Philip Morris
Executive Summary of Smoking and the State
Fields
- Type
- REPT, REPORT, OTHER
- Area
- HAN,VICTOR/OFFICE
- Master ID
- 2023914806/5052
Related Documents:- 2023914806
- 2023914807-4812
- 2023914813-4815 Antitobacco Bill Would Not Reduce Smoking Among Youth or Adults Experts Say Bill Would Violate First Amendment
- 2023914816 Table of Contents
- 2023914817 H.R. 5041
- 2023914818-4847 H.R. 5041 A Bill to Prescribe Labels for Packages and Advertising for Tobacco Products, to Restrict the Advertising of Tobacco Products, and for Other Purposes.
- 2023914848 Memorandum
- 2023914849-4861
- 2023914862 Industry Position
- 2023914863 1
- 2023914864-4907 Statement of Charles O. Whitley on Behalf of the Tobacco Institute Before the Subcommittee on Health and the Environment Committee on Energy and Commerce U.S. House of Representatives 900712
- 2023914908 2
- 2023914909 3
- 2023914910 Cigarette Ad Under H.R. 5041
- 2023914911 Cigarette Ad Under H.R. 5041
- 2023914912 Billboard Ad Under H.R. 5041
- 2023914913 Issue Briefs
- 2023914915-4918 Issue Brief -- H.R. 5041 Counter - Advertising
- 2023914921-4924 Issue Brief - H.R. 5041 Ingredients
- 2023914926-4928 Issue Brief - H.R. 5041 Warning Statement Proliferation
- 2023914930-4933 Issue Brief -- H.R. 5041 Advertising and Youth
- 2023914934 Opening Statements
- 2023914936-4941 Opening Statement - H.R. 5041 Counter - Advertising
- 2023914944-4946 Opening Statement - H.R. 5041 Ingredients
- 2023914948-4950 Opening Statement - H.R. 5041 Warning Statement Proliferation
- 2023914952-4956 Opening Statement - H.R. 5041 Advertising and Youth
- 2023914957 Questions
- 2023914959-4960 Counter Advertising for Friendly Witness
- 2023914961-4962 Public Health Macroview
- 2023914963 Counter - Advertising for Friendly Witness
- 2023914965-4966 Counter - Advertising for Friendly Witness
- 2023914967 Counter - Advertising for Friendly Witness
- 2023914968 Advertising Censorship for Friendly Witness
- 2023914969 Targeting Youth for Friendly Witness
- 2023914970 Targeting Youth for Friendly Witness
- 2023914971 Warning Statement Proliferation for Friendly Witness
- 2023914972 Warning Statement Proliferation for Friendly Witness
- 2023914973 Warning Statement Proliferation for Friendly Witness
- 2023914975 Counter - Advertising for Gov't Witness
- 2023914976 Counter - Advertising for Anti-Tobacco Advocate
- 2023914977 Counter - Advertising for Health Official
- 2023914978 Counter - Advertising for Gov't Witness or Health Official
- 2023914979 Counter - Advertising for Anti-Tobacco Advocate
- 2023914980 Charities' Anti-Tobacco Lobbying Is Criticized
- 2023914981 Advertising Censorship for Anti-Tobacco Advocate
- 2023914982 Advertising Censorship for Gov't. Witness
- 2023914983 Warning Label Proliferation for State or Local Gov't. Official
- 2023914984 Warning Label Proliferation for Health Official
- 2023914985 Advertising and Youth for Voluntary Health Group
- 2023914986 Advertising and Youth Government Witness
- 2023914987 'addiction' Warning Label for Gov't. Health Official
- 2023914988-4989 Foreword
- 2023914990 'addiction' Warning Label for Gov't. Witness
- 2023914991 'targeting' Minorities for Gov't. Witness or Anti-Smoking Advocate
- 2023914992 'targeting' Minorities for Health Official
- 2023914993 'targeting' Minorities for Anti-Tobacco Advocate
- 2023914994 Role of States for State or Local Gov't. Official
- 2023914995 Cost of Smoking for Health Official
- 2023914998-5020 the Social Security Cost of Smoking
- 2023915021 Background
- 2023915027 Everyday Activities That 'cost Society' Billions of Dollars
- 2023915029-5035 ... On Youth Smoking Three Decades of Initiatives
- 2023915037-5038 Vending Facts
- 2023915040-5041 on Licensing Tobacco Sales
- 2023915043-5046 Why Young People Start Smoking
- 2023915047 22
- 2023915048-5052 Legal Backgrounder
- Request
- Stmn/R1-025
- Named Person
- Koop, C.E.
- Surgeon General
- Tollison, R.
- Wagner, R.
- Surgeon General
- Document File
- 2023914805/2023915131a/Briefing Book H.R. 5041 Waxman Hearing 900712
- Litigation
- Stmn/Produced
- Named Organization
- George Mason Univ
- Site
- N332
- Date Loaded
- 05 Jun 1998
- UCSF Legacy ID
- gxv24e00
Document Images
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
OF
SMOKING AND THE STATE
Tobacco products are among the most highly taxed and strictly
regulated products in America. The economic penalties imposed
upon these products are justified by anti-smoking advocates by the
supposed costs to society that result from the claimed health
effects of cigarette use. These costs are known as "social costs".
But to the extent that any costs associated with smoking exist,
these costs actually are "private costs" -- costs borne by the
individual rather than society. This is the critical finding of a new
book, Smokina and the State, written by Professors Robert Tollison
and Richard Wagner of the Center for Public Choice at George Mason
University.
Wagner and Tollison conclude that there is no convincing basis for
the claim that any economic costs of smoking are imposed on
nonsmokers. Nor, the authors say, do smokers impose an
uncompensated cost on nonsmokers from the claimed consequences
of environmental tobacco smoke.
Social Costs: The Basis_ for Policy_Making
For 20 years, successive Surgeons General have waged war on
smoking. Surgeon General C. Everett Koop has announced his desire
for a smoke-free society. Federal and private agencies have joined
his crusade, some citing large monetary costs attributable to
diseases that have been associated with smoking.
The assumptions have had tangible policy results. Taxes, some of
them based on the social cost arguments, raise the price of
cigarettes by about 50 percent in this country. Every year even
higher taxes are considered both to raise revenues and to discourage
use of tobacco products. Nonsmokers claim they are bearing part of
the increased health-care costs due to smoking, and lobby for higher
taxes that would directly fund Medicare or other health-care
programs.
Public smoking restrictions result in part from claims of a social
cost attributed to the impact of environmental tobacco smoke on

nonsmokers. Efforts to restrict smoking in public places and in the
workplace have become more and more common.
The To(lison and Wagner analysis contradicts these essential social
costs arguments and, thereby, indicates the unfairness of policies
which are rooted in the social costs assumptions.
The "Cost" of Smoking: Who's Payina What
Anti-smoking activists consider lost productivity and presumably
higher rates of sickness and absenteeism as part of the social cost
of smoking. Even if these claims were correct, Tollison and Wagner
note, any cost of smoking would be borne by the smoker in terms of
lost pay, job status, promotion, etc.
Further, any medical costs that would be incurred by smokers are
not "joint" costs - costs paid for by smokers and nonsmokers - they
are costs paid solely by the smoker. Obviously, any medical costs
incurred by a smoker that he or she pays directly could not be a
burden on nonsmokers. But even when an insurance company picks up
much of the cost of medical care, there *are increased' premiums
charged to smokers which are not charged to nonsmokers.
Similarly, Tollison and Wagner note, there is no substantive basis
for claiming that smokers place an above-average demand on
Medicare.
Even if smokers were to make greater use of subsidized care than
nonsmokers, the existence of subsidized' care does not give smokers
an incentive to smoke more or to oet sick.
The External "Costs" of Environmental Tobacco Smoke
In recent years, a new line of argument has emerged in support of
restrictions on tobacco use: Smokers generate environmental
tobacco smoke (ETS) and thus expose nonsmokers to adverse health
risks.
Even if this claim could be scientifically proven -- and it has not --
Tollison and Wagner find that there are more external costs
resulting from blanket anti-smoking policies than any that might be
attributed to ETS. Owners of public facilities such as restaurants
and hotels have an economic incentive to provide the kind of

environment customers want. Employers deciding the merits of
workplace ,smoking regulations are hiring in a competitive labor
market; companies will thus provide the type of workplace most
attractive to the majority of workers. Legislative bans on smoking
result in more economic inefficiencies and social costs than letting
the marketplace do its job, the authors say.
SummaCy: Public Policy Results
The language of social costs often serves political, rather than
economic, ends. Because they are not based on substantive data,
social costs are analytical "unicorns" that should not be used' to
establish real world policies. Even if a third-party cost could be
assessed, the effort to eliminate it would often cost more than it
would save. This is certainly true of the government's attitude
toward tobacco prod'ucts, Tollison and Wagner say.
Smoking and the State concludes that tobacco taxation is not a
product of economic analysis; it is a result of upper-class fashion-
mongering and politicians seeking painless ways to increase
revenues. The patronizing anti-tobacco policies of the 1980's bode
ill for the traditional individualism of American life, the authors
say. When government has the power to "protect" people from
themselves, there is no guarantee that it will stop with smoking.
If government is allowed to enact punitive or costly measures that
arbitrarily restrict the liberties of smokers, where will this
coercive use of power end?
