Philip Morris
Social Cost and the Political Economy of Tobacco Taxation
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03-01-06 23:a1 T-
SOCIAL COSTS AND THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF TOBACCO TAXATION
Presented to the Philip Morris International Seminar on Taxation
September 10-12, 1986, Washington DC.
Alan E Woodfield
Department of Economics and Operations Research
University of Canterbury
Christchurch 1
NEW ZEALAND

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1. INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this lecture is to provide an economist's
perspective on the concept of social costs widely associated
with the use of tobacco products. The organization
is as
follow3. Pirat, I addrooo thc ioouc o5 hvir aoC'.iul-oGn-Ea a:.-G
detine~l and measured. Second, I explain how estimated social
costs are used in the policy debate surrounding tobacco, with
cpocial roforonco to taxation policy. Third, I provido a
critical interpretation of the social cost concept, and the
implications for tax policy arising from this interpretation.
Finally, I consider the social cost concept in ttle wlder
discusssion of the political economy of taxation. I conclude
with a summary and suggestions for future developments.
in the nature of a lecture, a number of arguments must be treated
briefly and informally. For a more detailed exposition readers
might consult my report "Social Cost and Benefit as a Basis for
Industry Regulation", copies of which are available for
circulation at this seminar.
2. DEFINITION AND MEASUREMENT OF "SOCIAL COSTS" OF SMOKING
In many Western countries, estimates exist for the annual costs
I
borne by those societies as a consequence of smoking. In my
reading of the literature, however, it is disquieting that in no
case is there a clear definition of social costs, nor a specific
justification for the inclusion of various items under the social
cost rubric. They are, in the words of British economists
Atkinson and Meade, "commonly thought to be relevant". In my

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opinion, what this literature believes is being estimated is the
annual amount of money that a society has to pay in order to
permit smoking to occur at the observed level, and which would
saved if there was no smoking at all.
Consider the following items which are among the more important
to be included as social costs.
I Medical Costs
(a) Direct Medical Costs
Expenditures on hospital services, physician services and
prescription drugs required to treat various illnesses
supposedly caused by smoking.
be
(b) Indirect Medical Costs
(i) Output and productivity losses due to smoking.
(ii) Output losses arising from absence from the workforce due
to smoking-related illness and pre-retirement death. The
latter is sometimes used as a proxy for the value of the
loss of life.
(iii) Benefits and pension payments to sick smokers and
dependents of deceased smokers.
(iv) Lost tax revenue aeso.^,-iated with (ii) abov_e._._
II Non-Medical Costs
(i)
(ii)
(iii) Imports of tobacco products,
abroad.
Fire damage costs.
Psychic costs. and remission of profits
(iv) Nuisance and health costs of passive smoking.
(v) Expenditures on tobacco products.
2
(vii) Tobacco advertising expenditures.

oU°lJl'rha. _-`7:p-1 7- 1iM..Ll.1
Consider now the procedures used to measure these various costs.
Direct medical costs are measured by first estimating the cost of
diagnosis and treatment of a particular smoking-related illness
(lung cancer, for example) and then estimating the excess
morbidity rate for smokers over and above what would be expected
for the smoking population if, in fact, there was no relationship
between smoking and illness. For example, suppose that 5 out of
every 100 nonsmokers contracts a particular illness, but 10 out
of every 100 smokers contracts the same illness. Half of the 10
smokers would be expected to contract the illness whether or not
they smoked, while the other 5 have their illness attributed to
smoking. For every 100 smokers, the cost of treating 5 patients
is calculated and the result is an estimate of the medical cost
of smoking with respect to this illness. A similar procedure is
followed for other smoking-related illnesses (coronary heart
3
.11 .,..~...... ..>.a .-I,- >»i- h~-aor..- . -_- _.......r-'.- - a . 1,
costs across all such illnesses are added together.
Output and productivity losses supposedly arise because people
take time out to smoke, or are less productive while they are
smoking, or are less productive because their smoking makes them
less healthy and their productivity and health are correlated.
To my knowledge, no study has attempted to measure these costs.
Output losses due to absence from work are measurea as roitows.
First, an estimate is made of the excess rate of temporary
absenteeism among smokers, along with an estimate of the average
period of absence. From this information, an estimate of total

00-31-G6 23:©a T- #113°75
potential worktime lost by smokers is made. This time loss is
then multiplied by average earnings of smokers to give the cost
of absence from work due to smoking-related illness. A similar
procedure is followed for permanent work absence due to
pre-retirement death, except that since the output loss is
permanent, the cost is measured in terms of the present value of
earnings that would be expected to be generated in the absence of
smoking. For example, suppose that 10 out of 100 60-year-o1d
nonsmokers die at that age. The argument is that society loses
the output that these 10 workers would have produced had they
survived until retirement. Now suppose that 15 out of 100
60-year-old smokers dies at that age. Ten of these would be
expected to die in any case. The others, however, are argued to
die prematurely as a result of their smoking, and society loses
the output they would have produced had they not been smokers.
Note that no individual is identified here; the discussion is
purely in actuarial terms.
Benefit payments to sick smokers and dependents of deceased
smokers are estimated net of payments that would be made-i-f;"-"
instead, smokers had been nonsmokers.
Lost tax revenue refers to taxes on earnings which would have
been available to the government had sick or deceased smokers
been available for work.
4
Imports of tobacco products-and profits sent abroad_hy_#x)bacan
companies requires no discussion at this stage. Fire damage
costs refer to costs attributable to the careless disposal of

0D-01-06 27-:05 T- q113-O5
cigarette butts, while psychic costs refer to the "costs of pain
and grief for smokers and their relatives and friends". No
measure of the latter has been provided to date.
Again, no attempt has been made to quantify the nuisance costs
of passive smoking, and there has been one attempt to estimate
the excess medical. costs arising from so-called involuntary
smoking by nonsmokers. Only one study counts expenditures on
tobacco products as a social cost, and few include tobacco
advertising expenditure.
3. SOCIAL COSTS AND THE POLICY DEBATE
There are many dimensions to the policy debate surrounding
tobacco products. Reference to social costs in this debate
appears to have been growing rapidly in recent years. I will
illustrate this with some recent Antipodean examples.
5
As might be expected, the anti-smoking lobby draws on social cost
estimates in its public statements and submissions to Government.
For example, in an article entitled "User pays: smokers to cough
up more in tax" published in the March 5 (1983) issue of the
Medical Journal of Australia, it was claimed that tobacco taxes
no longer compensated "the costs to the community due to
smoking", and that "smokers are going to have to cough up
increasingly more money to pay for the smoking related damages
that are being subsidized by non-smokers", in the New Zealand
context, the local press reported (on 11 April, 1986) that
Joy Townsend, a visiting British health economist sponsored by
the Medical Research Council, had claimed that New Zealand

30-O1-Q5 23:9o T- 4113-©7
6
smokers "cost about three times as much in health services and
lost production as the taxes taken from cigarettes". Further, at
the beginning of the "Great New Zealand Smoke-Free Week"
(described as the world's first nationwide campaign designed to
help smokers kick the habit, and funded by more than half a
million dollars of taxpayers money to support fun runs, "last
puff" ceremonies, "smoke-buster" raffles and the like), Dr Murray
Laugeson of the Health Promotion Division of the Health
Department claimed (on 1 July, 1986) that New Zealand "pays twice
as much for the effects of smoking as it gets in tax revenue from
tobacco". It is interesting to note that the costs to which
Laugeson referred also included "other losses such as fires
caused by cigarettes", and that the figures were "based on
studies done in the US, Canada and Australia" since there were
"no local studies on the cost of smoking to the nation".
Further, in the June 1985 Draft White Paper on tax reform, the
Australian Treasury referred to the "costs to society" associated
with smoking and recommended the continuation of the tobacco
excise (along with alcohol and motor spirits excise) while also
recommending a uniform tax rate on all other commodities. The
latter tax proposal was rejected, but the excises remain.
D]ow Zoaland, howover, hac iPqiF1AtA(3 t.n introduce a comorehensive
uniform goods and services tax on 1 October, 1986, which calls
for a uniform 10 per cent tax rate on commodities apart from the
old faithfuls of tobacco, alcohol, and gasoline. At that date,
tobacco will be taxed as follows.

33-01-3F23:06 T- #113-Er~~
7
(a) a specific excise of $28-21 per 1000 cigarettes.
(b) an ad valorem excise set at 90 per cent of the value for
excise duty.
(c) goods and services tax at the uniform 10 per cent rate.
In his Budget Speech of 31 July, 1986, the New Zealand Minister
of Finance claimed that the Government's tax reform objectives
included broadening the consumption tax base, lowering the rate
of tax, and making the tax system more fair. But he also noted
that "the Government has been urged to raise taxes on tobacco
products by people concerned about public health. It has been
pointed out that tobacco taxes in New Zealand are low by
international standards". The Minister's response was to add 70
cents tax per pack of 20 cigarettes, raising the tax share of the
retail price of a pack from 58 per cent to 71 per cent.
This demonstrates the apparent influence of social costs in the
determination of differential rates of taxation on tobacco
products. A reasonable inference is that where social costs
exceed tobacco tax revenues, the Government is "justified" in
raising the rate of taxation on tobacco products.
The validity of this proposition is now examined.
3. A CRITICAL INTERPRETATION OF THE SOCIAL COST CONCEPT
There is evidently a strong superficial appeal to an argument
which app2ears to be stating that people should pay all the costs
associated with an activity they wish to pursue. This is just an
example of the "user pays" principle, which is generally
applauded by economists. The critical issue, however, is the

0U-D1-Ci6 23:07 T- li l 1'-' ii' '
8
extent to which the costs of smoking are not covered by smokers'
private expenditures on tobacco products.
Apart from onei.nstance, the social cos.t literature, by
implication, does not treat smokers' expenditure on tobacco
recognized that smokers pay for the resource costs of providing
them with tobacco products, and do not require to be taxed on
these grounds. Thereforer social costs are viewed as a
by-product of the activity of smoking, and are in addition to the
resource costs of producing cigarettes. Further, there is a
strong implicit view that social costs are externa). to smokers.
Surely, if it was widely believed that smokers paid these social
costs, it would not be necessary to tax them at differential
rates in order to compensate "society" for these social costs.
Therefore, it is necessary to examine the question of who pays
for the social costs of smoking.
The social cost literature answers this question by arguing that
society, or the community, or the nation pays these costs.
Societies, communities, and nations, however, are simply names
for particular groups of individuals. The important question for
taxation policy is, which individuals pay for the social costs of
smoking?
The answer to this question depends on a detailed examination of
the various items making up social costs. Here, I will
illustrate the issues involved by examining the two components of
social costs which are of greatest numerical importance and

c0-191-ui i_:14 T- Gi1d-01
interest, namely, direct medical costs and output losses arising
from smoking-related work absence.
(a) Direct Medical Costs
The social cost literature does not fall into the obvious trap of
simply counting up the medical care expenditures of smokers and
defining these to be the direct medical costs of smoking. The
literature, however, presumably believes that it is appropriately
measuring the additional medical costs to society which arise in
the presence of smoking and which would not exist in the absence
of smoking. In fact, it is doing nothing of the sort, and the
estimates are seriously biased upward (in the statistical sense).
This is a vital, yet subtle point.
It can be illustrated as
follows. The social cost argument runs something like this.
Take a large sample of nonsmokers who have reached a given age,
say 65 years. During their 65th year, a proportion of these
people, say 2 out of 10, will contract a serious illness
requiring expenditure on medical care. This illness may be one
which has been defined to be smoking-related (such as coronary
heart disease), but it cannot have been caused by smoking in this
case.
Now take a large sample of 65-year-old smokers. The social cost
literature argues that epidemiological evidence suggests that
smoking is associated with ill-health. Suppose it is found that
3 smokers out of 10 contract the same serious smoking-related
illness as above. Two out of three smokers would be expected to
9
