Tobacco Documents Online

C JOHN W HILL II /16 Health and Morality-Tobacco's Counter Campaign Although first introduced to Europeans for its supposed'medicinal value, tobacco has been strongly critic zed fo its deleterious effects since Sir Walter Raleigh brought it to the Virgin"ia Colo yA~Toa y t~iettobr~N~nduStry is in the eye of a raging storm of controversy as evidence steadily mounts of tobacco's injurious effects on a person's health. Undoubtedly no Hill and Knowlton account has brought the firm John Hill founded as much criticism as its effort to defend a beleaguered tobacco industry. John Hill first accepted the account and today the firm he founded continues to serve the major tobacco companies. This continuing controversy raises moral issues far outweighing the economic concerns at issue in most public relations campaigns, e. g. the steel industry. ,_~_. . . ... _ The stakes in this ongoing public relations battle are enormous. On one side of the ledger is the health of more than 200 million teen-agers and adults. One the other • side are,prof its, even survival, of the tobacco industry in d'epen4Wdence on the 55.8 million addicted smokers as of 1988. That year the Tobacco Institute boasted that these smokers reptesented a buying power of $1 trillion dollars, argu*ng. "they help fuel the enginfof the largest economy on the globe a In the 1990s America's tobacco companies began compensating for the shrinking domestic market by stepping up exports abroad-and with the help of the United States Government! Throughout the first half of the twentieth century, smokers and doctors largely ignored negative news about smoking because anti-tobacco claimants presented their findings more in moral than in scientific terms. But soon after World War II a renewed interest in research, funded by the increase in money given to universities and hospitals in the pestwar science boom, helped doctors accumulate enoug~ m~ dical ,4 Mrs~ov' Sfvwl evidence to alarMtobacco manufacturers, smokers, and doctors. associa- ting:+lung cancer with smoking appeared in an article by Ernest Wynder and Evarts Graham in the Journal of the American Medical Association in 1950. Two other articles y Richard Doll and Bradford'Hi11 were published in the British Medical .Tn,,rnal i~~Cone~bv,AltO~~fcfh-Ver all led to the conclusion that smoking was N Q N N ~ A Ca O O ~

JOHN W HILL 11/17 ~ ~ _ib 3. The industry could have taken the position that the cigarette-health link had not been fully established, but neither had it been disproved. Therefore, there was a strong burden of proof on the industry. In this course, the industry could urge• caution to smokers and fundR research to ascertain the true facts. This would have avoided:contooversy in favor of clarification and unbiased inquiry. 4. Finally, the industry could'have treated those opposed'as enemies of smoking an&used public relations to reassure the public and provids% rationalization to addicted smokers to continue their habit. In this course the serious question of public health could be turned into a contooversy. In short, the industry could fight back and try to refute evidence eppose&to its self-interest. Perhaps the last straw that led to the bobacco industry Kr to Hill and Knowlton for help was when Dr. Ochsner spoke in New York City on December 8, 1953, and'asserted that "the male population ofnwouldSoetdecidated if cigarette smoking increases as it has in the pest unless some steps are taken to remove the cancer- producing factor from cigarettes." Cigarette atocks dropped one to four points after the meeting, and, as Business Week, noted "fa`t paced events loosened up for the first time official tongues of the tobacco indtistry. NiM E. A. Darr, president of R. J. Reynolds, was quick to respond there had;been ano real or substantial evidence showing cigarettes cause lung cancer.01' Such responses caused Senator Maurine Neuberger, whose late hushand had died of lung cancer, to respond: "Ridicule and derision became diliberate defensive weapons in the hands of the tobacco industry public relations experts." Within days after the speech by Dr. Ochsner, six nervous company presidents turne&to John Hill for help. t Hi1L and Knowlton~Retained, TIRC Set up In response to an urgent telegram from Paul M. Hahn, president of the American Tobacco Company, the presidents of six major companies met in New York City December the most challenging problem our organization has ever faced--and perhaps the most challenging problem that ever faced a great industry, one with annual sales of almost S5 billions and with economic roots that reach clear back to the farm." 10 and 11, 1953, to consider what action they could take to mute the evidence of' the dangers of smoking. As executives do when faced with a public relations crisis, the:z agrBed to confer with John V. Hill. These executives met twice, once on December 15, and again on December 28 with Hi1L and his key aid'es to discuss ways of developing a public relations response to the.-Mountingg evidence against smoking's ill effects. In the words of one Hill aide" "This is. .

JOHN W HILL,TT/18 After the December 15 meeting in which H&K was asked to do an intensive study of the problem and report back in two weeks. Intensive research was begun; "Research directors and other representativee of leading companies have been interviewed and immediately all available material on the subject has been read, including newspaper and magazine articles, company statements and various reperts of medical research organizations." One of the reasons for Hill and Knowlton's steady growth in the Post War II years was its emphasis on research to determine a course of action. On December 22, 1953, H&K sent a recommendation to the six presidents stating: Because of the serious nature of the attacks on cigarettes and' the vast publicity given them over:the air and in the daily press and in magazines of the widest circulation, a hysteria of fear appears to be developing throughout the country. There is no evidence that this adverse publicihq is abating or will soon abate. This publicity has given rise to a situation wllich makes it imperative for the cigarette makers to inform the public regarding the facts. .. The following name is submitted for the Committee: Cigarette Research and Information Committee. It is believed that the word "Research" is needed ifi the name t6 give weight and added'credence tothe Committee's statements. However, the word cannot be used unless the industry is prepared to back it up with genuine joint research action and support. The research to be sponsored by the Committee would be of two kinds, namely (a) medical research to be financed jointly and (b) editorial and statistical in all phases of]k the cigarette problem to be carried on through public relations counsel." The presidents agreed on this appr•oach~and decided that the Committee would be headquarter& in H&K's offices in the Empire State Building. . Aides said John Hill made this a condition of accepting the account--that research be financed'to ascertain the facts. Strangely, Hill's memoir, The Making of a Public Relations Man, published in 1963, stands silent on the tobacco account. H&K considered independent scientific research essential, though industry leaders had h0ped to avoid this approach. The companies argued that they had conducted considerably more research in their own laboratories and had sponsored work at universities and hospitals that was not generally known. The tobacco J ~ ae~'that mammrh what was neede& was dissemination ss presidents of the "Big Six" a of information already gathered rather than condncting new research. Hill Pstrongly disagreed and emphatically wanned the companies that they should probably expect to sponsor additional research," G~oss wrote in a memo found A in the John Hill Papers. Hill and Knowlton sawiby creating an independent committee and by publicizing each~new grant thev could eenerate Dositive

ADD HILL/ / /f ~ Although Hill and Knowlton had represented many large corporate ciients--Avco Manufacturing, Texaco, Procter & Gamble, and Gillette--it had built a solid reputatio serving trade associations--steel, aviation, and' ~" the drug industry. Hi1 who 1,(had a~i reputation as a "corporate confidenty" was then chairman of the firm he had founded and led to dominance in the agency field. Hill had always stressed that corporations should e= present supporting evidence, facts, to influence public opinion. aDifferent interpretation of the facts is possible, and each side is entitled to R~LiCiOi~t its views, leaving it to the public to decide which to* accept." Bert Goss, then H&K OMt ~ president,Atold Eongress "We believe that if you give the people the facts they will eventually operate on the basis of those facts, if you give it to them convincingly and effectivelzy H&K's economic writer Edwin F. Dakin, saw the public relations problem "as one that revolves around the interpretation offacts," adding, "There is only one problem, confidence ansJd how to establish it, public assurance, and how to create it. He wisely opined, "No resort to logic ever cured a panic.7" And panic was the word for the tobacco indsutry's leaders with its $5 billion dollar business and large;rprofit margins at stake. The tobacco presidents finally agreed to the formation of the Tobacco Industry Research Committee and adopted a budget of $1.2 million for the year 1954. The presidents agreed that "the purposes and objectives of the Committee are to aid and assist research into tobacco use and health, and particularly into the alleged relationship between the use of tobacco and lung cancer, and to make available to the public factual information on this subject,"' adding, "It is the considered judgment of the Committee that its activities shall be confined to the purposes set forth above." The presidents were guarding against the appearance of any activity that might come under the ban of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act. Hill and Knowlton rapidly put its hurriedly-drafted progrmm into action. The first step was to publish an advertisement on January 4, 1954, in 448 daily newspapers across the nation. This advertisement, "A Frank Statement to the Public by the Makers of Cigarettes," contaiaed the following points:which even today expresses fairly well the industry's public relations positionY

JOHN W HILL C KU II j1V t.v . , , l. Tb. rvporta :th.l si~as+sttem cause ls:nq sa8o.r. while not fonclusiv., should not be 'disr.qasd.d or li9htly ,,i * .: . .. A r disadsasd.• 2. 4xin.nt dootors a~ct =.sear~ acisn~ists have ~: . • . . . t_.: ~ publiely.qo.st4pn.d the sirdfisaaos of.ths_ezperia.nts . .. . . , .. alrsady oondcct9d% tk. , llsdical rsssarc4 indicat.s many possible causes ot,.luaq cancer. b. Tho;..is qo aqssssrut aaoaqapthoriti.s as to , t2r cause of lunq aaas.r. c. TMR ~in r no proo#. t4at ci" ats s.okiaQ is oir 99. t~. sapI ss. : c . . i: a. lJi. .~li~titY of thr,~}tatistics sited ia tb. - _... , . _ reports wLidh have bwn rsL.lssd tiaN bsen questioned by noted authorities. " 3. The tobacco industry accipts in interest in peoplaa• ]fealth' as a'basic raponsibifftf : 'jara.onnt to .very other consideration in our businiess.• 4. The manufacturers do not believe tbsir products are injurious to health. S. The manufacturers always bave and alrrays will ooopa ate -bn Aaf.quatdinq pablic °lysalth. 6. Tobacco has btfered".olacs: rslsocation. and [ : •njoyment to mankind for oore than 300 years. Durinq that tiam it has bssn b.ld rssppasi~le for,practically every d ise sit o f t!a.?Au*&11 body. `"On!' by. ouo r tLi„ crqe s_ have , . .. i. . .. . .. . . . been abindotled fot 'lack of'.videncit."

JOHN W HILL II v ( 7• as t!A"'ridia of''serlous digaSU' fi`atmit,t.r of d..p conc.ra. to , thq i14ustry. ; , . `,.,~:. .. s. What will industry do about it. a. it vill qive aid'aae arsibtino: ~o tA~ .- . - . ,., .- ra"arch .:ffot't' into ai:2 phsii1 Qf `tdbAaoo tui, aild . . . , . ~ ~-~ . b. Zt has formd a~oihr indastrT qroup, the lobsaoo -Industry hss.arch Coamitt... ,E.'', h. ; rrstis*b' abk3iiti.iirill b. sup.rvis.d by prd.ia.i! Iiei~ia~iats. ` . ~. 9*%iKi i' Dy the b.ads of the major tobacco companies who belonged to the TIRC. How much influence did John Hill have on the establishment of the Tobacco Industry Research Committee and on the formulation of this public relations defense. When directly asked this question Mfl7`4 by Col. George Hamel, who was then writing his master's thesis at the University of Wisconsin on&IMMe Hill's career, Hill wrote Hamel: yI decline to comment on this matter on the basis that this is an active, highly sensitive account."' '~hich may explain Hill's omission of the account in his memoir. Publ~icly'the firm was given credit for a highly influential role in the cigarette companies' adoption of a pu~li~ re~atkiong cjmp~i~n. Senator n er oo , mo e c een: Kaurene==Heuberger wrote ~ "Cool heads among the public relations-wise labored and brought forth a counter-offensive weapon with which to slay the smoking and healthi3ragon:< the Tobacco Industry Research Committee. The creation of the TIRC , the brainchild of the resourceful public relations firm of Hill And Knowltcn, was aJ of ingenuity." Business Week, in an article on the state of public relationsaws 1960, commented: "Probably one of' PR's best finger-in-the-dike jobsAdtiring the tobacco-lung cancer scare when the tcbacco industry brought in Hill and Knowlton. H&K helped set up the Tobaccc Industry Research~Committee, run by prominent scientists an&based on the prerise that there is no conclusive proof that cigarettes cause cancerp b4that t~-ae industry has an obligation to get the full facts."

JOHN W HILL DI 22 ` H&K Staffer,,E. C. K. Reed wrote Hill "Both the statement and the preliminary program strike me as about as sound as anything we have ever put out." The TIRC, to lend credibility to its program, hired Dr. Clarence Little //y~rt:sf N Ci as director. Dr. Little broug t l~credentials if not much competence to the job. He had been president of the University of Maine and of the University of Michigan. More importantly, and ironically, from 1929 to 1945 he had serv d as managing director of the American Society for th+ontrol of Cancer, whicb mme the W powerful foe of cigarette smoking, the American Cancer Society. In those years Dr. Little had done little to arouse tfhe public to the dangers of cancer .. or to muster much research into cancer's causes. Another irony: He was forced out of his position in the cancer society by the indomitable Mary Lasker, widow of Albert Lasker, who had playeda major role in the 1920s campaign to get women to smoke. Lasker's agency, Lord & Thomas, was aided in this campaign for the American Tobacco Company by public relations pioneers, Edward L. Bernays and Ivy Lee. At Mrs. Lasker's insistence, Lasker's successor agency, Foote, Cone and Belding, was brought into her campaign to strengthen the cancer society and educate the publtc about-the danger signs of cancer. Mrs. Lasker moved in on the society in 1944 and put it on the read to its large resources and powerful educational efforts of today. Scientists were gEeatly perturbed that Dr. Little would lend his name and credibility to the tobacco companies. willingness N The research funds of TIRC were administered by a scientific advisory board composed of eight independent scientists or doctors, and Dr. Little. The funds were provided by contributgons from;'the cigarette companies based on sales. By the mid-60s several million dollars had been contributed and distributed. For example, $800,000 was•--alloted for research in 1963. A cynic would observe that ~ this amount was equal to only one-half of one per cent of the industry's ++/ advertising expenditures which encouraged people to smoke. The Wall Street Journal story of June 16, 1954, breaking the news of Dr. Little's appointment.) described him as a "husky, sun-tanned man of 66" who "toye&with a pape during a press conference yesterday and said he avoided smoking cigarettes because, as they burned, they threatened to singe his mustache." The soory quoted Little as praising "the tobacco industry for its to finance and permit free investigation of all phases of the smoking and Qancer." He asserted that ivesearch did'discover relationshlip "the next job tackled will be to determine how to relationship a direct i between 0 eliminate the danger fram tobacco." In this period the Wall Street Journal industry information uncritically. accepted

JOHN HILL II JW li.*o In fact, most newspapers reported the formation of the Tobacco Industry Research Committee favorably. A memo prepared by H&K on a breaittiown of editorial opinion showed only nine per cent of the newspapers expressing opinions on TIRC were unfavorable, predicting biased research, while 65 per cent were favorable without reservation. "Newspaper reaction throughout the country to the announcement of the Tobacco 3iisIndqAry Research Committee was nearly 13 to 1 in favor of the Tobacco Industry's action," the report concluded, "News handling of the announcement story was nearly 100 per cent favorable. Yet, in contrast, 73 articles indicated a Ulief that conclusive proof linking smoking to lung cancer already existed. One of the initial recommendations in the H&K proposal was to conduct a public opinion poll on this issue, a standard procedure in most public relations programs. E. C. K. Reed persauded Hill that this would be a mistake. "Any widespread'public opinion poll would seem to come under the heading of fanning the flames. I don't think you will find out anything anyway except that people are concerned about smoking and would like to see it given a clean bill of health by the medical profession."

JOHN W HILL 11/24 Dr. Little was quick to enter the fray. The New York Times published a story June 22, 1954, headlined, "'Cigarettes Found to Raise Death Rate in Men 50 to 70," reporting a study by Drs. E. Cyler Hammon§ and Daniel Horn, which had been sponsore&by the American Cancer Society, which by now was in full cry against the dangers of smoking. Their paper was given at a medical meeting in San Francisco. The article statedf "Cigarette smokers from 50 to 70 years of age have a higher death rate, from all diseases, as much as 75 per cent higher than that of non-smokers." The next day the Times printed a second story, this one based on a statement by Dr. Little, who had been appointed just the week before, in which he characterized the Hammond•Horn study as "preliminary" and said it was only "a statistical examination of the last two and one half years." The Times reported that American Tobacco and P. Lorillard had "referred questioners to Dr. Little's report." ThusIs it became that under H&K guidancep the tobacco industry was now speaking with one voice. bAJ Ais 1fs ~/G• Hill and Knowlton's strategy ap the outset was not to seek publicity, which might fan the flames of the burning crisis, but to influence stories already in the works. Bert Goss instructed his staff to remember "we are not interested: stimulating or encouraging the publication of any articles or news stories on the subject of tobacoo and cancer or the work of the Committee." Instead, he wrote in a staff memo, Hill and Knowlton's "sole interest is in knowing what is being written and in getting our side of the story over if an article is scheduled for publication." The agency monitored medical and scientific journals and conferences, and although they did not actively try to counterattack by sending pro-MiStobacco sissR doctors to medical meetings, staff members did gather information into a compendium which was sent to doctors acooss the United States. The strategy was to avoid case-by-case responses to new charges and~direct debate with scientists; the agency responded mostly through the popular press. Initially this strategy appeared to pay off. For example, the New York Times coverage of the massive American Cancer Society study, the first report, which~ followed the creation of th+IRC, tended to be balanced, quoting docbors on both sides of the issue in the first story and then seeking TIRC's response the next day. Despite the generally positive reception the TIRC had received in the press, by Se-;tember 9, 1954, the staff at Hillland Knowlton considered science A tt,rp ~ A/~„ writers an "_bstacle" to their program, ,.~igTtha an influential section of 4os science writ_rs'^completely prejudiced against cigarettes were able "to color and slant st3ries in magazinde and the daily press," according to a memo in the John Hi1_ Papers.

JOHN HILL II .%*7 %~ To counteract this presumed bias, the PR firm set up meeetiggs inl241r August and September, 1954, for Dr. Little and the chairman of the TIRC with~a host of publishers, editors, and science writers from major publishing groups, including Arthur Hays Sulzberger of the New York Times, William Randolph Hearst, Jr., Jack Howard of Scripps-Howard, and Roy Larsen of the Luce publications. Nonetheless stories continued to appear that were critical of the industry. One student of this campaign, Karen Miller, writes that "Skepticism by the journalists toward the Tobacco Industry Research Committee is striking because American~beliefs about science and medicine overall were very o timisti during the 1950s." Despite journalists" doubts, TIRC 9TATement ~y ~ N~~appear frequently in the press. Journalists who may have 45110edistrusted Committee reports were constraned from reporting their suspicions by adherence to the journalistic tradition of "objectivity," which means the reporter must get "both sides of the story." Another problem was the journalists' necessary reliance upon official sources because they were not scientists or doctors. Science writing was still maturing in this ptiiod. - The Raleigh News and Observer had reported on January ~ 1, 1954, that "the Justice LCparLLUCltL ita6 inrormC.:14ci6aitLi6a manufacturers that they cannot legally act in concert to combat medical claims that cigarette smoking may cause lung cancer," and that contributions to medical research would have to be made by individual companies. The TIRC got around the Justice Department's advice by creating an "independent" organizations which had its own public relations agenda separate from the campaigns the companies sponsored. In reality, public relations, not research, was the agenda of TIRC. In,all this Hill and Knowlton kept a low profile because if TIRC were to have credibilit•,the public must be shielded from the fact that public relations professionals were aW writing t* TIRe;taell-organized reports. Over time J'ohmHill had stoutly asserted that paper groups established by a client to promote a cause under the guise of being independent should be eliminated from the public relations profession. "The right of free speech also carries the obligation that the source of it will be open for all to see," he wrote. "It is not the work of public relations--let it always be emphasi~zed--to outsmart the American public by helping management build profits." -':,ut in fact the TIRC was essentially a front for the public relation work of the industrve' created to blunt the growing threat to the cigarette makers" enormous profits.