Tobacco Documents Online

Proposition P: anat©my of a nonsmokers' riigbtss ordinance hF:TL'R I IANAI'JCR', t:SQ On Norember 8, 1983, voters in San Francisco passed', "Proposition P;' a referendum on the city's workplacc smoking ordinancc which ha& bccn cnacted by the Board! of Supervisors (uht .~tquivalcnt of a city council) six months earlicr: The vote matkt:d the first' time t'hao the tobacco iitdustry, which has consistently opposed all laws rcgulatin,g public smoking, hud' been defeated in such an election contiest, and it meant that San, Franciscans had approved what was thenithc strongest workplacc smokiitg lsw in the country. The ordinance reyuires that all public and private offcc~ workplaces havc policies on, smoking that seek to accommodate thc nct:ds of smokers and nonsmokcrs. it requires that notice of the policies bc giNCnto employacs and that appropriate signs be posted. The'law is enforccd by the citry's health department, and civil penalties are imposed on employers who fail to establish rcasonable policiies. WINNING OVER BusINESS' LEA4DERS To~understand why the'ordinance reached the ballot in the forrnlof a referendum, it is helofullto review the proctss by which it became law: VlJhen first i'ntroduced before a threie-member committee of the Board of Supervisors, in January i'983, the'ordinantx was stroogly supported by Californians fmr Nonsmokers' Rights (a non-profit orga- niYationdeveloping legislative, legal; and eduealtional ap- proaches tocurtail'smokiieg in ipublic places a~nd the work- site) land by the health cqmmuni'ty ingenerai. It drew vir- tually, no opposition. But by the end of the second hearing,, the sympathetic committee had reservations abouu thee specific language; partly due to a, letter from Robert Beck„ a Bank of Arnerica vice-presidbnt and a, leader in the 3merican Cancer Society. Although he expressed sbrong, support for the concept of the ordinance, Beck was con- cerned that the rigid conditions'of certain provisions would adversely affect businesses. The committee asked for a one-month continuance to see if' the problems eould' be : ironed out. On the day before the ne:tt scheditled hearing, the Chamber of Commerce asked for a meeting with Cal* iforrians for Nonsmokers' Rights to discuss an alternative proposal by the Bank of America. The bank presented the idca xltat became the corners3one of the ordinance and the center oficontroversy: that every'empUoyer be required!to establish, a smoking policy to satisfy the needs of' both smoking and nonsmoking office workers; but if an accom- modation satisfactory to the nons'mokers„whatever their number, could not be made, then smoking would be pro- hibited in that' work area. This proposal would give busi- nesses flexibility inisolving a problernl buvwould giveem- Ployeesa statutory right to a smokc+free environment. In cxchange for acceptiinS', the proposed compromise N r. Hanauer is an editorof law booki and r past-president of the :9oand o('.Di- reetoniof CGlifornians (or Nonsmokers' Riehts. Addi%swtreyponderee to d,y r: Hlanauer, Cal i(orntans for Nonsmokers' R~i 6hts, :*S4 Uni,ersn yA,e. Suiie 500, , 8arkelery. C A.9a7114 . language, the Chamber of Commerce agreed not to;oppose' the ordinance. The precise language was hammered out at one further meeting; attended by Supervisor Wendy Neldcr,. the author.of the ordinance, and representatives of'Calii- fornians for Nonsmokers' Rights; the Chamber of Com- merce, the Small Businessmen's Association, Bank of' America, and two othcr, banks. The ordinance was passed unanimously by uht; supervisors' committec in early May. In two reyuircdivotcs by the full Boardl the mcasure passed by 9 to12 and 10 to 1. It was signed into law by Mayor Dianne Feinstein on June 3. This happened despite intensive lobbying against the law by the'Del!Monte Corporation, a subsidiary of'RJ Rcynolds since 1'979, the localiattorney for the Tobacco instlitutc„and even some members of the na- t,ional Democratic Party who tried to persuade the Mayor to veto the law, In support of themeasure were hundreds of telephone ca11s and letters from San Franciscans. The Mayor later reported that she had recciveti more than 100 letters from people'around the country who urged her, to sign the ordinance so thaetheir local governing,bodies would be encouraged to enact similar legislation. Shortly before the first vote by the full Board, the Chamber of Commerce broke the agreement not, to oppose the ordinance. Since its promised neutral stance had'never been publiciied„thcChamber of Commerce did not appear to have changed its position. On June 1 S, siit people held a press conferencc to announce a campaign for a referendum: to repeal the ordinance. Having eonfrontedl the tobacco industry in Uwo statiewide initiative campaigns in 1'978 and 1980, proponents of the ordinance knew the real signlir, cance of' the announcement and were prepared for what followed. Each tobacco industry campaign, has certain predictable elt:ments, and the Proposition P carnpaigrt fol~ lowed the usual pattern: . The major cigarette companies, thrtatghi their public rela- tions arm„ the Tobacco Institute, hire a campaign manager, whose fursvtask,is toorgrnize a9ncal organizationlof "concerned'; oitizens,"'whicli'then becomes the nominal campaign organisa- tioa. In a ttormal'politial campaign„al group of people forms a steering committee : to act as a policy-making, body, and it,, in, turn, hires a campaign manager, The tobacco industry does ex- actly the opposite, because no grassroots or lor„ally financed or- ganizations opposed to nonsmokers' rights'ttogistation have ever been formed. Moreover, the industryseeks'total controliover pol- icy matters, and the way tolaccomplish that is to hire its own campaign manager. • The tobacco companies contribute to the campaign in di- rect proportion to their rapective market shares. This is a keyy indication thaith'e campaign is actually being run,by the indsu- tryitself-as a single entity-and not by theloeat'organization. • The tobacco companies go to great lcngths to downplay both the extent and nature of their involvement.,They denN that they are doing,any,thing other'uhanimaking financial! contribu- tions to a locaJ campaign organization and'they grossly undtres- timate the amounts of money they are,contributing. They also delay in making the largcst contributions until the end! of the JULY 19N5/NF.W YORK STATE JOURNAL O'F M1EDICINIE 3G9 B-I

C campa6gn so as w minimize any adverse publicity, • The tobacco cumpvniesstudiously avoid the subject oflth'e hcalth'ihaaardi uf seeond-handsmoke and attempt to stcer the debate to such ixsucs as gavcrnmcntregulation,and the costs to taxpayers of enacting the lsw. Thcy do this in a manner designcd to convince the votcrs that extremely'harmful consequences will necessarily flow from the law. For exsmple, it is usually predict- cd that smokers will ibe'arrested whila'rupists and robbers go un- detectal. thattpaople will be drivcn out'of business, and that vital x,cial services will be shonchanged!in ordbr, to pay forthe law. • Two important secondary themes are always present to back up thc primary arguments: (1) the Jltw represcntsan attack on civil libcrties and'denics smokers the freadom of choices (2) the industrywill admit there is a problem but claim the proposed lanv is not t hc right solution. Thus thc slogan that appeared at the end of TV advertisements against Proposition, P: "Proposition P is simply not the answen" Thc industry position is that to the ex- tent second-hand smoke might be a minor annoyance to a few particularly sensitive pcopic, "common sense" and, "common eourtcsy"-not Fovcrnmcnt' regulstion-will- suffice: This has the double advantage of sceming to be understanding of'the probltm and at the,samc time depicting,propuncnts of the law as wcillmea'ning but sadly misguided. • When the sub1eatof the effects of second-hand smoke can- not be avoided, such as during live debates and press interviews, the tobacco industry representatives will deny there are any health hazards, often misquoting and quoting out of conte:tt medical authorities in the process. They will claim that,even if some studies show secondlhand Ismoke to be harmful, others do not, and thus the jury is still out. In other words; they impiy;, vir- tual unanimity in the medical community is needed before any laws should be passed that would limit smoking, • The industry uses i'ts economic'and political powerto secure endorsements from both individuals and organizations. • On a general level, the industry7s best weapon is eonfusion.. As any political lanalystwill attest, when voting on ballorissues, a confused, voter will invariably vote "No." Thus, a eommon, thread running through all the industry's campaign advertising and debating is the attempt to confuse the public. All of these factors came into play during the Proposi- tion P campaign. The first public movewas the press con- fercnce tio announce that "Citizens Against Government Intrusion" (later changed to "San Franciscans Against Government Intrusion" doubtless when it was rcalized that the acronyrn for the name would have been CAG'I)'would place a rcferendum onithc ballot to repeal the workplace smoking ordinance. The group announced'thatJim Foster, the founder of one of the city's gay Demoeratic clubs ('San Francisco has the' largest gay community in the United States); would manage the campaign and that, at the group's reqttcst, the tobacco i industry would contribute S4!0,000 to fund thcir petition drive'because of insufficient time to raise funds locally." SLEIGHT O'E HAND None of the people ai'thc news conference had ever tes- tified'against the ordinancc, and cxeept, for Foster;,none of them was hcard!froni again!d'urinig,thc campaign. A few days latcr Foster stated ina newsp:tper intervicw that he had becn recruited for the campaign by, the Tobacco Institute's atuorncy: Another person who lost out on the job later re- vealed that he had been intierviewcd by a vice-president of the Tobacco Instiiute: The S40,000 fagurc„which was re- pcatcd in every interview on the subject'over the next two wccks; was untrue. Theindustry had pledged more than S t00,pfD0; and, in fact, 597,0n0 was spent to put the measure onithc ballot. The tobacco industry, huwever, denied any involvement in the campaign otihcr than as a, financial supporter and at one point stated that subscquent'fu!nding, by the industry would be contingent on a demonstration of local support. The induxt'ry ended up putting Sll,2'50,000 into the campaign; the liacal contributions amounted to $3.300. The moneyspcnt by the "1'Jo on P"'campaign set a new national record for a, locai'ballot measure (surpassing the 51.11 miIDionithe tobacco industry spent in Miami in 11979 to defeat a similar ordinance). To find out firsthand why the tobacco companies were contributing so much money to overturn a local health regulation, Supervisor N+elder field l a press conference early in the campaign to announce tihat she had sent tell:grams to thc presidents of four cigarette companies challenging them toldcbatc her onitht: merits of the law. None replit:d: The petition drive itself was a travesty of the democratic process. Since thclobaccolindustry was not likely to fnd! volunteer signature gatherers, it hired a professional peti- tioning',cornpany.from Los Angelas and paid'petition cir- cu!lators as much as S0.70 per signature. One method'used to collect signatures was for the paidlcirculatots to explain that they were merely trying to put the measure on' the ballot for a public vote-rather than to repeal a law that had' already been enacted. At least two of the paid circulators (who had obtained several thousand signatures between them) were not bona fide registered''voters of'San Francisco, as required by the election laws. lronically, when the de• ceptive practices of the tobacco industry were brought to the attention of the press, they were so confused by the referendum'prtxedure (they could not understand that the tobacco industry put the measure on the ballotinorder to repeal an existing law),,that, they madritappear that the supporters of the ordinance had committed the improper practices. OBJEICiIVEc HOME RULE The campaign organization in favor of'Proposition_ P was formed iniAugust under, the same "San Franciscans for Local Control."'The decision was to make the central issue of the campaign the alttempt by a, large out-of-state special interest group to overturnia local health ordinance. The organization included representatives from Californians for l*lonsmokers"R'ig!hts, the'San Francisco Chapter of the American Cancer Society; the San Francisco Lung AsstD- ciation„the Sicrra Club, and Common Cause, as well as several political activists. The proposition was soon endorsed and supported by'a number of prominent individuals and organizations, including the San Francisco Pblice Officers Association. Early in the campaign, a local attorney appeared on a television debatc with Supervisor Ncldcr and'claimed that imposing restrictions on smoking in the workplace wouldN set a precedent' for denying employment to gays tnni uhq= . grounds that they might, have AIDS. This was pcrccivcdiasN a crass attempt by the tobacco industryta scare the largeN gay community, and several gay leaders denounccd tihcM tactic. The argument was not raiscd aglun; and thc ;ttt0rncyG0i never apreared' agai'n on behalf of the "';`lio on P'' cam-4~, paign. The tobacco industry's efforts settled on the fiullinwinc~A :ullegations tha0 the law con,titutes governmcnt intrusiion~ 370 NEW YORK ST,1Tf? JO'UR'NAIi UU WLIDICI'tiF./JUt.Y IwBt B'-2 cl

; into the private workplace: that'thc 1ltnv isunnrccss:ury and the mattcr of stninking should be worked out privately; and that the lawfosters "anc-man rule" by giving a.ingll• nonsmoker the power tu dictate personal behavior by all llhe other pct+plv in lho office. One of the liirni pirc4s of hlerature by tlhe tobacco industry told citizonx that thcy should be :rngry that tlhey wcrc'being forced to vcttc'in an unnecessary elcctlion, thereby heaping scorn on propuncnts ol' the ordi- nancc for what the tubaccoindustr} itself'hatd engineered. They claimed that thc law' is d'isc,rintinatory because it applies to all private empluyccw but only :(I°i of public employces- in otihcr wurds, city as oppu.ed'tu state and fudcrallcnipliwcc,: Actually,, t'hc City Attorney had deter- mined that the city did not have the tx)wcr tocnfurccthc'lativ in state and' federal officus and, in any evcnt.,allist;ttc cmr ployccs were already protected by a st:uc Iitnv. The most outlandish'allcgatiom c:rntc inimponsc to the growing public awnrenc.s that the "Nlo on P" rtmpaigni wa:s receiving 99,7"l0 of its money from out-of-state tobacco companies. One "Nru on P" rcprerkntativc charged during a dubatic that proponents were gctting 94.''~;% of their money from outside San Franci:u:o, and this absurd claim was continued throughout the campaign. Probabli,v the mos2'important endorsement would be that' of the San Francisco Democratic Central Committee. The Committee had solidly supported the twostatta+idc'inifia- tlixes for nonsmokers' rights in 197'8 and 1'980, and there seemed'to be no reason why, they wouldl not endorse the ordinance, particularly since it, had the backing of the Mayor. But no one reckoned on just how much pressuree would be brought to bear, all the committee endorsed "1Vo on P" by a vote of 15 to 14l Just how much that, endorse- ment meant was brought home the day after the election, whcnthe contact person for the "Yes on P"'campaign in the Mayor's off ce said thao her own!husband Iwas so confused upon receiving the voting recommcndations from the Democratic Central Committee that hc' almost voted against the proposition. Perhaps the saddest moment in the campaign came when The Bav Guardian, a liberal biweckly ncwspapcr, which had been the only ncwspapcr in thestate to support the 197K' statewide initiative and one of the few to support the 19800 initiative, announced itsoppo»ition to Propcflxition P. Neither the publisher nor his support for nonsmokers' rights had cltangcd, but the perceived threat of the loss of cigarette advertising evidently becanne ovcrwhelming. UNDEuSTANUIIVG~ MAtiS 141It•:1rtA Prupuncntsof the ordinance developed three kcy com- poncnts of their campaign. First, Edgar Spi7.ci, a mediaa consultantiand produccrof thousandit qf radiu'and tclcvision commcrcials, volunteered his services. The "1'es on P"television commercial he created featured a, tough-looking cowboy riding a horsc' on a San Francisco street and decrying the fact that the tobacco companics were spending 9970 of the money to overturn the new smoking ordinance. At the end tic repeats the campaign slogan: "Tclllthc to- bacco companies tobuttiuut!i" (The advertising community namcd it the best television commcrcial in Nort'hcrn Cali- forniia for 1'9133'.) The second key clemcn, was to force the ttubacco industry to changc thc'taglines at the end of the "No on P" radio and TV advertisements to say "paid for by the tobacco industry" rather than "paid for by, San Franciscans Against Gov- ernment Intrusion." The Federal Communications Act of' 1934 retquires'broadcast stations to identify the true sponsorr of all politicalladvcrtisementsl fJsingall volunteer attorneys, AUOq(westemlmusic up and undar) . You know, we San Franeisean's aro a proud twnchi We like to idb rtt+inqs our own way. So when soms 4ottcs, like the low tli0iYl9ttDbaeeol eoRpanies from oul of statel qa'up 199.5 % of the doUars to iovertum ourneiw smokinq orQinal . wel1, ttnt just imakes ms mad. It'yuu're as mad as'J am.,why not IPin me in tellinq tMese tobacco companies to ~t7Un OIJ4 Vote Yes on P (music up and iout)) headed by Paul' Loveday, who had led'the twoistatewide initiative campaigns, proponents put together a, 31D+page . memorandum (and more than 100 pages of'supportling documents), which was thcn presented to adl'thrstatidnsl broadcasting "No onP" commercials. W'ithin twod'ay,s of rl of this material„K'RON-TV, the NBC affiliate and tihest'ation with the largcsramount of "No on P"campaiign advcrtising, informed San Franciscans Against Govcrnmcnt Intrusion that if they did! not modify, the ta'glinc, the ad- vcrtlivcmcnts would be taken off the air. KNBR (NBC radio) followed suit. The tobacco industry then chanecd!tht: taglinc for' KRON to rcad; '"paid fior by San Franciscans Against Government' Intrusion, which is funded by com- panies in the tobacco industry."'They reluctantly agreed Jl:liY I1)X5/'!vfw YORK STA'Tf JOtURNTI. O1' NLI)tCIMIi' 371 B -3'.

i to this because the wording was visual only and in relatively sanall type, but they rcfuscJ to do itfor radiu and thereby, lust their largest rudiu buy for the last three wceks of the election. Thi>;nvas the first time that any, rttdioior tclevision .tatiitn in the country had acted to require such a tugl'ine change without having becn urdt:rcrd to do io by the Federal Communications Commission. I'dowever; none uf'the other stations acceded to the request. The third' major component of the campaign, a voter contact mailing prugraim, was where much of the money was spent. VlJhilc free radio andacicvision time was obtained under the Fairness Doctrine, $50;0100 was put into a mailing progr:um. Three hundhed thousand pieces of mail inisevcn versions were tairgeted to particular groups within a larger population of probable voters. The two most important'mailings were one featuring pictures of six celebrities who had dicd'of cancer and sugbestiing that tihcy would all votee for Proposition P if they wcrcaiivc„and one entitled. "Thc. I 13ig Tubact:u Companies Have Licd To You 10 Times." in. which 10 lics of the tobacco industry were docuntcnteJ. As the campaign drew, to a clu.e one humorous and tell- ing incident stood out. A week befurc the election the local public broadcasting station tclecast a program focusing on the campaigns fior two ballot measures-Pruposition P and one aimed at imposing a moratorium on high-rise dcvcl- upmcnt. One of thc aaff people whom the tobacco industry hired fiur its "Nit un P" effort was also the campaign man- agcr of the anti-high-risc proposition. It had bt:cniaKsumcd' that he took the tobacco industry job so he could!deft•aytiho management expenses for the other proposition, which had a very low budgec. Indeed, hrspcnt very little time cam- paigninb against Phupusiuiun P, and it is doubtful the to- bacco industry was getting its money's worth. As the teli- vision show focused on the a.inti+high-ri:+e proposition, it showed this individual sitting behind a battered old'd'esk, in a spartan room, bemoaning how his barcbones campaign The basics of beating the tobacco industry . LSStJES CERTAIN To ARISE Hedt6. The deleterious effects of secondhand tobacco smoke are the raison d'Ltue for any law limiting smoking. Proponents of the law should'have a firm grasp of all the reievant evidence, pary tictilarly the most reliable studies showcing a link' between secondhand smoke and serious diseases, as well as l other studies that may be less conclusive. Even though the health issue is the one in which the proponenta' stand on the mostsoiid ground, the tobacco industry, can confuse voters (as it has even on the issue of smoking's role in lung cancer and heart disease) by claiming that "proof" is lacking and that more "research" is needed.t`3 Costs. The tobacco industry will' claim that any law that restricts smoking will be too expensive both to goverttmentt and private industry. The purported cost factors will include the posting of signs, enforcement; and disruption of businesss operations. The industry will clnimthat the law will force some businesses to close or relocate. Proponents pn safely rely on the experiencrin communities in which such laws have already, been in effect to demonstrate that any costs arc negligible. Enforceatemt. Whether the law is to be enforced by the police or a health authority, the industry will raise the spectre of important criminal or health matters'being ignored Iwhiie smokers arc heing hauled off'to jail. The fact is that the law is intended solely as a recourse in the event' ofl a dispute over, the right to 372 smoke inithe presence of others who may be adversely affieaed. In all places where such laws have beenenactedi they ha'vee proven largely self-enforcing, and, few fines or'citations have been issued.• Govet- P, t regulation. The tobacco industry's argument that nonsmokers' rights legislation represents'government intcusion iinto essetttially private matters has proven to be an effective weapon. The countier argument'must begin with the fact thar the law is a measure to protect publichealth, which isoneofthr most important funetions of govern- ment. Cjrll Gbertia. The tobacco industry maintains that any, infringement on the right to smoke is a violation of' civil liberties. (In the black community ad- vertising by the industry suggests that restrictions on smoking are a first step in bringing back segregationls'To Miami s Jewish community the tobacco industry warned "flon't let it happen here."s) The industry also compares eiean indoor air laws to Prohibition. Such a comparison is not difficult to rebut, for there are numerous governmental restrictions on the useof alcohol to protect public heaith and1 safety that have almost universal l support. Scope of law, No matter how limited' or comprehensive the proposed luw may be, the tobacco ind'ustrry, will oppose all restrictions onsmoking,that may cutinto cigarette sales. The industry will claim either that the law is discriminatory be- cause it applies to some busincsses and not to others or will claim that it is too sweeping and repressive. `GA'' YORK STATE JUt;ttNAL OF ' \ll'IAIt.'1NF; Jl,'1.5° Ivttt Campaign financing. The sudden infusion of enormous funds from the to- bacco industry to defeat clean indoor air laws will become a major issue in the campaign, The industry never enters a campaign halfheartedly and always provides nearly every penny of't'he op- position campaign. The proponents of the law must ezploit'this from the be- ginning of the campaign and must' make the public and press realize that the op. position campaign and the tobacco in+ dustry are one and the same. Many of the local contributors to the opposition campaign are also likely, to have direct financial ties to the sale of tobacco products. Endorsements. Closely connected' wiih the issue of campaign financing is the question of'who supports and who opposes the law, Apart from the to- bacxtrgrowing,and manufacturing states of Connecticu4 Florida, Georgia, Ken- tucky, Mary;land„North Carolina, South Carolina„and Virginia, or New York (where three of the six Unittd States cigaretrte companies are hcad4uartered)6 voters will be interested to learn that the opposition is led by out-of-state interests. Moreover, as such legislation gains in popularity, local public figures are in- creasingly eager to lend! their names too the rampaign. Thc contrast between the quality and quantity of locall support versus that of the outsdde tob:tcco inter- ests is striking; CAIt'tPH7t:N STRATEGY Build a coali'tion. Essential to the passage of clean indoor air measures is B'-4.

was being xac:u»rolilcrcd by the highly financcdcopp,••lsitictn; backed by developers and major cor{klratiun.. A1omcnth Iatcr the same individual u•as IDhutt/graiphcd in the elegunt9y furnirhtal "tiu un F'" ht:adyuartk:rs in front of a sulnhisti- catud cuntruter„which w;ts puttinE out infAlrmtttiion con voter suht?urt by neit:hbuncowuls.. Ih±pite the hugc cxqxnf3iturL. ;ud deceitful tactics ctf the cigarette ctontpaulics, they were braticn in this campaign bew:ausc tlwy cnwrctuntertid a rc.clurccful group cDf non, smukcrx' rights atl'vcoc:ucs who had been through tttc wriing.critwicc before and w•hu iknew what tu cxpCet and 1what had tKa lDr done to win. lu i. hoped that their experience will bc tof hcJto tu people in utllcr communities whu nni¢ht square to(lf against the tubztccto inclitstry in the future. Tile accotm- p;anyinu ;trticlc tln issues tto Ix: faced and campaign stratcgy isclc..igncd ttl provide the basics af!running, a c.tntpaign! The final tally, in thc'clectiiun was iit'J;7-3N tu17KJ;4a'I-a remarkable victc,ry in light uf thc uverwhclming odds. As a broad base of support among , con- stituencics such as health agencies. en- vironmental organizations, and public interest groups. Environmentalists ap- preciate learning or being,remindusd tha't' tobacco smoke is thalargest contributor to indoor air pollution. Getting as many people from different organizations in- volved'as eariyas possible gives them the feeling that they arrpart of tihc'decision making process and gives their organi- zations a stake in the campaign. Gmpaign staff. With the exeeption, of a close-knit community where it is still . possible for local values to prevail against commercial pressures from outsiders, a campaign cannot be run against the to-, bacco industry without' a competent full-time staff. It is important to hire people who are committed to the issue. FYatd-nisinq. Although it is not possible to compete dollar-for-dollar with the tobacco industry for'campaign money,,, there may be no, need to. The tobaaao, industry can be'beaten, even when, it' ouLspends the opposition by 10 to one. On the other hand, a minimum amount of money must be raised'in orderr to run a, creditable campaign. This means mounting a full-scale fund raising effort using both direct mail and per+ son,taperson contact. Campaigrt focus. The most effective issue for proponents of a local' or state nonsmokers' rights law is the invoive- ment and'virtually complete financing of the opposition by the tobacco companies. The proponents"campaign should never focus on the tobacco industry's theme song of costs, enforcement, and govern- ment, intrusion. A campaign that can frDcus the voters' attention on its issues (in a resultL Californians for Nonsmukers'. Rights has suc- cecdrd in lubbying,ot'hcr contmunitics tarcDug,hcout Cali- fornia to pass similar laws„thc most rrcct-t of which is 11 us. nngult:.e, whose ±trict ordinance v.an.ibn(• by Mayor Tum i 1iraJllcycx;tctly, aone year after the vutie, :t l'rutwsiitiun I°. Perhaps with the po..+ibility of a chainL rcactitln in mind, the tobacco industry tricd'one last dcslxtratc r.waaure aftier thc. elcution, On the follwwing5unday the indu.try, ran a full page newspaper advertixement complaining that'the clcl,ee vote was nut sufficient to warrant, imposition of such a controversial law and askingpeuple to urge their Icgixl.•unor.s to amcndl Proposition P. The cigarette cuminanics.huultd have saved their mwney, fur, bby placing the referendum un the ballot they had in,ured; under the terms of the C:ity. Chartcr: that the law could not bc touched for a yc:ur. I3y that timt:, a news story in the anti-rcgulatur} t.UiJlV'.Srrccr JrJUrnaJ'(nugu!;t 15. , 1984) wwould be pronouncing the law a success, this cassc, health and'tobat:co industry money) willl stand' a good chance of winning; a campaign that spends its time answering eharges by the other side will I inevitably lose. Endorsements. It is important to se- cure key local endorsements early. Many subsequent endorsements wiil depend on who has already endorsed the initiative, every radio and'television advertisement must identify the source thatpaid for it. In seeking to defeat clean indoor air measures, the tobacco industry invari- ably organi><es undl:r a mislcading name of an apparent local group (for example, "FAIR. Floridians Against Increase& Regulation"). A challenge can be madee to the use of such a name as the true. Some individuals who may have no sponsor of the advertisements. Even if strongnpinion on the issuemaygivetheir the effort does not succced in forcing a endorsement'to thefinstperson who ap- - change in tagline, it can gcnerate algreat proaches them with a reasonable pre- deal of journalistic scrutiny which will' sentation. Police: sheriffs', and fire- further highlight the issue of tobaxo' fightierrs organizations have been prime early targets of~ the tobacco industry. For the proponents, enlisting the full eom- mitmentof tbelocal medical'assaciation and Ispocifuc physician-spokespersons and other health professionals for hearings, press conferences, and other public ac: tivities is imperative. Regrettably, there are too few physicians with sufficient political and media experieasx: Fairoess time. The tobacco industry will flood the'airwaves.rith advertising. Nevertheless, the law reyttires that all radio and television stations must give each side of a ballot measure fair time (but not equal time) to present'its views. Some stations attempt to fulfill this ob- ligation by giving,the "poor' side of a campaign a chance to present its views on an off-hours public a'ffairs'program, but others will give between one-fourth and one-third of'the advertising time purchased by the tobacco industry. The effort to obtain this time should begin early,,, and' legal advice should be ob- tained' on how to pursue it most effec- ttvely. Radio and tele.i•sion taglines. By laww industry involrvement. ' In.Rstigation of tobacco industry daims. Claims by the tobacco industry concerning the costs of implementing andlenfnrcing the legislation as well as the "evidence of medical experts" should be fully investigated and exposed for whatever fraud is present. For exampie, tobacco industry claims relating to medical evidence often involve either a tnisquote'or a quote out of cotttett. It is important that the press and public be made aware of anysucli fraud'as earlyy and often as possible. REFEatENC'Es 1. A rwb/rraa IJ Qrearoes ad Au.,rrr W eshieqnn, tDC, The Totiweo tmtitute, t 981. 2 Tie Swwkfng Cmunooeays A Irrvpernior. W.atunqon, aC, The Tob.cop tiutituta.,l94i. 3. Tpt f.on Atwr1 ... 1rDlic Seto(uns, Wie- uaa-5akr,u RJ Reynotds Tobacw Co. 1916. a4. KaAn Pt:: The Ntirtncrota Ckan dndoor Air Aot: NYSrareJ,Ned 19tf3i 83:1300-I3o'1, 5. T.te Jr CF. A plnician-lod rrferrndum for cfeaavr air iei Ftonda. .'YY Siare J.1led' 19B3:8J: 1302. 6'. Blum A: CiEaretta smokin}.nd litt prontmwa: editoriuh iare not enouili. Ni)~Srare..J'.Nnl 1983; 83: 1_15:1281. . Jt:I \'' 1'Ix<,tit 11'l }^(lK',1; ST,AfP IUUR'VAi! 01 Mt IDIICINI. B -S t7'T

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