Tobacco Documents Online

The preceding text has been professionally transcribed. However, although the text has been checked against an audio track, in order to meet rigid distribution and transmission deadlines, it has not yet been proofread against videotape. LANGUAGE: ENGLISH LOAD-DATE: June 28, 1996 RJR0000000012000396 700534337

PETER JENNINGS: Actually, quite a number do. R.J. Reynolds gives you money, Brown & Williamson, Philip Morris, U.S. Tobacco, the Tobacco Institute, Nabisco, Rep. JOE L. BARTON: I've never had anybody directly relating the tobacco issue in this office, so it's just- it's not an issue with me. It should be possible to have an intelligent policy debate on the merits, on our review process in this country for food, drugs and medical devices. I have attempted to do that. PETER JENNINGS: [voice-over] Dr. Kessler s leadership at the FDA is under attack in several ways. One influential think tank in W ashington paid for newspaper ads that compared the FDA to murderers and drunk drivers. Rep. RICHARD J. DURBIN: W hen it comes to FDA reform, there's room for reform, but some of the groups who feel the strongest are the groups that would like to see the FDA turn out its lights and go out of business, particularly when it comes to tobacco regulation. And you 11 find those groups, when you lift the lid and look under the cover, contain a lot of tobacco money. ANNOUNCER: [television commercial] The following paid for by Citizens for a Sound Economy. PETER JENNINGS: [voice-over] Another group, Citizens for a Sound Economy, has assailed the FDA in newspaper, television and radio ads. ANNOUNCER: [television commercial] The government too often fails to do its job the way- SPOKESPERSON: Someone needs to give them a wake-up call. PETER JENNINGS: [voice-over] For the tobacco industry, this group is a natural ally. It has advertised against FDA regulation of tobacco and it also takes money from tobacco companies. C. BOYDEN GRAY: Of course the FDA could be more user-friendly and more- PETER JENNINGS: [voice-over] The chairman, C. Boyden Gray, the fomter White House counsel to President Bush, would not tell us how much. [interviewing] Do you take money from the tobacco companies? C. BOYDEN GRAY: I believe we do. We have. I suspect we have. I actually am not familiar with- with out- with our precise breakdown of who gives and who doesn't. PETER JENNINGS: You're not familiar with- with- C. BOYDEN GRAY: I don't- I don't- PETER JENNINGS: -with who's- C. BOYDEN GRAY: I haven't got- I mean, I have not actually pored over the list of the- no, I just don't. PETER JENNINGS: You have no idea how much the tobacco industry contributes- C. BOYDEN GRAY: I do- I do not. PETER JENNINGS: You have been criticized recently for, in essence, doing the tobacco industry's business for them, willingly or not. C. BOYDEN GRAY: I don't know why people would say that. The FDA reform issues are quite separate from tobacco issues. RJR0000000012000396 700534329

[interviewing] Do you believe that the tobacco companies want to attract smokers under 18? DAVID KESSLER: In some ways, Peter, they have to. The evidence is very clear that smoking begins in children and adolescents and it's children and adolescents who are becoming addicted. PETER JENNINGS: [voice-over] W hen Dr. Kessler and other critics accuse the tobacco companies of targeting children, they point specifically to a character named Joe Camel. It is an accusation that R.J. Reynolds, the company behind Camel cigarettes, unequivocally denies. So does Diane Burroughs [sp?]. In the early 1980s she was a market researcher for Reynolds. Her work led to the creation of Joe Camel. [interviewing] Why do you think so many people out here have the notion that R.J. Reynolds knew that Joe Camel would appeal to people under 18? DIANE BURROUGHS: I suppose they think everything in tobacco is a devious plot. PETER JENNINGS: And that's- there's nothing to that at all. DIANE BURROUGHS: There were no devious plots. There were no plans to attract anyone under 18. PETER JENNINGS: Why do you think R.J. Reynolds settled on a cartoon character? DIANE BURROUGHS: I dont think of Joe Camel as a cartoon. PETER JENNINGS: Oh, really? DIANE BURROUGHS: No. I think of Joe Camel as a person, a person who exhibits a certain way of looking at life, a certain way- a lifestyle, if you will. And the benefit of a Camel is, one, it's kind of fun. PETER JENNINGS: [voice-over] In 1984 Reynolds's best-selling cigarette, Winston, was losing market share to its competitor, Marlboro. Burroughs spent two years trying to figure out how Reynolds could attract more young, beginning smokers. But she says her market research focused exclusively on 18- to 24-year-olds. [interviewing] How can you ensure that the Joe Camel program, for example, didn't appeal to people under 18? DIANE BURROUGHS: Well, you really can't ensure that kind of thing unless you're going to go out and do research and say, 'Do you hate this ad?' And Reynolds doesn't do research among anyone under 18- these days 21. PETER JENNINGS: [voice-over] Reynolds researchers did understand, as their own internal documents suggest, that most beginning smokers were 18 or younger. Twenty years ago, in 1976, when Reynolds was preparing its business forecast, their researchers wrote, The 14- to 18-year-old group is an increasing segment of the smoking population. RJR must soon establish a successful new brand in this marke[.' And in 1994, seven years after the Joe Camel campaign was launched, a study released by the federal Centers for Disease Control concluded that Camels' popularity had shot up among teenagers 18 and under. RJR0000000012000396 700534323

Copyright 1996 American Broadcasting Companies, Inc. All rights reserved ABC NEWS SHOW: ABC News Special (ABC) June 7, 1996 Transcript # 74 TYPE: Show; Special SECTION: News; Domestic LENGTH: 8066 words BODY: ANNOUNCER: This is an ABC News special, Peter Jennings reporting. PETER JENNINGS: Good evening and welcome. This hour is about cigarettes and the people who make them, which means it is about the only product that you can buy virtually anywhere which, when used as directed, kills more than 400,000 Americans every year. It actually only costs pennies to make one of these and every year the five major cigarette makers make several billion dollars in profits. Tonight we're going to show you how the tobacco companies continue to prosper despite the damage these things do and despite the increased pressure the companies are under from lawsuits and proposed government regulation. This is a very, very smart industry that has been turning adversity into opportunity for the last 30 years. Take a look at this. How would you like to have a warning on everything you make that says you will greatly reduce a serious risk to your health if you stop using the product now? You'd think this would drive the cigarette companies crazy. Actually, they helped to write the warning in 1965. And since then, every time someone sued a tobacco company for damages that cigarettes do, the company simply said, 'Hey, you were wamed.' The companies are proud they have never, never lost a lawsuit to a smoker and had to pay a penny. Now take a look at this. [voice-over] This is one of the classic cigarette commercials from the 1960s. It was meant to convey the message that smoking made life better. And it was very effective. ANNOUNCER: [television commercial] Come to where the flavor is. Come to Marlboro country. PETER JENNINGS: But in 1967 the government ordered that television stations should also run public service messages, including this one, that advertised the dangers of smoking. They were also very effective and people began to smoke less. ANNOUNCER: [American Cancer Society commercial] Cigarettes- they're killers. PETER JENNINGS: So what did the tobacco companies do? They agreed to a total ban on televised cigarette advertising which mean, of course, stations didn't have to run those pesky messages that said smoking could kill you. And one year later, cigarette sales in America were up. RJR0000000012000396 700534321

When Reynolds pushed the Joe Camel image in the marketplace, they focused on convenience stores, the place most underage smokers get their cigarettes. Mike Shaw, [sp?] Amy Lowkes [sp?) and Cheryl Roundtree [sp?] were Reynolds sales reps. [interviewing] Was there ever any doubt in your mind that it was part of yourjob to sell cigarettes to teenagers? MIKE SHAW: I knew it was part of my job to sell cigarettes to anyone that ] could, not particularly or specifically teenagers, but to anyone, and that would include teenagers. PETER JENNINGS: If you could push R.J. Reynolds cigarettes to 18-year-olds, would you do it? Would you be expected to do it? AMY LOWKES: Yes. PETER JENNINGS: Sixteen-year-olds? AMY LOWKES: Yes. PETER JENNINGS: Fifteen? AMY LOWKES: I would say teenagers 13 and up. PETER JENNINGS: Thirteen and up. In other words, you- do you believe that your company expected you to push the product all the way down to 13-year-olds? AMY LOWKES: Not- not directly, one on one. By way of promotion and advertising, yes, not direct sales. Not from me to you or from me to a 13-year-old, but by- by using the promotional items, by putting the T- shirts there, you- you ve removed yourself from the situation and then- and let the sale happen. PETER JENNINGS: [voice-over] In two internal memos written in 1990, two Reynolds division managers tell their reps to identify stores near high schools, in an effort to target young adults. A few months later, after one of these memos was leaked to the press, its author issued a retraction, telling his staff, I was wrong with my reference to high school-aged young adults.' [interviewing] But were you asked to go and- and survey consumer stores close to high schools, for example? AMY LOWKES: Yes. PETER JENNINGS: Did you ever ask why close to high schools? AMY LOWKES: I didn't ask why. I knew. I mean, I think we- there's so much that goes on that it's just an understanding. You know, we know. CHERYL ROUNDTREE: That was very clear in the- AMY LOW KFS: It was real clear. CHERYL ROUNDTREE: -that we were to target outlets near colleges and high schools. That was very clear. PETER JENNINGS: [voice-over] We asked for an interview with a senior Reynolds executive. We were turned down. In a written response, Reynolds denied their sales force targeted high school students. It said RJR0000000012000396 700534324

the managers who wrote those two memos were disciplined and that Joe Camel was not aimed at anyone under 18. In 1994 the Federal Trade Commission, investigating charges by anti-smoking groups, did decline to restrain Reynolds's use of the Joe Camel ads, but the chairman of the commission released a strongly- worded dissent in which he wrote there was reason to believe that the Camel campaign induced underage people to start smoking. The Food and Drug Administration's Dr. Kessler: [interviewing] Well, the tobacco company would say to you, 'Look, Joe Camel is designed for an 18-year- old. He pursues 18-year-old habits, He talks about 18-year-old pursuits. I'- DAVID KESSLER: Eighteen-year-olds and not seventeen-year-olds? PETER JENNINGS: That's not- that's not the issue, perhaps. The issue- DAVID KESSLER: Yes, it is the issue. Tell me how you design an advertising campaign that affects only 18-year-olds. PETER JENNINGS: Maybe you can't, but is the tobacco company not perfectly legitimate in saying, Tm entitled - I'm selling a legal product - to advertise to 18-year-olds'? DAVID KESSLER: And you say that, if you're a tobacco company, with a straight face, that an ad like Joe Camel affects 18-year-olds and not 16-year-olds or 17-year-olds? Peter, I just don't think that's credible. PETER JENNINGS: [voice-over] Last year Dr. Kessler proposed a series of measures to regulate tobacco products. The FDA would like to limit cigarette advertising and impose Gghter restrictions on retailers who sell cigarettes in their stores. DAVID KESSLER: Every medical organization, every scientific organization that's looked at it over the last decade has concluded that nicotine is an addictive substance and it is ourjob to regulate those products. The law is very clear on that. PETER JENNINGS: [voice-over] The tobacco companies have filed suit against the FDA, challenging its right to regulate them. They also claim they regulate themselves. They do provide retailers with training videos like this one. NARRATOR: [tobacco company training video] It's against the law for you to sell tobacco products to minors. PETER JENNINGS: [voice-over] They also provide stickers and signs warning that minors can't buy cigarettes. But sting operations like these, conducted by local media and law enforcement across the country, repeatedly suggest that those warnings are often ignored. Government studies show that most minors are never asked for I.D. and that tobacco use is going up among people under 18. BRIAN: Some places will say to you, like- they'll say to have LD. and if you're, like, No, I'm 18; they7l be, like, 'All right, but put it in your pocket before you walk out of the store,' something like that. ZACK: Most of the, like, cigarettes and everything- [crosstalk] They're directed for kids. TEENAGE BOY: Definitely. ZACK: You know? RJR0000000012000396 70053 4325

REYNOLDS SALES REP: [hidden camera] -you know, because we're in no way, shape or form advocating any kind of sales to minors. In fact, we are dead against it. PETER JENNINGS: [voice-over] But listen to the Philip Morris rep when we asked them about their Action Against Access program. PHILIP MORRIS SALES REP: [hidden camera] For us to go out and aggressively try to- to pull retailers off of our program would not be a good business decision for us. We're trying to keep the government out of it is the reason we're- we're kind of pushing what we're doing, trying to keep Washington off our backc. W e've got the FDA rulings, all this other stuff- PETER JENNINGS: [voice-over] Though a few moments later he added this: PHILIP MORRIS SALES REP: [hidden camera] It's also, we feel, the right thing to do. PETER JENNINGS: [voice-over] We requested an interview with a senior manager at Philip Morris. Our request for an interview was turned down. But last month, under pressure from the Clinton White House, Philip Morris held a press conference in New York. SPOKESMAN: [May 16, 1996] We offer this comprehensive plan in the hope that all sides in the debate will set aside the hostility of the past and work together. PETER JENNINGS: [voice-over] This time Philip Morris said it would support federal legislation which would restrain how cigarettes are advertised, marketed and sold to young people, though at the moment there is no such legislation before the Congress. But Philip Morris said it would support such legislation only if Congress would agree that the Food and Drug Administration should never have a role in the regulation of tobacco products. Dr. Kessler is not impressed. [interviewing] Last month Philip Morris offered a very public compromise. Why did you reject it? DAVID KESSLER: It fell short. History is filled with examples in which the government is posed and ready to do something and the companies say, 'Hold it. We have the solution.' PETER JENNINGS: Dr. Kessler would like this to be the moment in history when the tobacco companies find themselves finally unable to preempt or delay or step around government regulation. We'll have more in just a moment. [Commercial break] ANNOUNCER: Peter Jennings reporting continues. CONGRESSWOMAN: It takes courage to go up against the tobacco industry. You not only get a lot of calls to your office, you get a lot of pressure. Ist CONGRESSMAN: lt talks about a tobacco lobbyist. Talks about all the money he received to walk around here and convince you and convince me- 2nd CONGRESSMAN: The tobacco lobby in this town- Rep. RICHARD J. DURBIN, (D), IL: They are everywhere. They are undoubtedly watching this and writing down every word to use it against all of us. RJR0000000012000396 700534327

No one should underestimate the tobacco industry's determination to win. This hour is about an industry that never says die. ANNOUNCER: Peter Jennings reporting, 'Never Say Die: How the Cigarette Companies Keep on W inning.' [Commercial break] ANNOUNCER: 'Never Say Die: How the Cigarette Companies Keep on Winning' continue.c. PETER JENNINGS: Some full disclosure, to begin with. I started smoking when I was 13 and I remember very clearly how we guys thought it was the cool thing to do. It never occurred to us for a second that we were ever going to become addicted. I didn't quit for almost 30 years and today we know that I was fairly typical. Most regular smokers in the United States, about 8 out of 10, begin to smoke when they are younger than 18- in other words, when they are children. And that is why there is such a battle right now between those who want to regulate the tobacco companies, in the name of children, and the companies, who insist that smoking is an adult choice. [voice-over] How they begin and when they begin is pretty well documented by now. Last month ABC News conducted its own poll of smokers under 18 and we found roughly the same pattern that researchers have been finding for more than 20 years. ZACK, Age 16: I mean, I can quit cigarettes anytime, but it's just that it's hard to because, like, all my friends smoke, you know? Everyone smokes. MATT, Age 16: I started smoking when I was, like, 13. PETER JENNINGS: [voice-over] The average age for beginning smokers was 12-and-a-half years old. And, on average, most who smoked had tried to quit by the age of 14. By the time they were 15 or older, nearly half the young smokers said they were hooked. BRIAN, Age 16: I just tried to stop cold turkey and I was, like, I don't feel like smoking anymore. It's a dirty habit. Put it down: Lasted maybe five to seven days, something like that. MATT: Because I need a cigarette when I wake up every day, after I eat- certain times. ZACK: You ie used to a cigarette, you know, and being social and everybody's smoking except for you and you're just, 'Wow, jeez, I need a cigarette,' you know? PETER JENNINGS: [voice-over] Seventy-five percent of the young smokers we spoke to say they wish they'd never started smoking in the first place. The government tells us that one in three of them will die of smoking-related diseases. BRIAN: Back then, like, if I knew I was going to become an avid smoker, I would- I would have- I would have, like, never picked up, you know? But I didn't look at it that way when I was, like, 12 years old, DAVID KESSLER: Ask a smoker when he or she began and you're going to hear the tale of a child. It really is a pediatric disease. PETER JENNINGS: [voice-over] Dr. David Kessler is commissioner of the Food and Drug Administration, the FDA. He was appointed by a Republican president and now he speaks for the Clinton administration in a battle with the tobacco industry about the advertising and the selling of cigarettes to minors. RJR0000000012000396 700534322

THOMAS SANDEFUR, Brown & Williamson Tobacco: I believe that nicotine is not addictive. DONALD JOHNSTON, American Tobacco Company: I, too, believe that nicotine is not addictive. NARRATOR: Now the tobacco industry is trying to tell us that second-hand smoke isn't dangerous. TOBACCO COMPANY EXECUTIVES: -not addictive- not addictive- [on screen: Do they think we're stupid?'] PETER JENNINGS: Why did you take what was widely regarded as the most effective ad off the air, the famous 'sound bite' ad from the Congressional hearings? Gov. PETE WILSON: We didn't take it off. PETER JENNINGS: Yes, you did. Gov. PETE WILSON: No, we didn't. PETER JENNINGS: [voice-over] Yes, they did. After our interview with Governor W ilson, we obtained internal documents from the California Department of Health Services which reveal the department was anxious to get the ad off the air. The department's director then told us the ad was not renewed for fear that R.J. Reynolds would carry out a threat to sue. According to the most recent data, smoking in California is going up for the first time since Proposition 99 was passed. Dr. Glantz believes a great opportunity is being missed. Dr. STANTON GLANTZ: Proposition 99 is like a vaccine that prevents cancer and heart disease. It is the solution to the tobacco epidemic. lf the whole country were to have a program run of the magnitude and with the quality that the California Proposition 99 program was before Pete Wilson and the medical establishment and the tobacco industry wrecked it, we could eliminate tobacco and the attendant disease as a problem. And that's been thrown away. And to me it would be like a group of politicians destroying an AIDS vaccine to get campaign contributions. The only difference is tobacco kills more than 10 times as many people as AIDS. PETER JENNINGS: Dr. Glantz might be a little too pessimistic. The California Medical Association, under its new president, Jack Lewin, now supports full funding for Proposition 99 and just last week someone in Governor Wilson's office called us to say that for the first time in six years, he will not try to divert money from Proposition 99's anti-smoking programs. The person who called attributed the govetnor s change of heart to an improving budget picture in California. [Commercial break] PETER JENNINGS: Finally this evening, imagine for a moment that three jumbo jets full of passengers crash every single day of the year and everyone on board every plane dies. That horror would be equal to the toll that cigarettes take every day, 365 days every year. By now, at least, we should have learned what not to do about cigarettes. It is not enough simply to tell children not to smoke. For many rebellious kids - and most kids are rebellious - that simply makes smoking more appealing. And it doesn't seem to be enough to ask the cigarette companies to control themselves. We have seen tonight how successful that is. The cigarette companies have been wining, in part, because there's never been a national debate about the death and destruction which smoking causes. There is now. I'm Peter Jennings. Thank you for joining us. Good night. RJR0000000012000396 700534336

ROBERT DOLE: Sure. PETER JENNINGS: -you do not believe that nicotine is addictive? ROBERT DOLE: Oh, my non-scientific view is that it's- it's a habit. Some people who've tried it can quit easily, others don't quit, so I guess it's addictive to some and not to others. PETER JENNINGS: [voice-over] Mr. Dole's reluctance to identify nicotine as addictive is contradicted by virtually every scientist in the world not associated with the tobacco industry. Mr. Dole also differs sharply with President Clinton, who supports the FDA's pending proposals to keep teenagers from smoking. [interviewing] Do you see any merit in the Food and Drug Administration's efforts to get cigarettes out of the hands of children? ROBERT DOLE:1 don't see any- I see merit in the message that teenagers shouldn't smoke. I don't see how it's going to be policed. They're claiming a lot of jurisdiction they've never claimed before. But I believe, in the final result, it's going to be left up to the states. DAVID KESSLER: Every day, every day of the year, 3,000 children become regular smokers and a thousand of them, a thousand of those 3,000 who begin every day- a thousand of them will go on to die from smoking-related diseases. When that sinks in, when it hits you that it's really the chief preventable cause of death in this country, if you were a public health official, what would you do? PETER JENNINGS: Whatever Dr. Kessler manages to do now - and he will announce very shortly precisely how the FDA intends to regulate tobacco - the companies already have a strategy to tie the government up in court for years. Never say die. ANNOUNCER: Peter Jennings Reporting will continue in a moment. [Commercial break] ANNOUNCER: 'Never Say Die: How the Cigarette Companies Keep on Winning.' Once again, Peter Jennings. PETER JENNINGS: Now we're going to tell you about a proven strategy to reduce smoking and we know it works because for the past eight years, since it has been in effect in California, it has led to a stunning 42 percent decline in the number of adult smokers. And yet California's program, which Californians voted for as Proposition 99, has been under attack from the day it was born. [voice-over] The idea was to raise the tax on cigarettes 25 cents a pack. Most of the revenues, about $400 million a year, would pay for health care for the poor. The rest would be spent on programs to help Californians quit smoking. California voters loved it. By 1990, California's state government had collected hundreds of millions of dollars for a variety of 'stop smoking' programs and very tough anti-smoking advertisements, including television commercials such as this one. ANNOUNCER: [television commercial] It's one of the most addictive substances on earth and it's hooked millions. It's called nicotine and the tobacco industry knows that the more nicotine their cigarettes have the more hooked you'll be. Of course, every year thousands of people die from their addiction. But you know what they say. There's plenty of fish in the sea. The tobacco industry- they profit, you lose. PETER JENNINGS: [voice-over] California researchers measured the impact of Proposition 99 and people were astonished. Smoking, which had been declining very gradually in California, suddenly plummeted at more than twice the national rate. RJR0000000012000396 700534332