Tobacco Institute
Working Paper the Political Element in Science and Technology: Sammec II and the Anti-Smoking Lobby
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- 1. Ault, R.W. Author
- Affiliation:
Auburn University
- Affiliation:
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This decision reveals SAMMEC II methodology for what it is -- politics based on
questionable science. The authors apparently have decided what results they want, and they
are willing to adjust calculations to ensure that they find what they are looking for.
The most serious flaw in estimating indirect morbidity costs (lost income due to
illness and disability) again pertains to the use of biased relative rates. As Table 10 shows,
SAMMEC II uses relative rates which report about 30 percent more work-loss days for
smokers than for nonsmokers. These rates are developed from productivity loss estimates
by Rice et al. (1986), which were similar to those reported in Rice and Hodgson (1985).
The latter study claims that smoking causes smokers to experience 32 percent more work
loss than nonsmokers. SAMMEC II, in line with these studies and, indeed, employing their
results, attributes the entire difference in absenteeism rates between smokers and nonsmokers
to smoking. Research studies such as those by Leigh (1986) and Allen (1981a, 1981b),
which do consider the effect of significant factors, fail to account for potential
interdependencies between smoking characteristics and other behavior. Even the popular
press links smoking with other lifestyle choices such as drinking, breakfast consumption,
hours of sleep and exercise (see, for example, Otten 1988). (See also Attachment A,
Section I.)
The results obtained by SAMMEC II based on productivity studies of Rice et al., as
a recent study shows, may be inaccurate and unscientific. These work-loss studies employ
only a simple means difference test as a statistical basis for their deductions. Thus, they are
incapable of determining whether absence rates are influenced by smoking since they cannot
account for factors common to smokers as a group. However, a paper directly relevant to
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V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
SAMMEC II software and the logic underpinning it are not simply faulty. As noted
earlier in this paper, SAMMEC's political aims were to enlist government and "goodwill"
not-for-profit entities to develop exaggerated and unreliable estimates of the "social costs"
of smoking. SAMMEC II developers violated fundamental and long-recognized social and
economic principles of cost-benefit analysis by loosely interpreting costs and then by
complete elimination of benefits from the calculation.
First, it is highly questionable to argue that any "social costs" could apply to
smoking. If any such "costs" do exist, all consequences of individual behavior are p •nvate
costs in any reasoned calculation of "costs." This means that if there are any lost earnings
due to illness or "premature" death plus all medical expenses, they would be borne by and
must be attributed to individuals. This principle has been given scientific status in all
competent studies of costs and benefits.
But even SAMMEC's authors readily admit that -- on SAMMEC's own grounds, i.e.,
on calculating costs as "social costs" -- any "social costs" of smoking may be non-existent
or negligible when all costs of the health care system are taken into account. As they argue,
the "net economic effect of cigarette smoking in future scenarios is speculative" and
"movement toward a nonsmoking society may be recessionarv in the long term" (SNR, p. 8,
[emphasis ours]).
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