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Youth issues timeline

by Anne Landman

This timeline traces the industry's history from coveting the youth market to completely denying that they covet the youth market.

No date
No date Another reason for the industry to have youth programs
Describes the need for the industry to obtain recognition for "responsible public service" to "offset the notion that we place profitability above public welfare." Suggests that "a program to discourage teens from smoking ... might prevent or delay further regulation of the industry."
Jul 1974 At the behest of Philip Morris, the Roper Organization polls youngsters at locations like parks, lakes, near high schools, etc. about their smoking habits
Philip Morris explored the smoking habits of youngsters (24 and under, with no lower limit) to try and determine the threat KOOL posed to Marlboro in this market.
30 Sep 1974 1975 marketing plan for RJR discusses the importance of the 14-24 age group
"First, let's look at the growing importance of the young adult in the cigarette market. In 1960, this young adult market, the 14-24 age group, represented 21% of the population. As seen by this chart, they...represent tomorrow's cigarette business. As this 14-24 age group matures, they will account for a key share of the total cigarette volume for at least the next 25 years."
21 May 1975 Philip Morris harbors its secret data on youth smoking
In the document, "The Decline in the Growth Rate of Marlboro Red," PM marketing executive Myron Johnson keeps secret (private) data on the smoking habits of 15-17 years olds, and discusses why children starting to smoke is of such great importantce to Philip Morrris. Quote: "The teenage years are also important because these are the years during which most smokers begin to smoke, the years in which initial brand selections are made, and the period in the life-cycle in which conformity to peer-group norms in greatest."
13 Jan 1976 Marketing document breaks down the total number of smokers in U.S. between the ages of 12 and 17
This is believed to be an R.J. Reynolds marketing document
15 Mar 1977 RJR gives out samples of Vantage cigarettes to children--some in strollers.
Parent in Castro Valley, California writes RJR to complain.
30 Aug 1978 Lorillard frankly admits that "the base of our business is the high school student."
This memo from Lorillard sales staff states, "The success of NEWPORT has been fantastic during the past few years. Our profile taken locally shows this brand being purchased by black people (all ages), young adults (usually college age), but the base of our business is the high school student."
17 May 1979 Just months after receiving the above memo, Curtis Judge, President of Lorillard disavows to the government any attempts to appeal to children
Just months after receiving a memo from his field sales force acknowledging that children formed the basis of their cigarette business, Curtis Judge, President of Lorillard Tobacco Company, wrote a letter to Joseph Califano, then Secretary of Health Education and Welfare, disavowing any attempts by his company to appeal to children. In the letter, Judge said, "For many years Lorillard has avoided directing the appeal of its advertising to young persons....Everyone, including Lorillard, agrees that children should not smoke...We neither direct the appeal of our advertising to children, nor do we encourage them to start to smoke."
31 Mar 1981 Philip Morris laments decline in teen smoking as threat to business
"Young Smokers-Prevalence Trends, Implications, And Related Demographics" . States that "For over fifteen years certain demographic and social trends have been moving in directions favorable to industry growth. Now, one by one, these powerful social and demongraphic factors are turning against us...The trends are 1) After increasing for over a decade, the prevalence of teenage smoking is now declining sharply. 2) After increasing for over a decade, the average daily consumption of teenager smokers is declining. 3)...The absolute numbers of 15-19 year olds will decline 19 percent during the 1980's...
Aug 1981 Brown and Williamson considers smokers as young as 16 in the middle east to be a viable market
19 Oct 1981 Sensing discontent about youth issues and the possibility of more regulation, the Tobacco Institute hatches plan to send "appropriate" messages to youth about smoking.
Rather than discouraging youth smoking, the Tobacco Institute's plan was to craft messages that make it apparent that smoking is an option, and one made not by children, but by adults--a formula designed to drive children towards smoking. They eschewed "scare tactics" (health messages). Quote: "Many efforts are made to discourage youth smoking but almost all of them consist of wrongful 'scare' tactics. Young people need knowledge of prudent youth lifestyles and encouragement to make informed adult lifestyle decisions later. Action #2: Development...of messages [that] might stress both the practicalities and enjoyments of life divided into youth and adulthood, with pmphasis on behavior appropriate for informed consideration at the adult states, including a wide range from professional athletics to family responsibility, drinking or smoking. Rationality rather than fear could be emphasized."
25 Mar 1982 Philip Morris marketing research shows that a price increase reduces smoking, particularly among youth
"...[P]rice has its greatest effect on the young, particularly young males, and..price acts...on reducing the proportion who smoke to a much greater extent than in reducing cigarette consumption among committed smokers...a ten percent increase in price would cause a 4.2 percent decline in sales. ...If there is a proposed increase, and if it is indeed one dollar per thousand, it would probably be less harmful to accept it without comment than to fight it and give the anti-smoking fanatics another forum in which to vent their spleen."
May 1982 The Tobacco Institute complains that anti-smoking groups' youth campaigns present smoking as "repugnant and unhealthy" -- and plan their own campaigns instead.
The tobacco industry's "kids don't smoke" programs are designed to assure to children that smoking is a positive choice they should look forward to making in the future. The tobacco industry designs "youth programs" of its own because similar campaigns designed by anti-smoking groups that targeted children "present smoking as repugnant and unhealthy." Furthermore, according to this document, the goals of the industry's "kids don't smoke" campaigns are to "...offset further erosion of the industry's image in this area, reverse political trends and gain recognition of our efforts from public service organizations and public officials." A goal of actually reducing or eliminating youth smoking is conspicuously absent.
1985/E The Tobacco Industry develops a Youth Strategy to "prevent or delay further regulation of the industry"
The industry recognized that it needed a public relations move to bolster credibility. It subsequently Introduces use of "socially conscious programs" (especially youth programs) to bolster their image: Quote: “The potential positive outcomes of adopting [socially conscious programs] may be: increased goodwill and reputation of the tobacco industry...the ability to affect the problem areas that most concern the tobacco industry and simultaneously obtain tax benefits ...Describes the challenges facing the industry re: credibility, describes the need for the industry to get recognition for "responsible public service" to "offset the notion that we place profitability above public welfare." Suggests that "a program to discourage teens from smoking (and adult decision) might prevent or delay further regulation of the industry."
14 Feb 1990 Tobacco Institute works to undermine Chanhassen, MN ordinance to ban self service displays, even though city council says such displays incite shoplifting by minors
In spite of the public declarations that self-service cigarette displays facilitate tobacco shoplifting among Chanhassen youth, cigarette manufacturers worked to mislead and intimidate the Chanhassen City Attorney and members of the city council to prevent them from adopting the measure. This February, 1990 Tobacco Institute document describes the industry’s strategy: "In order to defeat this ordinance, we must convince the [Chanhassen] City Attorney and selected City Council Members that they are legally prohibited from adopting the proposed ordinance."
14 Feb 1990 Tobacco Institute works to undermine Chanhassen ordinance to ban self service displays
In spite of the public declarations that self-service cigarette displays facilitate tobacco shoplifting among Chanhassen youth, cigarette manufacturers worked to mislead and intimidate the Chanhassen City Attorney and members of the city council to prevent them from adopting the measure. This February, 1990 Tobacco Institute document describes the industry’s strategy: "In order to defeat this ordinance, we must convince the [Chanhassen] City Attorney and selected City Council Members that they are legally prohibited from adopting the proposed ordinance."
Mar 1990 Children shoplifting cigarettes confirmed as ongoing problem in Chanhassen, MN
In March 1, 1990 article in the Chanhassen Villager, city council member Ursula Dimler stated that “as a parent, she [was] aware there is a problem with kids stealing cigarettes."
07 Jan 1991 City of Chanhassen, MN tries to ban self service displays, to eliminate high theft rate by children
The city council of Chanhassen, MN, introduces a bill to rid the town of self-service cigarette displays, which they discovered to facilitate cigarette shoplifting among minors.
29 Jan 1991 The real purpose of the industry's "youth programs" include “...seiz[ing] the political center and forc[ing] the anti-smokers to an extreme."
According to this document, the purpose of the industry’s youth programs was to: -- “...support The Institute’s objective of discouraging unfair and counterproductive federal, state and local restrictions on cigarette advertising...” -- "Reinforc[e] the belief that peer pressure--not advertising--is the cause of youth smoking.” --“...seiz[e] the political center and forc[e] the anti-smokers to an extreme...” , (thus making pro-health advocates appear unreasonable), --“Bait anti-tobacco forces to criticize industry efforts. Focus media attention on anti’s extremism. Anticipate and blunt anti’s strongest points.” (REASON: So the press and media would ignore them)
17 Jan 1992 Youth programs were to help the tobacco industry disrupt the ASSIST program- a government effort to lower the smoking rate
This document reveals a motive behind the industry developing its own youth programs: such programs were a way to thwart the ASSIST program and to enable the companies to "suggest that further Federal or state funding is not needed for youth anti-smoking campaigns." Quote: "6) Tobacco Industry Activities: ... [As] a major goal of ASSIST is to reduce youth incidence, the tobacco industry could also offer our own youth initiatives with Tobacco Helping Youth Say No, and the COURSE Consortium,....and suggest that further Federal or state funding is not needed for youth anti-smoking campaigns." I believe that these are the most effective means of disrupting ASSIST. I welcome your comments.
Jul 1992 RJR Rolls out "Support the Law" - 1993-94
With great media hype and fanfare, RJR rolls out its "Support the Law--It works" program to deter more regulation and increase its corporate image
1992100 Industry recognizes the threat of "the local challenge," and need to counter it.
"The number of 'youth-related' local ordinance introductions continues to increase...In 1992 alone, 156 localities in 27 states looked at this set of issues." ..."During the 1980s and until very recently, however, the clear priority for the industyr was in the state capitals; local activities always took a back seat as far as time and recources were concerned." Refers to "slowing the local hemorrhaging in California" by monitoring local ordinance introductions, responding quickly with local-based advocates, the ability to project a "local concern" about given anti-tobacco ordinances, making it more difficult for anti-tobacco leanders to day "The only people who oppose this ordinance are the out-of-state tobacco companies."
30 Nov 1992 Youth programs assist industry in countering anti-tobacco activity at local level
A little-known purpose for the tobacco industry's youth programs was to allow the TI to contact store owners on the local level so they could recruit them to help their cause. This 1992 Tobacco Institute document reveals that convenience store owners were paid to report on local anti-tobacco activities and that the Institute’s “It’s the Law” youth program helped facilitate the contact: “For monitoring purposes, we fund our allies in the convenience store groups to regularly report on ordinance introductions and assist in campaigns to stop unreasonable measures...Promotion of The Institute’s ‘It’s the Law’ program and other industry programs play a helpful role was well.”
1993 (est.) It's the Law - reasons for program
Further evidence that the primary focus of the industry's "youth programs" is to slow the proliferation of marketing restrictions rather than to stem the tide of nicotine addiction among youth. Quote: "Youth access to tobacco products has become the anti-smoking movement's principle argument in seeking to impose further restrictions on tobacco sales and marketing practices - primarily vending, self-service brand promotions and advertising. It also serves as another reason for the anti-smoking movement to call for increased excise taxes, in the belief that it would price the product beyond minor's reach."
25 Jan 1993 One reason the tobacco industry worked to subvert the EPA's attemtps to regulate secondhand smoke was to "defend against 'Pro kids' legislation
Lists the tactics and strategies the industry will use to subvert the EPA's secondhand smoke case. Says one goal is to "defend against 'Pro-kids' legislation."
Sep 1993 (est.) Tobacco Industry's evaluation criteria for "It's the Law" program fails to include a decrease in youth smoking
(From Pg. 3 of the document): "Evaluate the effectiveness to date of the materials and messages. [Criteria:] --Retail recognition and use --Legislative and Press Recognition/Credibility --Credibility of industry messages on youth issue [NOTE absence of any criteria to guage actual decrease in youth smoking]
13 Jan 1994 RJR infiltrates Jaycees, Boy Scout organizations using third parties, to get them to "take its message to the community"
Scouts, Jaycees, etc. to get these groups to carry its "kids don't smoke" message. Recognizes that it must use third parties because people won't sign on to the effort if they see a tobacco company is involved.
13 Jan 1994 RJR infiltrates Jaycees, Boy Scout organizations using third parties, to get them to "take its message to the community"
Scouts, Jaycees, etc. to get these groups to carry its "kids don't smoke" message. Recognizes that it must use third parties because people won't sign on to the effort if they see a tobacco company is involved.
27 Jun 1995 Philip Morris rolls out "Action Against Access" program
This confidential Philip Morris (PM) memo reveals that PM's Action Against Access program is "an action to give our allies 'cover' in the event Kessler makes a move" to protect youth from tobacco. The memo indicates that the AAA program would of necessity eventually hav eto spread to Europe to avoid accusations that PM treats European youth differently than American youth.
11 Aug 1995 Philip Morris plans to roll out youth initiative programs throughout Europe
Discusses feasiblity and plans for "Action Against Access" and "Kids don't smoke"-type programs in Hungary, Russia, Sweden, Lithuania, Nordic areas, Poland, Czecholsovakia, Turkey and Israel. Discusses pros and cons of such initatives, political effectiveness, etc.
16 Feb 1996 (est.) Philip Morris mobilizes advertising and other trade organizations to help fight FDA regulations aimed at stopping nicotine addiction among youth
Philip Morris used third parties to fight the FDA's 1994 proposed measures to protect children from tobacco. This document describes the monumental effort that PM put into mobilizing "credible" trade groups, advertising associations, etc. to oppose FDA restrictions to protect children.