NYSA TI Single-Page 2
Issue Report Alexis Whither Environmental Regulation
Abstract
Few will dispute the need for some kind of regulation in a complex society such as ours. When the behavior of people, or of firms, or even of governmental agencies, causes damage to others -- and when the ancient system of tort law becomes too cumbersome or cannotbe applied for other reasons-- there arises a need for regulation imposed by government on the basis of democratic consent by the people.
Fields
- Named Organization
- Exxon
- Federal Register (publication)
- Rochester Institute of Technology
- University of Virginia
- Washington University in St. Louis
- Federal Register (publication)
- Named Person
- Chilton, Kenneth
- Hopkins, Thomas
- Singer, S. Fred
- Hopkins, Thomas
- Date Loaded
- 18 Jul 2005
- Box
- 9009
Document Images
ISSUE REPORT
JULY 1, 1993
ALEXIS
WHITHER ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION?
by S. Fred Singer
de TOCQUEVILLE
INSTITUTION
Few will dispute the need for some
kind of regulation in a complex society such
as ours. When the behavior of people, or
of firms, or even of governmental agencies,
causes damage to others -- and when the
ancient system of tort law becomes too
cumbersome or cannotbe applied for other
reasons-- there arises a need for regulation
imposed by government on the basis of
democratic consent by the people. But like
every other human activity, particularly if
it is carried out by government, regulation
requires a system of checks and balances.
Othe~¢ise, a new tyranny will spring up,
composed of regulators whose purpose in
life, whose gratification, and whose power
derive from ever-increasing levels of
regulation.- Like kudzu in Georgia,
regulation will grow until it strangles the
economy.
Regulatory. Crisis
As the level of regulation in the
United States has grown exponentially --
measured either in number of laws or in
pages of the Federal Register -- we may be
approaching the critical level where in fact
the economy is being strangled -- where
enterprise is restrained, where
entrepreneurship is stifled.
AfleP all, the level of regulatory costs
is now in excess of $600 billion per year,
over 10 percent of the GNP, according to
Prof. Thomas Hopkins of the Rochester
Institute of Technology. Prof. Murray
Weidenbaum, director of the Center for
Study of American Business at the
Washington University in St. Louis,
estimates that one-quarter of the regulatory
costs are connected with the environment,
and are the fastest growing segment.
This outlay does not appear in the
federal budget but is reflected in higher
prices in the stores and lower real incomes.
Raising the costs of all goods, energy, and
transportation levies an average annual
burden of nearly $1500 on every American
household -- a thoroughly regressive tax.
Householders could spend this sum in ways
that better advance their health and well-
being than do current environmental
controls. It is well established that people
who are well-off live healthier and longer
lives. Making men and women poorer, as
these regulations do, can only degrade their
health and shorten their years.
principles
• There may not be much we can do
about changing the incentive structure of
the regulators themselves. Public choice
theory tells us that they will always strive
for pay, perks, and power. But we might
be able to set up and enforce by law some
Dr. S. Fred Singer is Professor of
Environmental Sciences at the University
of Virginia and directs the Washington-
based Science & Environmental Policy
Project. He is currentlyworking on a study
on environmental regulation for the Alexis
de Tocqueville Institution.
Note: Nothing here is to be construed as nece-~arily reflecting the viewx of the Alexis de
Tocquev~ll¢ Institution and |t~ directors or as
aa attempt to a~d or hinder lhe passage of legislation of any bill before Congress.
T!31741185

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principles of regulation-- to make it more
rational, more effective, and less costly.
What might such principles be?
First of all, one would argue that the
regulatory entity should always be at the
lowest level of government appropriate to
the problem. This is really a democratic
principle, which allows each citizen to make
an input on matters that concern him
directly. The outstandingexample, certain-
ly, is zoning for land use. In the
environmental area, the example would be
garbage collection and solid waste disposal.
These should not be problems regulated by
federal regulators inside the Beltway. On
the other hand, problems of water quality
may involve the counties or states in a
watershed; problems of air quality may
involve airsheds that encompass more than
one state.
A second principle, but just as
important as the first, is to make sure that
regulation satisfies some kind of cost-
benefit criterion. It is understood, of
course, that the regulation should be as
cost-effective as possible -- that is, of least
cost to achieve a particular goal. But is the
goal itself worthwhile? Here one has to
measure the benefits that can be achieved
and compare them somehowwith the costs.
It is at this point where analysis
rather than politics plays a most important
role. The economic analyst will want to
compare the incremental benefits to be
gained with an increment of cost. Only if
an additional dollar of pollution control can
gain more than a dollar of benefits (in
environmental damages avoided) is it
worthwhile to tighten controls. But to
measure the benefits requires the
knowledge and application of appropriate
science, whether meteorology or medical
scienc.,eo
Initially, regulation did prove to be
worthwhile. Removing the first large
increment of pollutants from water and air
probably produced more benefits than it
cost. In the last twenty years there have
indeed been tremendous improvements in
the quality of the air, and of streams and
lakes. But removing the last few percent
of pollution is enormously expensive and
often not even within th~ reach of
technology. More important, it does not
produce commensurate benefits and
therefore wastes resources and money.
Economic theory as well as everyday
experience show only diminishing returns
from increasing degrees of pollution con-
trol.
One cannot stress enough the
importance of sound science in setting
environmental regulations. Recent history
is replete with examples of policies
instituted on the basis of nothingmore than
press releases that were not backed up by
peer-reviewed scientific data. There are
many examples where the science is ignored
or misused in order to push particular
policies. There are even examples of where
the science has reversed itself; yet the
policies march on as if nothing had
happened.
It is easy to see why politicians,
bureaucrats, and regulators would oppose
any such rational approaches to
environmental regulation. Itwould restrict
their freedom of action, limit their power,
and rob them of influence.
Last but not least, there is the matter
of comparative risk. Even if a particular
control scheme for a particular pollutant
satisfies the cost-benefit criteria, the funds
involved might be better spent on doing
away with some other hazard to human
health or well-being.
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In considering environmental
regulations, there is also the matter of
equity that needs to be weighed. In
general, the cost should be borne by those
who pollute -- thus encouraging them to
pollute less. Economists have long argued
for fees on emissions rather than for
absolute limits. By the same token, those
who benefit might be asked to share some
of the cost burden. And finally, one needs
to consider that costs and benefits impact
differently on people depending on their
income group or geographic location.
F_~onomi~.Impacts of Over-Regulation
As long as the criteria listed are
satisfied, we can be confident that
regulation is benefiting society. It is over-
regulation that one needs to be concerned
about. One of its pernicious aspects is the
fact that it adds costs to the economy which
are not very apparent. The costs do not
appear in the federal budget and they are
not paid for by federal taxes. They appear
as the costs of raw materials and
production, of transportation and
distribution. As these costs are passed
along to the consumer, they raise prices and
lower the standard of living. People
become poorer without knowing where to
put the blame.
The enormous expense of further
curbing effluents from power plants,
factories, and cars -- and now, in Los
Angeles, from dry-cleaning shops, the
corner garage, and the bakery down the
street as well -- must be passed along to the
consumer through higher prices; otherwise
these establishments have to fold. As sales
fall due to higher prices, and some firms
cannot maintain their viability, workers lose
their jobs. The costs of these regulations
force the weaker companies into
bankruptcy. Typically, small firms cannot
afford the. specialists to fill out the
innumerable forms needed for emission
permits, or to take the precise
measurements required, or to employ the
myriad of environmental consultants,
lawyers, and just plain paper pushers.
Strict regulations also erect barriers
to entry for new businesses, discourage
entrepreneurship and innovation, and
curtail competition, all of which force prices
up. Large established firms should love this
new business climate, which bestows on
them monopoly power -- but consumers and
job seekers should be very concerned.
Except for those employed in large
corporations that face less competition,
individualworkers and labor unions should
also be apprehensive. Higher production
costs pare our standard of living, diminish
our competitive position on the world
market, and curtail exports. Traditionally,
firms have moved to areas offering lower
labor costs. Textiles and other labor-
intensive manufacturers, for example,
shifted from New England to the South.
Now plants subject to strict environmental
controls, such as those in the chemical and
extractive industries -- mining, smelting,
petroleum and refining-- are seeking less
costly climates. For many it's the only
alternative: close down or move offshore
where environmental regulations are less
burdensome.
The way in which these controls are
enforced contributes significantly to their
burden. Courts and juries are holding
eo'mpanies with deep pockets guilty of
"criminal" offenses for environmental
accidents, like the Exxon Valdez. The
assigning of liability post-facto, often hitting
not the actual polluter but those who can
afford to pay, is damping new investment.
Although this disincentive is impossible to
quantify, the fear of exposure to enormous
costs must be having a crimping effect on
economic growth. Investors are increasingly
wary of putting their money in the United
States because any serious environmental
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mishap with which they could be remotely
connected might subject them to huge
liabilities.
More Jobs?
Does environmental regulation
create new jobs? The argument was used
widely by Vice President AI Gore during
the recent campaign. But it is problematic
at best. As money is removed from the
private sector, it destroys productive jobs
in industry and agriculture, while creating
jobs for regulators who promulgate and
enforce, administrators who monitor and
issue permits, and environmental lawyers
who lobby and litigate.
Let's be clear: tightening
environmental standards cannot create
more jobs -- the contrary is true. At the
very best it will shift jobs, without any net
gain. It will abolish jobs in factories that
construct real products and substitute
pursuits that spawn paperwork. All we have
to do is to retrain workers -- so the story
goes. But it won't be easy to turn out-of-
work miners and blue-collar workers into
environmental lawyers.
Government, of course, can always
create jobs with tax money or through
regulation. For example, for major projects
the law requires that government agencies
or private firms produce environmental
impact statements. The taxpayer or the
consumer, by way of higher prices, must pay
one group of consultants to write these
tomes -- many inches or even feet thick --
and then spend more of our money to
employ another firm to read them. One
bunch of guys digging holes and another
filling them in -- but no product! The
private sector could have used those funds
to employ workers in productive
occupations that would have created
valuable goods and services, raising people's
standard of living and improving their
physical well-being.
Science Misused and Ignored
There are many examples -- too
many--of misguided regulations based on
pseudo-science or worse, and applied
without regard for geographic, differences
or other common-sense factors. The 1990
Clean Air Act gives us many good
examples. One title dealswith urban smog
and prescribes what to do about it. As
Kenneth Chilton of Washington University
reminds us, the data are suspect, the criteria
are misplaced, and national control policies
are pitched to making Los Angeles smog-
free -- an impossible goal. The costs to the
nation, notsurprisingly, will be enormous.
Another title of the same law deals
with air toxics, the emission of substances
that could conceivably cause cancer. The
problem is that the cancer risk is calculated
for a susceptible person who is maximally
exposed to the atmosphere for 70 years, and
that the risks are computed based on
dubious scientific data. Furthermore, the
analysis neglects the obvious: the fact that
the person will be indoors for much of his
life exposed to an indoor air quality that
is likely to be much more hazardous. Even
so, cancer risk, normally about 25 percent,
would be reduced to only 24.99999 percent,
but at a cost of multi-billion dollars that
could have been used to save many more
lives by reducing more down-to-earth risks.
Yet another title deals with the acid
rain problem, the acidification of rain by
sulfur dioxide from coal-burning power
plants. It calls for emissions reduction
nationally of 10 million tons per year -- a
nice round number for which there is no
scientific justification whatsoever, except
that it would cut the remaining emissions
in half. Over the last twenty years, the
emissions have already been reduced by 25
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to 30 percent, without much noticeable
impact on acidity. Furthermore, the science
has changed completely since the early 80s
when there appeared to be some cause for
concern about the health of lakes and
forests. By the end of the decade these
fears had disappeared. A major scientific
study, the half-billion dollar, ten-year-long
National Acid Precipitation Assessment
Project (NAPAP), conducted under
government auspices, had demonstrated
that most small lakes affected are naturally
acidic and that forests are not harmed.
This new scientific evidence was never
disputed; it was simply ignored. Thosewho
wanted to pass the extremely expensive
control legislation that would add some $5
to 10 billions to the cost of electricity simply
declared the scientific studies to be "not
policy-relevant."
One final example: the precipitous
phase-out of production of
chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs). The policy
decisions here were driven by hype and
fear, by false stories of blind sheep and
rabbits in Patagonia, and by exaggerating
the fear of skin cancer. Press releases
about ozone depletion always refer to it as
"worse than expected." The question was
never raised whether the theory underlying
the expectations was wrong, whether the
observations were wrong, or whether both
were wrong; yet these are the only logical
choices.
What To Do?
What can be done about excessive
regulation, not supported by scientific
evidence, yet imposing tremendous costs on
the economy, destroying jobs, and
discouraging entrepreneurs and small
business enterprises? Somehow -- to use
President Clinton's words -- the pubfic must
be made to "feel the pain." In other words,
there is hope -- provided the public can be
educated about the cause-and-effect
relationship between overregulation and the
loss of jobs and lower standards of living.
One way to do this i~ by having
people pay directly for what is judged to
promote environmental quality. Within the
next few years, motorists will face not only
higher gasoline taxes but also greatly
increased costs in monitoring car emissions
and in recharging or replacing air-
conditioning systems. Perhaps these and
similar instances of direct, out-of-pocket
costs will lead to a kind of consumer
revolution, which in turn can lead to an
overhaul and rationalization of our whole
system of environmental regulation.
And who will be our allies in this
enterprise? The greatest support may come
from small business, particularly from start-
up companies, and from labor unions who
are beginning to understand why productive
jobs are being lost and why the economic
engine is no longer running at full speed
-- and from citizens acting through local
government, through counties and cities.
Local governments are feeling the
burden of ever-growing federal regulation.
Last September, Ohio's major cities
released a cost report on environmental
compliance: more than $3 billion for the
next decade. Columbus, for example, spent
10.6 percent of its 1991 budget on
compliance and expects this figure to rise
to 23 percent by the year 2000. The report
identified 14 specific environmental areas
covered by legislation and subject to regula-
tion. It also noted that during the past four
years alone ]~PA worked on 1219
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regulations of which 665 were new --
proposed rules that required study and
comments. Leaders in other states are also
lodging complaints -- for example, the
Southern Municipal Conference,
representing fourteen states. The National
League of Cities, in endorsing these
grassroots complaints of the cities, may be
successful in forcing action at the national
level.
Perhaps these state and local activists
will get behind the outstanding legislation
on risk assessment that Senators Johnston,
Moynihan and others are offering to rectify
this situation.
Conclusion
Will stiff, super-clean standards
really generate benefits in terms of human
health? Science tells us that there is little
if any additional return from the complete
elimination of "hazards" such as pesticides,
asbestos, dioxin, radon and various air
pollutants. Most gains come from
eliminating the initial 90 percent -- which
is generally slmp]e and cheap -- rather than
from eliminating the last one percent--
which is frightfully difficult, in many cases
virtually impossible, and in ahnost all
instances extremely costly. The goal of zero
risk is not only unrealistic, but unattainable
and infinitely costly.
The real questions are -- or should
be: Do we need more stringent environmen-
tal controls for better human health and
ecological values? Are the additional
benefits worth the additional cost? How
clean is clean? The answers to these
questions are not easy to come by and
require a lot of scientific data and
understanding. They cannot -- and should
not--be settled by emotional appeals and
activist rhetoric. Society can no longer
afford to waste resources on a large scale.
The purpose of environmental
regulation is not -- and should not be -- to
"create jobs." Its announced purpose is to
improve human health and protect
ecological values. But once past the initial
level, further clean-up often throws off tittle
in the way of health benefits. Households
could take the $1500 per year and spend
it better on food and shelter and proper
medical care. It is well-recognized that
'~vealthier makes healthier." And cleaner,
too.
If human health and a better
standard of living are the major societal
objectives, then we want productive
economic growth, not unproductive make-
work jobs based on excessive regulation.
To echo the principal recommendation of
the Ohio municipalities: "Environmental
legislation and resulting regulations should
be formulated on a well-founded, peer-
reviewed scientific basis."
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