Philip Morris
Passive Smoking and Your Heart
Fields
- Author
- Brockie, R.E.
- Huber, G.L.
- Mahajan, V.K.
- Huber, G.L.
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- MAGA, MAGAZINE ARTICLE
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- OKONIEWSKI,ANNE/OFFICE
- Attachment
- 2046323388/2046323605
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- N526
- Request
- Stmn/R1-035
- Stmn/R1-036
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- Stmn/R1-036
- Named Organization
- Consumers Research
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- Garland
- Glantz
- He
- Helsing
- Hirayama
- Ho
- Humble
- Lee
- Parmley
- Surgeon General
- Svendsen
- Wells
- Garland
- Author (Organization)
- Consumers Research
- Medical College of Oh
- Presbyterian Hospital of Dallas
- St Vincents Hospital
- Univ of Tx Health Center
- Medical College of Oh
- Master ID
- 2046323388/3605
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issue and left the statutory standard in place.
While the agency rejected a variety of attacks on
that standard, we are concerned with only one of
the defeated arguments: the contention that the
standard will force carmakers to produce sznaller,
less safe cars, thus making it more difficult and
expensive for consumers to buy larger, safer cars.
We find that the agency has not coherently
addressed this concern.
When the automaking firms petitioned for a
reduction in the model year 1990 standardd down to
26.5 mpg, and petitioners pressed the argument
that failure to reduce the standard would cost lives,
NHTSA had three basic choices. First, it might have
concluded that the statute does not require it to con-
sider safety effects when deciding whether to
embark on a modification proceeding. It could then
have dismissed petitioners' claims without further
ado. While a court might have reversed, the statuto-
ry framework is so loose and...that the agency would
have had a fair shot at being upheld.
Second, NHTSA might have seriously examined
the record data. On its face this suggested (as we
shall see) the overwhelming likelihood that a 27.5
mpg standard reduces the supply of safe cars avail-
able to American consumers. Conceivably, of
" ... consumers who do not want to
be priced out of the market for
larger, safer cars, deserve better
from their government."
course, a sophisticated analysis might have over-
come the record's apparent implications, but even
if it did not, all NHTSA would have had to do was
face the trade-off. It could have said that while the
27.5 standard might cost, say 200-to-500 American
lives a year for ten years, it would also reduce
American oil imports by, say, 50,000-to-400,000
barrels a year, and that in its judgment the trade-
off was worth it. And it could have expressed any
such trade-off in less numerical terms.
Finally, NHTSA could have fudged the analysis,
held the standard at 27.5, and, with the help of sta-
tistical legerdemain, made conclusory assertions
that its decision had no safey cost at all. That is
what it chose. The people petitioners represent, con-
sumers who do not want to be priced out of the mar-
ket for larger, safer cars, deserve better from their
government.
...the agency insisted at oral argument that
even if the 27.5 standard constrains the behavior
of carmakers, it will not lead to smaller cars. Yet
nowhere has the agency actually justified this
claim or even purported to make such a finding.
"Nothing in the record or in
NHTSA's analysis appears to
undermine the inference that the
27.5 mpg standard kills people..."
It came closest in the following passage:
"[T]here are still a number of fuel-effeciency
enhancing methods that [GM and Ford have] not
fully utilized throughout their fleets.... NHTSA
believes that the domestic manufacturers should be
able to improve their fuel economy in the future by
these and/or other technological means, without
outsourcing their larger cars, without further down-
sizing or mix shifts toward smaller cars, and with-
out sacrificing acceleration or performance."
Why the agency expressed itself in the normative
("should be") is anybody's guess. At any rate, it has
never claimed that domestic manufacturers will in
fact meet the standard without downsizing their
fleets, or even that there is a substantial probability
that they will do so, or even that there is a substan-
tial likelihood that they will use methods other than
downsizing for the lion's share of the work. Presum-
ably NHTSA does not assert such facts because it
could not ground them in the record.
Moreover, to the extent that carmakers choose
technological innovation over downsizing (and fur-
ther assuming that such innovation would not itself
compromise aspects of auto safety), that choice
would involve significant costs in implementation,
even if we assume that research and development
are complete. That cost would translate into higher
prices for large cars (as well as small), thereby pres-
suring consumers to retain their old cars and make
the associated sacrifice in safety. The result would
be effectively the same harm that concerns petition-
ers and that the agency fails to negate or justify.
The historical fact is, however, that carmakers
respond to CAFE standards by reducing the size of
their fleets. NHTSA itself has explicitly acknowl-
edged as much in the past, and we ourselves have
insisted that "the evidence shows that manufactur-
ers are likely to respond to lower CAFE standards
by continuing or expanding production of larger,
heavier vehicles." Even in the decision below the
agency acknowledged this link, explaining that
"Chrysler's CAFE has been higher than that of GM
or Ford in recent years primarily because it does not
compete, or compete as heavily, in all the market
segments in which GM and Ford sell cars, particu-
larly the large car market."
The agency now tries to obscure this reality by
pointing out that "the average fuel economy of the
new car fleet has improved steadily from 26.6 mpg
in model year 1982 to 28.2 mpg in model year
April 1992 11

"As NHTSA itself has amply docu-
mented, however, minivans are
considerably less safe than vans
generally, with a fatality rate per
registered vehicle about 25-33%
higher than that of large cars."
1987, while the average weight of a new car
increased two pounds during the same period."
This argument misses the point. The appropriate
comparison, which NHTSA must but did not
address, is between the world with more stringent
CAFE standards and the world with less stringent
standards. The fact that weight has remained con-
stant over time despite mileage improvements
shows the effect of technological improvements, to
be sure, but in no way undermines the natural
inference that weight is lower than it would be
absent CAFE regulation. Here we can be quite
sure that it is lower, since, as NHTSA observed in
this decision, economic recovery and declining
gasoline prices sharply raised consumer demand
for large cars over the relevant period ("consumer
demand has shifted back toward larger vehicles")
If consumers demanded substantially bigger cars,
carmakers-absent regulation-would have pro-
duced substantially bigger cars, not cars that
remained, on average, within two pounds of the cars
made when consumers favored smaller cars. More-
over, NHTSA has given us no reason to think that
whatever technological innovations permitted
automakers to meet CAFE requirements while
keeping weight constant did not also cost consumers
more, again pricing some consumers out of the mar-
ket for new large cars.'
NHTSA also argues that even if the 27.5 mpg
standard will deplete the supply of large GM or Ford
cars, a consumer looking for a big car "will buy a
large car from another manufacturer, or will buy a
minivan, or will keep his or her older, large
car.... [A]ny one of those alternative consumer out-
comes is far more likely than the possibility that the
consumer will buy a smaller car than he or she
wanted to buy." Nothing in the record suggests that
any of these will give consumers large-car safety at
the prices that would have prevailed if NHTSA had
made a less stringent choice.
The reference to buying large cars from "anoth-
er manufacturer" is somewhat in the spirit of
Marie Antoinette's suggestion to "let them eat
IIt is significant that even NHTSA makes no more than the lame claim
that "[tlhis example illustrates the point that not all CAFE gains come
by reducing weight." The issue is whether a material portion of the
"CAFE gains" are likely to entail downsizing. NHTSA never even pur-
ports to deny this.
cake." By NHTSA's own hypothesis, the "other
manufacturers" are Chrysler, which has essential-
ly removed itself from the large car market, and
foreign manufacturers, which are subject to CAFE
standards on their U.S. sales. To the limited extent
that foreign firms produce truly large cars at all,
they are expensive ones.
In suggesting minivans (which are exempt from
the 27.5 standard), the agency disingenuously
obscures their dangers by citing safety figures only
for vans in general. As NHTSA itself has amply
documented, however, minivans are considerably
less safe than vans generally, with a fatality rate
per registered vehicle about 25-33% higher than
that of large cars. Finally, NHTSA's notion that
the consumer should "keep his or her older, large
car" ignores both its own finding that neww cars
"appear to experience fewer accidents per mile
traveled," and the plight of consumers seeking to
buy a large car for the first time.
By making it harder for consumers to buy large
cars, the 27.5 mpg standard will increase traffic
fatalities if, as a general matter, small cars are less
safe than big ones. They are, as NHTSA itself
acknowledges. The agency explains:
"Occupants of the smaller cars generally are at
greater risk because : (a) the occupant's survival
space is generally less in small cars (survival space,
in simple terms, means enough room for the occu-
pant to be held by the vehicle's occupant restraint
system without being smashed into injurious sur-
faces, and enough room to prevent being crushed or
hit by a collapsing surface); (b) smaller and lighter
vehicles generally have less physical structure avail-
able to absorb and manage crash energy and forces;.
and (c) in most collisions between vehicles of differ-
ent weight, the forces imposed on occupants of
lighter cars are proportionately greater than the
forces felt by occupants of heavier vehicles.°'2
The agency tries to skirt the obvious conclusion
with two specious arguments. First, it essentially
argues that the 27.5 mpg standard will have no effect
on the availability of large cars (i.e., will accomplish
nothing at all). This, we have seen, is simply untrue.
Second, the agency observes that new cars now come
with a variety of mandatory and optional safety fea-
tures (airbags, anti-lock brakes, etc) that will pre-
sumably compensate for a decline in size.
There are two things wrong with this latter
(See CAFE, page 35.)
2One might argue that the third factor indicated that if all cars were
small, there would be fewer traffic fatalities. Any such inference
appears quite doubtful. Cars can hit a variety of objects, including
trucks, trees, and other cars; fatalities in car-to-car crashes do not
account for even a majority of passenger-car occupants fatalities.
Unless NHTSA outlaws trucks and trees, smaller cars will probably
always mean higher fatality rates, as NHTSA recognizes., ("in single
vehicle crashes, there is increased risk of serious injury or death").
12 Consumers' Research

Special Report:
Passive Smoking And
Your Heart
Gary L. Huber, MD, Robert E. Brockie, MD,
and Vijay K. Mahajan, MD.
n the July 1991 issue of CR, we defined
the nature of environmental tobacco
smoke (ETS), presented an overview of
how the possible health risk of exposure to ETS
is assessed, and reviewed the available literature
on the alleged relationship between ETS expo-
sure and the risk of nonsmokers developing lung
cancer (see "Passive Smoking: How Great a Haz-
ard?"). There are published now a total of 32
studies on ETS and lung cancer. Although some
may cite these reports to mean otherwise, the
majority of the published data do not support
the conclusion that exposure to the residual con-
stituents of ETS is associated with lung cancer
in nonsmokers. That is, only 7 of the 32 pub-
lished studies-or less than a fourth of the
investigations that have examined this ques-
tion-report a small, but statistically significant,
increased risk. The reader is referred to our ear-
lier publication for a more extensive analysis of
these considerations.
Exposure to environmental tobacco smoke has
also been reported as associated with the develop-
ment of cardiovascular disease. This is an impor-
tant issue, in that the number of people in our
society who develop cardiovascular disease
exceeds by a substantial margin those that will
develop cancer. A critical evaluation of this sub-
ject requires placing the available information in
some rational perspective within a broader under-
standing of cardiovascular disease in general.
The term "cardiovascular disease" is used to
describe those illnesses of the heart, brain, and
other organ systems that develop because of
acquired abnormalities in the blood vessels that
supply them. Cardiovascular diseases are by far
the most common cause of disease and death in
our society today. Over 60 million Americans suf-
fer from these diseases and one million or more of
them die each year, accounting for one death
every 30 seconds. Cardiovascular diseases are
responsible for almost one-half of all deaths in the
United States. To place this in further perspec-
tive, there are more than twice as many deaths
Drs. Huber, Brockie, and Mahajan are with, respectively,
the University of Texas Health Center, the Presbyterian
Hospital of Dallas, and St. Vincent's Hospital-Medical
College of Ohio.
from cardiovascular disease as there are from all
forms of cancer combined.
Coronary artery disease, an illness that is due
to a narrowing or blockage of the major vessels
that supply blood to the heart muscle, is one of
the most common forms of cardiovascular disease.
If the coronary artery is partially blocked, the
reduced blood supply to the heart muscle may
cause reversible ischemic heart pain, or angina
pectoris, to develop. If the blockage is more
severe, myocardial infarction (irreversible dam-
age to part of the heart muscle) can develop;
"The fact that about half of all
cardiovascular deaths can not
be explained on the basis of spe-
cific identifiable risks reflects
how little we really know about
these matters, and how extreme-
ly difficult it is to study them
with precision."
worse yet, sudden death may occur. These are
manifestations of coronary artery disease that we
commonly call "heart attacks." Coronary artery
disease and heart attacks cause about one death
every minute in this country.
The exact cause of coronary heart disease is
not known. It is generally held that the primary
problem is atherosclerosis, which is a gradual
build-up of fatty deposits on the inside of the
coronary vessels. The build-up of these deposits
forms an atherosclerotic plaque, rendering the
artery wall thicker, often with an irregular sur-
face that may cause the blood within to clot. This
is a slow process that begins in infancy or early
childhood and progresses all through life. As the
build-up of fats (primarily cholesterol) continues,
a point is reached where the vessel opening
becomes significantly narrowed and is more sus-
ceptible to complete blockage. Many people who
die of heart attacks, however, do not have an
unusual amount of atherosclerosis in their coro-
nary vessels, or even elevated cholesterol levels.
Furthermore, the degree of development of
April 1992 13

plaque formation does not consistently correlate
with the site of an eventual occlusion or with
death from this disease.
Atherosclerosis appears to be responsible for
the largest share of heart attacks and related
deaths in this country. How or why atherosclerotic
plaques occur and develop, however, is not
known.' In the absence of a proven mechanism for
the development of coronary heart disease,
emphasis has been placed on the identification,
through epidemiological studies, of "risk factors"
that are associated with an accelerated rate of for-
mation of atherosclerotic plaques. Most often,
however, results of such epidemiological studies
are expressed as death that is attributable to heart
disease, not as a quantification of atherosclerosis.
Unfortunately, death certificates, from which
mortality rates are often derived, are notoriously
inaccurate for diagnosis of heart disease.
Risk Factors
A risk factor is the term that describes a char-
acteristic of behavior or of lifestyle, or an envi-
ronmental exposure, or an inherited
characteristic, that on the basis of epidemiologi-
cal data is reported to be associated with the
development of disease.
The risk is usually expressed as an "odds-
ratio," or a "risk ratio," which measures "relative
risk" in comparison to some control group or pop-
ulation which has not been exposed to the factor
in question. If there is no difference in the disease
rates associated with the factor, compared to the
disease rate for the non-exposed or control group,
the relative risk will be calculated as "unity," or
1.0. If there are differences in the disease rate
that are associated with the factor studied, these
differences will be expressed as a relative risk
that is some variation of unity. If the relative risk
is less than 1.0, the average exposed individuals
would have less chance than the nonexposed con-
trol individuals for the development of the dis-
ease. If the relative risk is greater than 1.0, the
exposed individuals would have an increased
chance for the development of the disease. How-
ever, the degree of increased or decreased risk
must be "statistically significant" by acceptable
biostatistical criteria before a relative risk can
have any meaningful importance.
Relative risk relationships are only mathemati-
cal associations. When they are consistent and
1There currently are two widely investigated, speculative theories: (1)
Atherosclerotic plaques develop in response to an initial injury to the
blood vessel wall, or (2) the plaques are an uncontrolled growth of
sorts, with replication within the vessel wall that results in a build-up
of cholesterol-laden cells that eventually will cause a blockage.
strong, there is an implication of a potential
causal relationship. Even when very strong, how-
ever, risk factors by themselves do not represent
anything other than a statistical association.
They must always be considered in the context of
other scientific information. They must also be
evaluated in the context of whether or not the
reported association makes any biological sense.
The strength of a statistical association does
not necessarily determine its importance. For
instance, a weak association, if statistically signif-
icant, that affects very large numbers of people
may be important because of the magnitude of its
effect on the population at risk. A strong statisti-
cal association that has no biological relevance
may be unimportant or meaningless. Even strong
relative risk associations must be viewed cau-
tiously when there exist numerous potential caus-
es of a disease. The greater the number of
potential "causes" of a disease (usually identified
as risk factors), the more difficult it becomes to
analyze (or implicate) any one of these "causes"
(or risks) to the exclusion of another.
When the relative risk is less than 2.5 or so,
the association of the identified risk factor with
the development of the disease is, by convention,
considered to be weak. That is to say, the associa-
tion of the risk factor with the development of
disease may have only limited or no real meaning.
The weaker the relative risk, the greater must be
the care and responsibility exercised in its inter-
pretation. When the relative risk is less than 2.0,
there is a strong possibility (or probability) that
the association is artifactual-that is, the relative
risk may actually be due to confounding factors
where two or more potential associations cannot
be separated or distinguished. (A confounding
factor, in this context, can be defined in the most
simple of terms as "an alternative explanation. ")
When the relative risk is less than 2.0, there are
enormous problems of controlling the biases of
the investigator as well as biases that are inher-
ently present within the experimental design of
every epidemiological study. Bias, in this context,
means the introduction of error by failing to con-
trol for or to consider other important influences.
Risk Factors for Cardiovascular Disease. To compli-
ca.te matters further, it is extremely unlikely that
cardiovascular disease is ever caused by one factor.
The development and progression of this disease
are associated with many factors. Over the past 25
years, in fact, more than 300 identifiable risk fac-
tors have been reported as potentially important to
the development of cardiovascular diseases.
Even with this large number of risk factors,
leading authorities in cardiology emphasize that
it is remarkable that most people who develop
14 Consumers' Research

atherosclerosis and most people who die from car-
diovascular disease do not have a readily identifi-
able specific risk factor to explain their disease.
For example, only slightly less than 50% of all
cardiovascular disease and death has been associ-
ated with specific risk factors. The fact that about
half of all cardiovascular deaths can not be
explained on the basis of specific identifiable risks
reflects how little we really know about these
matters, and how extremely difficult it is to study
them with precision.
Cardiovascular risk factors are usually classi-
fied as unmodifiable or modifiable. Unmodifiable
risk factors are ones that represent an association
that cannot be changed, such as age, gender, race,
genetic determinants, family history, and so on.
Modifiable risk factors in many ways are poten-
tially more important, because once identified
they hopefully can be reduced or controlled.
Modifiable risk factors number literally in the
hundreds, but the most important ones are
thought to be high blood pressure, diabetes melli-
tus, and elevated blood levels of cholesterol and
triglycerides. Excessive life stress, excessive alco-
hol intake, lack of regular exercise, cigarette
smoking, obesity in a certain body distribution,
and other life style factors may be almost equally
important. Most physicians try to reduce modifi-
able risk factors in the hope of reducing the mor-
bidity and mortality due to cardiovascular
diseases and, especially, coronary heart disease.
Active Smoking
Active tobacco smoking is reported as a major
and an important risk factor for the development
of cardiovascular diseases and for coronary heart
disease. Active smoking is called a "major" risk
factor because of the large numbers of people who
smoke. Smoking rates may be under-reported
now because of the associated "social taboos" of
smoking. In spite of this consideration, it is esti-
mated that at least 50 million Americans contin-
ue to smoke on a regular basis. The Office of the
Surgeon General has emphasized that reducing
the magnitude of this active smoking population
would have a major national health impact in
reducing cardiovascular disease mortality.
Although classified as a "major" risk factor for
heart disease on the basis of the sheer number of
active smokers, it may come as a surprise to many
readers to learn that active cigarette smoking is
not a strong risk factor. For instance, in 1983 the
Surgeon General's report focused exclusively on
tobacco smoking and cardiovascular diseases and
estimated the relative risk for coronary heart dis-
ease in smokers at 1.7, compared to nonsmokers.
Other estimates, now based on over 20 million
person-years of epidemiological assessment, have
set the relative risk in active smokers for coro-
nary heart disease at a level of from as low as 1.3
to as high as 2.0 or slightly greater, but with a
four-fold greater risk for sudden death, compared
to nonsmokers.
Indeed, when critically analyzed, most epidemi-
ological studies report that active tobacco smok-
ing alone is, in the absence of other potential risk
factors (such as high blood pressure and high
serum cholesterol levels), an extremely weak risk
factor for the development of cardiovascular dis-
eases. Given the presence of additional risk fac-
tors, however, such as high blood cholesterol
levels or hypertension, tobacco cigarette smoking
has been reported to influence the net overall risk
for death from coronary heart disease. That is,
adding active tobacco smoking to another under-
lying risk may result in a net effect that 'a greater
than simply the sum of the two individual risks
combined. There are several possible explanations
for this, which will be addressed in the discussion
that follows. It is not clear, for instance, whether
tobacco smoke itself is actually important in the
development of atherosclerosis or whether simply
that tobacco smoking is an epidemiological
"marker" for a life style characterized by multiple
high risk behaviors. It must be remembered, how-
ever, that increasing the strength of the risk asso-
ciation does not allow the inference that the risk
factor in itself is causal, for active tobacco smok-
ing or for cholesterol or for any other factor.
'Passive' Smoking
Nine epidemiological studies (see table, page
17) have reported the relative risk for develop-
ment of cardiovascular disease in nonsmokers
exposed to ETS. Since the residual constituents of
ETS are so dilute, it is extremely difficult to mea-
sure them directly. In that context, then, it is
important to emphasize that none of the nine epi-
demiological studies actually measured exposure
to ETS, but rather projected or estimated an
exposure to ETS on the basis of a surrogate. The
surrogate was usually the historical identification
(by answer to a questionnaire) of a smoker living
in the household of a nonsmoker. The nine stud-
ies contain 12 sets of epidemiological data, seven
sets of which are data for nonsmoking females
who were married to or living with active male
smokers, and in some instances who reported
ETS exposure in their workplace. Limited data
are available on four sets of nonsmoking males
who reported a surrogate equivalent of exposure
to ETS.
April 1992 15
~
I

What Is ETS?
Environmental tobacco smoke (ETS) consists
of "secondhand" residual smoke constituents
emitted by active smokers into their sur-
roundings. The nonsmoker may be exposed to
these residual constituents in very dilute con-
centrations.
ETS residual constituents are remnants of
exhaled mainstream and of sidestream tobac-
co smoke that are so dispersed in environ-
mental air that it is somewhat of a misnomer,
or misconception, even to refer to them as
"smoke," per se. Under real-life conditions,
only about 100 or so of these environmental
tobacco smoke remnants have been identified
to date-and then only at extremely low con-
centrations-in the environment of smokers.
This is in contrast to the several thousand
constituents that have been reported for the
mainstream smoke that is inhaled by active
smokers.
Five of the twelve data sets report very small
increases in relative risk that reach statistical sig-
nificance, and seven of the data sets report
changes that are not statistically significant at
conventional levels of biostatistical acceptance.
A relative risk ratio is an estimated average
change in the disease rate associated with the
studied variable; in all of these studies, then, the
relative risk is the projected estimate of risk for
developing cardiovascular diseases for nonsmok-
ing individuals married to or living with smokers.
Confidence intervals also are included for all data
presented in the table.2 Seven of the 12 data sets
have as a lower limit of their confidence intervals
a relative risk of less than unity (1.0), indicating,
by universally accepted epidemiological stan-
dards, that spousal smoking may not be associat-
ed with the development of cardiovascular
diseases in nonsmokers; in other words, confi-
dence intervals that reach less than unity for rel-
ative risks indicate that there is insufficient
evidence that the experimental group is different
from the control group at the specified level of
confidence.
How Valid?
None of the ETS epidemiological studies is a
"high validity" randomized prospective interven-
tion study designed to evaluate whether or not a
reduction in the level of exposure to ETS is asso-
ciated with a reduction in risk for cardiovascular
disease. Three of the ETS studies are low validity
case-control studies and six of the ETS studies
are cohort "quasi-prospective" assessments. That
is, they are drawn from what were prospective
studies designed for another purpose and, as
such, are valid only for generating hypotheses,
not for confirming them. None of the six cohort
studies were initially designed to evaluate the
effect of ETS as a risk for cardiovascular disease.
They all represent "data dredging" by "retrospec-
tive" assessments of "nested case-controls" fol-
lowed prospectively for another purpose.
The studies are of diverse design and draw con-
flicting conclusions. The six cohort studies, for
example, do not report comparable data. Some
report disease rates and others report death
rates, some report prevalence statistics and oth-
ers incidence data, and some assess the broad cat-
egory of cardiovascular diseases in general and
others assess certain manifestations of only the
more specific coronary heart disease. For these
reasons, the data from the various studies cannot
be legitimately combined in so-called meta-analy-
sis to see if stronger conclusions can be drawn.3
Even though combining such diverse data as
are available from these studies is not generally
considered scientifically acceptable (at least not
by currently justified procedures), two publica-
tions nevertheless have attempted to do so.` A
third publication (Steenland, 1992), did not pool
results of epidemiological studies, but developed
and employed an elaborate model based on an
extensive number of untested assumptions.
Steenland projected a 2.2 percent greater chance
for nonsmoking males and 1.2 percent greater
chance for nonsmoking females of dying from
coronary heart disease by age 74, when living
with a smoker, in comparison to those living with
a nonsmoker over a lifetime.
Dosimetry and Trends. None of the studies on
ETS and cardiovascular diseases measured or in
any way directly quantified actual exposure to
environmental tobacco smoke.s In the absence of
direct measurements of exposure, these studies,
like all epidemiologic studies on ETS, have used
2 A 95% confldence interval is a statistical expression of a range of val-
ues that have, as listed here, a 95% probability of including the true
value for the effect of nonsmokers living with smoking spouses, com-
p3ared to nonsmokers living with nonsmoking spouses.
Meta-analysis is a way of pooling or combining several studies, by sta-
tistical analysis and integration of the results of low-power or weak
reports, in order to draw conclusions that may be stronger than those
demonstrable in any of the weak studies alone.
4The first publication (Wells, 1988) derived an estimated "pooled relative
risk" for ETS surrogate exposure and heart disease of 1.2 for females
and 1.3 for males. The second publication (Glantz and Parmley, 1991)
failed to provide the reader with the methodology employed, and project-
ed an overall "pooled risk" of 1.3 for both males and females.
5 Five of the nine studies on ETS and cardiovascular disease attempted
to assess via a questionnaire on household smokers whether or not
there was a "dose-related" association between the number of smokers
16 Consumers' Research

Studies of ETS and Cardiovascular Disease in Nonsmokers
Study Sex
Type of
Study#
Number
of Cases+
Relative
Risk** 95%
Confidence
Interval Variables Controlled
Hirayama, 1984++ F P 494 1.16 0.9-1.4 Husband's age
Garland, 1985 F P 19 2.7 0.9-13.6 Age, blood pressure (BP), weigt, choles-
t
i
t
l
Lee, 1986 F
C
77
0.9
0.5-1.6 erol mart
a
sta
us.
Age, marital status.
M C 41 1.2 0.5-2.6
Svendsen, 1987 M P 13 2.1 0.7-6.5 Age, BP, plasma lipids, weight, income,
He/sing, 1988 M
P
370
1.3*
1.1-1.6 education, alcohol.
Age, education, marital status, income.
F P 988 1.2* 1.1-1.4
He, 1989 F C 34 1.5* 1.3-1.8 Age, BP, cholesterol, race, residence,
Humble, 1990 F
P
76
1.6
1.0-2.6 alcohol, other factors (but data not available).
Age, BP, weight, cholesterol.
Hole, 1990 M/F P 84 2.0* 1.2-3.4 Age, BP, weight, cholesterol, social class.
Dobson, 1991 M C 22 1.0 0.5-1.9 Age, sex, prior coronary heart disease.
F C 43 2.5` 1.5-4.1
~ P=prospective cohort study; C=retrospective case-control study
' Statistically significant at the conventionally accepted level (5%).
'` Weak relative risks have risk ratios between 1.0 and 3.0, or so. Any risk below 1.0 represents a
negative relationship. Note that none of the studies report a strong
average relative risk.. Data reported are from the author's papers or from review articles.
+ Cases contains coronary heart disease deaths and/or cardiovascular disease, with or without death.
++ Some of the data from Hirayama were reported as "statistically significant" with unconventional
90"/% confidence intervals (relative risk of 1.3 with 1.1-1.6 confi-
dence intervals); recompilation of all of his data available reveals a nonsignificant relative risk.
surrogates of exposure. For nonsmokers, the sur-
rogate of ETS exposure has been an estimation of
the number of active smokers living in the same
household (usually an actively smoking husband
with a nonsmoking female or an actively smoking
wife with a nonsmoking male) or an estimate of
smokers present in the work-place of the non-
smokers. These surrogate "exposure" estimates
were derived exclusively through various ques-
tionnaires. No study employed actual direct quan-
tification of ETS or ETS constituents in the
environment of the nonsmoker. We reviewed in
some detail the serious shortcomings of this
approach in our previous publication in CR, noted
above, and the reader is referred to that contribu-
tion for a more extensive discussion.
As with other studies on ETS and potential dis-
ease risks, some of the reports on ETS and cardio-
vascular disease contain data on some of the
population subsets that, in the absence of other-
wise significant differences, suggested to the
authors or to other reviewers a "trend" of the sta-
tistically insignificant data toward a meaningful
association. Although in most of science "trends"
in these kinds of data do not count, there are
in the household and the amount of cardiovascular disease. The results
were inconsistent, with some reporting a dose-response relationship,
most reporting no significant effect, and some data suggesting a
reverse dose-response relationship-less disease reported with high lev-
els of exposure to ETS.
"Six of the nine studies report a
relative risk for cardiovascular
or coronary heart disease...that
is approximately equal to or in
excess of that reported for active
smokers. Intuitively, that makes
no biological sense whatsoever."
legitimate ways to assess whether or not such
"trends" might have some "statistical signifi-
cance." Seven of the nine original reports claim
and discuss "trends" in their results, even when
their own published statistical analyses of these
data demonstrate that the proposed "trends" had
no statistical significance. In other words, these
contributors seemed to ignore their own biostatis-
tical analyses and to adapt new rules to fit
hypotheses otherwise not provable by their own
reported data or by conventionally accepted bio-
statistical principles.
Other Scientific Evidence. Nonsmokers in the
environments of active smokers typically are
exposed to only extremely small amounts of a
very limited number of residual remnants of ETS.
Potential cardiovascular effects would not be
expected from exposure to such small concentra-
tions of these smoke constituents.
April 1992 17

"All of the more than 300 cardio-
vascular risk factors that have
been identified are confounding
variables and many have the
same approximate relative risk
or risk ratio as that reported for
spousal smoking."
Under real-life conditions,e it has been estimat-
ed that nonsmokers are exposed to approximately
as little as 1/10,000 to at most only about 1/100 to
2/100 per hour or so of certain constituents of
cigarette smoke to which the active smoker is
exposed in the same period.
Exposure of nonsmokers to the highly diluted
residual constituents of ETS is at a concentration
well below that level which would be expected to
produce any long-term pathological effects or dis-
ease. Remarkably, then, in the face of this
extremely low level of exposure, six of the nine
studies report a relative risk for cardiovascular or
coronary heart disease associated with ETS expo-
sure that is approximately equal to or in excess of
that reported for active smokers. Intuitively, that
makes no biological sense whatsoever. Something
clearly is wrong with either the design or with the
gathering and calculation of the epidemiological
data in these studies.
Cigarette smoking remains a high frequency
event in our society, with an estimated 50 million
or more active smokers today. Approximately 500
to 600 billion cigarettes are consumed each year
in this country alone. Death from cardiovascular
disease is also a high frequency event in our soci-
ety, with over one million cardiovascular deaths
each year and one death every 30 seconds. It is
not surprising, therefore, that considerable inves-
tigative effort would be spent on studying the
potential association between these two high fre-
quency events.
When such potential associations are studied,
great care must be exercised to control for the
influence of confounding factors on the reported
results. This is particularly true for cigarette
smoking and cardiovascular diseases because the
reported association between the two is quite
weak, the number of additional risk factors is
extraordinarily large, and less than half of all car-
diovascular disease mortality is reported to be
associated with specific identifiable risk factors.
6 By "real-life" conditions it is meant conditions encountered in day-to-
day living conditions in the world, as opposed to the artificial con-
straints of the experimental laboratory or a sealed environment
chamber.
Confounding Variables. A confounding variable is
one that can cause or prevent the outcome of
interest (in this case, death from cardiovascular
disease) and is not associated with the factor
under investigation (in this case, reported expo-
sure to ETS). All of the more than 300 cardiovas-
cular risk factors that have been identified are
confounding variables and many have the same
approximate relative risk or risk ratio as that
reported for spousal smoking. If these confound-
ing variables are not evaluated and controlled for
in an epidemiological study on ETS, how then can
ETS be implicated to the exclusion of the other
factors?
It cannot be, of course, but that is exactly what
has happened in the nine studies on ETS and car-
diovascular diseases. For instance, the two largest
studies (Hirayama with 494 cases and Helsing
with 1358 cases-together representing well over
80% of all reported cases in these studies) do not
even control for blood cholesterol levels, do not
control for high blood pressure, and do not con-
trol for diabetes mellitus, the three strongest risk
factors associated with cardiovascular disease.
Indeed, none of the nine studies controls for more
than a limited handful of the potential 300 or
more reported identifiable risk factors.
In the absence of controlling these variables,
the reported outcomes for implied ETS exposure
are impossible to interpret with any confidence or
meaning. In fact, it is now scientifically unaccept-
able to undertake an investigation (or, for that
matter, unacceptable to accept the contention of a
published study) on cardiovascular disease with-
out properly controlling for the three best known
and widely accepted risk factors-high plasma
cholesterol levels, high blood pressure, and dia-
betes mellitus.
Lifestyle Factors
Active smokers are different from nonsmokers
in a remarkable number of ways. In general,
smokers as a group appear to have a lifestyle that
results in a clustering of several adverse health
risk factors. Smokers tend to drink more alcohol
than nonsmokers, drink more coffee, live a more
stressful life, behave more aggressively, have a
lower socioeconomic status, exercise less, sleep
less, and spend less time on enjoyable hobbies.
Smokers tend to be less safety conscious, not to
wear seatbelts, to have accidents more frequently,
and to behave in ways that increase their risks for
injury. Smokers, on average, are less educated
than nonsmokers. Smokers are less "health con-
scious" than nonsmokers, and they have a more
negative attitude about modifying behavior to
18 Consumers' Research
