Tobacco Documents Online

Services of Mead Data Central, Ina LEVEL 1; - 48 0F 55 STORIES Copyright (c) 1986 Educational Broadcasting and GWETA; The MacNeil/Lehrer NewsHour November 14, 1986, Friday Transcript 92905 LENGTH: 9633 words HEADLINE: Fallout; Second-Hand Smoke PAGE 165 BYLINE: In New York: ROBERT MacNEIL, Executive Editor; In Washington: CHARLAYNE HUNTER-GAULT, Correspondent; GUESTS: In San Francisco: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI, Former National Security Adviser; In Washington: Rep. LES ASPIN, Democrat, Wisconsin; Rep. HENRY HYDE, Republican, Illinois; CHARLES KRAUTHAMMER, Ne w Repubiic; SUZANNE GARMENT, Wall Street Journal; REPORTS FROM NEWSHOUR CORRESPONDENTS: ROD STEPHENI(Visnews), In Philippines; ROGER ROSENBLATT; LEE HOCHBERG (KCTS), in Seattle BODY: Intro ROBERT MacNEIL: Good evening. Leading the news this Friday, President Reagan said the country will support him on Iran. In Congress, his speech did not silence criticism of' the secret initiative. The United States imposed economic sanctions on Syria for terrorism. We'll have the details in our news summary coming up. Charlayne Hunter-Gault is in Washington tonight. Charlayne? CHARLAYNE HUNTER-GAULT: The news summary tonight is followed by an extensive look at Iran fallout. We start with the view of former National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski. Then two congressmen debate the administration's Iran diplomacy. Essayist Roger Rosenblatt weighs in.with some words about the principles at stake. We get two opposing media views. And finally, an update on smoking in the workplace. News summary MacNEIL: President Reagan said today that most Americans will approve his arms shipments to Iran, but there was continued criticism from Congress, and' Iran challenged his account. Iranian President Ali Khameini, speaking in Tehran, did not mention arms shipments, but denied'that his government had conducted negotiations to improve relations with the U.S. He said Mr. Reagan's jy account of negotiations was mere lies, that only Iranian intelligence officers 0 had talked with American officials. In Washington, President Reagan spoke to a ~ White House audience, outlining a policy of firmness and flexibility. jy Pres. RONALD REAGAN: Wp have and will continue to pursue every possible ~ option to remove the causes of terrorism. In short, we will talk when talking (~ is productive and will be firm when firmness is required. But when terrorism N does occur, we will act decisively against those who are responsible. There has ~ not been and will not be any ransom for hostages. Let there be no doubt the United States does not pay tribute to terrorists. MacNEIL: There was criticism of the President's explanations from both Republicans and Democrats in Congress. Republican Senator Pete Wilson of California was critical of the decision to send weapons to Iran, saying, "'I L Er~/ * :~ ® ® &21E ~''~i ~~ 1 ~ ~~~~ ~~~~~ ES®

Services of Mead Data Central, Inc. PAGE 166 (c) 1986 EBC & GWETA. All Rights Reserved, November 14, 1986 think they should have chosen some other means, like medical supplies." Richard Lugar, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, approved the arms shipments, but said the secrecy was a mistake. Democrat James Exon of Nebraska called the President's actions "'morally wrong, a clear case of duplici'ty.' Democrat Patrick Leahy, vice chairman of the Intelligence Committee, said the operation sounded amateurish. Sen. PATRICK LEAHY (D) Vermont: I just think it was a poor policy from word~ go. I think it got worse because of the attempt of the White House to run this out of a -- pretty much out of a basement office In the White House. I think the State Department and Department of Defense were cut out far too much. It's almost as though the policy was done looking for real short term gains without any consideration of what happens in the long range interests in the Middle E ast -- ours and the other countries in the Middle East. MacNEIL: Among U.S. allies, there was oblique criticism. British Foreign Secretary Sir Geoffrey Howe told parliament, "In our view, concessions lead to~ more, not less, hostage taking." A spokesman for the neo-Gaulist rally in France, the party of Premier Jacques Chirac, told reporters, "Those who give morality lessons would do better to look and sweep their own doorsteps before criticizing others. The French government neither sold nor traded arms to obtain the li'beration of hostages." Charlayne? HUNTER-GAULT: President Reagan imposed more sanctions against Syria today, calling the measures an effort to express our outrage over that country's continuing support for terrorism. The President tightened export controls, terminated availability of export-import bank programs, and ended commercial flights between the two~nations. Presidential spokesman Larry Speaks also said that U.S. oil companies have been informed that their continued involvement i'n Syria was Inappropriate. Speaks also said the staff of the U.S. embassy in Damascus will be reduced, and no high level visits between U.S. and Syrian officials will take place. At a State Department briefing, spokesman Charles Redman explained why such steps are necessary. CHARLES REDMAN, State Department spokesman: We believe further steps must be taken to discourage such Syrian behavior and to express our outrage and that of the American people at Syrian sponsorship of this attack and its long pattern of support for terrorism. We have been in consultation with our allies on this matter, including members of the European Economic Community, who announced their own measures on November 10. We welcome these decisions. These measu res and our own actions will send a clear and unequivocal message to Syria. Its support of terrorism Is unacceptable to the international community of nation s. HUNTER-GAULT: Syria was also named in a NATO report today that said terrorist attacks will increase and claim more lives in the future. Other countries named were Libya and Iran. The report says they openly endorse terrorism as a means of achievi'ng their policy goals. The report, a draft prepared for the NATOmeeting which started today, also criticized Western Europeans in their preference of political measures to fight terrorism. MacNEIL: The Philippines was gripped by an air of crisis today as President Corazon Aquino vowed to punish the killers of leftist Rolando OLalia, and his followers mounted protests against the man they thought responsible. Rod Stephen of Visnews has a report.

Services of Mead Data Central, Ina PAGE 167 (c) 1986 EBC & GWETA. All Rights Reserved, November 14, 1986 ROD STEPHEN (voice-over): More than 6,000 demonstrators, incensed by his murder, marched to the headquarters of Defense Minister Enrile. It was peaceful, but the placards told the story. The protestors blamed Enrile. Reports say that the defense minister had Olalia killed because he was too cl ose to Mrs. Aquino and had intended to call a general strike if the military threatened her rule. Only rumors, but enough to worry Enrile, who ordered a force of more than 100 riot police to guard the crowd. The death of OlaLi'a has already been~ compared to the assassination of Benigno Aquino in 1983, and Mrs. Aqui!no has set up a commission and offered a reward of $10,000 to anyone who can help the police find the killers. HUNTER-GAULT: British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher arrived today in the United States for two days of talks with President Reagan.Her plane landed la te this afternoon at Andrews Air Force Base outside Washington. She meets with the President tomorrow at Camp David. The talks are expected to; cover a wide ran ge of issues, particularly Mrs. Thatcher's concern over President Reagan's long range goal of eliminating ballistic missiles, which she said are necessary to defend Western European countries. MacNEIL: The U.S. exploded a major nuclear device in the Nevada desert today. It was the 19th announced test since the Soviet moratorium.last year and measured 5.6 on the Richter Scale -- one of the highest readings for a nuclear test. In Washington, a Soviet scientist implied the U.S. was cooking the books on its nuclear tests. Vladimir Baranovsky, an offici'al Soviet scientist of Moscow's Academy of Sciences, told' a news conference today that the U.S. exploded four more devices than the 19 announced since August, 1985. He also said U.S. testing may cause the Soviets to end their moratorium. VLADIMIR BARANOVSKY, Soviet scientist (through translator): Today there is supposed to take place the 23rd nuclear test by the United States in the same period that the Soviet Union has not conducted such tests. It is possible to allow the other side to do 10, 20 extra tests, but if we see no signs that the moratorium can become bilateral, then reasons do come up that may force a political reevaluation of the whole situationi. MacNEIL: Baranovsky is a member of a U.S.-Soviet group that disputes the U.S. position that it's not possible to monitor a test ban.U.S. officials say the group is- advancing Soviet propaganda. Speaking of advancement, 1,100 marchers reached the end of a 3,600 mile long trek today. The members of the Great Peace March entered Washington, completing the last 15 miles of a journey begun in Los Angeles more than eight months ago. They plan tolhold a rally at the Lincoln,Memorial tomorrow. Organizers of the march advocate a nuclear test ban, a bar to all weapons in space, and say they represent 46 states and several foreign countries. HUNTER-GAULT: President Reagan today signed a bill that creates a no fault compensation system for victims of injuries resulting from childhood vaccinations. The President said he was signing the legislation with what he called mixed feelings. He said he supports provisions of the bill that would allow companies to export drugs not yet approved for use here by the Food and Drug Administration, but he also said he had serious reservations about the compensation package, partly because it would require federal funds. tCb L EXIS * A EXIS 0 LEXIS O'1?EX!S ~

Services of Mead Data Central, Ina PAGE 168 (c) 1986 EBC & GWETA. All Rights Reserved, November 14, 1986 MacNEIL: In economic news, Ivan Boesky, a leading Wall Street takeover specialist, agreed to pay a record $1,00 million penalty for insider trading abuses. Boesky admitted to using nonpublic information obtained from another trader to earn $50 million in illegal profits. The settlement negotiated by the Securities and Exchange Commission also bars Boesky from the securities busi'ness, although he can remain as a personal investor. And' in other economic news, wholesale prices rose a moderate .3% in October, and retail sales plunged by 5%, due almost entirely to a decrease in auto saI es after special cut rate financing programs ended. Excluding automobiles, sales showed a slight overall gain in October. HUNTER-GAULT: Next, we.devote most of the News Hour to the fallout over Iran diplomacy, and end with an update on smoking in the workplace. Fallout MacNEIL: Our lead focus section tonight: President Reagan's Iran initiative. Will it play in the Persian Gulf, will it play in Paris, and will it play in Peoria? We'll try to get answers to those questions from former National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski, from the chairman of the House Armed Services Committee Les Aspin and Congressman Henry Hyde of the Foreign Affairs Committee, and finally, with two columnists who've helped frame the Washington debate, Charles Krauthammer and Suzanne Garment. We invited the administration, but they chose not to send anyone. Responding to two weeks of news reports an d what he called utterly false charges that the U.S. had traded arms to Iran for U.S. hostages in Lebanon, the President went on national television last night to explain and defend the decision of his administration to renewidiplomatic contacts with Iran. Here's how he explained the policy last night. Pres. REAGAN: For 18 months now, we have had underway a secret diplomatic initi'ative to Iran. That initiative was undertaken for the simplest and best of reasons. To renew a relationship with the nation of Iran, to bring an honorable end to the bloody sfx year war between Iran and Iraq, to eliminate state sponsored terrorism and subversion, and to effect the safe return of all hostages. Without Iran's cooperation, we can not bring an end to the Persian Gulf war. Without Iran's concurrence, there can be no enduring,peace in the Mi•ddle East. N MacNEIL: We go first to Zbigniew Brzezinski, President Carter's national O security adviser. In that job, he had confronted two questions at the heart of N the current debate: how best to deal with the Iranians and the role of the N national security adviser. He was the first person holding that job to testif y ~ before a Congressional committee. He join us tonight from a studio in San ~ Francisco. N Mr. Brzezinski, overall, what was your reaction to the President's Q~ explanations last night? ~ ZSIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI, former national security adviser: Well, I must say that I am very sympathetic to his objectives. I think he's right in stressing tha t the United States needs to open contacts with Iran because of its geopolitical importance. He's rigfi t to be concerned about the hostages. He's right to be concerned about helping to end the Iraqi-Iranian war. But having said that I do feel that the methods used -- the tactics employed -- were *too costly and LEXES ' IEEX1S'@E~6S 'f~."E~,'65

Services of Mead Data Central, Inc. PAGE • 169 (c) 1986 EBC & GWETA. All Rights Reserved, November 14, 1986 too risky. That's my bottom line. MacNEIL: Well, let's take those, then. How costly, first of all? Mr. BRZEZINSKI: Well, very costly, I think, first of all, in the region, because the United States has a stake in a good relationship with the moderate Arab states. It has a stake In not being perceived as in some way helpful to. Iran's conduct of the war against Iraq. And the shipment of even limited defense oriented items destroys any pretense of American non-involvement. It creates the false Impression of America, in fact, helping Iran. And secondly, it is costly, I think, with our allies. MacNEIL: You mean that the psychological effect of that, even if, as t he President said, the arms were defensive and could not make a difference in the war, the psychological effect would!be as you described. Mr. BRZEZINSKI: Well, it's not only psychological; it's also political. We, in effect, ar ehelping to pierce the defense embargo that we ourselves imposed on Iran. And that is bound to have an impact on the attitude of other governments of the world arms merchants, and it certainly will have an impact on the attitude of the Arab governments which feel threatened by the wave of Islamic fundamentalism originating from Iran. So In the region it's damaging. Secondly, in my judgement, it's also damaging towards our allies. After all, we have been urging them not to deal with terrorist states, to maintain a firm position. And clearly, our own conduct has not been consistent with our proclaimed rhetoric. MacNEIL: You said also too risky. Mr. BRZEZINSKI: Too risky, particularly in regards to the negotiations in Tehran. I have the highest respect for my successor, Bud McFarlane, and I admire his courage In going to Tehran. But In sending a former national security adviser to Tehran to some uncertain and apparently undefined encounter which, in effect, was aborted and without advance certainty that at least some of our key objectives would be achieved, I think was risky in terms of the individuals involved and in terms of the stakes involved. I feel that such an actY'on should not have been undertaken unless we have some advance assurance that either the hostages will be released or that there will be some significant ~ turn in the American-Iranian relationship. Q isn't reali'stic to ex ect N ust sim that it l l a i Ma NEIL: So p p j y me peop e are s y ng c N I reliable deals wlth any supposediy moderate faction in Iran. What is your on experience? Mr. BRZEZINSKI: We11, I must say that there is something to that. When we N were trying to resolve the hostage issue, when the American hostages were held ~ in the embassy in Tehran, we had some dealings with some Iranians. The foreign ~ minister o~f Iran at the time negotiated throu h intermediaries with us with the then Chief of Staff -- domestic Chief of Staff -- Hamilton Jordan involved in that operation. And I must say, throughout the effort, I was somewhat skeptical, because I felt that when the bottom line comes to be written, the Iranians simply would not deliver because of internal.divisions. And I rathe r suspect that this is what happened in this case, and we should have probably known better. Thou h I say this with hesitation because I know the intentions were good and the s~akEs were high. But again, I have to say that I think the EX- I wS ~' . ..~~ m L ~~ IS® ~ ~ . ~'~~~~ fE):[ S

Services of Mead Data Central, Inc. PAGE 170 (c) 1986 EBC & 6WETA. All Rights Reserved, November 14, 1986 tactics were simply wrong -- fundamentally unwise. MacNEIL: You say you applaud the objectives. Did the President convince you with his explanation that the dealings with Iran did have a broader strategic purpose than simply releasing the hostages? Mr. BRZEZINSKI: You know, it's a very dangerous game to try to read people's motives. But ff I may speculate, I suspect that, in: the case of McFa rlane, it was the geopolitical motive that got him involved In this venture. For the President and perhaps for some of his domestic advisers, the plight of the hostages probably was important as well, and perhaps uppermost. In any case, it seems to me that the 'tangible issue at stake had to be the hostages, because it is difficult to imagine an upgrading of the American-Iranian relationship while the hostages were being held. And here, of course, the guestion arises, should we have been willing to trickle in arms on a kind of dribbling basis while the Iranians were releasing one hostage after another, but then their allies were taking other people hostage. That seemed to~ me, again, to be a dubious tactic. MacNEIL: Did the President, in your view, satisfactorily defend his proposition that he has not violated:the principle of trading for hostages -- of giving things in exchange for hostages? Mr. BRZEZINSKI: In my view, I think we all ought to be a little more honest on that subject. I know of no government -- I repeat, no government -- that has been ultimately unwilling to deal over hostages. Even the Israelis have, after all, dealt over hostages and arranged for exchanges. So I think i't would have been better if we had made it clear that our policy is that we will not sacrifice vital national interest. We will not sacrifice fundamental principles. But under certain circumstances, we are prepared to deal if some reasonable, even if somewhat unpalatable, swap can be arranged. I think that would have been a better position to adopt than an absolutist, rhetorical stand which we then violate on the AT, so to speak. MacNEIL: So is the impressi'on left to the world that the United States does deal for hostages now? Mr. BRZEZINSKI: Oh, yes. I think not only is the impression left that we deal' with the hostages, but the impression Is left that we are being rather ~ hypocritical about it. And I think that Is costly as well. This Is why I feel 0 that our regional interests were damaged and' our overall standing was damaged as ~ well by this particular action. ~y MacNEIL: Come to the domestic issues in this for a moment, and one that -- in ~ which you have a very relevant experience. Some critics are saying, 3ncludin g ~ some on Capitol Hill, that it i's wrong to use the National Security Council as ~y an operational action arm of the executive branch in things like this for ~, clandestine exercises, bypassing the departments -- the cabinet departments and the CIA. What Is your view of that? ~, Mr. BRZEZINSKI: I don't entirely agree with that. I think we have to be, again, somewhat more refined in our judgements. Presidents are entitled to conduct their foreign policy as they best see fit in terms of the people they are comfortable with. President Nixon~used Mr. Kissinger for secret diplomacy regardin China. And that was, I believe in, the national tnterest. I have some dea~ings with foreign governments after the Soviet invasion of

Services of Mead Data Central, Inc. PAGE 1:71 (c)' 1986 EBC & UWETA. All Rights Reserved, November 14, 1986 Afghanistan, again, for the sake of national security. The problem might arise if the National Security Council actually becomes engaged as an institution in the conduct of operations -- but really operations. Here, we are talking really about the President relying on the national security adviser for ad hoc, highly sensitive, occasional negotiating missions. And that I really do not think is improper. On the contrary, it would be an excessive limitation of the President's ability to conduct foreign policy to deprive him of that option if he wishes to exercise it. MacNEIL: Is this inci'dent goingito hamper the President's conduct of foreign policy for his remaining two years? Mr. BRZEZINSKI: If It poisons the well, so to speak, in relations with Congress, if it contributes to a crisis of confidence in him, if it stirs up partisan passions, then I think it will. And this is why I'd just as soon have this incident talked out and put behind us, because it is important for all of us that the President, and particularly the Senate, work together nn issues of national security. MacNEIL: Did he successfully limit the damage last night, do you think? M'r. BRZEZINSKI: I have to say that, much as I wish that he had, I feel tha t he has not. Because I do not think that he really convinced the country -- he didn't convince me, in any case -- that the issue was dealt with in the best possible manner. MacNEIL: Mr. Brzezinski, thank you for joining us. Charlayne? HUNTER-GAULT: Now to Congress, where President Reagan's speech appears to have addednew zest to the debate, especially bringing more Republicans more vigorously to the President's defense. Joining us are Les Aspin, a Democrat from Wisconsin and chairman of the House Armed Services Committee; and also Congressman Henry Hyde, a Republican from Illinois and a member of the House Foreign Affairs and Intelligence Committees. They joimus from a studio on Capitol Hill. Gentlemen, first, let's start with your institutional interests. The •Presi'dent said that the key committees had been informed. Congressman Aspin, were you informed early enough and fully enough? Rep. LES ASPIN (D) Wisconsin: We were all informed, in fact, only after th e issue broke in the press. I think there was nobody on Capitol Hill that was informed before the Issue was public. H1lNTER-GAULT: And in your view, that is not proper. Rep. ASPIN: I think that he made a political mistake. Henry Hyde and I ha ve disagreed, and he may have a case, on the legal point, as to whether there was any legal requirement to inform Congress before this, but I think there's a widespread agreement among all members of Congress that politically, he would have been a lot -- he, meaning the President -- would have been,a lot better off, had the circle of people been widened to include at least the leadership on Capitol Hill.

Services of Mead Data Central, Inc. PAGE - 172 (c) 1986 EBC & GWETA. All Rights Reserved, November 14, 1986 HUNTER-GAULT: But let me just understand you. You're saying that the President did nothing illegal in not -- Rep. ASPIN: I think that is a debatable issue which will be part of the Intelligence Committee's oversight when they go into this in a couple weeks. It's a debatable point on the legal point. HUNTER-GAULT: Right. Rep. ASPIN: But I think the political point is not debatable. I think on the political point that it would have been better politically to have included people on the hill -- at least the leadership of both parties and'both houses on the hill. I think that is widely agreed to on the hill. HUNTER-GAULT: Congressman Hyde, is it widely agreed to and do you agree with it? Rep. HENRY HYDE (R) Illinois: Well, I agree with Les. I think politically it would have been wiser to bring into the circle at the takeoff of this operation! the so-called gang of eight. That is, the leaders in the House and the Senate and the leaders on both intelligence committees in the House and the Senate. I understand the administration's reluctance to do that, because we can not keep a secret on Capitol Hill. And lives were at stake -- not only the hostages, bu t people inside Iran. But nonetheless, I think those eight people could be trusted and ought to have been trusted.And I think bipartisan support would have followed from that, and the political fallout wouldn't be as rough as it is now. HUNTER-GAULT: Do you agree with that part of it, Congressman Aspin -- that lilves were at stake, and therefore, it was understandable that -- Rep. ASPIN: I have a certain amount of sympathy with that positi'on, and clearly, you've got a problem when the more people know something, the more likely it is to get out. In this case, I would have tilted towards the decision to include more people, regardless of that. Rep. HYDE: If I might add on the legaliity, I think -- HUNTER-GAULT: Yes, I was about to -- Rep. HYDE: Right. I think Les has highligfi ted the fact that the law, in m y judgement, is deliberately ambiguous. I looked up the debate, and Les participated in it, along with Congressman Boland, the chairman of the Intelligence Committee, and I think the Constitutional powers of the President were deliberately kept vague in the law -- his right to withhold information f or serious, sensitive security reasons -- an6nobody really wanted to nail it down. So there''s an ambiguity there where both sides have something to argue about. HUNTER-GAULT: Where do you think they'll come out on this one In the Congress? Rep. HYDE: I think Congress will i'nsist that it was not treated fairly or honorably or right, and I think the President will disagree, and I will side wilth the President. LEYIS'R5EIL8Z'LEX,'!3'1ZGK- IS

Services of Mead' Data CenVal, Ina PAGE 173 (c) 1986 EBC & GWETA. All Rights Reserved, November 1:4, 1986 HUNTER-GAULT: Let me ask you both this: did the President last night persuade you that the United States government was not trading arms for hostages, Congressman Aspin? Rep. ASPIN: No. This thing smells like a swap, it sounds like a swap, it looks like a swap. I think it's a swap. HUNTER-GAULT:'But the President said there has not been and will not be any ransom to hostages. Is the President lying? Rep. ASPIN: Well, I can't judge his motives. I mean, I'm not i'n a position to know what was going through his mind, Bud McFarlane's mind or Poindexter's mind or anybody in the administration's mind at the time. All I can say is that you look at this thing, and the shipments and the release of the hostages was so close together, it couldn't have been a coincidence. Now, they may think there was no quid pro quo, I can't believe that the Iranians didn't think there was any quid pro~quo or any outside observer looking at this would think that there was no quid pro quo -- outside observer meaning other people in the Arab states, people in Europe and'other countries. HUNTER-GAULT: Congressman Hyde, were you persuaded that there had not been a deal -- arms for hostages? Rep. HYDE: There is a superficial plausibility to the fact that there was an even up trade. But I accept the notion that the overriding purpose of this whole adventure was to develop access and influence with some elements inside Iran that are moderate, anti-terrorist, anti-Soviet and pro-solving the war with Iraq. Those are very important, noble motives. And they needed some credibility with other people and with the military within Iran. And this was an offer of bona fides or good faith. Now, the hostage situation, they're not held by these Iranians; they're held by people over whom the Iranians have some influence. Perhaps they weren't able to deliver what we had' hoped or what we had expected. They did dribble out some hostages. But I am convinced that t he ove rriding policy goal was to develop and nurture this contact inside Iran, because the direction pflst-Khomeini that Iran goes might very well forestall World War III. It was risky. No assurances of success. And I agree with Dr. Brzezinski. Maybe he wouldn't have done it. But I think the President did the right thing, and it's not over yet. HUNTER-GAULT: Do you buy that -- Rep. ASPIN: Can I -- HUNTER-GAULT: Yes. Rep. ASPIN: Let me say that I think that Henry's right about that. HUNTER-GAULT: About which? Rep. ASPIN: Thi~s point that their overriding policy objective here was what Mr. Brzezinski called the geopolitical reasons. I did not originally believe that. I originally believed that this idea of improving the relations by developing contacts with moderates in Iran was a cover up -- that they had one In, and their main,objective was the hostages, and that they had come up wi~h this idea of developing relations with the moderates as a cover up to what E. ® ® ® ~~"6~ L EIrle

Services of Mead Data Centralj Ino. PAGE 174 ('c) 1986 EBC & GWETA. All Rights Reserved, November 14, 1986 they got -- when they got caught trying to trade hostages for military equi'pment. I now believe, having been through enough briefings,, having sat through this process, that, in fact,; what Henry Hyde is saying.is correct -- that their first motive and the main motive, certainly of Bud McFarlane and probably of the whole administration policy here, was that of trying to develop a relationship with the moderates, looking to trying to make sure that we don"t have a pro-Soviet government in Iran when Khomeini goes. HUNTER-GAULT: So you think -- Rep. ASPIN: I think that's right. I think that's right. But I do -- HUNTER-GAULT: So you think this was a proper use, then of the NSC? Rep. ASPIN: No. Let me just say that -- Rep. HYDE: Proper use of the NSC, she said. Rep. ASPIN: Yeah, I understand. Let me just first of all say that I think that somewhere along the line, even though they started out on this broader geopolitical track, somewhere along the line they got very heavily i'nvolved'in the hostage Issue, and that there was a swap -- more than one swap. There we re several swaps of military equipment for several hostages. And somewhere they started out on the higher plane, but eventually they found themselves dealing with the hostages and straight out making trades. HUNTER-GAULT: And your answer to the question about this being a proper use of the NS C was no. Rep. ASPIN!: I think the NSC -- it's a tricky thing. I think that the NSC, just -- first of all, I think that any President ought to be able to structu re the government to work the way he wants it. Congress, though, has a right to~ having certain information about that. And the NSC is tricky, because Congress is not -- the NSC is really a staff directly to the President and is not, therefore, answerable to Congress on a day to day basis. So if the President"s going to, as a matter of preference, run operations out of the NSC, as opposed to coordinating papers, which is what they do when they coordinate policy, or baybe even occasional secret diplomacy missions. If they're going to actually run operations out of the NSC, I think you're going to find a cry in Congress for more access in terms of hearings, testimony, witnesses coming before Congress from Congress, from the NSC. • HUNTER-GAULT: Just very briefly, Congressman Hyde, because we're going to leave you and come back. So if you could just respond to that briefly. Rep. HYDE: Yeah, I think that the President uses the tools that are available to him on a very surgical, delicate, sensitive mission -- those that he has t he most confidence in, those people that are sympathetic with the program, those people that have personal relationships that are helpful. And if that's the NSC, why, that's fine. If it was the Coast and Geodetic Survey, that would be fine, as far as I'm concerned. Get the job done. HUNTER-GAULT: All right, thank you. Stay there. We'll be back. Robin?