Tobacco Documents Online

'Todf11~ ~j~i7tR1aJ~~ ~3 ry r~-a t^~^ TNr f%liGRd6Gla.P /.v~{e4X ~L/~' x 1 ~~~`_~~ ~' at lY7~ - ~= , O[eu5.= •, I T For 20 years, the toll from a danberous chemical steadily climbed. This is the untold story of the tragedy at BridesGurg. = Or. W: s-: Fq;r.c+. a pv!my:r~.y ,y~ppYCt mw s: GTn L:a~ Hospaa/, p:. s~ed udamaf/a. en xakeo al > Rpnm a-f Nass an0.v~:.nwty pOSSAed a lvM.nah wdck in a mmdiedjnumal shatlmkw/ rspbntdY eanev : d.ates to tAC ehemsal BCM2. %itnsr pa+~ and Canphnr Ja+.lns: ne.r la. aMwn w r+a- MPote he tFed cI tan<er. iuntia'•: prodCeO Br.srB-r.a. wnn iNamatinn en RMm antl Nws wakws a.pw.d w BC6tE. -- --- - - - ~ _ _ - - - --- - - THKP 0005940

a rr• ,,. ' ~_. - -'--- '-- rsr~ - - - ~ COl'Elt: D;l:lriing Six, located inside the Rnhm and }toas chemica: i; ptaat in ti.e ,iluieaberg section of Philadelphia, beeama kr.n.va to~$ worters as the ^Death House.' SUNDAY, OCTOBER 26, 1975 _ 12 516Sho Diesl J `------~ Robert Pontiotu Latorence 0tcese Joseph Kareher Bcrn Born Born • 5-29-28 1-fB-24 1e-14-34 Died Died Died - 1a14-T2 a-6-70 11-9-71 By 1B£4, executives at Bohm and Hem suspected that lung eencer deaths at the company'a Bridwburg plant were due to expaure to a dangarous chemical. In the yean that foltuwed, tests and studin were conducted to determine the nature and extent of the threat to w`uch wvrken were boing exposed. Men were a-raysd periodically. Cancer was induced in mice end - rets. Numerous chemicals to which the wurkea were exposed wzte tu4d for cancer-ausing properties. This is Lie story of how the company responded to the wamings of the chemical's danger. It ia the story otdnetors, ecientista and goverr.ment of rk- dais. And it's v-ry much the story of the men who died-men iiiu Joe Sarciwr, urry O:cem and Bob Poations-ar.d how tita p;,mimny bxtr.~l:d i!e nbliE:tion: to the°.r fe.^••iNm. 52 The lYavrard Pyle Legacy Tha founder of the Brandywine School li as on In a new bL o,traphy heavily illustrated with his works. Wise Eia9de 8 Ya2pxviaw / AiexaaGfa &Et_etiy At 13, she's a publiabed noveliat and a big-time tv veteran But she'a also sunny, tr,nwroat and very una.uretic The Skcp5c / On Apprehc-'sian ~ Cro;z.aiqo~r d rd PazzFe 54 Per.^,aassli:3ss, etc. ROBEkT HOkBERG 4ates tVaaater, Peotnres EARL E. DAV:S smtt An»t FP.ANA •d. POSTAR_I SL:a.tN nA\'IS FAUST Art C:-rec:or ettice ManeL.er rrqY I!n N rl l~e.~h1 Y.w,iwr,.ln r,K,M nr. rv/h,1.A a. e,.r i MJI:` . n I/n, 1Nn ..><w,. e:.:ae y,. La'uy..!-.•J w.:m+4r. N r YaI, T~.I~MnMIb.~,.N.J,,,,nwJn,nxWS,,.w+,w,~\/A~M I r. { .. Ft, l y ~ ~.,~,~.~ 1} t..~;M i ~ "4~ t~ n =~`n 1 t ~v ., . a. s~ ~~c . a pool-at ) . ~ EA S~yq~'? ~ +, a (~y FBl c+. t Ir R:.:5:4 ~ sG_ S:.•`~'ws ~~ V Z3~pz,o ~ V''i V B ~~~~ ~~~~~+1~;6 Buy your Sylvan Pool'now and cash in on the many advantages of building a pool in the fall. You will get the lowest prices we've had this year with our special fa1 di3count. Yourpooi will be installed immediately..: no wait- ing. Ydu will have all winter to plan your landscaping and early spring to do it so next summer when every- one eLe is raking and seeding, you v?l be svdmming. Be one of the very, very smart p"ple and either visit our showrooms or call us. If you can't come to the showroom, we'll come to you. But, act now, time is running out. World's Most F~perience3 Pool Builders Unipour Concrete and All Atvnwtum ) inyl Pools :r.:. Pen:;a. E? C 91 °SG2sCA7 10 Yba a~ f . ~ c~ ~1 n Y:i~i t"6..70 '.'+G . Cd.'dl!%°~dsa~°vi.i. ~6 ktt'. sl.^-•d paols on display ia the Followir.g s5nwroom locotions: 4 I3ar' s45>m, ?a.--1 M9ta North on Route 611 Wzst CssFa:, Na.---4 fA.3tes 5ou:h on Route iIN l\ ~ 1 ~ 3MfCVECaI..~/:.?•.1~\ - - -- --....---~----- - -.-._ ---~---~- - THKP 0005941 -

S: FRI(7 L'mDcontinacd altnwed spiils aod vapars to c scadc down 10 lerels below whcra men worked on other processes. Them wore three tiers to the Ca1E process. Tt:v chcmi.a v:>s actually produced on the top level, by shovclin~ paraformaldehyde flakes and al~m?num rhloride into kettles. "Thc men would cough. lhen tu:n away," Beavers rr•cnlls.'fbe CL1E weu!d thc-n go down a chute to the.level beluw, where a&tctors would mix it in kettk•s that men would havc to epen frnn lirne to time., When they did lift the liCn. vapors came rolling out at them. Then the mixture waa dropped to the level below, where water mas added This time, when the man bit the switch on the agitator, the fumes billowed out and the men would have to run from the build- Ing gasping for air, Ihen wait to go back In again because, says Beaven, "the fan= weren't efficient; they didn't move enough air." The three CME tien were suspended abow arsother process, the Rethane machine, known by the men as the "Screaming arimi • Every time there was a spill or boilever, the Rothane opea- tnn wen exposed too. "Everybody in lhebrsildinghad to rua outiide," secalis one Building Six survivor. "Sornelimes you'd have to run down the steps and outside beuuse it looked Ske that whole dame kettle waa going to explode. "1'he guys on the Rothane p.-ocess down below couldn't stop. The Screaming Mimi had 20 blades cutting the Aothane and if you stopped. it set up like concrete. When the ChiE fumes hit the ffoor, It wras like a Londoe fog, Everybody had to ruo outside to breathe. "It was so goddam hot In there you couldn't wear a mask. They were old nrbber maeks and you eouldn't ge; yvar breath through them and so whenever there was a spi)l, and it happened a couple of times a day, everyone in the whole build- Ing got a shot. And if you tried to amoke after gett:ng a ihot of that stuff, It made you puke." Bob Pontious was a Rothnne operator, and )ike his huddies he tended to ignore the dangen of the Death House. In a rough physical )ob, there wero _ alwa, s more obvious dangers. On September 2G, f933, the same year Pontious was cited for hero- Ism, a 55-gallon octan, drum exploded at Brides- brisg. touching off a blaat destroying a Gp00-gallpr tank of solvent. Henry Rucker, 41, was showered with blaring chemieL Hc d:cd befors ficemen could put out the biare. Welter Crzyminaki was sprayed with bunring chemicals and fnpnenta of flying metaL He staggered our end survived. The blast alarmed snme workers and for a while there was talk of organizing a union. But It didn't last For one thteg, many Bridasburg workers were staunch Catbolles of Polish and Cetman descent who feared that the Federxtion of Glass, Ceramic and Si6ca Sand Workers was f::ot»mtmist-dominated. For aucther, the pay and benefits wcra good, and few wanted to pay union ~ dues And many were too tough to be scared easily. - "A lot of us had been In the Army, had seen ~ combat and were used to death,° aays ane wor)ter•- "Roh•n and Haas seemed by comparison as barm- a less as a bake,y.° a Alongside much more dra.nalic dangers, the ~ death tell in Building Six silently mounted. But Rohm and Haas had 10,000 workers by 1960, and ~; the deaths of a few of them seemed not to portend 4 a major lr e-r.dy, e In fact, there had been warnings: l As long ago as Worl:: War 1, both Germany ~ and France rcjected RCME - a mixture of fo.- ~ mal_de%yde and hy-drnehloric acid - as poison gas for their bitter trench warfare because it was too volatile and unpred!rtable. If the German cbrmista imported by Rohtn and Hans were enaware oi this earlier experienee. the company v:ns alcr:ed in 1931 At that timc, Dow Chemr.ical Crnnpany• second largest RC•1tE pro- ducer, pubhshed rasules of alarming tests it had made. "Tests with laboratory animals have shown the liquid CN16 to be capable of causing severe burns of the skin and cyes. Tests have alsa shown that vapors of this uiatereal are poinfu Ho the eyea, noae and throat and are capable of causing serious inlury• to the lungs ... it appears advisable to can- sider the vapor hazard ... tonsparuble to that pre- sent<d by strong arid or raustia' Dr. Baaven now says the company was aware of this report and saw to it that aum with asthma wercn't exposed to BCbIE. Several workers say that when they complained of skin irritation, they ware told to try taking showerfi when they torn- pLlned of throat irritation, they wroregiveo cough sTUp. The following year, 1953, contained another warning of sorts, orre that resulted fn a sad Irory: In April, at a Gulf Oil refinery at Part Arthur, Tex" 100 workers were exposed to deadly nickd orbonyl fumas. Two workaa died and 31 more were hospitalized. A new ltahm and Ran pfant bad recently ofwyd In ^ia~t was aware it nn the same risks with Its workers. It sponsored a research project in Philadelphia. Dr. Wifxrp8s suggested a raaid st::dy be made: "... s*alsert Hyster¢a they rrlust also have a group from al7ettx_r buiidir.g:' that coneluded a"closed-kdtk" system was (m- prratA-e for the Houston plant But In PtuMdel- phia, CME workers continued to use the open- kettle system for ycan to eoma As early aa 19ii, men exposed to BChtBat the 13ridesbucg plant began to die of mpiratory, oncer. Appwreutly the fust to dae was John W. Keeley, a l&yearold penslanr, on Januay 3, 19g5. Another expoaed worker, John W. Suva)a, dted eight days later, at 63. The next exposed worker to become a victim was HaroM P. Mor:is, 41, who died on btarch 12, 19Ns Cyril EnglehardL 54. died two weeks later, and on August 3• Alfred 0. Sli.hrskl, only 33, suo• eumbed to cancer. Thcre wen four more deaths in the next threa years: Eliga IdcQu.<,,, CC, a pseirer and eafeterla worker, died Apri114,195fi• when fre was making §1.g1 an bau; Emll Gciger, a lead burner who was often exposed to BC3fE, died Februarlt.2, 1959; and William J. White, 43, a nratcriala han- dler, died on August 31, 1959. A 29-yearold woman, Doris L Smith, died November 25, 1939, after working num than six y-cars in lab 21. where batches of BC?.IE were analyzed. The next to die wa., •toseph Ramulis,49, a Semi- works kettle opcr.d.or who started at Pwhm r;nd Han in 1943. lfe died Navember 19, 2060, of a brain tumor and lung cancer. On April 24, 19E1, George W. Knorr Jr., 64, died of lung umcer. The to1 bcgar• to rise dramaticaily by 1962. On bfey 2I, Henry Schwarir; thc bult d Ing Six, who doubled his hourly wages lrem 9 to $3.00 during his nine years at the tnmp+ny, of lung eancer. No was only 3$ Ten wecks I- ors August G, Charles F. Epkr, 55, died of 1 cancer. But by November 19G1, Rohm and llaas exi utivcs wcre beginning to. notieo something wrrY in Building Six. By then, 13 had died, ailhoug the company, after a fuli investig.tion of its pe sonnel fdea, had discovered only three ber:auss w•as nof checking worken who had retired or Is the company. Thirteen years later, eompany executivesha~ conflicting versions of just who first noticed tt Inueasing mortality In the building. Myron Longenbcrger, personnel manager ~ the timo, saya, "7Lo personnel dcpartmcnt, in/ better position to see how these deaths wrre as curring than anyone else, noticed what scerned * a coincidence of three lung caneer deaths oe-y Ing arnong empksyes of Building Sie^ Hgngtar Beaven says 1M first to r^. . the late Dr. Robert hlegowan, Br)des~.,_- pbyaician. "It was remarkable that a.l. perceived at all," Beavers saW. 'Aa y..~ knos the.e was an Increasing arnount of eannr In 1sAf adelphia and the cfviliud wor)d wbare peogd ssaoke•' By anJysing a serles of "company confider t41" memus, one eon diaeet tlre alew precesta c gatMling lnformatinn and making decisions ehs wrould. In taet, drag on as the deaths cantinued (e another 12 years. In a mann dated Novemh.r 19,19fS, the fin steps were )aid out elearly enough. The memo was written by Dr. LouisW. Cover a stubiwrn corporate vice president in eLarge c research and the rnan who had opposed inatallinL the closed-kettle system In Building Six a decsd earlier, according to Dr. Beavers. Cov,ert ordere the preparatlon of detailed work htriorin on a the dead merr, and noted that the SloandCelt•_ ~: - Institute In New York City bad agrsed to exw +- o list of chaaicals used at the plant far nrcv- gede properties. One weak later, Dr. Covert and a group of ke; executivrs met at Bridesbisrg to hear a guat ape.fiee, the renownd expert )n rheat disease Dr. Katkeritre Boucot Sturgb• Now 44 she was aleeady the grand old ledy, . Philadclphla medicine and a pionecr in envirc: tmnui health. An authority on TB and arxe Its vlttim, r was director of the dly/s Pubuoeary Neopf+s Researoh Prolect, a I2.yaar study to detarmine them was a)ink bNwear woki:y and eancec. For.15 years, she had routinely visited tIu BrldesbrtrE Pf+ntg studying cheat IC-rays, uonsult )rrgwfthout charge to the danp.ny. For 12 of thoat years,m as ho9d of PHRPr she kad sereened voluntcan hom the 13ridrburg plant at bar offia downtewn. "1'be personnel director, Longenberger, askei me to go up to talk to the top brax about funf eancer," she reolled in an Interview at her anti~ :ro-frlled Main Line home erre day )ut June When I was finished. I aaked them,'Now wh3 did you ask ase here!' "Becauae the reports on our men suCgest there may be lung cancer in one of our buildings, I was told. I re:uember distinctly telling them the fint thing they should do was to be eertain, tc have a tapid epidemioloe-rinl study (study of the Incidence and distribution of disease in a popula, tion) of the men from-the buildinx• but to avert Irystcria, they must also bave a group from am THKP 0005942

By C'i ILLAi2D S. II3.Shr3ALL snd sAcPar;N D. so:nrg©ri A t Matty tt'eryaski's funeral in Auguat of 1939, his widow, Angela, turned to Joe Karcher. one o(Werynskis co-workera who was serving as a pallbearer. "Why dnnt you get the hell out of that plaee?" she aobbed. "The same thing is going to happen to you." But Karcher, like the others, mostly men with limited skills and little eduotion, stayed on at the Rohm and Han plant In the BridMburg section of Philadelphia, piling up the overtime and pursu- !ng the trappings of the good life. "He was a family man," his wile would say Iater. "Hehated Ihe job. He teok a correspondenee course to get a better job. He got his diplama, but then be got sick." When they wheeled Joe Karcher Into his last cumpaaY picnic. friends say, he looked awful, a shell of the 1i5-pound, physically fit man they knew. And when he died on November 9, 1971, at lhe eye of 3 i, hisbu2uII- biit. tough, 2611-pound Bob Pontious-softened for a moment, and turn- ing to his wife, Marie, with tears in his eyes, mur- mured, "btaybe I'LL be next" He var next. But not the fisL ' By the company's own count. 29 men and women employea have died of respiratory tancer after exposure to a chemical calied bis-ehlaro- mctny: eth-r, or BCME The final number of death+ caused by BCME may r.ot be known for many years to come. The company prs-: denl himself says he believes a higher body count is inevitable. But through inter- viewa and examir=fron of dor_mtns, the writers of this article independenelv arrived at a figure of 54 respiratory cancer deaths due to exposure to ~ BCbIF a figure which may prove to be quite lovr as time passes. It is impossible to establish beyond all sclentifk doubt that each individual death in this story was the direr. result of exposure to BCb:E But while conclusive mediol proof in any specific ca:e may be lac`t.ing, and while estimates of the number of deaths may vary, the fact that exposure to BC6IE caused cancer is ne longer divputed. This was not elwa)s so. In fact, then Is strong evidence to sug- gest that, at the minimum, •Se company dragged Its feet, net only in reporting the potential cancer danger to the men, but also in eliminating their exposure to G:e chemical. The harshest inlerpre- tation that the evidence suggests is that over a period of years the huge chcmical firm conducted a campaign to deceive both its emplnyes and the general public of the ECME dar.,-eq finally ad- mittfng the carcinogenic effects only when it be- came iTpr.saihl. to hide them my longer. Th'-. then, is the story of a hi6hly respected chemical f~rm's work with a dangeroun suhstance. It it t_-.e story of men like Diatty Werynski and Joe Karcher, who died from their work. And It is very much the story of Robert Pontious. Robert Pontious was a friendly, powerfully- built man with jutting can who worked for 16 years in Building Six at the Bridesburg plant of the Rohm and Heas Company. One gets an Idea of the kind of tnan be was through a slory told by a co-worker. On January 16,1959, there was "a tremendous exploskn in a storage bin in Building Six," the worker racalls ' "There were beams and tnatarlal flying all over and a fire up on the top floor. I ran like hell for the locker room, but Schrodia (building foreman Al Schroth) grabbed me and Bob Pontious, a Rathane operator on the ground fkxu, and told tn to save the materlal, start getting it into drunu so It wouldn't be lost. A safety man ran in and told us to get the heH nut, the place was on fire. But Schrodie or- dered us up to the top floor to pull the stuff away from the fire." After the blare was extinguished, Myles Dougherty, Pontious' foreman, went back to bis office and wmte out a citation: "Robert Pontious w352 exhibited the basic qualities of a good operator and through his quick thinking and action,under unusual circumstances, eould-possibly have savcd the company further damage of property ... Mr. Pontious quickly shut down his two grinding mills thus stopping further dust and air from going into tT.e danger area. He then stood by awaiting further orderz." Rohm and IIa,-s workers were awace of many risks that went along with their jobs, and wan willing to accept them This waa so partly because of the kind of place ?.ohm and Hais had always been, a place where you wo:ked hard and were paid weLL . The eompany's stem but benevolent patemal- fsm began with its founder, German entrepreneur Otto Haae, who came to this country in 1909. Vnder hts guidaneq the company created new markets and gr.w rieFh with government contracts.. Over the yeara, Its 3nventions and dtstoveriea seemed endless, IL+ growth relentless, its phitan. thropies munificeut Chemicals, pTasGes, synthet- Iq and pharmaceuticals ware produced in abund- anee and sold aroucd the world. Always a pioneer, It invented or was the first to produce new kinds of cusmetie, dyes, varaishes,lnxccticidea and last- drying paints.It Inventcd Plexiglas.It led the way In modern techniques of wine-making and sugar refudng. Today, morc than 20.000 people work for Rohm and Haas. From its modern headquarters at 6th and htarket Streets in Philadelphia, the company embraces some 51 manufacturing planta and 25 foreign subsWlaries and affiliates s, read tlirough 22 countries and five cnntincnts. TF.e family firm started by an immi2rant capitalist Is now the 12th largest chemical company In the worjd. The companys vision led it tn dominate the industry in the develupment of a w'-nule new family of chemlcals, the ion exchange resins. Rohm and Hans turned ion exchange res;na Into a vital part of American Industry, finding new uses for ihcm + in purifying water for nuclear power plants, nu- :- dear subma:irw and watcr treatment facilities and In recovering uranium from low grade ore. . To produce ton exchange resins, the company .. vsed an intermediate chemical, at Snt BCME. + Later the chemical used was CME, whieh con- tained a small percentage of BCh1E as a eontamf- sumt. It was during the boom years of 1946 to 19ig that Fohm and Haas put a team o! researeh chem-' ists to work experimenting with the produclion of BCb1S. - . One young chemist at Bridesburg at the Lfine wes Dr. Ellington Beawrs, now the company's •icepresident for researeh and worker safety and health Beavers is a vigorotn Georgian with a hearly voice who jogs a mile each morning. Since reaeh- . btg the exoNtivqlevels a great deal of Beavers' career In recent yeara has been Involved with BCMK, but in ways he could not have eeet fm- agmed when he worked In the laba alongside men experimenting with the chenucal nearly lwv de,:- ades ago. - "The work was done under hoak with a forced draft that pulled up the fumes, so Il was pretty safe," recalls Beavers. "But one day, one of the chemists, Fred Bittner, spilled some of the stuff on his pants. It ate thens away. He simply put on F."-'zb caat and went out and put on another pair . i•usnra° . :he Incident was quickly overlooked as BCME moved rapidly fnto production In 1948 in theSami- vrorks, a Lrge pilot plant at Bridesburg. "1 remember that vividly," .ays Becvers. Tm aware because I was Irritated by ehe BC3fE It had a sb.vpellect that constricted the throu, made you catch your breath. It was very unpleasant to .• breatha" lnthekaba.BCMEhadbeenmadetnBasksthe . size of basketballs. In the Semiworks, workers . produced it In 100.gallon kettles, open uuldrons front wMch futxs billowed up as ehemieah wera added and stirred. Despite the fumaa, and despite emphatic posted instmctfons. Beavers says, the men never wore gas masks. - - "It waa brmdo. It wroufd hare been an ad- mfrsfon of a)aek of virility If they woee them_ I know I never wore one.° In 19SO, production of pure BCME was ),alted. It wos eating away the kettles. The chemists came up with a subsUlute. CMr:, containing two to eight percent SCME For a while, part of the process was mered to Building R•1I, to its own rrcn- corro.aive kettka Fortyone men worked on lt there. Finally, one building aaa found where the proces>es could be combined. It waa called Build- 1ng5ix,litertobec.lledtheDeathHouse4ysome of llre m.n who worked there.It was rexlly a huge shcd, with round kettles.et on cros.cd bc:.ms that THKP 0005943

54 C'iT_0)311"sI7 rontintrcd touch, a, she had rtco:nmr,ul.d nearly two years earlier, with Dr. Norton Nvtson at N.Y.U. LnnpenSerger was a confirmed brGever in chest %-ray'a ani felt that itotnn and Haas' par- ticipati,,u in the X-ray project was adequate. "1 thoul:ht LS.it was more than euougb;' Longen- bcrger says. N,.noaheless• he received p.:rmission to Invite Dr. Ne'.:.m. the world's leading expert in lung cancer rrse:,r,h, to the Bridriburg p'ant On July 28, 1961, f.:,r.genberger went to a lunch that in- ehtded Dr. Sturgis, Dr. Nelson and Dr. David Gold.tcin, Ndson's assistant "/ re.ne•.nber the lunch w<ll;' recalls Dr. Sturgis. "SVhat happened .•• is what earnmwrly happens: science suspects managem.nt's matives." The luncheon meeting began negotiations be- tween Rohm and Haas and Dr. Nelson that ended nine months later In an impasae. During the course of the protracted negolia- tions, three more men at the Brklaburg plant died of respiratory cancer aRer exposure to BCh1E In addition to F1oyd Wright, they were William J. Buadlowslu, 50, on Febwry 24,1905, and Thomas Hills, 53, tirst exposed to BCS1E in the Setn.i- worln in 19ag, on April g,1N.5. Both the company and Dr. Nelson nov agree that the only obstacle to Nelson's doing the study was his belief that he should have the right to publish his 8ndings According to a company memarandum an the negotiations: "Dr. Covert's conclusion was that 'we had no reoourse but to wilhdnw.'" When Dr. Sturgis leprned that the negotiations had broken davm, she recalls, "It really shook me up." "Iater, I heard the reason Robm and Haas d:3r: t ta :e i:orwn idel.•oa's proposal was that he was rather abrasive, aggressive, hostile in the way he said he wouldn't undertake the study unless, --whatever :he results, he could publish them." It was the same complaint the company "uld voiee about another doctor who became interested in the BChfF, deaths. Dr. Sturgis says she did not hear from Lnngan- bergrr again until receiving a telephone call 16 months later, in December 1966. "He said the company wanted to give me sometlting, some money.', turned him down at fust I told him I didn't want to pay incoau taa on it What he wanted to g: •e me xs pcaauts. : It must have been because of wiat I was doing for them at PNBP. I told Loagenbergs that if he wanted to give me anything at all, make out the check to Women's Medical Ceflep to be used tn the department of envizvnmautsi medicine, when I was chairman by that tima" Dr. Sturgis says that thete ware two checlo- one dated December 9,1966, for $1,SOO, the other 'JanuarY 18, 1998, for another 61,5g0 - "to be used for a graduate summer fellowship.^ ~_ . e e Dr. Sturgis says that between 1964 and 1968 ~ she was not consulted uy Rohm and Haas. In the meantime, the company began negotiating with a Hazleton laboratorfes, of Falls Church, Va., to do ~ the study, but it would take two more months be- fore lluletan submitted a written proposal to ~ Rohm and Haas on July 27.1985. Thc terms were much morc to Rohm and Ilaas' t liking: in tt:c proposal. Hszieton su,gested and d Rohm nnd f Iazs agreed that the best way to i.olnte ~ the canccr-cau,ing substance was by testing mice. Year.a later, in Senate testimony. Rahtn and _ Haas presiatat Vincent Gregory would attempt to discredit the Hazieum atudy by calling thc n:icc "cana•r-p;ou¢." Yun¢thdesv, Itnzh;tun candudcd the vs-ry test ordered by the cumpany, a:ul the resulls, which showed three times the normal cancer rate among the mice, was tvns:dar..f highly significant, accmding to JamxGargas, man.'klcr of the fiazieton sttuly. "We tri<d to get the re:,uhs quickl}•-etut was our objective," says Carg,u "We described In our propa.;.1 what we were going to do and they aPproved 1L" Hazleton also agrecd that "it Is understood that this proposd is pmvided on a eonfulcnti:d baus." Harleton would only make public what Rohm and Haas wanted made public. There was one other important differenec be-. tween the Hailrton and N.Y.U. proposals: the price tag was $107,300, lesa than one-third the amount Dr. Nelson said he would nead to do a eomprebensive study. Dr. Costrt signcd theHarle- ton contract the day after he received It It would be nearly Ig months nmre •before Haslc4ott made a preliminary report. lgaanwhilq anoHer worker, William H. John- aon, a yard laborer and plant trucker, died Octo- ber 28, 1965. Two months later. ms December 27, Alfred Santae, a S2.84 an hour wrorker in fab 12, became the 22nd lung cancer victim to have been a .- • ~ ~ ra Qr. Karhelw gaueat gnr.'u„ a panear N.n.+rannsn- Yf ManA was oontaetad by me mmpanr'o 1962 aaour eantwAaatM 7n gul6np 9ut esyosed to BCME, and the fifth ainee the tedious negotiatioru began with Dr. Norton Nelson. When a preliminary Hazletnn report finally arelved at Rohnt and Haas on December 15, 1968, tt said the search had narrowed to nine chetnicalg with CMG and BCITE at the top of the lisc. The preliminary Hazlcton report showed at least four workers had died after expasure to known or highly suspect carcinogens such as chromium. Dithane, napthalaminr and three other chemicals From Building Six: Psrthane, Rothane and Kelehane, members of the carcinogenic DDT family. The report also Included a coded Gst from the company of the 23 cancer victims from various buildings. 14te number w•as far more than the number of eanc"r cases divni_,ed either to Dr. Sturgis or Dr. Nelson for studies before or after 1965. However, the Hazletonn rrmrt also chided Rohm and Haas for lack of eandor in supplying complcte and accurate datn or. chemicals. `There Is an clement of inaccuracy invol in the accumulation of known ehcmicwl eor.toe thc repurt stated. In addition to lung ca,cers, It chronicled He ki,is dixa<v, 4wkemia. and cnncers of the hrw kidneys, nasal passages, larynx, inle.tinta : pituitary glands, - It also included one death of inesothciioma that time an extretmly rare and always fatal It of cancer of the chest cavity caused esclusi, by prolonged exposure to asbestos, a cancerc ing substance apparently not used at Bridcakr Meanwhile, it was time for the company move out of its drab brick headqua~ters build on West Washington Square into a more sty: 13-flaor building overlooking Independence B On the afternoon of February 2, 196: d Rohm and Haas exeeutives wen summoned fr meeting fn the rich, rosewood paneled boardx of the new headquarters atbth and Market Stre Dr. Sturgis, slso invited, recalls how Gnpra: she was with the new buitding, the large room elliptleal table, , Up frerrt Falls Chutch, Va., pme Dr, Haa':, himself nnd his team of reaear<hen to make , report, illustrating key points with attdes f1a5 by a projector. In the studys first phase, the Inhalation te gramps of 10 Swira miq wen housed togethss a plastic cylinder. YLey wera eapnsed to BC vapors at what were then considered average dustrial exposure levela--ga parts of BCStE each mt7liam patb of air. All died in Bve d: The dose was rrdme.d by half. Still, half seeond group of mlee died in sevat days. TI 50 rtewbore mice were exposed to each of tf» r suryect chemicala up to 130 days. But the t exposed to BCMZ didn't last anywhere near long: Of 50 exposed at the infudtesinnl doa ane part per nullmq 37, or 74 percent, were d fruide 95 days. "Of the 37 anima]a," read James.~,atgas, lta tons proJect manager, "26 exhibited ... a* sidenble number of tumorm and 11 othe. sho. pinpoint hemorrhagp. The movtality dats ir aated BCMGlreated animals had a signiReer higher mortality than the control animais° wl animals treated with other subst:.tos froro Ro and Haas showed no sipti6cant differaneas A total af 64 kmg turnas was foutd lu 45 r btfected with BCMIL '1Senoors developed vrl the needles fstJaeted the subatance "in mere ; 590 control mice of this strafq we h.vw not served similar lesions In :nr-monthold anim The peopae araund the boardroom table mixed zeactions: the Haasas vrere su/ftetmtly pressed to go ahead wdth, they would Iater. . $6.S millioo in fmprovements over the ttext f years m"button up" the C315 proasa Aeeord•ing to EBington R..ven' 1975 wn of that meeting, however, BCMB still hadn'e bproven earelnogenie The company had sp $100,000 and $ve years to arrive back at the-pr of the warning lsswd 23 years earlier by L Chanicel Company In 1952: that BCffiE was 9 tating and disagreeable." In any ase. Rahm and Haa, did not tell men In 1967 ihat Hazleton Laborator[es I fdetttiBed HQ,1S as a tause of cancer. Dr. Norton Nelmn, who wasnt invited to boardreoret meeting at Robm and Haas, nevert leu was intensely lnteiested In the Har7emn fi ings fater, when Beavers belittled the tests, I son would observe, "It's not fair to say the I cedure was Invalid. It was not as powerful a ts nique as ours, but'it was o stgns) w•hich should have been disregarded" . The signal didn't take long reaching one 1 THKP 0005944

54 V1i:II L'dL$I contiuucd other building" She alsu remrnsbcrs advising: "Theres a man at \.Y.U.. Dr. Nortoa I:clvm. Call him in to do a^:mnl cxpcrimentatiun. Eic's a brill'emt man. He kr.ows a grcaT dcal about lozi<olngy., " When fG.rton \clsan finally did get ineo!s•ed, it would bc ta announce perhapa the most dramatic revela- tion of his career. Before the gentlemen escused her. Dr. Sturgis oficred to add l00 mrn from Bridcsburg to the ei:y-subsidued smoking study, and to seroen 211 chest \-rays taken at tho plant the year before. She also agreed, she says, to or.e unusual request: to send all medical reports rot to the men or to theis persanal physicians, but to Dr. bIcgowan, the plant physician. On December 8,1962, the company now insists, It "warned" 117 men of the cancer harard in Build- big Six. In a memorandum• the personnel depart- ment noted that it had becn unable to schedule tv.ro mcn, Walter Srablewski, 39, and Arthur ParfitL 34, both of whom were "absenL major stsrgery." The surgeries were for lung cancer. Neither man would survive. What the company now calls a"srarning" to the nien of the lung ceneer risk was tenned ln a memo at the time simply "a statement to introduce [he subject to dtis group of empleyes."The subject was Dr. Sturgii PNRP X-ray study. In retrospect, the wording of the warning be- eomea a striking document on the subject of worker-employe communications. The f rst half oE the statement concerns tuber- eulosts. Then, without mentioning that Dr. Slurgia; study concerned >aneer in the workpiaee, Rohms and Haas assured the men that she "has reviewed our data on plant people who ha.•e died during the past ten years and has slated that our incidence of deaths due to lung cancer is below avenge for the city." Dr. Sturgis denies saying that; she notes that her study had included only man 45 and older and L*.at it had not yet been completed. L-t any case, none of the workers and former workers interviewed in recent months could recall any warning in December 1962, although a num- ber recahed the chest X-ray program which began later that same month. - The man were shuttled by cab from Bridesburg to 311 South Juniper £;reeL then the headqwrters of the TB and Health Association. After being questioned by Dr. Sturgis, they met with her as- sistant, Dr. William Weiss, who wotild also become an important figure in the lung cancer drama that was beginning to unfold rapidly. Dr. Weiss says he asked the men basically the same questions that were asked of the 6,000 vol- unteen in the program: "Do you have a cough at Iha preser.t t?r..e... h:a it gotten worse in the past ~ six months... have you coughed up blood ... how = many years have you smoked?" X In the meantime, the company embarked on a ~ lobbying strategy that in future years would have jj a profound and personal impact on the widows a and children of workers who died of BChfE. The ~ maa primarily responsiAle for that strategy .:•aa t one of the two seN of the c4:nD,tny \ founder. ft¢p WhenthecompanywasfoundedbyOttoP.ohm• a Stuttgart chemist, and O:ta Hnas, a banker- entrrpreneur. only the lattvr cotne tn Anr:ea. z Tr.e c!der Haas was an austere man who rn<Ie a g< strectcar when his wnrth was in the millions. y Ween he dled in 1959. he divided nil company I ar.d his fart:me abm=t rq:m!!y `.,w.-.n hs two sons (cach is cunscrvalirely estimated to be worth "I'd betn working at Rahm nud lfaat sinae 194 $300 million today). John concerned hims.•If with in tbe nsechanical gang. I always tried to avok finance and personncl. Otto with tnarkating and Building Sis, but eouldn•L I had os go in to pad research pumps. I'd be tearing apart a gear reducer on: Fsrly in 1963, F. Otto Haas, a longtime mem- kettle agitator on the fifth floor and the sire ber of thc board of dircetors of Pemvyh:.nia wauldrooHandwhatthchcllwcrcyouwppos, Stanufacturers Association, went to the E'b1A w•ith to do? You couldn't go down, beeause dmt's wheec a"problem." it wea, so you'd run out nnm the fire escape fq Paul Fergusoa, house counsel and secrctary of 20 minutes or so. . PMA xt the time, recalls the episode: °Hc came ^Iftlreytoldyoutogolotoabuilding,youwee to us, Otto did, and be asked if we could be help- a, If one of the glaa-Eincd kettla developed'' ful in having Icgish,tion passed. We were able to crack, the forr•man would say go down and fiz tht get this legislation introdueed." or that and I'd know that the kettle was suppose Otto's problem, simply, waa that Rohm and to be ampty, and they were 25 feet deep. Hass, like many other industries, had to pay in- -•rd go over Ihe foreman's head, call the saW surance premiums to protect Its executives against , lawsuits arising from the deaths, injuries, or dis- oasn and say,'Dump this kmtle. But I used to ~ abling occupational diseases of its emplopes. ~htions. 1 got sl!es In rny eyes no nulier bm For 48 years, from 1913 to 1083, when a worker careful I was. CL7B left a sweet Wte En yaa or his widow accepted workman's oompensation mouth, you'd alttorb It In your pores and al paymenta, he muld not we the torpmation. B•tt manths latcr you'd swnt in bed at night and ye Otta was onnarned beeause the vrorker or his wt- ro"H ~n snKll Rohm and Haas. Hvor could accept compensation and then suea 'Building Six was a kind of punishment bufk memploye, such as Myron Longenlserger or the fM. Il was s constant dangec Thase op¢ralorz lu plant director or Otto Haas himself, fnr that no pr^toNlon- W.d go in Building Six, but we' mattn, mt It shorL We figured it wouldn't blow up wht Amendments to the VlorkrnenS Compensati n we wrre.ln there. But those operators were i Act of 1915 and the Occupational Diseases Act of there eight bottn a day or mare. They looked lEk 1939 would save the company money on Insurance walking aombies.lltere'ano job lo theworld lital In addition to protecting corporate executives from worth tbaL lawsuits by workers or their widows or survivon. `One thing I do know, there was no smokir ' On Marcb 25, 1963. Otto's wish was trans• In Building `+loe or En mori of the buqdings, G Dr. Strargts becar:e alarmed its 1,04, and once more Cr(,fBCd Er1e cOE'2ilaf2y to contact Dr. R7eFsen and begin tests on animals. tlut ttmtter. Therp was no opportunity to srnok And we didn't ever hsve enough vrnrk eloLhe They'd rot, they'd disintegrate in the washing m ebitte. My wife, Maria, bad to do the baby ehitq separately in a wrhagar tub. •If you cut your hand, you were told, 'Dor. report IL Your department vron't win the aateaward lhis year.' And if you went to the plant do tor, hed any right off,'You didn't get it hera.' "There was a joke around the plant that the was nothing at Hobm and Haas that would hu you. It migbt kill you. But it would-s't hurt ye . "I guess I was a bad boy. I always felt they hs formed into a pair of bills introduced into the State •caHous disregr.rd for htanen lives and I usual Senate. . ssid what I thought. It burned me ,sp. Those gu. The lwu bills couned through the Senate and- -`nse dadicated'to Robns and Haas. They wrork- House and on August 1 were signed into law. bard and they d'idtt't ask much from life. W It was a great victory for Pennsylvanla's lndus- couMn't Robm end Haas be dedicated to then trlalists In general and for the exeeuttva of Rohm When Mawn took a• test to get into a sup and Haas in particular. . virory, sehooling program and was told he fhmE . e e .% ba: was not aRowed to see his score, he went "I knem pnys who died .nhile I vsa then. his bos• Fred Morovek, and sald, "I qufl" "' 4 • semetimer, thera .oare two guys at once. Pd taRupmybuddy:..andhe'dsay,'Guesaudw died!' I finegy saw too tnaap nanraa up on the board and decided to get oteL" .-Bobe:t IDason, fornnr BoGtn and Hass osschaafc While Otto Haaa worked for changes in the mmperuation act, the personnd department was sending, In a8- 180 employea downtown for X- rays. Some of them became III and died. - After Srablewski and Parfstt in 1981, three more vrorkers died in 1964: William H. Mullen, 64, on April 2g; Paul Auman, 49, svho made $.6S an hour when he began working in Semiworks in 1941, on May 11; and Floyd Wright. 44, who worked In Lab 12 for 13 years, on October 27. These latest death; brought to 18 the num- ber of victims in ten y-e.,rs and led to a rash of transfers out of Building Six. Many tried to got into the unionized meelunical department. Some wrorkers• like mechanic Dob Mason, began to Ihink of lea:•ing the comPany, its good pay and fringe benefitx. _ You e ceay, Morwek told me. . "Ito: "I aiid.'You are.' And 1 walked out eI didn't have a job when I left. and my w tsted for a week. We laat our houss But I Itat I was doing the right Ihingg rm still alive. ORvo years after Ileft, I had a terrible pain my groin My testicles were swoHon, one of the like a basebaEl, and I.rs »rirsaCtty blood. 'I went to the doctor and he asked me la many Idds I had. I aaid fivw He said.'Gond, I ause you71 never bave anymnre!'rhey bad ramovc nne Wtiele.'I•hat shook me up, and r been wortied ever sina. "But the doctor said I war luclty, beeanae the poiwrs In your system hit your kidneys, would have killed you. I told him rd been wot Ing with chcmEcals and asked if that could be Ile aaid it was possible, but try to prxr il." On July 16, 1964, Dr. Sturgls became alarm at reports of the continually risiny death toll Bridesburg and called personnel director Ntyr Longetslscrger. She strongly urged that the co p+ny get going with anhtul studies and get ~ ~ '"" THKP 0005945 +--

54 <JY:0 ial.r7 c+.ntinuvd "Yeah, I guess so: Poor guy." `They weren't eonnrctiug anything," says Ol- ee.u a daughter, Jnann. '"fhey had no idea it was something they were working with. Everybady thought it wai an act of Ood." Larry Olcese and his brother, Joe, and John D'Akssandro had driven to work together in a ear pooi every dsy- from their row houses in Soulh- w-est Philaac:;hia. Thcre were few Bohm and Haas workers front the area, su they made sure they got the s,iae shifts. The oniy nigLt they didn't eome straight hame was Friday nights. e-hen they'd meet one of the o:her guys from Building Six. Edward "Chappie" Keplan, and go scmewhere for drinks and sl:ufaeboard with others from the CME gang- Larry Oicesc had started with Rohm and Hau shortly aftcr be fuished serving on the USS lous In the Pacific. He'd married Mickey during the war and they lived In the little house an Gten- nrore Street where ahe'd lived all her life. He started at Robm and Haa, wheee his oldee brother, Joe, works, when he was 25, at 51_SO an hour. He was a big, tightly-muscled man of 2113 pouods They put him immediately in Building Six, worki.ig with DDT untii it was discontinued In the mid-1930s, and then with CSI& He worked in Building Six for 24 ye.rs. He was especially close to John D'Alesaandro. Wh.a his second daughter, Pat, was born, he aaked Johnny to stand for her as godfather at the 1oca1 parish ehurch, Our Lady of Ia»tto, and the klda always called him "Uncle Johnny." D'Alessandro and Okese dtscusscd evetything about work In the car to and from work, D'Alea- sandro says, "and there wasn't any 1962 warning or my buddy Larry .vould have-talked about itr "My daddy didn't like to go to work," recalls 'Aa.nn Kr:'d a!.cays tty to L-et vut of it. e..clvodic would call and say to my mother,'SYhat'a it this . tune!' and shed say,'Sante old thing.' "He got alang better with Sch_rodie than most .- of the man. Schrudie was all right in his way if - he knew he couldn't push you around. 'I remember when I was a little girl, we went out to the plant once, all dressed up, for an open house. Tney'd been cleaning it up for a year, everything was freshly whit.washed, and the men stood around next to their kettles, whkh were filled with :rrter. and tl.e wives all tat the ldea how hannles, the jobs were. ' "Bohtn and kass wvuld have Christmas parties -. for the kids up at a ttic ner In Brid.abarg. One of the men would dreas up like Santa Claua and give out presents, stockings with eandy caar and coloring books and enyor.a. We didn't knew our fathers were paying for jt, tad Utete were coto- pany pirnin once a yev, with amvsement ddes and races and watermelon and pitchers of beer. The men my daddy warked with always at to- gether. "I thoueht _°.ch-t ad Hra: waa a pretty geod ^ company then, when I was a kid." F Several times over the years, Larry Olcesa ~ would ceme home and say, "Hon, I reany got a dose today." Or.e day in May, 1970, he said he'd a bad a slabbing chest pain. He went to the doctor, ~ who said l.e had to have surgery. It was caneer. "We always voted on everything, and we voted ~ on the operation. My mother was against it and so was I. We knew that if y"'+ exposed the can- 1 cer it might go like wildfire. But my father said, C'if I have a chance to live, I want the o,xration.'" ~, He entered St Agr.e¢ Hospital in South Phila- a delphia and went into surgery on May 22, 1970. r. "Tne dnetor sard he never saw a w'orse case of I eanccr. One lung w:s gene at,d liveo-quartera of the wall of his heart w•as eaten away." One of his buddie. from Building Six, Sam Nixon, eame by to visit O!a.m in the hospital. ylr kneu- he also had canecr, but he would live an- other two years. In June, Larry Olcete went hornc. He never complained of the pain. his daughter Joann said, "only of a little discomfort. But I could tell he was in agony by the way he movcd4 he writhed around; and he took so much morphine. "He was only supposed to take or.e morphine tablet every three hours, but he was taking three of them every hour so the doctor put hisn on Per- eodon and he was w-oMing them so I called and told him I was worried he'd become addicted. 'Don't worry,' he told me, 'Your father doesn't have enough time left to become add'icted' "He pretended that he was getting better. He had Uncle Joe take him out to the plant to visit the guys in the locker reosn. 'I'll be back in Sep. tember, rm just taking a kttle vacatIon."Yeab,- aure,' they said, 3ave a nk» vauticn.' " "All that summer, we had the i¢-conddioner an 24 hours a day, and at 3 in the raorning. Pd go down and find my father rocking- on the front pareh. 'Just tryingg to get a little air; he'd say. 'Toward the end, he got yellow iaundiee, he looked awful, but he wanted to go to Delaware Park, he loved to play the poaies. So I took off work and put him In the back sest with a couple of pillows. He rmde it up to the window himself and placed his own bet. And he was an mad be- eause he was a loser. He said,'Next week I want . to go to Hial.oh and win.' Only next week never tama "One of the stde - effeets of the cancer was he got diabetes," Joamr Oleese contmucd. "On August 8, he went to the doctor and his biood sugar was up ove* 400. The doctor put him in the buryital to get it down. - "T\w days later, Wednesday morning, they had to call the priest for last rites. "Nhen I walked in the raom, Ma said, '1've been here for three boum and he hasn't said a wcrd, he hasn't opened his eyes' `Well, I waa his baby, and I tiptoed ovar to him and took his hand md said, •Pm hera now, Daddy-' "'Yes, I know that,' he whispered'It's okay.' " And then he die4When they buried Larry Oitwe a few days later at Holy Crn•s Cemetery. it was a peaceful, beautiful day, and Johnny D'Aleaandro helped earry his coffin. e e . In early IB71, executives at Bohm and Haas .wre srorried. The eompany's net earnings had mppl.d 24 percent the previous year, the fourth decGne In net eusatgs In five ycars. The exeeu- tt.es were engaged in a major shakeup at cerpo_ ate headquarters and at plants all over the warld Bor 51 yean, the emphasis had been on re- wreh and the growth It preduced Now. In this very bad year, was the L'..ta for a radical change In dlrection. T. Otto Heas, in an unuwal move, kidced him- self upstairs after a decade as president and im- ported from Europe a small, aggressive, tough- talking salesman, Vincent Gregnry, then 47.Over night the thrust changed from growth and new product development to thrift and efficient man- agement In the shakeup, E1lington Beavers, elected a viee•president in 19iQ became vice-president of the research division in 19141 as well as corporate vice-president for health protcetion, a new tit4. If 1971 was a bad year at 6th and Market, it was even worac inside Building Six at Brides- burg. In fact, It was the worst among many years of cancer deaths. Tl.erc were nine more funeraS: in ten months: Fdword F. Matuszewskt 32; 1}1- w-ard Gahcl, 57; Egid Sch,nid. 70; Gerald K_Sznjri~ 63; Hrrbcrt Merx; Jacob Armstrong, .S&, Leo.Rieei 62; Charles Hoek; and Joseph Karcher, 37. "After he died," says l:archer's widow. Lnn elta, "quite a few men quit. When he got sick: that was when things started to roll. The buildin/ w.u clo..edd down and converted" -- klrs Karcher, left to raise two ehildren-Joey: then seven, and Karen, nine-said her husband knew all the men who were dying but felt It. wouldrit affect him because he'd never.mokr.i as others had. "He was always In good physicatl sba;~ weighed 275 pounds, never smoked. He wea =n honest ntan, never took a day off, except in :- - spring of 1971 when Joey broke an arm. lie sm- .' he d pick up Joey at the hospital even if It rnas-.t losing his job_ If you took a day off, you had sa have a helluva good reason, `It took Joey two years to reslise his faUter wasn't coming back. During the six months hM fether was dying, hc was in a whedchair. The . kids would calll him 'Irmstdes.' That madehim laugh. "He.was a family maa He kept the job be- taauae he bad to supportt a family. He hatedtbd job. He took a correspondeoce eovrse to get a be+ ter job. He got his diploma, but then he got sick: A neighbor and old friend, Ed Lewandowsk. saw 8.rcher'a dechne. "F1rat, I remember seeishiar at a picnic at Clementon. He told me he ha: a cold he caddn't shake. Then, a couple of mouth before he died, I saw him again." By then, Karehee had lost 65 pounds. 'He took my hand, squaeud It and aaid,'Prr for me. F.d, pray for me. I got IotneG,ing teal L:~ I saw hiam once more. II stopped over to the tdho and he eouldnt even get up. Christ, he was lito a little old man and he was only 37.° - On November 9, 1971, Joe Karcher died. H- had worked throughout his 13 years at Bohm am Ha.s in Building Six and had made itt to shlt foreman by the time Mikeit?oyanos'rJ died ihre years eartter. '"1'he foremen get Et all over and they get I wont," says Hank Janik, 36. former foreman ' the Ditkane building, which, with Building 5 and Semiwarks, was one of three buildings Brldesbu.^g with the high.at numbers of deat: and diseasest "'111te fonrnen snon around a It They're exposed to evory9fing:". ILmk Janik and a lot of other men finally h: seen enough death and dying by 1971 to get o.. "Phere were about 40 that got out in 1971 ar about 100 between 1971 and'T2," Irronically. Janik, 32 when he left, thought h was lucky his ttmlical problerns started In his lat twrentia. 'Z was lueky, I toald get out But 11 guys who ware 40. Lhey had faadliar, they wa l.ooked, the7P r:ouldn't "I saw weryone getting cancer and heart a tacks and all that and I figured I was young y4 and I got out^ ' He left, he says, not only because of the nuc bar of mcn dying, but also because of the nun ber always sicY around him. 'Abnost everyoru had a hiatal hernia (a pn trusion of the stomach into the esoPhagus th: makes eating and swallowing diff.cli:). A gor dose of Dithane, a thick white Pow'der, wrou give you the runs for two, three days. And 1 g rashes all over In the summer.. .. "When it came to safety, snythieg yuu ask, THKP 0005946

a"'!'t.. t' !S. :. • s t f_uRowvo sn,dg.when_tba_prug_ranr ended_'•r-ieh was no nwnc ~ Y." hc ays„ adding he was'aonoyad h jv~c Rr•hrrt A. Kuuin, the Ruhen and liaa. ~' cFemia whn helped decelup the new fau,i!y ,d cSrn:inl. callyd ion exch,+.m;e tes- ins in tbr 19:~~s. sti!1 gct: excited when he thinhs nl.•ut thcm. "R'ii::,•ut thmr;' be drdare.+,"thc A•Icnnb, the IIL.rr.,b, ncclt•ar prn.er plants nnd atomic suhm::icr; wu_Id have hear impos>ible.•• He a:lis tbai tLry F.nve ai•o qainul trrmFndnus in- du.tri.d imyx:ance, hclping in the rrf,ning of tl,e produ<tion nr wine and su~tar, in rer.rocir.g inrpcritics frurn water used in commercial and home heaten and bnilers. Kunin and his colleagues at the Bridesburg lubs of Rohm and Haasdeveloped BCM&E to we in the intermtdiate stage of making the resin. While the substance is afe enough for Dr. Kunin or anyone else to handle once it is mixed with styrene beads, in the intermediate manu- letttuing steps it is su pustic that Rohm and H.an had to stop using pure BCMr- - it was eating away the machinery - and switch to CMR, which still contained up to eight percent BCME as an inadvertent and unavoidable con- taminant Working to lower this percentage after the men started to die from BCME fumes, the chemists got the amount of BCME in CME down to one-half of one percent - still 60,000 times the concentration NYU scientists found would cause caneer in nts. §-: W i-10 'D?v!~ cor,tinued' I of the plant the engineering department, where for five years reports had been flying on this and that proposed modifuation to the CME operation. Now, slow9y, a new brick wing was built around Build:ng Six and cement partitions were irst+lled and g edualb•, over rhe next three yeara, the kettles finally were closcd. The workers had petitioned for fans and by February 1965 the company began designing a better ven0ilat'.on system, but it would be nearly another year before vents were actually installed It was not u:!!1 IIlr-rch 3,1967, ona month after the Haaleton report an: ten yean after the con• cept was introduced in Semiworks, that Rohm and Hasa prepared a cost estimate for a ekaed kettle system for Building Six. - F-tve months later, the closed kettle LxstaDation began in Building Six and two months after that, on October 24• 1957, the company finally installed - a fan in the chloromethylatiod aret Meanwhile, the body count from respiratory cancer began to a<ce:erate e+"n awre npidly. Dn ~ February 23, 1967, Ella Geiger, a retired glass it washer who had been exposed to BCh1E, diedi on Uarch 29, George Herau, 54, who was exposed to• ~ BCME as a material handler and Building R-11 d operator, died: and a month later, on April 27• a' Anthony S7.talnick, 67, who was exposed in SemF y works and Building R-12, died of lung cancer. On January 25, ]SGg, Michael J. Troyanoski, ~ 44, who made 51.97 an hour when he moved into f Bullding Sia in 1955, and later beqmc shift fore- ~ man, died of lcn: cancur, and Bub Pontious moved ~ up tou,porarily to the samc position. lle welcomed 8 LSeectra 13 cents an hour. He had six kid.- . On Feh.unry 3, nine days alter Trnyanaski .°- dicd, John P!i_k, v:ho was only 34, died of hmg . \ F Since July,1971, Rohm and Han researchers bave been working to come up with a safe aub•' atitnte for CMfi Exccutives declined to give any details, but predict it will be 1930 by the time it can be perfected, tested and put into production. In the meantime, the E50,000,000 a year ion exchange resin business continaes at four Rohm and Haaa plants in Ameriea. Europe and Japan. : canarc. IIa too was ftv:n Lta• CSEE gang in_R•.u?d- ing R-11. One of the first to know that Mike Troyanoskf was going to die was Dr. William Weiss, Dr. Slurgis part-time assistant on the Pulmonary Neoplasm Research Project on snmking. Twice a year, Troyanaski had clim4ed into a cab with his buddies for the ride to Juniper Street for the ques• tions and the X-ray. WSen Weiss s-rd otted LSe lesion on Troyanosld's lung, he sent the form letter to Dr. Megowon, the plant physician, who forwarded it to pcrsonnel di-sctor ]Jyroo l.ongenberger be- fore Troynnoski and his G.ni1y found out At least three others '<t ehe 14ray proL't•otn- Paul Auman, Tom Hilis and Bill Budzlosvski, aB CL7E worken in the old days in Semiwarks-had developed cancer during the screening program_ Weia each time routinely notified the company. He ays he attached no particular significance to the deaths because they were workers from Semi- works, not Building Six, and he had not been told BC6:E was used in Senuw•oriu as weB. In bfateh 1969, the Philadelphia Pulmonary Neoplasm Research Project came to an end after more than Bw 5-aars. The progmm, which bad been detecting cancer eases at Bridesburg, had cost Rohm and Haas only the wbfare; all the X-ray costs for five yuars for 120 people had been paid for with public mozey. CoinadcntaD o-~e P-oh..r ar.d Hass cxeeutis•e ervia on ~ 0 rM a d _ e t Assoe hon uring tmxit of this period. ,yron ngennerger, cie personner mrector ac Bridcsburg, the man wh•r received the X•rays and mte:SleAa an the mQn who w-lre teit•.•d w•aa a director of the association fronm Dlarch 2964 to- March 1970. {i ' Weiss, asociate direet Phihd•1 h' PS1feP v p4-lcd the t at Longeabrrger simply thanked him fur, thr intormation but nevcr offurcd to do anything mtut about the deatha. Myron ):.ongcnbergee was nearing the end a' his steand ternt ss a director of thu avociatier in 1969, and he was fighting a 1as4dilch battle tc keep the X-ray nwbiles rotling- hr November 19% be attended his last board mecting. One director newly on the board then• a yourif nd-ha~rcd physician, Dr. William Figueroa, re caRs, f.ongenbcrger seemed to be fighting fa much more than the chest X-rays, conslderin1 8rere was already a great deal of evidence tha; they did more harm than good-' Therte was, In fact, evidence that regular X sari evcr a long period of years, Instead of detect fog tubereuloeis or fung tumors, might cause can- ter. Lnngenbcrger rcealls Ihat his concern was fm gower•inmme groupc "Where you have minerf tks, as in the ghettees, then waa slRl TB, i feh sure, and I didn't think the assodation should gw ouL" Imtead, langenberger, a director through tht ycars of Rohm and HaaJ "captive" sludy, gos out He did not stand for re•eleqion ln 1970 and ilk not attend his last four board tneetings. Within several years, Dr. Weia would asstsi his former student, Dr. Flguvoa, In obtaining in format!on from Rohm and Haos on Ihe cx-xm deaths. Together. Wela and Flgueroa would pub. lish a landmark study of the respiratory eance deaths at Bridesburg, Yet, strangely, today Dr Wsiss keeps the records of the PNRP project It his home, refusing to reveal thens on,the ground: of "eonLdentiality" of the names of the dead. ani promising to mske every effort tn keep rhetr secret While Rohm and Hras was buttoning up tht plant front 1966 to 1970, aix more men died oa respiratory cancer. After John Flick eame Davic A. Reeves, 45, on March 28, 1966- On August 22 1968, Albert W. Ash, who worked in Building R-11 for 22 years, died at 55. Clarence AfeNary, 57, a materials handler, died September 3, 1966. Are tonlo DiNardo, a 77-year-old petuiouer, died Janu ary 5, 1969, and aix months later, on July 29,1969 Matty Werynski, 54, died. The 33rd apparent vic tLe of BCb'fE was William Blue, a materials ban dler, who died oe November 13, 196A Matty Werynski, one of the close clan f.ron Building Six In the mid-1950a, left four children Hio-widow. Angela, has remarried, but shc stil hasn't forgotten the way Malty used to cane hom, coughing and slck. "But he just went back, he hac a fatnily to suppmt like everybody elu," she says The 1970s began with fiee more lung ea--teer deaths: Stanley Kufiok, a tnatertal, handler and lab 12 janitor, was 60 wltm he died on February 15, 1970. Larry Olttse, a Building Six operatot for 20 yaars, was 49 wlw. ]te dicd on August 4, 1970. Three weeks later, on August 30, Stanky More:. 55, who was exposed In Semiwarks and Building R-12, died, and three weeks after that, on September 23,Joseph T_ klartin, 62, a materIn(r handler and shipper, died Joseph Zappola, a me- teriais handler, became the 96th BCSIE victim on Septendter 30, 1970. - When Matty Weryn'ki dfad back in July 1964 Larry Olr.ese, who'd worked with him in Buil?inf Six for ten years, came home onc night and hu wife Mickey, asked him what had happened al work that day. "Oh, we lu.t lost another guy.' - - "Cancer?" deaths to the comp:my but never suggesecd any aontinuec THKP 0005947

- 54 CJFeO F.I E3 jrom page 24 per million) sho.erd carcinoma. Dr. Nclsun, how-, ever, guesses tint C9fyF n+ay ahe be a potent ear- einagen. Neuc of the evidence supporta this'edu- tated guesi " Tne Moss memo was written June 1,1971. Two days lamr Vincent Gregory, the n.-w president, convened a major meeting in the Rchm and Hau boardroom. For nearly 20 years, Gregory had built6 up and eventually headed Itobm and Haan operalions in Europe, includir.g three pfants in Engfar.d. France and Italy that used BCAIE to produce ion ex- change res'.rrs. "When we got Nelson s call over the phone in May 1971 fIt came as the greatest shock. I was ab- solu:aly overwhelmed," Gregory said in a reeent ' Interview. In the boardmmn on Jtme 3, with 20 top Itohm and Han executives peesent, Gregory turned to ELington Beavers. His words, reealb Beavers, were...'From naw on, I want you to be personal- ly respons'ble." And with that terse assignment, Beaver's preoccupation with BCME begao. Then, says Gregory, "I shut down all the plants making Chfrs" But another month passed before. on Tuesday afternoon, July 6, Gregory called Beavers, Ray Walton, the new Bridaaburg plant manager, and Dr. Edward Reiner, the assistant manager, Do bis residence at the time, 321 Smedley Street The three drafted a statement that Refner wa to read to the m.n of Building Six. "We all vrent over what should be in that statement and there was no decision made to keep any of the facts from the meo," says Beavers. Tne next d„y, ltniner says, he assembled about 800 workers he waa told might have been exposed to CME and talked to them in groups of 30 to 30 men. Re says he read each of these separate grnups the statement drafted the previous evening. It noted that rats had developed lung cancer after exposure to ECSIE "but the results were not clea•.i; positive." ' • "\'Je do not praduce bis-CME at Brii-aburg nor do we use it here," Reiner assured the men, adding, however, that there was a gmaR amaunt of BC\SE present in CME used in Building Six and that, therefore, CS1E "osay be a dangarotts ehemical." "Rlte s-riouenesa of the NYU finding bas prompted the Company to assume that exposure of people to CME is undesirable, The decision hae been made to shut down the CME operation untR the plant develops prondures which wN miar tmfze exposure of persnnnel to CME, a'xn at very bw concentrations. "It is expected that the unit wBl be daem for 4-8 weeks, during which time extensive madiRca- tions of the CME operations wfll b, developed with the objective of elimiruting exposure CltSEto fumes. We fcel mat thase modifications may be tonsidered excessive, but until we have better knowledge, we are going to assume that CM6 is a very dangerous chemical . • .' The carefully-worded statement did not point out that Norton Ncl.son had induced cancer in rats with infinitesimal amounts of BCME, or the fact that no other scientist had estabiished that any esposure, no matter how small. was aate. And signiGcantly, the statement spnke only of cancer in rats, not mentioning human eartlno- genicity. In fact, the company, instead of stopping prodjctio:, of CR1E tompletely, would begin a lo:,y carnai4n to discredit animal testing as a way to determirrc cancer in man. One day last Junc, Dr. Itoiner was asked if, when he rcad the staten,cnt to the men, he offor- ed those in Building Six the opportunity to trans- fer out and, if so, undor what conditions. "Il's virtually imposeible to give a lateral trans- fer," he said. "If a man trained to be kettle opem- tor transfers, he would have to take a substantial cut in pay. It would take him five years in another building to huild up enough seniority to catch up." Reiner said the whole problem was tlwt an one has ever wanted out of Building Six, the top puy- ing building in the plant with its extra 13 cents an hour isolation pay: "I have no trouble finding men willing to go in." There were also, however, men who wanted to get out Last October, one of them went to Reiner and asked for a transfer out of Building Six. The rrmn had worked with BCME for 16 years and he waa frightened, even though he felt he couldn't afford theMasoE aeniority. thc lota of overtime, the bs of take-lame pay to support his family. The transfer was tdused 11a man went to a lawyer, who con6rmed that he tried and failed to get Rohm and Haas to recon- sider its decision. The only advice he could give to his client then, he says, was this: "1 told him," the lawyer aald, "that his wife would know where to find me if she becomes a ~•" a e e Nelson laid tt on the line in a 1971 reaeetictg that his staff iaad with governrne,nt officials and I2©Eacst and F.acs executives. . It was in the sumtrter of 1971, as tnore man slied in Building Six ard many experienced workera deserted Brideshurg, that the nanrmion plant yras able to come up with a new devkx to keep skilled . mm an the production lines: "bumpurg." •JohnD'Alesandro, whddridden towork every day with his buddy. Larry tlla», was ovrking in BufWing 60 In 16f1 when the exodus prna Some of the new mm In BuikGng g0, he said, had been gtean three yeera seniority far every year they worked tbam .o tke;' had quickly "bumpsd" D'Alessandee off the Building 80 seniorfty ladder. ' When a cutback hit the building In 1271, D"- Almsandre says, he bad to krok fur another job .itliln the pl.nt. To retain hbeomparatively hfgh• pay rate, he bad to go inm the buildiry be always avolded, the building where bis bost friend caught a Ieshal dcee of Btxtffi the building where there were op.nlrsg¢ Building Six. D'Alenandm is home now, on dwbllity, aRee a year and a baII in Building Sbc It took him that long to get a transfer out. During that tknc. Iw says, the alarm sfgnaling BCME Iwks vxnt off "at least 20 times.' He has been out on disability for two yean now with seven damage to the muscles around his heart He can vacuum the house a little and he onr pick up things a little and he can watch TV, but he tires easily, and he has M use a lightweight l.idy's bawling ball when he bow•lv once a week, and he has to bowl willr the senior citizens because that gives him mon time R, catch his breath bolwern shots. Bowling is important to him nnw; i!S his only diversion. ' "I'd do anything to go back to workY he says. 'But I know I never wiB." And John D'Akssandro is 49 years old. . . • 'No, nurrasonabte perma could have hft yfwt' ' xecring ,rirhout the k"oudedge that we uere deet-; ing with a potent corcinogen, a very eorty sub-, stonce indacd ° - -Dr. Norton Nelson, - On July 22, 1971, more than 100 o,embers oG the ion exchange industry, government health of, efcials and Morton Nelson's research staff asacm- bled in a large conference room at the NY U Medical Center. The government scientists and industry repre. tentativea took seats at desks while Dr.Iaskin and Dr.VanlAsuttqofNYU tooklurnsatthepodiusn and the blackboard, explaining their research with vcild rats and BCME and CbfE. The Iunch,Bcaven recalia, was sandwiches and aoda pop, and, according to one N Y U scientist, the room wass filled with tension. Dr. Roy E Atbert, oneof the N Y U scfen Wtrl later recalled In tntfinenybalore Senator John Vl 1lrnneys Subcommittee on the Environment that the fnduslry representatives acted "exlremely tbreatoned" and that It "required really ovew whelming evidenee, experfnsorW evldenee. ar well as rnaunon krmwl.dge about suspldon ni Increased numbers of lung eancer uses to brin; them_ sround The meetfng that waa held wn : room Iull of angry mna^ Four years later, Dr, Notiat Nelson wn ask: . if anyone could hava left that tsteelLtg with ar. doubt about his research, ~t'here was no chance of a miatake.- Nelsc: saW, shaking his head, speakfng softly- "We Ia . it an out, we lald it an the Bne. . `No, no reasonable peimn could ltave kit t5t- meating without the knowledge that we ara deal ktg with a potent cardnogen." On July 26, 1971, Herbert Merr, a worker t~ Lab 21 for 34 yeassm died of lung caneer,r the deaet of Annshong, Riea, Hock and Kareher qufck-: followed. All had been e:posed to BCMF. - One month before Armstrong's death, a ne, federal law, the Ot,:upatiooal Safety and ifeatt? Act of 1970, for the first time required Rohm am Haas to report such deaths to the federal govermettt on three sra arale fonns, The Brrt, OSHA Fernt 100, is a log of otasttlocallnluries,111naus sadfatalfties; Form 187 a supplamentary record of aeh. entry on Fottn 1ond Form 162Is aa analal summary. 71se mmp.uy, however, failed to report tb. Rw easn and at least sevan more that w ald I low ova the nec: four yean After the entire BCME industry received t: bad wws at N Y U In July 1971. Bohm aod Haa asnnged--with theald ofagrarttfram theNaUOnr Caneer Institute - for periodie tesu of aR k workera at Johna Hopkins University School c Medisma Brfdesburg plant workers vrere tobe given apr tum cytology tests In an attempt to detect canc+ tn time for treatment Workers In tlhe piant hs to aptt into a jar each morning for three days an then take the iar m Baltimore by hlelruliner h analysfs and a series of quntions, among them th predictable "Do ye.u smoke2" • 1 Alf Rohrra and Haas workers back to 1951 ar reportedly being sent to Jolrna Hopkins far the: tests. Apparently, however, the most hcavil} exposed rnan have not always gotten the highe prinrity. ~ "Rohm and Haas had started sending mrn Johna Hopkins and I thought my hu.bamt shn,i have heen sent first, but thry '.'era scndinx pr THKP 0005948

~ 54 WHO )71.~.,D continued for, you got. They gave you rubber gloves and gogglet, but the stuff got through anyway. But 11 even then, the stuf!'s al) over you. it got through and into your i.un. Two years aiter I left I still couldn't raise a lather when I'd soap up. "We bought used garage uniforms at salea and had to throw them away in three weeks, they were full of holes... . -We knew that guys were dying in Building Six and Semivorks. Guys knew when they went u Semiwo:ks t~Lat you didn't'snoiv Vihat the heR would happen. It could blow up in your face, what have you. But Semiworks, Dithane and Building Six were the best-paying jobs. Young guys would work those buildings. It took six or seven years to realize the stuff was no good for you. • "For two ytars, front'69 to 7t, I was short of breath all the time and taeback of my ean would open up half an Inch and bleed. My eyeGds, eI- bows and behi.'td my ears had to be checked for skin ca.icer. . "1 knew young guys my age whose lungs were gone on them. Mostly the lungs. They had ttvu- bie breathing. They were eaughing up blood. "I finally left becauso my doctor siid I wasn't ' getting any better. The doctors at PGH thought I had stoma.h rxncer. It te^_ed eut to bs a higher : form of coliHs. I was in the hospital 32 days in = 1973. I went from 243 pounds then to 172 a few months ago." a e a a In January 1971. Dr. Norton NeUon and his a colleagues at New York University's Institute of ~ Fnvironmental Medicine made a dramatic dis- eovery. For 17 years. Nelson and his staff had been do- ing wneer rcrearch. One of the proS!ems they had encountered wos that, by using specialty bred z laboratory rats and mice for testing, there was lit- tle slmilarity to conditions in the world outside. ~ Thus Nelson ond his team had been doing ex- ,1 perimrnt+ nn wad rats irhosr envirnnments more ~ closely resembled that of man. The atartling find- lag the scientist made with one serlas of experf- ments prompted Dr. Nelson, on bloy 10, 1971, to make an unexpected phone call to Rohn and Hasa. The background nI chat phone call went back a number of ynars, back in fact to April 1965, when Rohm and Haas broke off negotiations with Net- son rather than allow him to publ'uh his findings without company approval. Unknown to Rohm and Haas, Dr. Nelson and his colleagues had retained their interest in CME _aml BCME and had found federal funds to go ahead with the research on their own. One of the scientists, Dr. Benjamin Van Duur- en, had been studying an entire family of sus- petted carcinogen>, the halostheaa, widely used in the chemical Industry. Van Duuren was, Net- i aon says, the only man on earth at that time who could have looi•.ed at a list o! 100 chemicals used in Building Six and the Semiworks and tell, at a glance, which to suspaetL in 1867, Van Dauren reported that he could Imduce cancer merely by painting the skin of mice with BCLIE, or by injecting it under the akin of rats. Now he had completed more research, and bad a prelkninary report of what he had found alated for publication in the Archives of Snvironmental HeaW4 of August 1971. it was extremely unusual for auch renowned scientists to publish the pre- Bm:nary report of their research, but they were deeply concerned. Thus un May 10, 1971 Dr. Nel- soo felt he could delay no lunger in calling Rohm and Haas to disclose the results of his test and bis upcoming article. The earliest the company eould agree to a meeting with him was 30 a.m. on Tuesday, June L Ellington Bcavers, the new corporate vicrnpresi- dant fur henllh protection, sent Fred 1°ilson,.his associate director of research, accompanied by other executives and a cump'+tty toxiculogist, up to see Nelson. What Ihe company learned wasesscn0ially this: 7ha scEentl:7a had pej niltcu tais to breathe Over The Years Doctors alld Ecien3iz-ts IavesagaS2d LCRiE (1) Dr. Kalherino Sturgis is ewuulted by e,nnp.ny in 1932 when lung cancer dcatlss ue olrmed. (a ef 3) Dr. William Wciss, whn wrks fw ik. Sturgis in the 1`ulm,xaryNeopfesm Remward, l'roject, begins saeening workers for lung cancer in 1962. Dr. Sturgis urges the eompany to hire tlta eminenlpnter reseueher, Dr. Norton Nelwn. n4)~n ~ I.abs, hired aben negotiations vith Dse, tolls tia eompany in l9G that BCMR is a areinogen. (9) Dr. Netsow leRa the company in 1971 that BChIE ie the moat potent cardmgen evn teated. (6 as p) Dr. William Figaare; with the help of his formw teacher Dr. Weiq, pubikho a ed.nGRc arti- ele an lung cancer and BCME. It is b.aed on bdur- matfon fraa Figueroal palieal, Rdsett Pwdious. (8) Flguuva'e article raeeivr lnduatriel Medical Asroefation'a highest aaard far a aadiesl artiela in 1973: award is presented by Nalsaa. IiCbfE, and had concluded it was the most poler earcinogen ever diseovered. . In its article, the Nelson team noted il had gon further than the Harleton toals: "In light of thes findings and In view of the fact that tndustrial es posure to these volatile liquids wat more likely t be via the respiratory tract than the akin• w undertook to examine their effects by means t animal Inhalation exposurn. 'A startling turoor yield at extremely low cor centrations of BCME leads us to submit this pr. liminary report particularly In view of the poler tial hazard to Individuals ottvpatim,ally expose to these widely used alkyiating agents." Just bow dangerous was BCME? lwoof Nelsea's colleagues,Drs Marvin Kusc rter and Sidney Laskin, told the t»mpany NYU's findings on June I.'hro days later, tn tnern.s for ltohm and Haas ofBcials, company toa eologist Jsek N. Moa noted that the wild ra had been exposad to an in¢edibly smaR amount BCME: onstenth of a part of BCME far each et million parts of air for six hours a day. five da; a week, and, at thfa )evd, aR 90 ra4 w•rx dea inside 950 days . Atso devastating was the effect BCME ha ence it formed lung tuman. "Dn. Nelson an Kuscluar ataled that these wen eot the tponu neous strair-related tumors (adenomas, as delii erately used in the Hasleton studies for quic results) but emphasirad their similarity to tl bronchiogenie spuamous ceil carcinoma (<a.•sca of the lhroat) found in man. Furthermnre, thet tumors were observed to spread to distant silt std altxk the olfactory organs and RnaRy Inva2 the ainuses, the skull and the brain....' "Following a prescnWtion of lhe teehnieal dat Dr. Nelson stated lhat bis-CME was the must yv tent carcinaga. eucr tested by tke NYU pronp Moss vrrote, underlining the pasaage. °Only one animal exposed to CME (at mte pa - To Pcgc J _`" -- THKP 0005949 uy_