economic reports and so on and so on. Most, if not all that material, is hearsay -- at times double, triple if not quadruple hearsay. The material may or may not be controversial, may or may not present hypothesis as facts, may or may not omit material contrary to one party's position. Brandeis briefs are no more than some kind of Pandora's box which is dumped on the Court's lap for the giving. The Cour is then expected to roam about through such material and retain in its own wisdom out of a mass of ifs, buts and maybes, that piece of evidence which may support the position of the party submitting the brief. (i0) Supra, note 5, p. 402

118 Judgment on Applicant's objection to the production of a book written by Dr. Kenneth E. Warner, Selling Smoke, Cigarette Advertising and Public Health, published in October 1986, by the American Public Health Association in Washington, October 23rd, 1989 i0 20 30 4O Even in the United States, there are criticisms against some Brandeis briefs. One example is the case of Witherspoon v. The State of Illinois (which is reported at (1968) 391U.S. 510), where the Court was dealing with the issue of an Illinois statute that provided for the ex- clusion of jurors having scruples against death penalty. "The Court reviewed the social science material which purported to show that death-qualified jurors were partial to the prosecution on the issue of guilt or innocence. Mr. Justice Stewart, in speaking for the Court, took note of the academic papers which were filed in the case and declared that the date was too tentative and fragmentary to establish that jurors not opposed to the death penalty tended to favor the prosecution in the determination of guilt. The Court also noted that the materials that were put before them contained terms and techniques which were clearly unsa- tisfactory. The Court stated: 'We can only speculate ... as to the precise meaning of the terms used in those studies, the accuracyof the techniques employed, and the validity of the generalizations made' " (ii) With respect, while it may in some instances be necessary at the appeal level to resort to Brandeis brief type of materials, it is the Court's view that such briefs are inadmissible, per se, en bloc in the first instance. Such briefs are unsworn testimony, they are not subject to cross-examination, they have no definite content and they are based on the American theory of legislative facts. Again, the legislative facts are used in the U.S. in (ii) Morris Manning, Proof of facts in constitutional cases, 1986-87 Charter Cases, Proceedings of the Canadian Bar Association, Chapter i0, p. 311

119 Judgment on Applicant's objection to the production of a book written by Dr. Kenneth E. Warner, Selling Smoke, Cigarette Advertising and Public Health, published in October 1986, by the American Public Health Association in Washington, October 23rd, 1989 i0 2O 30 40 establishing the rational basis test which does not require the same strictness of proof in the U.S. as that required in Canada and Section 1 of the Charter. A justification under Section 1 requires, as per the words of the Honorable Chief Justice, "cogent and persuasive evidence" That is, "a high degree of probability". That is not to say that any of the material found in Brandeis briefs may not be put in evidence but that it should be put in evidence piece by piece either by consent of the parties, by admission, through judicial notice where appropriate, or through the ordinary rules of evidence as the Court will discuss later: "Litigants may be tempted to present economic, political or sociological evidence to the Court in "Brandeis brief" form as is often done in the United States in constitutional cases, and which was done in Canadian constitutional references even prior to the Charter. See Reference re Residential Tenancies Act, (1981) 1 S.C.R. 714; Reference re Amendment of Constitutional of Canada NOS. I, 2 and 3), (1981) 1S.C.R. 753; Reference re Anti-inflation Act, (1976). 2 S.C.R. 373. It is questional whether the procedure used on a reference in Canada is acceptable in concrete cases in a trial situation. It is submitted that expert evidence should be tested by cross-examination as to the validity of the underlying assumptions used and conclusions reached. A trial Judge would then be able to reach a more informed decision about the matter than where instantly heanded two conflicting uncross-examined upon reports ..."(12) (12) Neil Finkelstein, Laskin's Canadian Constitutional Law, 5th Edition, Vol. 2, p. 1008

120 Judgment on Applicant's objection to the production of a book written by Dr. Kenneth E. Warner, Selling Smoke, Cigarette Advertising and Public Health, published in October 1986, by the American Public Health Association in Washington, October 23rd, 1989 i0 20 30 40 (3) Extrinsic evidence Extrinsic evidence is described by Professors Charles, Cromwell and Jobson as follows: "Defined very broadly, extrinsic evidence can include any material external to the statute being interpreted. This would include such items as prior version of the same statute or other statutes in "pari materia." Usually, however, the term is used to describe materials relating in some way to the legislative process leading to enactment. When closely related to the actual parliamentary activities, material is often referred to as part of the legislative history. Such material could include statements made by the Minister introducing the Bill upon second reading in the House, statements by others members of Parliament in the House and Reports of Parliamentary Committees with respect to the proposed legislation. Pre-enactment reports of Law Reform Commissions, Royal Commissions or other special committees also fall within the Extrinsic Evidence category but are not as closely connected to the actual legislative process. Statements about the proposed legislation made by ministers, other government officials and members of Parliament outside the House are sometimes referred to by counsel and represent a form of extrinsic evidence, as are government pamphlets explaining the legislation. All of this evidence relates to the proposed legislation, but is technically not considered part of the legislative history." (13) (13) William Charles, Thomas Cromwell and Keith Jobson, Evi- dence and the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Butter- worth, 1989, p. 75

121 Judgment on Applicant's objection to the production of a book written by Dr. Kenneth E. Warner, Selling Smoke, Cigarette Advertising and Public Health, published in October 1986, by the American Public Health Association in Washington, October 23rd, 1989 i0 3O 4O The expression "extrinsic evidence" has been extend- ed to cover a number of other documents, including scholar writings, analysis, expert reports, governmental and private briefs, scientific and social researches, etc. The material considered by the Supreme Court in Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec, (14) is a buoyant example of the diversity of material filed as extrinsic evidence. There are no general rules established and, as stated by Mr. Justice Laskin, there should not be any principles laid down concerning the admissibility of such evidence: "... no general principle of admissibility or inadmissibility can or ought to be propounded by this Court, and ... the questions of resort to extrinsic evidence and what kind of extrinsic evidence may be admitted must depend on the constitutional issues on which it is sought to adduce such evidence". (15) The basis for the admission of extrinsic material is not obvious. Sometimes the Court resorts to the doctrine of judicial notice (16); which is described as follows: "Judicial notice, it has been said, is the acceptance by a Court or judicial tribunal, without the requirement of proof, of the truth of a particular fact or state of affairs that is of such general or common knowledge in the community that proof of it can be dispensed with. The doctrine is thus said to be an exception to the general rate that a Judge or jury may consider only evidence which has been tendered in Court and may not act on personal knowledge ... As Lord Summer put it in Commonwealth Shipping Representative v. Peninsular and Oriental Branch Service, (1923), A.C. 191 at page 211: (14) (15) (16) Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec, (1989) 1 S.C.R. 927 Anti-Inflation Reference, (1976) 2 S.C.R. 373, Laskin C.J.p. 389 id., p. 389; Ford v. Qubec (1988) 2 S.C.R. 712, at p. 777; R. v. Bonin, unreported, B.C.C.A., 1989/1/31, Hutcheon J., at pp. 40 to 45 of 47

122 Judgment on Applicant's objection to the production of a book written by Dr. Kenneth E. Warner, Selling Smoke, Cigarette Advertising and Public Health, published in October 1986, by the American Public Health Association in Washington, October 23rd, 1989 i0 20 3O ' ... to require that a judge should affect a cloistered aloofness from facts that every other man in Court is fully aware of, and should insist on having proof on oath of what, as a man of the world, he knows already better than any witness can tell him, is a rule that may easily become pedantic and futile.' Thus it has been held that, gener- ally speaking, a Court may properly take judicial notice of any fact or matter which is so generally known and questioned, or any fact or matter which can readily be determined or verified by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot be personally questioned". (17) Through judicial notice, the Court may take notice of an historical fact, consult historical works or documents or be referred to them, take notice of an opinion which rest on hearsay, even of an evidential fact or of a fact in issue. (18) Sometimes the Court will admit extrinsic evidence out of necessity because the evidence was not adduced at first instance and because constitutional issues cannot be decided in a vacuum. References are the most obvious situations and in these situations, the material is received under reserve of their relevancy and of their weight. (19) The reason given by Mr. Justice Dickson for the admissibility 40 (17) (18) (19) R. v. Potts, (1982) 66 C.C.C. (2d) 219, Ont. C.A., at pp. 225-226. Leave to appeal to the Supreme Court refused, 82/5/17. R. v. Zundel, (1987) 58 O.R. (2d) 129, Ont. C.A., at pp. 182-183. Leave to appeal to the Supreme Court refused, 87/6/4. supra, note 15, p. 387

123 Judgment on Applicant's objection to the production of a book written by Dr. Kenneth E. Warner, Selling Smoke, Cigarette Advertising and Public Health, published in October 1986, by the American Public Health Association in Washington, October 23rd, 1989 i0 20 30 40 of such material is that in constitutional references, the Court should not deny itself of any material that may be logically relevant and highly probative to the issues: "We should be loathe, it seems to me, to enunciate any inflexible rule governing the admissibility of extrinsic materials in constitutional references. The effect of such a rule might well be to exclude logically relevant and highly probative evidence, it is preferable, I think, to follow the practice adopted in the Anti-Inflation Reference and give timely directions establishing the evidence or extraneous materials to be admitted to serve the ends of the Court in a particular reference. Generally speaking, for the purpose of constitutional characterization of an act, we should not deny ourselves such assistance as Royal Commission reports or Law Reform Commission reports underlying and forming the basis of the legislation under study, may afford. The weight to be given such report is, of course, an entirely different matter A constitutional reference is not a barren exercise in statutory interpretation. What is involved is an attempt to determine and give effect to the broad objectives and purpose of the Constitution, viewed as a "living tree", in the expressive words of Lord Sankey In Edwards and others v. Attorney- General for Canada. Material relevant to the issues before the Court, and not inherently unreliable or offending against public policy should be admissible, subject to the proviso that such extrinsic materials are not available for the purpose of aiding in

124 Judgment on Applicant's objection to the production of a book written by Dr. Kenneth E. Warner, Selling Smoke, Cigarette Advertising and Public Health, published in October 1986, by the American Public Health Association in Washington, October 23rd, 1989 i0 20 30 40 statutory construction". (20) These often cited words of Mr. Justice Dickson should not, however, be taken out of their context. The fact that Mr. Justice Dickson refers three times to the context of constitutional references in this extract makes it clear that the rule laid down is directed at constitu- tional references and like cases. It is the Court's opinion that this rule should not be blindly extended tot rials at first instance. 4) Admissibility of extrinsic evidence at first instance. With respect, it is the Court's opinion that evidence in constitutional cases at first instance, either intrinsic or so-called extrinsic evidence, should be dealt with accord- ing to the normal rules of evidence. In the Court's view, there is no need to resort to the American concepts of Brandeis brief or legislative facts. These concepts merely confuse the evidentiary issues and are useless in solving them. As pointed out by the Honourable Mr. Justice Lamer in the Motor Vehicle Reference, while discussing the "substantive" versus "procedural" content of the expression "principles of fundemantal justice," it would be a disservice to the Canadian constitution to allow the American debate to define the issues in Canada: "The substantive/procedural dichotomy narrows the issue almost to an all or nothing proposition. Moreover, it is largely bound up in the American experience with substantive or proce- dural due process. It imports into the Canadian context American concepts, terminology and jurisprudence, all of (20 Residential Tenancies Reference, pp. 722-723 (1981) 1S.C.R. 714,

125 Judgment on Applicant's objection to the production of a book written by Dr. Kenneth E. Warner, Selling Smoke, Cigarette Advertising and Public Health, published in October 1986, by the American Public Health Association in Washington, October 23rd, 1989 i0 20 30 40 which are inextricably linked to the problems concerning the nature and legitimacy of the adjudication under the U.S. Constitution. That constitution, it must be remembered, has no Section 52 nor has it the internal checks and balances of ss. 1 and 33. We would, in my view, do our Constitution a dis- service to simply allow the American debate to define the issue for us, all the while ignoring the truly fundamental structural differences between the two constitutions. Finally, the dichotomy creates its own set of difficulties by the attempt to distinguish between two concepts whose outer boundaries are not always clear and often tend to overlap. Such difficulties can and should when possible, be avoided" (21) The same holds true for evidentiary matters in constitutional cases in Canada. It must be remembered that the Charter was not intended to turn the Canadian legal system upside down as was pointed out by Mr. Justice McIntyre in the Mills case. "The absence of jurisdictional pro- visions and direction in the Charter confirms the view that the Charter was not intended to turn the Canadian legal system upside down. What is required rather is that it be fitted into the existing scheme of Canadian legal procedure. There is no need for special procedures and rules to give it full and adequate effect". (22). (21) Supra, note 6, p. 498 (22) Mills v. R., (1986) 1 S.C.R. 863, at p. 953

I0 20 30 40 126 Judgment on Applicant's objection to the production of a book written by Dr. Kenneth E. Warner, Selling Smoke, Cigarette Advertising and Public Health, published in October 1986, by the American Public Health Association in Washington, October 23rd, 1989 In the Court's opinion, the Canadian legal system and particularly the Canadian Law of Evidence as developed over the years by the Courts, is perfectly apt to solve the evidentiary issues raised in constitutional cases at first instance by resorting to the normal rules of evidence and by refining them to the occasion if need be. The basic rules of evidence, i.e. relevancy, hearsay, best evidence and judicial notice are the key to solving problems of evi- dence in constitutional cases at first instance. The first basic rule of evidence is that all rele- vant evidence is admissible evidence: "A general principle of evidence is that all relevant evidence is admissible. The law of evidence, however, reposes on a few general principles riddled by innumerable exceptions. Two major exceptions to this general principle are hearsay evidence and opinion evidence. There are also exceptions to the exceptions: "expert witnesses may testify to their opinion on matters involving their expertise," (Cross on Evidence, 5th Ed. (1979), p. 20) and may also, incidentally, base their opinions upon hearsay" (23) The first step, then, is to determine the relevancy. What are the issues at trial? Is the material sought to be adduced relevant to the issues? For what purpose is the evidence sought to be adduced? In a constitutional case where a Section 1 justifi- cation is at issue, it may well be necessary to examine the background, the operation, the object, the purpose or the effect of the legislation. Any material that is directed to these issues will be relevant and admissible unless it falls into one of the exceptions to the relevancy rule or (23) R. v. Abbey, (1982) 68 C.C.C. (2d) 394, Dickson C.J. at p. 408

127 Judgment on Applicant's objection to the production of a book written by Dr. Kenneth E. Warner, Selling Smoke, Cigarette Advertising and Public Health, published in October 1986, by the American Public Health Association in Washington, October 23rd, 1989 is otherwise excluded. Once admitted into evidence, it will be weighed by the Court in reacing its decision. i0 As pointed out by the Honourable Chief Justice, one of the exceptions to the relevancy rule is the hearsay rule which is in its turn also riddled by innumerable except- ions. Many of the so-called extrinsic documents can be delt with adequately with the hearsay rule and its exceptions. As a fundamental rule, when the document in question is hearsay, it should be excluded unless it falls into one of the exception to the hearsay rule. And these exceptions are mostly based on the notions of necessity and trust- worthiness. As an example, the Ontario Court of Appeal admitted evidence of an expert witness based primarily on documentary material which was hearsay to prove the existence of the Holocaust as an exception to the hearsay rule: 2O 3O "The Courts have in the past been willing to expand the hearsay exceptions when the evidence sought to be introduced has met the conditions of necessity and trustworthiness. In Ares v. rennet, (1970), 14 D.L.R. 3d 4, (1970~ ~.C.R. 608, 73 W.W.R~ 347, Supreme Court of Canada held that hospital records, including nurses' notes, made by someone having a personal knowledge of the matters then being recorded and under a duty to make the entry or record should be received in evidence as prima facie proof of the facts stated therein. Mr. Justice Hall, speaking for the Supreme Court of Canada said at p. 14 D.L.R., p. 622 S.C.R.: 4O 'The question has not been free from doubt. The need for a restatement of the hearsay rule has long been ac- knowledged, but differences of opinions exist as to how the change should come about.'

128 Judgment on Applicant's objection to the production of a book written by Dr. Kenneth E. Warner, Selling Smoke, Cigarette Advertising and Public Health, published in October 1986, by the American Public Health Association in Washington, October 23rd, 1989 i0 20 30 40 Mr. Justice Hall adopted the mino- rity view of Lord Donovan and Lord Pearce in Myers v. Director of Public Prosecutions, in (1965), A.C. i001, and quoted with approval passages from the speeches of Lord Donovan and Lord Pearce. He said at p. 15, D.L.R., and pp. 623-625 S.C.R.: "Lord Donavan presented the case for extension of the rule by judicial decision in these words (at. p~ 1047): I am aware that your Lordships view these consequences with uneasiness. Nevertheless it was urged on behalf of the appellant that this house is powerless to prevent them. The argument is that the records themselves are hearsay; that legislation would be required to make them admissible evidence; that the admission of this evidence would have to be hedged around with safeguards lest un- trustworthy evidence comes in the same door; and that all this is the province of Parliament. My Lord, I feel the force of the argument but I remain unconvinced. The common law is moulded by the judges and it is still their province to adapt it from time to time so as to make it serve the interests of those it binds. Particularly is this so in the field of procedural law. Here the question posed is: - 'Shall the Courts admit as evidence of a

129 Judgment on Applicant's objection to the production of a book written by Dr. Kenneth E. Warner, Selling Smoke, Cigarette Advertising and Public Health, published in October 1986, by the American Public Health Association in Washington, October 23rd, 1989 i0 particular fact authentic and reliable records by which alone the fact may be satisfactorily proved?' I think the Courts themselves are able to give an affirmative answer to that question.' He was supported by Lord Pearce who said (at pp. 1040-i042): 20 3O 40 'I find it impossible to accept that there is any 'dan- gerous uncertainty' caused by obvious and sensible improvements in the means by which the Court arrives at the truth. One is entitled to choose between the individual conflicting obiter dicta of two great judges and I prefer that of Jessel M.R. His dictum was as follows, 1 P.D. 154, 241: 'Now I take it the principle which underlies all these exceptions is the same. In the first place the case must be one in which it is difficult to obtain other evidence, for no doubt the ground for admitting the exceptions was that very difficulty. In the next place the declarant must be disinterested; that is, disinterested in the sense that the declaration was not made in favour of his interest. And, thirdly, the declaration must be made before dispute or litigation, so that it was made without

130 Judgment on Applicant's objection to the production of a book written by Dr. Kenneth E. Warner, Selling Smoke, Cigarette Advertising and Public Health, published in October 1986, by the American Public Health Association in Washington, October 23rd, 1989 i0 2O 3O 40 bias on account of the evidence of a dispute or liti- gation which the declarant might be supposed to favour. Lastly, and this appears to me one of the strongest reasons for admitting it, the declarant must have had peculiar means of knowledge not possessed in ordinary cases.' On that expression of principle he admitted the extension which has been acted on ever since in the Probate Division. 'That, I respectfully think, is the correct method of approach, par- ticularly to a problem that deals with the Court's method of ascertaining truth. As new situations arise it adapts its practice to deal with the situation in accordance with the basic and established principles which lie beneath the practice. To exalt the practice above the principle would be a surrender to formalism. Since this branch of the law is so untidy, there is but little appeal in the 'demon of formalism which tempts the intellect with the lure of scientific order'." In our view, the expert opinion of Dr. Hillberg, even though primarily based on the documentary material described by him, which was hearsay, was admissible to prove the existence of the Holocaust".(24) (24) R. v. Zundel, (1987) 31 C.C.C. (3d) 97, Ont. C.A., per curiam, at pp 145-146. Leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada refused 87/6/4.

131 Judgment on Applicant's objection to the production of a book written by Dr. Kenneth E. Warner, Selling Smoke, Cigarette Advertising and Public Health, published in October 1986, by the American Public Health Association in Washington, October 23rd, 1989 i0 20 30 40 Again, many of the so-called extrinsic documents may fall within the exceptions of necessity and trustworthi- ness. Statistical date would be one example where it would be extremely difficult to collect the data from all sources and where, at the same time, it would offer sufficien assur- ances of trustworthiness. Also, not all statements contained in material are necessary hearsay. It all depends on the purpose for which the material is advanced: "The main concern of the hearsay rule is the veracity of the statements made. The principal justifiction for the exclusion of hearsay evidence is the abhorrence of the common law to proof which is unsworn and has not been subjected to the trial by fire of cross- examination. Testimony under oath, and cross-examination, have been considered to be the best assurances of the truth of the statements of facts presented. Not all statements by a witness of that which he heard someone else say are, necessarily hearsay. A felicitous formulation of the distinction between hearsay and non-hearsay evidence is found in the Privy Council decision in Subramaniam v. Public Prosecutor, (1956), I W.L.R. 965 at p. 970: "Evidence of a statement made to a witness by a person who is not himself called as a witness may or may not be hearsay. It is hearsay and inadmissible when the object of the evidence is to establish the truth of what is contained in the statement. It is not hearsay and is admissible when it is proposed to establish by the evidence, not the truth of the statement, but the fact that it was made.'

132 Judgment on Applicant's objection to the production of a book written by Dr. Kenneth E. Warner, Selling Smoke, Cigarette Advertising and Public Health, published in October 1986, by the American Public Health Association in Washington, October 23rd, 1989 i0 20 30 40 What is sometimes loosely and erroneously referred to as hearsay evidence may in fact be "original evidence" as Cross terms it (Cross on Evidence, 5th Ed. (1979), p. 8, emphasis added): 'When a witness is asked to narrate another's statement for some purpose other than that of inducing the Court to accept it as true, his evidence is said to be "original". Original evidence may therefore be defined as evidence of the fact that a statement was made, tendered without the reference to the truth of anything alleged in the statement' " (25) An example of such original evidence in the context of constitutional litigation, where relevant, would be Royal Commission Reports or Law Reform Commission Reports under- lining and forming the basis of the impugned legislation; they are not filed then for the purpose of aiding in statutory construction, but for the purpose of outlining the social and economic conditions under which the Act was enacted. (26) Another example is foreign legislation similar to the impugned legislation: "I acknowledge the assistance of counsel in supplying a very complete record of the legislative history of s. 281.2, of the state of the law in other countries, and of Canada's international (25) (26) Supra, note 23, at pp. 408-409 Supra, note 20, p. 723

133 Judgment on Applicant's objection to the production of a book written by Dr. Kenneth E. Warner, Selling Smoke, Cigarette Advertising and Public Health, published in October 1986, by the American Public Health Association in Washington, October 23rd, 1989 i0 2O 30 40 commitments. Mr. McKillop did argue that foreign law must be proven by expert testimony. With respect, that rule applies only when the Court seeks to discover foreign law in order to apply it. In the Charter context, these materials are most often offered for the analysis of principles contained in the judgments, and not for a statement of foreign law. In this respect, they have the same status before us as academic opinion. Sometimes, they are offered as an indication of what other societies are doing, in support of an argument about what is appropriate for a free and democratic society. As such, they are always secondary materials and need not be subject to the evidentiary rule relied upon. This does not, of course, prevent the calling or expert evidence if thought appropriate." (27) Another help in admitting so-called extrinsic docu- ments is the resort to judicial notice as was done in Potts, in Bonin and in Zundel, all cited earlier. Finally, another help in determining whether the evidence is admissible is the best evidence rule, although this rule may prove difficult to apply a priori in constitu- tional cases: "Where the basis for its legislation is not obvious, the government must bring forward cogent and persuasive evidence demonstrating the provisions in issue are justified having regard to the constituent elements of the s. 1 or of s. 9.1 inquiry, (see R. v. Oakes ...). (27 R.v. Kee@stra, (1988) 5 W.W.R. 211, Alberta C.A., at pp. 225-226

134 Judgment on Applicant's objection to the production of a book written by Dr. Kenneth E. Warner, Selling Smoke, Cigarette Advertising and Public Health, published in October 1986, by the American Public Health Association in Washington, October 23rd, 1989 i0 20 3O 4O In showing that the legislation pursues a pressing and substantial objective, it is not open to the government to assert post facto a purpose which did not animate the legislation in the first place (see Big M. Drug Mart ...). However, in proving that the ori- ginal objective remains pressing and substantial, the government surely can and should draw upon the best evidence currently available. The same is true as regards proof that the measure is proportional to its objective (see R v. Edwards Books and Art Ltd., (1986) 2 S.C.R. 713, at p. 469). It is equally possible that a purpose which was not demonstrably pressing and substantial at the time of the legislative enactment becomes demonstrably pressing and substantial with the passing of time ant the changing of circumstances." (28) IV - THE DECISION In the present instance, Respondent seeks to file Dr. Warner's book as evidence of its content (see the tran- script, Volume II, pp. 1558 to 1561), to show that the res- trictions imposed upon the tobacco companies by the Tobacco Products Control Act are rationally connected to the object- ives of the Act which are the protection of public health and the reduction of tobacco consumption, and to show that the measures adopted by the Act impair, as little as possible, the right of freedom. These two issues are highly contested by the Applic- ants and are at the very heart of this constitutional case. Dr. Warner's book addresses directly the question of the effect of advertising on consumption of tobacco and takes (28) Irwin Toy Ltd. v. at p. 984 Quebec, (1989) 1 S.C.R. 927,

135 Judgment on Applicant's objection to the production of a book written by Dr. Kenneth E. Warner, Selling Smoke, Cigarette Advertising and Public Health, published in October 1986, by the American Public Health Association in Washington, October 23rd, 1989 10 20 30 40 a strong position on the matter -- The title of his book is indicative of his views, "Selling Smoke" --. In the introductory chapter of his book, Dr. Warner states that the thesis developed in his book, to which he refers as "fudamental," is that there is a direct link between advert- ising and smoking: "A fundamental thesis of this monograph is that there is a logical chain con- necting information flow to knowledge change; knowledge change to attitudinal change, and attitudinal change event- ually to behavioral change. This logical chain applies equally to the relationship between dissemination of health information and the avoidance of smoking, and between cigarette advertising and the initiation or continuation of smoking." Chapter 2 of the book deals with who smokes and the health effects of smoking. Chapter 3 deals with publicity and public education; Chapter 4 with the nature and magnitude of cigarette advertising and promotion; Chapter 5 with the functions of cigarette advertising; Chapter 6 with policy alternatives with respect to banning, restricting or regulat- ing the promotion of tobacco; and, finally, Chapter 7 con- cludes that a ban on tobacco promotion is essential to the promotion of public health. As can be seen, Dr. Warner's book is no less than a book of opinions on the very issues facing this Court, whereas many experts are scheduled to testify and file reports on both sides at trial on this very issue, while Dr. Warner is not scheduled to testify and has not prepared a report. For example, at least 13 esperts are scheduled to testify on behalf of Respondent with respect to the tobacco and advertising issues only: i) Dr. Kjell Bjartveit, Tobacco control in Norway with reference to the Canadian Tobacco Products Control Act;

136 Judgment on Applicant's objection to the production of a book written by Dr. Kenneth E. Warner, Selling Smoke, Cigarette Advertising and Public Health, published in October 1986, by the American Public Health Association in Washington, October 23rd, 1989 i0 20 2) Dr. Michael Chandler, A report on the Special Vulnerabilities of Children and Adolescents; 3) Dr. Joel Cohen, Effects of Cigarette Advertising on Consumer Behavior; 4) Dr. Katherine Covell, Psychological and Methodo- logical Issues in Assessing Causes of People's Behaviour with Self-Report Measures; 5) Jerry Goodis, Submission to the Superior Court of Quebec on the Subject of Tobacco Advertising; Rights: 6) Dr. Trevor Hancock, Public Health and Private a Practitioner's Perspective; 7) Dr. Jerrey Harris, Cigarette Advertising and Promotion in Canada: Effects on Cigarette Smoking and Public Health; 8) Dr. Michel Laroche, RSle, nature, fonction et effets de la publicit4 des entreprises de produits de 30 grande consommation; 9) Dr. William Leiss, The Nature and Uses of Imagery in National Consumer Product Advertising; i0) Dr. Laurent marcoux, Rapport sur l'impact du tabagisme au Canada et mesures des contr61es ~ mettre en oeuvre; ii) Dr. Richard Pollay, The functions and management of cigarette advertising; 12) Dr. Jacques Tremblay, Initiation au Tabagismes adolescent: un probl~me individuel, social et culturel; 40 13) Dr. Fernand Turcotte, La R~glementation de la publicit4 et des Produits du tabac comme intervention de sant4 publique.

10 20 30 4O 137 Judgment on Applicant's objection to the production of a book written by Dr. Kenneth E. Warner, Selling Smoke, Cigarette Advertising and Public Health, published in October 1986, by the American Public Health Association in Washinqtonr October 23rd, 1989 On Applicants part 4 experts will testify and file reports on the same topics. They are: i) Dr. Zalman Amit, a report on behaviorism and smoking, drinking and advertising; 2) Dr. John Jenkins, a report on the effectiveness of advert- ising; 3) Dr. Leonard Reid, on the effect of mass communica- tion and 4) Michael Waterson, on the role of advertising in cigarettes. The Court should be loathe to admit under the dis- guise of so-called extrinsic evidence any form of opinion evidence that will not submit to the purification process of cross-examination when expert witnesses that will submit to cross-examination are readily available. The following remarks made by Manning in his article ofn "Proof of Facts in Constitutional Cases," which has been cited before, albeit relating to sworn expert opinion, should be given even greater weight with respect to unsworn expert opinion: "We must also guard against a tendency to rely to much on experts invading the ultimate issue area. We must guard against an expression of general belief which really is directed to an opinion as to how the case should be decided. The Court must avoid shifting res- ponsibility to expert witnesses to decide the case. It is for the Court to evaluate the facts in light of the acceptable and applicable rules of law and not for the expert to ultimately determine the case. Because of the nature of the in- quiry to be made, expert opinion must be approached cautiously and by an expert by expert basis. The Court has an obligation to carefully examine the opinions offered and counsel has a duty to ensure through cross-examination and rebuttal material that each opinion is fully assessed. This means there must be the fullest of cross-examinations regarding the underlying assumptions, inferences drawn and conclusions reached

138 Judgment on Applicant's objection to the production of a book written by Dr. Kenneth E. Warner, Selling Smoke, Cigarette Advertising and Public Health, published in October 1986, by the American Public Health Association in Washington, October 23rd, 1989 I0 20 30 by the expert prior to a decision being reached as to the admissibility of the experts's opinion. The inquiry must be directed towards ascertaining whether the inference can be logically drawn and whether the information is reliable. The experts must, as well, be directed to keep away from the issue to be decided by the judge and be confined to opinions which truly assist the Court in understanding the field and determining facts in issue." (29) Indeed, the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms being founded as it states in its preamble on the supremacy of the rule of law, it would be ironical indeed that Courts, while interpreting and implementing the Charter, should wander away from the basic principles of the laws of evidence which are designed to ensure that truth is said, that the parties have a fair trial and that the decision is rendered upon proper grounds and proper evidence. All this being said, it is the Court's opinion that Dr. Warner's book, although possibly relevant to the issues, is clearly inadmissible as being unsworn testimony and as being.hearsay. The book does not fall within one of the exceptions of hearsay and is not susceptible of judi- cial notice in the present instance. For all these reasons, the Court maintains Applic- ants' objection to the production of Dr. Warner's book, Selling Smoke: Cigarette Advertising and Public Health. JEAN-JUDE CHABOT, J.C.s. 40 (29) Supra, note ii, at p. 317

139 Judgment on Applicant's objection to the production of a Gallup survey conducted in 1988 for the Canadian Cancer Society concerning the knowledge and attitudes of Canadians towards the effects of smoking, November 23rd, 1989 I0 2O 30 4O TRANSCRIPT OF THE REASONS OF A JUDGMENT PRONOUNCED ORALLY ON NOVEMBER 23, 1989 The Court is seized with Applicant's objection to the production of a Gallup survey conducted in 1988 for the Canadian Cancer Society concerning the knowledge and attitudes of Canadians towards the effects of smoking. The following is the transcript of the arguments of both parties and of the Court's decision: "Me EVRAIRE; (for the Attorney General) Q- Could you look at the document that I've put before you and identify taht for us, please? (NEIL COLLISHAW) A- Yes, this was a report that was sent to me by officials of the Canadian Cancer Society. It's a report of a Gallup survey that they had undertaken in nineteen eighty-eight (1988) where a sample of Ca- nadians were questioned about their know- ledge and attitudes towards the harmful effects of smoking. Q- And if you look at this document ... Me POTTER: (for Imperial Tobacco) Excuse me, My Lord, I"m sorry. This is obviously a polling report prepared by so- meone else for someone else sent to Mr. Collishaw. It's -- we brought in someone who knew something about polling to testi- fy about polling. Here's Mr. Collishaw, who was presented, and adamantly over se- veral days of discovery the lawyers on the other side say he's not an expert in any- thing. This witness is not competent to testify as to the contents of that thing. Me EVRAIRE: (for the Attorney General) I agree. He's not competent to testify as to the contents, but he's entitled to say, My Lord, if he read the document and if so, the extent to which he relied upon it. However, on the document maybe my friends will want to argue that. He's entitled

140 Judgment on Applicant's objection to the production of a Gallup survey conducted in 1988 for the Canadian Cancer Society concerning the knowledge and attitudes of Canadians towards the effects of smoking, November 23rd, 1989 i0 20 3O 40 to, it is my submission, inform the Court of the basis on which he took certain views such as the fact that publicity may be an important factor arising out of the challenge of the impugned legislation. And that's the same basis on which we ar- gued the earlier matter. I'm wishing to show, through Mr. Collishaw, that cer- tain information came to him and that, in fact, that became part of what he knew about the public, the product, in advising his superiors and hence the minister. Me POTTER: (for Imperial Tobacco) I note that this thing is dated after we launched this challenge, My Lord. He could hardly have drawn any conclusions from this in advising his minister Me EVRAIRE: (for the Attorney General) Well, My Lord ... Mr IRVING: (for RJR-MacDonald) Not only that, My Lord, it's a year after the document which we're discussing. We're looking at an RJR-51 ... Me EVRAIRE; (for the Attorney General) Well, if its buttresses the witness' conclusions ... Me IRVING: (for RJR-MacDonald) Just a moment. Which is January -- wait a minute. Which is dated January, nineteen eighty- seven (1987) -- and now we're being told that he had information on which he based what he said in that document and this is it, and this, you will see, is nineteen eight-eight (1988). So whatever it is, it's certainly not something ... Me POTTER: (for Imperial Tobacco) After we sued. Me IRVING: (for RJR-MacDonald) And it's after the action was brought as well. Me EVRAIRE: (for the Attorney General) Well, my friends, they want it both ways, frankly. They want to put in a Gallup re- port when it suits them, but not when

141 Judgment on Applicant's objection to the production of a Gallup survey conducted in 1988 for the Canadian Cancer Society concerning the knowledge and attitudes of Canadians towards the effects of smoking, November 23rd, 1989 I0 2O it can be seen o.. THE COURT: Well, I mean, come on! Me EVRAIRE: (for the Attorney General) I'm not suggesting -- no, I did not say, nor did I ask the witness if this was available to him at the time he wrote that, but whether or not his view was such that this became part of the knowledge that he had about what the Canadian public knew or oughtto know or did not know or should have known. THE COURT: Objection sustained." JEAN-JUDE CHABOT, J.C.s. COPIE CDERTIFIEE CONFORME (s) J.J. CHABOT, J.C.s. 30 40

142 Judment on the objection to the production of the report of the Toxic Substances Board of New Zeland titled "Health or Tobacco: an end to tobacco advertising and promotion", dated May 1989, November 29th, 1989 J U G E M E N T i0 On the objection to the production of the report of the Toxi Substances Board of New Zealand titled "Health or Tobacco: an end to tobacco advertising and promotion", dated May, 1989. The objection is sustained. The witness is not privy to the document. The document is hearsay and does not fall within one of the exceptions to the hearsay rule. The document is not background to the impugned legis- lation and at this stage and with regard to this witness at least, the objection is sustained. JEAN-JUDE CHABOT, J.C.s. 20 30 40

143 Judgment on Applicant's objection to the production of the report of Dr. David Michael Burns concerning the United States Surgeon General's reports on Smoking and Health for the years 1964 to 1989 (Exhibits A.G. 146-A to 146-W), December 5th, 1989 i0 20 30 40 TRANSCRIPT OF THE REASONS FOR JUDGMENT The Court is seized with Applicant's objection to the production of the report of Dr. David Michael Burns concerning the United States Surgeon General's reports on Smoking and Health for the years 1964 to 1989. (Exhibits A.G. 146-A to 146-W). The objection extends to the testimony of Dr. Burns as an expert witness on the subject matter of his report. The reports of the Surgeon General were first intro- duced in evidence in the course of the examination of Mr. Neil Callishaw, a representative of Health and Welfare Canada. The reports were introduced as "original evidence" to show that they were material available to Parliament at the time of the enactment of the Tobacco Products Control Act, which is the subject of the present constitutional litigation. (In that regard, reference is made to pages 4729 and 4856, volume 30 of the unofficial transcript). The reports for the years 1988 and 1989 were objected to at that time as not being material contemporaneous to the enactment of the impugned legislation but that objection was taken under reserve. Respondent now wants to call Dr. Burns as an expert witness to attest to the reliability and credibility of the various reports of the Surgeon General and to prove the truth of the statements therein contained, thus the objection. The objection may be summarized as follows: Dr. Burns' report is not opinion evidence of himself based upon this special knowledge of the affairs in issue, and, secondly, his opinion is not within his province as an expert witness. This first part of Dr. Burns' expert statement is an historical summary of the reports of the Surgeon Gener- al, particularly for the years 1964 to date (p.2 t p.8). The second part. addresses the question of credibility and reliability of the reports of the Surgeon General in the American scientific community (p.8 to p.ll). The last two pages of his expert statement contain a summary and the conclusions of facts that flow from the reports.

144 Judgment on Applicant's objection to the production of the report of Dr. David Michael Burns concerning the United States Surgeon General's reports on Smoking and Health for the years 1964 to 1989 (Exhibits A.G. 146-A to 146-W), December 5th, 1989 I0 2O 30 40 Dr. Burns graduated from Harvard Medical School in 1972. After his internship and residency at the Boston City Hospital, he joined the U.S. Public Health Service in 1974, as a medical officer with the National Clearing- house for Smoking and Health, Bureau of Health and Education at the Center for Disease Control in Atlanta, Ga. In 1974- 1975, he was asked to draft the 1975 Surgeon General report (A.G. 146-1). In 1979, he authored 2 of the 23 chapters of the 1979 Surgeon General report (Chapter ii, Involuntary Smoking, and chapter 13, Other Forms of Tobacco Use) (Exhibit AG-146-L, vol. I). Afterwards, he became one of the editors of the Surgeon General reports for the years 1980 to 1983. In 1984, he became one of the senior scientific editors of the Surgeon General reports up to the year 1987, at which time he became one of the senior reviewers of the Surgeon General reports. In 1989, he received the Surgeon General's Medaillion, an award for his contribution to public health issues. From looking at his C.V. and from hearing his explan- ations of it, the Court is convinced that Dr. Burns is a very learned, able and respectable gentleman in the American medical community. However, that fact alone does not qualify him as an expert witness on the subject matter of his report. Dr. Burns' expert statement is not an expression of his own expert opinion evidence but a collection and a summary of the opinions of others on many specialized areas of medical science. Dr. Burns is brought forward not to give his professional opinion, based on the study of the relevant facts, on his personal expertise in a parti- cular field and on the scientific literature (including or not the Surgeon General's reports), on an issue at trial, but rather to state the professional opinion arrived at by others in various fields of expertise, many of which are outside the scope of the expertise of Dr. Burns and to confirm that they are reliable and credible. While it is true that expert opinion may be based on hearsay, there nonetheless has to be, at first, the expres- sion of a personal professional opinion based upon the special knowledge or expertise of the witness, that opinion has to be related to the questions in issue and the opinion

145 Judgment on Applicant's objection to the production of the report of Dr. David Michael Burns concerning the United States Surgeon General's reports on Smoking and Health for the years 1964 to 1989 (Exhibits A.G. 146-A to 146-W), December 5th, 1989 i0 20 30 40 has to be within the province of the witness (I). In short, the opinion must be relevant, learned and based on special knowledge or expertise. In the present instance, Dr. Burns is not called to give his opinion on an issue at ~rial in a particular field of expertise, but rather to give his opinion on the reports of the Surgeon General which are not per se at issue in this trial but are merely (and this is not intended to be pejorative), but are merely a part of the existing body of medical and scientific literature existing on the subject of tobacco use and health. The fact that Dr. Burns considers these reports to be reliable is totally irrelevant to the issues at trial. The issue is not whether or not the reports of the Surgeon General are reliable and credible, but whether the use of tobacco is detrimental to health and, as the case may be, the extent to which it is. And Dr. Burns is not produced to advance his personal professional opinion in that regard. If the evidence of Dr. Burns is directed to the veracity of the content of the reports, it is again inadmis- sible. In practice, it would have the effect of allowing Respondent to indirectly introduce, thru Dr. Burns, a collection of various opinions of learned scientists, none of which are called as witnesses, as expert evidence of the content of such opinions in support of his case in the present ins- tance. This is not a proper way to proceed, constitutional case or not. The fact that a body of learned opinions in the scientific community may be collected in one source does not make the source more admissible in evidence. As to the editorial or reviewer's functions of Dr. Burns within the Surgeon General's office, these functions do not make him more the author of the professional opinions expressed by others. On the contrary, the very nature of his functions are in fact to review and edit the opinions of others, not to give his own. (1) R. v. Abbey, (1982) 2 R.C.R. 24; R. v. Beland, (1987) 2 S.C.R. 398

146 Judgment on Applicant's objection to the production of the report of Dr. David Michael Burns concerning the United States Surgeon General's reports on Smoking and Health for the years 1964 to 1989 (Exhibits A.G. 146-A to 146-W), December 5th, 1989 I0 20 30 40 With respect to the 1975 report which the witness said he wrote, it is to be noted that the 1975 report was a compilation of past reports and literature, in which Dr. Burns did not not participate, and of the additions of the current 1975 literature, in which again Dr. Burns did not participate. In 1974-1975, Dr. Burns had just terminated his residency at the Boston City Hospital and had not yet specialized in chest medicine, intensive care medicine and in internal medicine. Although he had some training at the Clearinghouse in 1974-1975 in epidemiology, he was not an epidemiologist, nor was he an oncologist nor a cardiolo- gist. He had not carried any personal research on tobacco and health, he had not authored any publication on the subject and he was not responsible for the content of the report: "The 1975 Report The present document, The Health Conse- quences of Smoking, 1975, begins with an overview of the health consequences of smoking and contains the current data on relationships between smoking and cardio- vascular diseases, non-neoplastic broncho- pulmonary diseases, and cancer. A fourth chapter, "Involuntary Smoking", reviews the effects to nonsmokers of exposure to smoke-filled environments. Although em- phasis is on the latest additions to the literature, where necessary to provide the background or framework, research from earlier years is included. This report was prepared by the staff of the National Clearinghouse for Smoking and Health in the following way: i. The Technical Information Center of the Clearinghouse continually monitors and collects the scientific literature on the health consequences of smoking through se- veral established mechanisms: a. An information science corporation is on contract to extract articles on smoking and health from the scientific literature of the world.

147 Judgment on Applicant's objection to the production of the report of Dr. David Michael Burns concerning the United States Surgeon General's reports on Smoking and Health for the years 1964 to 1989 (Exhibits A.G. 146-A to 146-W), December 5th, 1989 i0 2O 30 40 b. The National Library of Medicine, through the MEDLARS system, provides a monthly listing of articles on smoking and health. Articles not provided by the in- formation science corporation are ordered. c. Staff members review current medi- cal literature and identify pertinent ar- ticles. 2. The literature was reviewed by the Me- dical Staff Director who wrote first drafts for this report. These drafts were sent to reviewers for criticism and com- ment regarding the format, the appropria- teness of the articles selected for dis- cussion, and the conclusions. The final drafts of the total report were reviewed by the Director of the National Clearing- house for Smoking and Health, the Director of the National Cancer Institute, the Di- rector of the National Institute of Envi- ronmental Health Sciences, the Director of the National Heart and Lung Institute, and by additional experts both inside and out- side the Public Health Service. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS The National Clearinghouse for Smoking and Health, Daniel Horn, Ph.D., Director and Charles A. Althafer, Acting Director, are responsible for the preparation of this report. Medical Staff Director for the report was David M. Burns, M.D. Consul- ting editors were Elvin E. Adams, M.D., Daniel P. Asnes, M.D., John H. Holbrook, M.D., Paul Schneiderman, M.D., and H. Stephen Williams, M.D. Technical Editor was Priscilla B. Holman, and Technical In- formation Officer responsible for the li- terature collection was Donald R. Shopland. The professional staff has had the assis- tance and advice of the following experts in the scientific and technical fields

148 Judgment on Applicant's objection to the production of the report of Dr. David Michael Burns concerning the United States Surgeon General's reports on Smoking and Health for the years 1964 to 1989 (Exhibits A.G. 146-A to 146-W), December 5th, 1989 i0 20 30 whose contributions are gratefully acknow- ledged." (Roman numeral VIII and IX of AG-146-I) Follows a list of 30 reviewers and of 5 contributors to the preparation of the report, all members of the Center for Disease Control. One last point. The Court is of the view that the opinions expressed by the witness as to the credibility and reliability of the scientific literature contained in the Surgeon General reports, irrespective of relevancy, are, at the very least in the absence of any prsonal expert opinion on any issues at trial, not within the province of the witness. The issue of credibility and reliability is one to be decided by the Court and not by an expert wit- ness(2), especially where the opinion is advanced on its own merits and not as a corollary or as an aid to an opinion given by the witness on a matter in issue. For all these reasons, the Court is of the opinion to maintain Applicant's objection to the production of Dr. Burns' expert statement, called "The United States Surgeon General's Reports on Smoking and Health", and to maintain Applicant's objection to the testimony of Dr. Burns in that regard. JEAN-JUDE CHABOT, J.S.C. 40 (2) R.v. B41and, supra, note i, pp. 415-417

149 Inscription en appel, le 14 ao~t 1991 i0 20 CAUSE: 500-05-009755-883 C.s.M. 500-09-001296-912 C.a.M. CANADA PROVINCE DE QUEBEC DISTRICT DE MONTREAL C.S.: 500-05-009755-883 C.A. : 500-09-001296-912 C O U R S U P E R I E U R E LE PROCUREUR GENERAL DU CANADA Intim4-APPELANT, C. RJR-MACDONALD INC. Requ4rante-INTIMEE, ET LE PROCUREUR GENERAL DU QUEBEC, Mis-en-cause - MIS-EN-CAUSE 30 40 INSCRIPTION EN APPEL L'appelant, le Procureur g~n~ral du Canada, inter- jette appel, devant la Cour d'appel si4geant ~ Montr4al, du jugement rendu le 26 juillet 1991 dans le pr4sent dossier par l'honorable juge jean-Claude Chabot de la Cour sup4rieure, si4geant dans le district de Montr4al. Aux termes du jugement frapp4 d'appel, la Cour sup~rieure a accueilli la requite pour jugement d4claratoire de l'intim4e contre l'appelant et, en cons4quence, a 4mis les d4clarations suivantes: "ACCUEILLE la requite de R.J.R. MacDonald Inc.;

150 Inscription en appel, le 14 ao6t 1991 I0 20 30 DECLARE que la Loi interdisant la publicit4 en faveur des produits du tabac, r4glementant leur 4tiquetage et pr4voyant certaines mesures de contr~le, (S.C. 1988, chapitre 20) est ultra vires des pouvoirs du Parlement du Canada en ce qu'elle empi~te sur la comp4tence des provinces en vertu de l'article 92 de la loi constitutionnelle de 1867 et est en cons4quence inop4rante et sans effet; DECLARE que la Loi interdisant la publicit4 en faveur des produits du tabac, r4glementant leur 4tiquetage et pr4voyant certaines mesures de contr~le (S.C. 1988, chapitre 20) est contraire au paragraphe 2(b) de la Charte canadienne des droits et libert4s et qu'elle est en cons4quence inop4rante et sans effeto LE TOUT AVEC DEPENS contre le Procureur g4n4ral du Canada." L'enqu~te et l'audition de la pr4sente cause ont d4- but4 le 25 septembre 1989 et pris fin le 22 octobre 1990. L'appelant se propose d'invoauer ~ l'appui du pr4sent appel, les moyens suivants: i. La Cour de premiere instance a err4 en consid4rant que la Loi interdisant la publicit~ en faveur des produits du tabac, r~glementant leur ~tiquette et pr4voyant certaines 40 mesures de contr61e (la Loi) ne rel~ve pas de la comp4tence du Parlement du Canada suivant l'article 91 (Peace, Order and Good Government, comme mati~re de l'int4r~t national) et le paragraphe 91(27) (Criminal Law) et de la Loi consti- tutionnelle de 1867; 2. La Cour a err4 en concluant que la volont~ et la capacit4 des provinces de coop4rer a pour effet de faire en sorte que le Parlement f4d~ral ne peut avoir le pouvoir d'adopter la Loi en cause;

151 Inscription en appel, le 14 ao6t 1991 i0 20 3O 4O 3. La Cour de premigre instance a err4 en concluant que l'objet de la Loi n'est pas la protection de la sant4 publique (article 3 de la Loi); 4. La Cour de premiere instance a err4 en concluant que l'objet de la Loi se r4duit ~ 41iminer la publicit4 des produits du tabac et ~ contrSler les activit4s y inci- dentes et que la sant4 publique n'est qu'un objectif indirect et lointain; 5. La Cour de premiere instance a err4 en concluant que l'obligation d'apposer des messages de sant4 sur les emballages des produits du tabac ne touche que de mani@re incidente ou indirecte ~ la sant4; 6. La Cour de premiere instance a err4 en refusant de consid4rer la preuve d4montrant la n4cessit4 d'adopter la Loi afin de r4duire le tabagisme; 7. La Cour de premiere instance a err4 en concluant que l'objectif vis4 par la Loi ne peut permettre de r4duire le nombre de maladies reli4es au tabac; 8. La Cour de premi@re instance a err4 en consid4rant que la Loi ne s'adresse pas aux f!4aux du tabagisme et que son objet v4ritable n'est pas de lutter contre ces fl4aux; 9. La Cour de premiere instance a err4 eni omettant de consid4rer que la publicit4 est pattie int4grante de la vente des produits du tabac; I0. La Cour de premi@re instance a err4 en omettant de consid4rer et d'analyser chacun des articles de !a Loi en regard des questions relatives ~ la comp4tence f4d4rale et ~ la Charte canadienne des droits et libert4s; ii. La Cour de premiere instance a err4 en refusant de consid4rer toute la preuve (documentaire et d'expert) d4montrant que les produits du tabac sont des produits intrins@quement nocifs pour la sant4 humaine et en affirmant qu'il n'appartient pas au tribunal de d4terminer si le tabac est un produit toxique engendrant chez les consommateurs la d4pendance (addiction);

152 Inscription en appel, le 14 ao~t 1991 i0 20 30 40 12. La Cour de premiere instance a err4 en consid4rant que les produits du tabac sont des produits en vente libre, consomm4s couramment et qu'il n'y a pas lieu d'examiner les caract4ristiques de ces produits ou de les distinguer des autres produits m~me si la preuve d4montre que les pro- duits du tabac sont des produits toxiques engendrant de nombreuses maladies mortelles et la d4pendance chez les consommateurs; 13. Le tribunal de premiere instance a err4 en d4clarant que la publicit4, la promotion et l'incitation ~ la consomma- tion des produits du tabac, sont prot4g4es par le droit 4nonc~ ~ l'article 2b) de la Charte, soit le droit ~ la libert4 d'expression; 14. Le tribunal de premiere instance a err4 en consi- d4rant que les articles 9 et 17f) et g) de la Loi concernant l'obligation d'apposer des messages de sant4, sont contrai- res ~ l'article 2b); 15. Le tribunal de premiere instance a err4 en refusant de consid~rer et d'appr4cier route la preuve pour la quali- fication de la Loi aux fins de l'article 1 de la Charte; 16. De fair, le tribunal a refus4 de prendre connais- sance de route la preuve pr4sent4e par le Procureur g4n4ral du Canada et s'est abstenu de la consid4rer, m~me si la Cour supreme enseigne que la constitutionnalit4 d'une Loi ne doit pas ~tre d4termin4e dans un vide factuel; 17. Le tribunal de premiere instance a err4 en consid4- rant que route la preuve m4dicale n'avait pour but et effet que de colorer inutilement le d~bat; 18. La Cour de premiere instance a err4 en omettant de consid4rer que le droit ~ la sant~ est une valeur sous- jacente ~ l'exercice des droits garantis par la Charte cana- dienne des droits et libert4s; 19. La Cour de premiere instance a err4 en refusant de reconnaftre et de consid4rer la preuve qui d4montre que le tabagisme est un probl~me social complexe;

153 Inscription en appel, le 14 ao~t 1991 i0 20 30 40 20. La Cour de premiere instance a err4 en refusant de consid4rer la preuve d4montrant que la Loi est pattie int4grante d'un programme compr~hensif impliquant diverses mesures, plusieurs ordres de gouvernements et plusieurs organisations sociale et m4dicale; 21. La Cour de premiere instance a err4 en consid4rant que les valeurs d4fendues par "les requ4rantes sont la fibre expression commerciale et ensuite la libert4 d'expression tout court et ensuite la responsabilit4 et la libert4 individuelle"; 22. La Cour de premiere instance a err4 en omettant de consid4rer que les requ4rantes sont seulement des entreprises commerciales; 23. La Cour de premiere instance a err4 en concluant que le tabac est un produit de commerce 14gal et courant d'o~ il s'ensuit selon elle que la Loi en cause brime les consommateurs du droit de recevoir des informations sur ces produits; 24. La Cour de premiere instance a err4 en omettant de retenir que la Loi permet certaines informations aux consommateurs (comme par exemple, d'exposer des produits du tabac pour la vente dans un 4tablissement (art. 5.1a), de signaler que les produits du tabac sont vendus dans un 4tablissement ainsi que leurs prix (art. 5.1b), de faire usage d'une d4nomination sociale qui comporte un 414ment indiquant qu'on y vend des produits du tabac (art. 5.1c) et autorise le Gouverneur en Conseil d'exempter des pro- duits qui sont courir moins de risque ~ la sant4 des consom- mateurs (art. 17a)); 25. La Cour de premiere instance a err4 en ignorant le contexte 14gislatif entourant la Loi, notamment routes les loix (ex.: Loi sur la protection des non-fumeurs) restreignant la consommation des produits du tabac; 26. La Cour de premiere instance a err4 en omettant de consid4rer que le 14gislateur a arbitr~ entre le droit de tous ~ la sant4 et l'information 4conomique aux fumeurs;

154 Inscription en appel, le 14 ao6t 1991 i0 20 3O 40 27. La Cour de premiere instance a err4 en affirmant que la Loi en cause est paternaliste et totalitaire niant ~ l'"Etat" une pattie de son r61e au niveau de la sant4 publique; 28. La Cour de premiere instance a err4 en refusant de consid4rer la preuve qui d4montre que l'on ne peut lutter contre le tabagisme par un moyen direct, comme prohiber la vente de ces produits sans cr4er par le fait m~me d'autres probl~mes sociaux (criminalit4) et que ce n'est que par des moyens indirects, dont la Loi est pattie int4grante, que l'on peut en arriver ~ moyen et ~ long terme ~ r4duire le tabagisme; 29. La Cour de premiere instance a refus@ d'analyser toute la preuve 4manent des compagnies INTIMEES qui d4mon- trent que depuis hombre d'ann4es, les ocmpagnies de tabac d4pensent des sommes importantes en recherche de toute sorte dans le seul et unique but de vendre leurs produits; 30. La Cour de premiere instance a err4 en refusant de consid~rer la preuve d4montrant les effets de la publicit4 des produits du tabac; 31. La Cour de premiere instance a err4 en ignorant la preuve non contredite d4montrant les relations entre les niveaux de consommation et les mesures pour r4duire la consommation des produits du tabac; 32. La Cour de premiere instance a err4 en ignorant la preuve d4montrant les effets des mesures visant ~ r4duire la consommation des produits du tabac sur les niveaux de consommation de ces produits; 33. La Cour de premiere instance a err4 en ignorant la preuve non contredite d4montrant la vuln~rabilit4 des jeunes ~ la publicit4 des produits du tabac et la preuve non contredite d4montrant qu'un nombre consid4rable de jeunes s'initient et commencent ~ fumer vers l'~ge de 12 ans et qu'ils ne peuvent quitter ou abandonner la consommation de ces produits en raison de leur d4pendance (addiction);

155 Inscription en appel, le 14 ao~t 1991 i0 20 3O 40 34. La Cour de premiere instance a err4 en concluant que la Loi en cause ne satisfait pas aux exigences 4nonc4es ~ l'article 1 de la Charte, 4rant donn4 qu'elle ne r4pond pas de mani~re globale au crit~re de proportionnalit4; 35. La Cour de premiere instance a err4 en consid4rant que la Loi en cause n'est pas rationnelle en raison de l'exemption 4nonc4e ~ l'article 4(3) de la Loi; 36. La Cour de premiere instance a err4 en refusant de consid4rer et d'analyser route la preuve pr4sent4e par le Procureur g4n4ral du Canada; 37. La Cour de premi@re instance a err4 en consid4rant que l'on aurait d0 conduire des 4tudes d'impact sur la con- sommation canadienne qui tiendraient compte de la pr4sence des incitations 4trang~res ou sur les messages non-attribu4s avant d'adopter des r@glements; 38. La Cour de premiere instance a err4 en concluant que la Loi n'est pas raisonnable et qu'il n'avait pas 4t4 d~montr4 que la Loi est justifi4e dans le cadre d'une soci4t4 fibre et d4mocratique; EN CONSEQUENCE, L'APPELANT DEMANDERA A LA COUR D'APPEL: - D'INFIRMER le jugement entrepris; - DE REJETER au complet !a requite de I'INTIMEE; - LE TOUT AVEC DEPENS devant les deux instances. Avis de la pr4sente inscription en appel est donn4 Me Colin K. Irving McMASTER, MEIGHEN 630 ouest, Ren4-L4vesque Suite 700 Montr4al, Qu4bec H3B 4H7

156 Inscription en appel, le 14 ao~t 1991 i0 Me Georges R. Thibaudeau MACKENZIE, GERVAIS Place Mercantile 770 ouest, rue Sherbrooke Suite 1300 Montr4al (Qu4bec) H3A IGI MONTREAL, ce 14 i~me jour d'ao~t 1991 (s) COTE & OUELLET COTE & OUELLET Procureurs de l'Appelant 2O 3O 4O

157 Inscription en appel, le 14 ao~t 1991 i0 2O CAUSE: 500-05-009760-883 C.s.M. 500-05-001297-910 C.a.M. CANADA PROVINCE DE QUEBEC DISTRICT DE MONTREAL C.S. : 500-05-009760-883 C.A.: 500-09-001297-910 C 0 U R S U P E R I E U R E LE PROCUREUR GENERAL DU CANADA APPELANT-Intim4 CONTRE IMPERIAL TOBACCO LTD INTIMEE-Requ4rante ET LE PROCUREUR GENERAL DU QUEBEC, MIS-EN-CAUSE - mis-en-cause. 3O 4O INSCRIPTION EN APPEL L'APPELANT, le Procureur g4n4ral du Canada, inter- jette appel, devant la Cour d'appel si4geant ~ Montr4al, du jugement rendu le 26 juillet 1991 dans le pr4sent dossier par l'honorable juge Jean-Jude Chabot de la Cour sup4rieure, si~geant dans le district de Montr4al. Aux termes du jugement frapp4 d'appel, la Cour sup4rieure a accueilli la requite pour jugement d4claratoire de I'INTIMEE contre I'APPELANT eta 4mis les d4clarations suivantes: "ACCUEILLE la requite de la requ4rante: DECLARE que les articles 4, 5, 6, et 8 de la Loi interdisant la publicit4 en faveur des produits du tabac,

158 Inscription en appel, le 14 ao0t 1991 i0 2O 3O pr4voyant certaines mesures de contrSles S.C. 1988, chapitre 20) sont ultra vires des pouvoirs du Parlement du Canada en ce qui'ils (sic) empi~tent sur la comp4tence des provinces en vertu de l'article 92 de la Loi constitutionnelle de 1867 et qu'ils sont en cons4quence inop4rants et sans effet; DECLARE que els articles 4, 5, 6 et 8 de la Loi interdisant la publicit4 en faveur des produits du tabac, r4glementant leur 4tiquetage et pr4voyant certaines mesures de contrSle (S.C. 1988, chapitre 20) sont contraires au paragraphe 2b) de la Charte canadienne des droits et libert4s et qu'ils sont en cons4quence inop4rants et sans effet; LE TOUT AVEC DEPENS contre le Procureur g4n4ral du Canada." L'encu~te et l'auditon de la pr4sente cause a d4- but4 le 25 septembre 1989 et pris fin le 22 octobre 1990. L'APPELANT se propose d'invoquer ~ l'appui du pr4sent appel, les moyens suivants: i. La Cour de premiere instance a err4 en consid4rant que la Loi interdisant la publicit~ en faveur des produits du tabac, r4glementant leur 4tiquetage et pr4voyant certai- 40 nes mesures de contr~le (la Loi) ne relive pas de la comp4- tence du Parlement du Canada suivant l'article 91 (Peace, Order and Good Government, comme mati~re de l'int4r~t national) et le paragraphe 91(27) (Criminal Law) de la Loi constitutionnelle de 1967; 2. La Cour a err4 en concluant que la volont4 et la capacit4 des provinces de coop4rer a pour effet de faire en sorte que le Parlement f4d4ral ne peut avoir le pouvoir d'adopter la Loi en cause;

159 Inscription en appel, le 14 ao~t 1991 i0 20 30 40 3. La Cour en premiere instance a err4 en concluant que l'objet de la Loi n'est pas la protection de la sant4 publique (article 3 de la Loi); 4. La Cour de premiere instance a err4 en concluant que l'objet de la Loi se r4duit ~ 41iminer la publicit4 des produits du tabac et ~ contr61er les activit4s y inciden- teset que la sant4 publique n'est qu'un objectif indirect et lointain; 5. La Cour de premiere instance a err4 en concluant que l'obligation d'apposer des messages de sant4 sur les emballages des produits du tabac ne touche que de mani~re incidente ou indirecte ~ la sant4; 6. La Cour de premiere instance a err4 en refusant de consid4rer la preuve d4montrant la n4cessit4 d'adopter la Loi afin de r4duire le tabagisme; 7. La tour de premiere instance a err4 en concluant que l'objectif vis4 par la Loi ne peut permettre de r4duire le nombre de maladies reli4es au tabac; 8. La Cour de premiere instance a err4 en consid4rant que la Loi ne s'adresse pas aux fl4aux du tabagisme et que son object v4ritable n'est pas de lutter contre ces fl4aux; 9. La Cour de premiere instance a err4 en omettant de consid4rer que la publicit4 est pattie int4grante de la vente des produits du tabac; i0. La Cour de premiere instance a err4 en omettant de consid4rer et d'analyser chacun des articles de la Loi en regard des questions relatives ~ la comp4tence f4d4rale et ~ la Charte canadienne des droits et libert4s; ii. La Cour de premiere instance a err4 en refusant de consid4rer route la preuve (documentaire et d'expert) d~mon- trant que les produits du tabac sont des produits intrins~- quement nocifs pour la sant4 humaine et en affirmant qu'il n'appartient pas au tribunal de d4terminer si le tabac est un produit toxique engendrant chez les consommateurs la d4pendance (addiction);

160 Inscription en appel, le 14 ao~t 1991 i0 20 3O 40 12. La Cour de premi@re instance a err4 en consid4rant que les produits du tabac sont des produits en vente fibre, consomm4s couramment et qu'il n'y a pas lieu d'examiner les caract4ristiques de ces produits ou de les distinguer des autres produits m~me si la preuve d4montre que !es pro- duits du tabac sont des produits toxiques engendrant de nombreuses maladies mortelles et la d4pendance chez les consommateurs; 13. Le tribunal de premi@re instance a err4 en d4clarant que la publicit4, la promotion et l'incitation ~ la consomma- tion des produits du tabac, sont prot4g4es par le droit 4nonc4 ~ l'article 2b) de la Charte, soit le droit g la libert4 d'expression; 14. Le tribunal de premiere instance a err4 en consi- d4rant que les articles 9 et 17f) et g) de la Loi concernant l'obligation d'apposer des messages de sant4, sont contrai- res g l'article 2b); 15. Le tribunal de premiere instance a err4 en refusuant de consid4rer et d'appr4cier toute la preuve pour la qualifi- cation de la Loi aux fins de l'article 1 de la Charte; 16. De fair, le tribunal a refus4 de prendre connais- sance de totue la preuve pr4sent4es par le Procureur g4n4ral du Canada et s'est abstenu de la consid4rer, m~me si la Cour supreme enseigne que la constitutionnalit4 d'une !oi ne doit pas ~tre d4termin4e dans un vide factuel; 17. Le tribunal de premi@re instance a err4 en consid4- rant que route la preuve m4dicale n'avait pour but et effet que de colorer inutilement le dgbat; 18. La Cour de premi@re instance a err4 en omettant de consid@rer que le droit ~ la sant@ est une valeur sous- jacente ~ l'exercice des droits garantis par la Charte canadienne des droits et libert4s; 19. La Cour de premiere instance a err4 en refusant de reconnaitre et de consid4rer la preuve qui d4montre que le tabagisme est un probl~me social complexe;

161 Inscription en appel, le 14 ao0t 1991 i0 2O 3O 4O 20. La Cour de premiere instance a err4 en refusant de consid4rer la preuve d4montrant que la Loi est pattie int4grante d'un programme compr4hensif impliquant diverses mesures, plusieurs ordres de gouvernements et plusieurs organisations sociale et m4dicale; 21. La Cour de premiere instance a err4 en consid4rant que les valeurs d4fendues par "les requ~rantes sont la li- bre expression commerciale et ensuite la libert4 d'expression tout court et ensuite la responsabilit4 et la libert4 individuelle"; 22. La Cour de premiere instance a err4 en omettant de consid4rer que les requ4rantes sont seulement des entreprises commerciales; 23. La Cour de premiere instance a err4 en concluant que le tabac est un produit de commerce 14gal et courant d'o~ il s'ensuit selon elle que la Loi en cause brime les consommateurs du droit de recevoir des informations sur ces produits; 24. La Cour de premiere instance a err4 en omettant de retenir que la Loi permet certaines informations aux consommateurs (comme par exemple, d'exposer des produits du tabac pour la vente dans un 4tablissement (art. 5.1a), de signaler que les produits du tabac sont vendus dans un 4tablissement ainsi que leurs prix (art. 5.1b), de faire usage d'une d4nomination sociale qui comporte un 414ment indiquant qu'on y vend des produits du tabac (art. 5.1c) et autorise le Gouverneur en Conseil d'exempter des pro- duits qui font courir moins de risque ~ la sant4 des consommateurs (art. 17a)); 25. La Cour de premiere instance a err4 en ignorant le contexte 14gislatif entourant la Loi, notamment toutes les lois (ex.L Loi sur la protection des non-fumeurs) restreignant la consommation des produits du tabac; 26. La Cour de premiere instance a err4 en omettant de consid4rer que le 14gislateur a arbitr~ entre le droit de tous ~ la sant4 et l'information 4conomique aux fumeurs;

162 Inscription en appel, le 14 aoOt 1991 i0 2O 30 40 27. La Cour de premiere instance a err4 en affirmant que la Loi en cause est paternaliste et totalitaire niant ainsi ~ l'"Etat" une partie de son r61e au niveau de la sant4 publique; 28. La Cour de premiere instance a err4 en refusant de consid4rer la preuve qui d4montre que l'on ne peut lutter contre le tabagisme par un moyen direct, comme prohiber la vente de ces produits sans cr4er par le fait m~me d'autres probl~mes sociaux (criminalitY) et que ce n'est que par des moyens indirects, dont la Loi est pattie int4grante, que l'on peut en arriver ~ moyen et ~ long terme ~ r4duire le tabagisme; 29. La Cour de premiere instance a refus4 d'analyser toute la preuve 4manant des compagnies INTIMEES qui d4mon- trent que depuis nombre d'ann4es, les compagnies de tabac d4pensent des sommes importantes en recherche de route sorte dans le seul et unique but de vendre leurs produits; 30. La Cour de premiere instance a err4 en refusant de consid4rer la preuve d4montrant les effets de !a publicit4 des produits du tabac; 31. La Cour de premiere instance a err4 en ignorant la preuve non contredite d4montrant les relations entre les niveaux de consommation et les mesures pour r4duire la consommation des produits du tabac; 32. La Cour de premiere instance a err4 en ignorant la preuve d4montrant les effets des mesures visant ~ r4dui- re la consommation des produits du tabac sur les niveaux de consommation de ces produits; 33. La Cour de premiere instance a err4 en ignorant la preuve non contredite d4montrant la vuln4rabilit4 des jeunes ~ la publicit4 des produits du tabac et la preuve non con- tredite d4montrant qu'un nombre consid4rable de jeunes s'initient et commencent ~ fumer vers l'~ge de 12 ans et qu'ils ne peuvent quitter ou avandonner la consommation de ces produits en raison de leur d~pendance (addiction); 34. La Cour de premiere instance a err4 en concluant que la Loi en cause ne satisfait pas aux exigences ~nonc~es ~

163 Inscription en appel, le 14 ao~t 1991 i0 20 3O 4O l'article 1 de la Charte, 4tant donn4 qu'elle ne r~pond pas de mani~re globale au crit~re de proportionnalit4; 35. La Cour de premiere instnace a err4 en consid4rant que la Loi en cause n'est pas rationnelle en raison de l'exemption 4nonc4e ~ l'article 4(3) de la Loi; 36. La Cour de premiere instance a err4 en refusant de consid4rer et d'analyser toute la preuve pr4sent4e par le Procureur g4n4ral du Canada; 37. La Cour de premiere instance a err4 en consid4rant que l'on aurait d~ conduire des 4tudes d'impact sur la con- sommation canadienne qui tiendraient compte de la pr4sence des incitations 4trang~res ou sur les messages non-attri- bugs avant d'adopter des r~glements; 38. La Cour de premiere instance a err4 en concluant que laLoi n'est pas raisonnable et qu'il n'avait pas 4t4 d4montr4 que la Loi est justifi4e dans le cadre d'une soci4t4 libre et d4mocratique; EN CONSEQUENCE, L'APPELANT DEMANDERA A LA COUR D'APPEL: - D'INFIRMER le jugement entrepris; - DE REJETER au complet la requ@te de I'INTIMEE; LE TOUT AVEC DEPENS devant les deux instances. Avis de la pr4sente inscription en appel est donn4 Me Simon Potter OGILVY, RENAULT 1981, McGill College Suite ii00 Montr4al, Qu4bec H3A 3CI MONTREAL, ce 14 i6me jour d'ao~t 1991 (s) COTE & OUELLET COTE & OUELLET Procureurs de I'APPELANT