Tobacco Documents Online

Teleconference/Analyst Comments 2077409572

! ! • PHILIP MORRIS GARY BLACK CONFERENCE CALL ON ROGERS VERDICT AUGUST 26, 1996 Gary: Thank you. I have with me today, Melissa Ronan, who is our legal consultant. Most of you probably enjoyed reading her accounts of the Rogers trial as it went along. What I'd like to do is talk about the verdict, what it means. I want to distinguish between Rogers and Carter. I want to talk about this notion of a settlement. And whether the one that's outlined in the Wall Street Journal today has any merit. A couple of minutes on the FDA. Go over the litigation calendar coming up. And leave most of it for questions and answers. On the Rogers verdict, obviously the industry won the case. The vote was 6 to nothing on strict liability, and 6 to nothing on negligence. We talked to one of the jurors, Julie Pitts, who was the cardiologist's wife. She said it was 6 to nothing from the outset. There was no disagreement about which way they should go. They got through the strict liability claim really quickly. And that's what is meant that 1

0 0 • domino effect:" When we talked to Julie Pitts, she said the same thing. She said, "That's a hypothetical question. I can't answer that." So I think that when the press is saying that things would have been different if the documents had been introduced, I think that's stretching it just a tad. The other thing that I would talk about is just this whole notion that Indiana was an easy State. Because if you find that the plaintiff was more than 50% to blame, you have to find for the defense. It's not an easy state per se, in the sense that 37 states are just like Indiana. The 13 states that are not like Indiana, what they call pure comparative fault states, which Florida is one of them, which we all know. Mississippi and Louisiana are the other two that you still see a lot of law suits in. A lot of the other comparative fault states are states like California and New York, where because of other wordings of strict liability, and other wordings of negligence, you just don't have a lot of law suits because the threshold is very high for plaintiffs to win. So I wanted to make that clear to people. Some of the big differences, I think, between Rogers and Carter...you know with Rogers you had, I thought, a pro-defendant judge, who at the margin made a lot of calls that I think favored the defense. You can't always count on that. For instance when they tried to introduce some of the Brown and Williamson 3

• • documents here he said they weren't relevant. He also, in his jury instructions made it very clear to people that if Richard Rogers knew of the dangers of smoking and ignored them that he had assumed the risk of the product. And he made it easier versus last year where as you know there was a hung jury. So I think that's different. I also think that if you had Brown and Williamson documents introduced, or Philip Morris documents introduced, and people don't know this, but there were a lot of Philip Morris documents introduced in this trial. And if people want to see them, we have a copy of them. I think one of the differences here versus in Carter, was that you saw Reynolds put somebody up on the stand. it's kind of like if O.J. Simpson is accused of murder, he gets up on his own behalf and testifies. Here you had David Townsend from RJR get up, and try to talk through some of the allegations about what the tobacco industry knew back in the fifties and sixties. And it was...he made a fool of himself in the cross examination because he ran back to his bosses, after it was all over, like a kid who wanted to know if he did good. But I think he made some points. He said, I work in a department that's got 550 people in it. Which by itself is a big size, that means there are a lot of people trying to improve tobacco, if you will. But he also talked about some of the things that they've done over the years to 4 a)

! • 0 try to make cigarettes safer. Like basically lowering the tar and nicotine by 2/3 over the last 30 years. Like improving the filter. Like improving the wrapping paper. And, again, if you were to run the Carter trial all over again, and you were to ask people, "What was the single biggest thing that Brown & Williamson should have done differently?" I think the first thing they should have done taas, in closing arguments say that Brown & Williamson and American Tobacco are not the same. But the second thing they should have done was put somebody up on their own behalf, to at least talk about the documents, rather than to say, the documents aren't important. They're musings, that's the word they used, by a lawyer. And they're not really significant so don't pay attention to them. So I think what you need to do is basically confront them straight-on. And in talking with both Philip Morris and Reynolds about it, they both agree that that is what they will do. They are basically taking the approach going forward that the documents will be introduced. They may not be Brown_ & Williamson documents, but they might be Philip Morris documents, they might_be_RJR documents. And what you really need to do is take your chances and put somebody up on the stand. And I think that was effective here. So the punch line to the verdicts, and there is not really that much more to tell, except in talking to the one 5

0 • • first night when they said they were making progress. They had already gotten_ through that one. They spent about 11 hours going through the jury instructions, according to Julie. And there was really never any debate about whether or not Richard Rogers really contributed either most or all of his own negligence. Now the Journal talks a little bit about how they wanted to have the press conference because they wanted to make it clear they were not condoning the tobacco industry's actions. That's not quite the way we heard it. What we heard is that they wanted to make a statement that in addition that they didn't condone the tobacco industry's actions. But they also wanted to make a statement to smokers that they really ought to quit. Which I think most people know. One of the things that I'd like to just focus on is that there was some talk in the paper today about if documents had been introduced, like the Brown and Williamson documents that the jury would have done something different. And that's not, again, what we heard when we talked to Julie Pitts. And it's not what we heard when you listen to the press conference. What we heard when they said, "If you had seen documents indicating the tobacco companies knew that cigarettes were dangerous, would that have changed your verdict?" And the actual response was, on the press conference was, °I don't know. It's all tied together. There's a 2

0 0 • basically have a settlement with a group of attorneys, and it really didn't preclude any of the op-outs. That's the worst thing is when you start having people op-out because the settlement is not good enough. That just invites more litigation. As far as the specific piece that's in the newspaper today. I did talk with some people in the industry about it this morning. And they say, well that's the plaintiff's view of things, and it's not anything that the industry would embrace. But, again, in talking to them, I think that people would love for there to be some legislated compromise. I think the sticky points is the amount of money. 6 billion a year, growing to 10 billion a year is just out of the question. Second of all, I don't- think they would go for something that just lasts for 15 years. But when you start going through the math, and you start saying, OK_, what does Philip Morris trade at versus where it would trade if it was looked at just on fundamentals. I mean you probably have about a 40 million dollar difference in Philip Morris alone. And that is, of course, on a present value basis. I think that you have to play with ..... Put it-another way, if , N you looked at all the businesses at Philip Morris, O 4 v except domestic tobacco, and then you back out the o co debt, which is about 16 billion dollars, we come up ~ with...the market is valuing Philip Morris, excluding 0 8

• • juror that we've been able to reach so far...they did spend about 11 hours reading instructions. It was unanimous from the get-go. There was not a single person who felt that the industry should be found liable under strict liability. And there is not a single person who felt that the industry should be found liable on the negligence claim. The reason they called the press_conference is_kind of unclear. In the press conference they said that they wanted to make it clear to people that the tobacco companies, you know, they were not condoning their actions. But we also heard that they wanted to, and this was also in the Indiana newspaper, that they wanted to make it clear to people that they should be aware that smoking causes cancer. So that's it on the verdicts. On the settlement. You know I think everybody would like there to be a settlement. I would like there to be a settlement. I think if you talk to the folks, the outside counsel for Philip Morris, they would like there to be a settlement. I think even if they admitted it, that the executives at Philip Morris would say they would love there to be a settlement, if it could be a legislated settlement. Now a lot of people say you should never settle because that's how the asbestos industry went bankrupt. The asbestos industry went bankrupt because they started settling one at a time. And once you start settling one at a 6

• • • arguments. Rather than take the approach that smoking does not cause cancer, which the industry has done, that's the model they've used for years. And actually in talking to Julie Pitts, she questioned it. Which is interesting. So maybe they did save one person by doing that. But I think rather than focusing so much on that, that smoking doesn't cause cancer, I think David Hardy's closing arguments, when you say, well does smoking cause cancer?_He says, we don't know. And I think that's a much better response. I think that is the type_of response you're going to get going forward. Because they can follow it up by saying, if you smoke, nine out of ten people who smoke don't get lung cancer. So to focus most of your efforts on the personal choice issue, and the addiction issue, that is pretty much what David Hardy's closing arguments, rather than trying to debate whether or not smoking causes lung cancer, because you lose a lot of credibility there. I'll open it up for questions right now. Operator: (Instructions) Mr. Patterson, you may ask your question. Patterson: Good morning, Gary. The Medicaid suits, and tying that into the settlement issue. I guess I'm not seeing anything pulled together there. 15

(Technical problem) • • I think that you'd want to do something like that if you were the industry. You'd want to base it on excise taxes rather than, you know, money that comes directly out of the P & L. You would have a consumption effect. Which, again, I think the FDA would like that, if you could raise the price of a pack of cigarettes from the FDA's perspective to three or four dollars, obviously, you know, that would definitely cut down on teen smoking one way or another. Patterson: OK. Thanks, Gary. Gary: Sure. Operator: Mr. Avery, you may ask your question. Avery: Gary, the award in the Carter case...what is the incentive for the plaintiff's attorneys to file for additional cases considering the time and the expense it requires to go through one of these cases? Gary: Wilner...it's a good question. Wilner, you know, he says he's got three people working full time on this tobacco litigation, including himself. And he started this effort about 18 months ago. So he's going to get $250,000, let's say, two or three years from now. Because the award is $750,000, and it will take two years before all the industry's appeals are exhausted. So let's say that's worth $200,000 or even less. $180,000 in_ present value dollars. And you've got 18

0 * think he can do both, because they are only two weeks apart. My guess is he's going to go up against Liggett again. Because you don't want to go up against Reynolds. Reynolds, of course, has got all the great attorneys that have done him well over the last, you know, thirty years. Liggett because they are not really in the best of financial shape. They might not have the management team that you would want. I would think that Wilner, if he's smart, he is a smart guy, would rather go up against Liggett than Reynolds. That's all that I really have to say. one final point I would make about Rogers is that most people were expecting it to be a hung jury. And I can't emphasize enough that in talking to the jurors there was nobody on this jury that really even seemed close to saying we should give money to this plaintiff. I thought it was a great...a well run case by (Shook,Hardye Bacon), who seemed to take the lead on this. I think they put up much better witnesses than Brown & Williamson did. I think the documents, obviously, are the important issue going forward. But one of the big things that you're going to see...two big things that I think will change going forward is, one, I think they will be able to put people up on the stand, and talk about the documents and try to at least put context around or at least diffuse them and challenge them. The second thing...I think we saw David Hardy do this in closing 14

s 0 • domestic tobacco at about 80 dollars a share. Now with Philip Morris U.S.A, if you back out the corporate expense is about 3.7 billion dollars. So you take the 3.7 billion dollars. You get 830 million shares. That mean that each multiple point is worth about $4.50. So if I start with the $80, and I say, OK, if you could somehow get the marketer to put a five or six multiple on the domestic tobacco instead of the one multiple or two multiple that is there right now. That's the same thing as saying that I' d be willing to give up 67 0 because I'm putting two points on domestic tobacco now, where it really should be six or seven. That's saying that I would be willing to give up 67% of my domestic tobacco profits in order to get rid of all this litigation. So I think there is a lot of room, is my point. I think that the money that is available could be substantial, and everybody would go away happy. Because you could finally get rid of this litigation. Now a lot of people have asked us what our numbers on that, if you would look at what is domestic tobacco. What is the company worth if domestic tobacco is worthless? At Philip Morris it's about 81 dollars. For Reynolds it's about 22 dollars. So we can send back of people are interested. On the FDA. You know we don't believe that the FDA has any leg to stand on. There are two issues, and we've talked about them both in the past. One is the 9

0 0 • these stocks for years have always said it would be great if Philip Morris could trade at a market multiple. Yet I think the chit on the table where you could say, I'm willing to accept legislatively some FDA jurisdiction on some issues in return for some language in that-same -legislation that basically forever says you can't sue the tobacco industry because we do want to stay in business. And that is a big difference between this and asbestos. Because with asbestos, obviously, you had substitute products. With tobacco you can't ban it because people are still going to smoke. - As far as the litigation calendar. There is something -new that we haven't really told people about. We just really heard about it last- week. September 9th, there,is a tobacco trial that starts in Louisiana. It's called Hulin. It's versus Brown & Williamson. It's somewhat different, though, than your typical tobacco trial. Because it also involves asbestos. Apparently Hulin was exposed to asbestos and he also smoked. He says_he's got lung cancer, so he's suing both, one asbestos company and Brown & Williamson. But it's probably something that we should look at. In the past, you know, people haven't really thought too much about these type of cases, because it seems like with the Lourillard filters, people just kind of say, that's not really a tobacco case. I think 11

• • • focus on. Because you're going to have this big fight about whether you can get Brown & Williamson documents introduced against Liggett. Again, I would take the view that you can probably can under state of the art, if your competition was doing these scientific studies, the court can say, you knew or should have known about these same type studies. But I think it's up to the attorneys for Liggett, obviously, to say, well, you know, just because one person at Brown & Williamson thought this, it doesn't mean that we thought this at LiggAtt. And what you would do is you'd put your own person up on the stand, and basically talk about what types of studies you were doing. And try to show that you did not believe that nicotine was addictive. And you give all the data that we all know. And that we saw in Rogers. One out of two people quit. 90% of people quit without professional help. So I think that would make a world of difference, versus what Brown & Williamson did in the Carter case. Then there is also a second trial, another Wilner case in November. November 4th. It's a case called Wallerson versus Reynolds. Wallerson is actually the_personal representative of Jane Conner. Now Jane Conner was a 40 something woman who died, allegedly of_lung cancer. And she left, I think, two kids. Talking with some of the folks in the industry about which case Wilner would rather do...I don't 13

0 ! • 44 liquormart decision. That basically says you can't take away somebody's first amendment rights. If there is a viable alternative, and you can't take it away, unless you can show definitively that you are restriction or your ban is going to actually accomplish your stated objective. Which in this case is to get kids not to smoke. And there is nothing in the FDA documents that shows that if the FDA is successful that it would basically work in getting kids not to smoke. So the question becomes why did the FDA do it, then, if obviously it's going to get blocked in court. And we've heard that Judge Esteem from North Carolina, a Republican, is going to have, kind of like a status meeting today on the case to try to figure out where's going to go in terms of amending complaints, and giving a time table to as to when he might rule. Because obviously come Wednesday, when it gets published in the federal register the industry will file for a preliminary injunction. Probably on Wednesday. So I think_ the reason why they did this was, because, again, they wanted to get something on a table. Clinton is using it as a campaign issue, obviously. I think that if you get something on the table maybe people-would start trying to actually be serious about negotiating some sort of solution. And, again, it fits into this whole idea of a settlement. I think this is a great opportunity. People who follow 10 IV

0 • • time, people hear about these settlements, and then everybody starts suing. What I think the industry would like is there to be some legislated settlement where, for example, you could say, we're willing to accept a lot of the FDA provisions if its part of the...let's use for example, the 1997 tobacco Education and Awareness Act. But we want to stay in business. And in return for accepting of these requirements, we would like there to be some pre- empting language. Similar to like the_'_Black Lung" legislation from about 15 years ago. Which the coal miners...the odors of the coal mine got introduced. They were able to stay in business, and people would not be able to sue the tobacco industry anymore. I think, though, that that would really only preempt future litigation. And it wouldn't take care of all the past litigation, unless you were to try to make that legislation retroactive. So I think you'd need to convince the courts to basically say that anybody who has been exposed to tobacco up until the point of the legislation, would have to be part of a mandatory class action. And those are rare. You usually see mandatory class actions when there is limited funds available, which usually means bankruptcy. But I think the industry would be willing to accept some kind of settlement if it was a legislated settlement as opposed to something like Ben LeBow did, which was to 7

0 • • three people full time working on it. That doesn't really pay the bills, is my point. However if you can win, and he says he's going to do one a month. If he can win...let's say he does twelve of these next year, and let's say he can win, you know, if he feels he can win half of them, and then, you know, again, looking at present value next year, $180 times six, that's like a million dollars. It still kind of barely pays the bills, if you want to think about lawyers. And maybe it does...for two associates and maybe Wilner, that's not really a bad pay day. I think the real money comes in if you can somehow consolidate these cases. You know we have all talked about class actions, and we've all talked about how the Castano ruling in the Fifth Circuit kind of, you know...would send a signal that the courts don't want to have Class Actions. The problem is that in Florida you've got kind of the opposite approach going on. Most people are aware by now that the Florida Supreme Court decided to allow the Broin Class Action, which is the flight attendant Class Action to go through. Even though it's got the same manageability problems that Castano had. It's a lot fewer people. There are only 60,000 flight attendants, instead of 50 million addicted people in Castano. Really it'll be interesting to see what the Florida Supreme Court does with Engel. Because with Engel you've got potentially 19

• • • Operator: Mr. Geiger you may ask your question. Geiger: Can you give us your perspective on this plaintiff proposal in terms of the likelihood that goes forward, with give or take on both sides, and what are the potential....(difficult to hear part of question). I realize it's very early in the game. Gary: I mean this proposal that's in the paper today. There is a 0 chance of it occurring. I mean 0. It's a plaintiff proposal that was concocted by Dicky Skruggs and six Attorney Generals. And you know, in talking to the industry, again, everybody would like there to be some legislated solution. You know Steve Goldstone said back in March in the Financial Times that he would like there to be some legislated solution. I think that this specific proposal that you see in the paper, there is a 0 probability. However I think it's a trial balloon. I think that if there is going to be a settlement. And this is why people should really think about mathematically what tobacco stocks are worth right now. And I think if you're going to have a solution now would be the time when the industry would be willing to come up with something, and agree to give up something such as the FDA. They have a very strong position on the FDA,_contrary to what the press would say. Because the court precedent would say that 44 Liquor Mart, would stop the FDA from being able to take action on the advertising issues, on the 21

• ® Morris, because of the international growth, and because it just spits out so much cash flow that it doesn't know what to do with it, so it just gives it back. Then what you really...and I think that investors are going to start doing this with Philip Morris as the settlement discussion stuff heats up. What you really then should do is come up with a lesser of settlement expected value, or damages expected value, and take the lesser of it and subtract it from the fundamental value. When you do that using as worst a case as you can come up, they're going to come up with at Philip Morris and most of these tobacco stocks are just tremendously under valued. Because people are basically assuming domestic tobacco is worth nothing right now. And that's just absurd because this industry is not going to be allowed to go bankrupt given that it generates 17 billion dollars, which is about 11% of the U.S. corporate tax bill- Philip Morris is the largest tax payer in the country. They're not going to be allowed to go bankrupt. People are still going to have to smoke. They're not going to allow a black market to start taking over the streets where they sell cigarettes out of the backs of vans. So I think that the odds of a settlement are relatively high, almost perversely, as someone said to me over the weekend, almost perverse, it would have been better if they 23

i • • have all-these factors replicate themselves in every one of these trials. And you're going to have the lawyers basically say the documents are unimportant so ignore them again. And you're not going to have jurors going into the jury room thinking that Brown & Williamson and American Tobacco are one and the same. I think it actually will do some good at getting the industry to say, well, perhaps, maybe, we should really think about how we can go about getting all this litigation to go away once and for all. And I think now is the time when they will do it. Because you've got this FDA proposal out there circulating. The industry's got a very strong position. And you've got a judge_who's from North Carolina who's going to decide this issue. I think you could make a trade. And somehow convince investors that the litigation is not going to hurt you again. Operator: At this time there are no further questions. Gary: OK. Thank you very much everybody. N O __ V V .p _- O t0 O O -4 25

0 • 0 it might be something that we want to watch, though, only because_ it's_ in Louisiana, which is a pure comparative fault state. And you could have the Brown & Williamson documents come up. It's not going to be something, though, that you could say, that's going to be the trend going forward, because it does involve asbestos. But it is something that we're going to have to watch. Also on September 4th, we have the Mississippi Medicaid Hearing...we should get some indication, at least listening to the Mississippi Supreme Court, how they think about this case. And then, of course, October 14th would be the next trial down in Florida. And that's the Clark Case versus Liggett. Now some people have asked us if that is something that we should be concerned about, because it's Liggett. Yes,_ and no. It's Liggett so you're not going to have great management testifying on your own behalf. But what helps you is that Jim Carney, who runs this case, who is being paid, we think, by Philip Morris, because it was filed last year, before Lesow settled, and before he threw out his attorney, who was Jim Carney. It's Latham and Watkins in New York. For those of you who have followed the industry for years, you know them from Cippollone. They're very good. And they will put on as good a case as David Hardy and the group did in this Rogers trial. So that's on October 14th. And, again, that's what people are going to 12

0 • • Gary: Well the Medicaid...the settlement that is in the Journal today...again, think of it as Dicky Skruggs. Dicky Skruggs represents each one of these six Attorneys General who has filed suit, including Mississippi. And I think that when you're trying to come up with a settlement you're going to basically include the 50 states because there is a limit. You've got only 50 states. Now the problem with it is you've got municipalities, such as the City of San Francisco, the City of Los Angeles, that could also sue you. You've got the Blue Cross Blue Shields of the world that could sue. And because it's a reimbursement type claim by saying we're just going to have settlements for the 50_Attorneys General, it doesn't really make sense because you're not putting a lid on the liability. Again, if you have a legislated solution. Where you say, you know, people cannot sue...and when you define the entity that they cannot sue going forward, you can include any jurisdiction that is trying to recoup for medical costs, whatever. If you're trying to get a legislative solution you can definitely include that in your language. The problem is that any...and I think the industry will disagree on this, but I think it would be very difficult for anybody who has sued up to now to basically say that they have to be part, or they would be banned from suing just because they passed some legislation as of, 16

0 0 let's say, January 1st, 1997. So I think you'd have to still settle with them somehow if you were going to do that. I don't see how the legislation would necessarily ban, you know, those suits that have already been filed before the legislation goes in. So I think it would be part of it. I think that is what, in my reading of the wall Street Journal article, which, again, it's a plantiff's story. The industry knows nothing about this. And I think it's something that the plaintiff's would like. I think if you're trying_to look at it from the industry's perspective, they would not accept any kind of legislation as part of a settlement unless it included the Attorney General's in there, and unless it included all the jurisdictions who could possibly sue for Medicaid or medical expense reimbursement. Patterson: Would there be a tax, excise tax? Gary: Again, what's in the paper today, and I just want to emphasize that this has nothing to do with reality. This has to do with something the Plaintiff's bar came up with. This is like the plaintiff's bar floating a trial balloon saying, here's our opening...if you're interested get back to us. I think if you're the industry you- would want it to be excise tax driven w because you would have_a consumption effect that ~ V doesn't necessarily affect the P& L. ~ co • 0 CO co 17

i 0 0 2 million smokers that are a proported class. Maybe you might_limit it to just smokers who have some disease already manifested. Which would cut it down to one in three if you use all diseases that come_from smoking. Maybe you would have a half a million people in the class. You know I've got to believe at this point that the Florida Supreme Court, for whatever reason, you know, is taking a very anti-tobacco bias. And if you talk to the industry, they are not as sure as they were two months ago that Engel is going to be thrown out. So the money, I think, for Wilner comes in either, becoming part of a class, but I'm not sure that that's his real route. Or consolidating, say, the two hundred claims he has for pre-trial Discovery and erogatories, depositions and then farming them out to each of the state courts so that you get the main stuff done up front. You only depose each witness once. And you could probably do more than one per month if you were able to do that. So I think if he can get, you know...if he can get a couple of these trials to go for him I think he's going to have a much better chance of convincing courts that he should be able to consolidate a lot of these cases. And then it starts paying off if he can start winning. Let's say, one out of two instead of one out of six. I mean if he wins one out of six, the economics don't really help him at all, I don't think. 20

• 0 O lost the Rogers case because then it would give them more incentive to settle. I don't really think of it that far, because I think you'd rather negotiate from a position of strength than of weakness. But I think the odds are high over the next couple of years that you could see a settlement. High meaning, you know, somewhere between a third and two-thirds. It's in that range, I think, because the Clintons are probably going to get another 4 years in the White House. Gregier: Gary, I guess what we need to see is ..... (Part of question too unclear to hear) ..... something coming from the tobacco companies that might lead the investment community to believe they are in fact more inclined to pursue a settlement of some kind? Gary: Yeah, I think if you talk to them, and I'm not saying talk to the investor relations folks, because they are just going to tell you what their CEOs are telling them to say. But I-think if you talk to the outside counsels, which we do, if you talk to some of the internal counsels, and you just probe the idea of settling, I think you get a lot of willingness to at least listen. And, you know, Steve Goldstone himself, CEO of Reynolds, who's a lawyer, would say you'd have to be crazy not to at least listen to the ideas out there. And I think this Carter verdict, you know, may have been a blessing in disguise. While it is an aberration in my mind, because you're not going to 24

0 • • jurisdictional issues, all the court precedent since the 1938 Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act was passed, that there has to be a medical benefit for cigarettes to be called drugs. I would think that if the industry is willing to give up that chit in return for, we want to stay in business. We don't want to be sued out of existence. And we're willing to settle, you know, in return for some language that say you can't sue the tobacco industry. And we're kind of along the lines of the black lung type legislation you saw a couple years ago. Sort of along the lines of the National Vaccine Act, which basically allowed people to make the DPT shots without getting sued. I think that you would see the industry want to settle if you could come up with a legislated solution. So if you're asking me what is the probability of this one in the Journal being passed, 0. What is the probability of the next two years will you see some sort of settlement, to the earlier question, that takes into consideration the Medicaid suits, takes into consideration all the Class Actions. And wipes out as many of the_ individual suits as you can possibly get away with. I think the odds are pretty high. Everybody would agree that if you can value, say, Philip Morris on its theoretical value based on fundamentals, and ignore, for a second any cost of either settlement or damages, people would put a 20, 22 multiple on Philip 22