Tobacco Documents Online

DATE TIME NETWORK PROGRAM June 27, 1996 I0:00-ii:00 PM (ET) ABC-TV Peter Jennings Reporting Transcript Peter Jennings, host : Good evening and welcome. This hour is about cigarettes an~ the people who make them. Which means it is about the only product that you can buy virtually anywhere which, when used as directed, kills more than four hundred thousand Americans every year. It actually only costs pennies to make one of these, and every year the five major cigarette makers make several billion dollars in profits. Tonight we're going to show you how the tobacco companies continue to prosper, despite the damage these things do, and despite the increased pressure the companies are under from law-suits and proposed government regulation. This is a [eryvery smart industry that has been turnlng adversity into opportunity for the last thirty years. .Take a look a~ this. How would you like t? have a warning on everythlng you make, that says you wzll greatly reduce a serious risk to your health if you stop using the product now? You think this would drive the cigarette companies crazy? Actually, they helped to write the warning in 1965. And since then, every time someone sued the tobacco company for damages that cigarettes do, the company simply said: 'Hey, you were warned'. The companies are proud they have never, never lost a lawsuit to a smoker and had to pay a penny. Now take a look at this. (Visual: Television commercial for Marlboro cigarettes -- 'Come to where the flavor is, come to Marlboro country'.) Jennings: This is one of the classic cigarette commercials from the 1960"s, it was meant to convey the message that smoking made life better, and it was very effective. But in 1967 the government ordered that televisions stations should also run public service messages, including this one that advertised the dangers of smoking. They were also very effective and people began to smoke less. TI38900267

VIDEO MONITORING SERVICES OF.&JVlER1CA, INC Page: 2 (Visual: Gunfighter enters a saloon, doesn't use his gun, others in the saloon are too busy coughing from their cigarettes, gunfighter leaves saloon. 'Cigarettes, they're killers'.) Jennings: So what do the tobacco companies do? They agreed to a total ban on televised cigarette advertising, which meant, of course, stations didn't have to run those pesky messages that said smoking could kill you. And one year later, cigarette sales in America were up. No one should underestimate the tobacco industry's determination to win. This hour is about an industry that never says die. (Theme music.) Afunouncer: Peter Jennings Reporting. 'Never Say Die, The Cigarette Companies Keep On Winning.' (Commercial break.) I-low Jennings: Some full disclosure to begin with. I started smoking when I was thirteen, and I remember very clearly, how'we guys thought it was the cool thing to do. It never occurred to us for a second that we were ever going to become addicted. I didn't quit for almost thirty years, and today, we know that I was fairly typical. Most regular smokers in the United States, about eight out of ten, begin to smoke when they are younger than eighteen. In other words, when they are children. And that is why there is such a battle right now between those who want to regulate the tobacco companies in the name of children, and the companies who insist that smoking is an adult choice. How they begin and when they begin is pretty well documented by now. Last month ABC News conducted its own poll of smokers under eighteen, and we found roughly the same pattern that researchers have been finding for more than twenty years. Zack (Age 16): I mean I can quit cigarettes anytime, but it's just that it's hard to because like all my friends smoke you know, everyone smokes. Matt (Age 16): I started smoking when I was like thirteen. Jennings: The average age for beginning smokers was twelve and a half years old. And on average, most who smoked had tried to quit by the age of fourteen. By the time they were fifteen or older, nearly half the young smokers said they were hooked. Brian (Age 16): I just tried to stop cold turkey, and I T138900288

VIDEO MONITORING SERVICES OF AMERICA, INC Page: 3 was, like, ~ don't feel like smoking ~?ymore, it's a dirty habit, put it down. It lasted maybe fzve to seven days, something like that. Unidentified #i (Teenager): 'Cause I need a cigarette when I wake up every day, after I eat, certain times. Unidentified #2 (Teenager): You're used to a cigarette you know, and being social, and everybody's smoking except for you and you're like: oh geez, I need a cigarette, you know. Jennings: Seventy-five percent of the young smokers we spoke to say they wish they'd never started smoking in the first place. The government tells us that one in three of them will die of smoking-related diseases. Brian: smoker, didn' t old. Back then, like if I knew I was gonna become a avid I would've like never picked up you know. But I look at it that way when I was like twelve years Dr. David Kessler (Commissioner, FDA): Ask a smoker when he or she began, and you're going to hear the tale of the child. It really is a pediatric disease. Jennings: Dr. David Kessler is commissioner of the Food and Drug Administration, the FDA. He was appointed by a Republican President and now he speaks for the Clinton Administration in a battle with the tobacco industry about the advertising and the selling of cigarettes to minors. Do you believe that the tobacco companies want to attract smokers under eighteen? Kessler: In some ways, Peter, they have to. Evidence is very clear, that smoking begins in children in adolescence, and it's children and adolescents who are becoming addicted. Jennings: When Dr. Kessler and other critics accuse the tobacco companies of targeting children, they point specifically to the character named Joe Camel. It is an accusation that RJ Reynolds, the company behind Camel cigarettes, unequivocally denies. So does Diane Burroughs. In the early 1980's she was a market researcher for Reynolds, her work led to the creation of Joe Camel. Why do you think so many people out here have the notion that RJ Reynolds knew that Joe Camel would appeal to people under eighteen? Diane Burroughs (Market Researcher, RJ Reynolds):. I suppose they think everything in tobacco is a devlous plot. Jennings: And there's nothing to that at all. TI38900269

VI~E]3 MoNri'ORING SERVICES OF AMERICA, INC Page: Burroughs: There are no devious plots, to attract anyone under eighteen. Jennings: Why do you think RJ Reynolds cartoon character? there were settled on a no plans Burroughs: I don't think of Joe Camel as a cartoon. Jennings: Oh really? Burroughs: No. I think of Joe Camel as a person, a person who exhibits a certain way of looking at life, a certain way -- a lifestyle if you will, and the benefit of a Camel is one that's kind of fun. JerLnings: In 1984, Reynolds best-selling cigarette Winston was losing market share to its competitor Marlboro. Burroughs spent two years trying to figure out how Reynolds could attract more young beginning smokers, But she says her market research focused exclusively on eighteen to twenty-four year-olds. How can you insure that the Joe Camel program for example, didn't appeal to people under eighteen? Burroughs: Well you really can't insure that kind of thing, unless you are gonna go out and do research and say: • Do you hate this ad', and Reynolds doesn't do research among anyone under eighteen, these days twenty-one. Jennings: Reynolds researchers did understand, as their own internal documents suggest, that most beginning smokers were eighteen or younger. Twenty years ago, in 1976, when Reynolds was preparing its business forecast, their researchers wrote: 'The fourteen to eighteen year-old group is an increasing segment of the smoking population. RJR must soon establish a successful new brand in this market'. And in 1994, seven years after the Joe Camel campaign was launched, a study released by the Federal Centers for Disease Control concluded that Camel's popularity had shot up among teenagers eighteen and under. When Reynolds pushed the Joe Camel image in the marketlplace, they focused on convenience stores, the place most underage smokers get their cigarettes. Mike Shaw, Amy Louts, and Sheryl Roundtree, were Reynolds sales reps. Was there ever any doubt in your mind that it was part of your job to sell cigarettes to teenagers? Mike Shaw (Former RJ Reynolds Employee): I knew it was part of my job to sell cigarettes to anyone that I could, not particularly or specifically teenagers, but to anyone, and that would include teenagers. Jennings: If you could push RJReynolds cigarettes to eighteen year-olds, would you do it? Would yoube expected TI38900270

V~DEO MOf~ITORING SERVICES OF AMI~ICA, INC ~: s to do it? Amy Louts (Former RJ Reynolds Employee) : Jennings : Sixteen year-olds? Yes. Louts: Yes. Jennings: Fifteen? Louts: I would say teenagers, thirteen and up. Jennings: Thirteen and up. In other words, do you believe that your company expected you to push the product all the way down to thirteen year-olds? Louts: Not directly one-on-one, byway of promotion and advertising, yes. Not direct sales. Not from me to you, or from me to a thirteen year-old, but by using the promotional items, by putting the T-shirts there, you've removed yourself from the situation and then let the sale happen. Jennings: In two internal memos written in 1990, two Reynolds division managers tell their reps to identify stores near high schools, in an effort to target young adults. A few months later, after one of these memos was leaked to the press, its author issued a retraction, to high telling his staff: 'I was wrong with my reference school aged young adults' But were you asked to go and survey consumers ~he high schools for example? towards, Louts: Yes. Jennings: Did you ever ask why close to high schools? Louts: I didn't ask why, I knew. I mean I think ~here's so much that goes on, that it's just an understandlng, you know, we know. Sheryl Roundtree very clear and-- Louts: (Former RJ Reynolds Employee): was real clear. That was Roundtree: --that we were to target outlets near colleges and high school, that was very clear. Jennings: We asked for an interview with a senior Reynolds executive -- we were turned down. In a written response, Reynolds denied their sales force targeted high school students. It said the managers who wrote those two memos were disciplined, and that Joe Camel was not aimed at anyone under eighteen. TI38900271

VIDEO MONITORING SERVICES OF AMERICA, INC Page: 6 In 1994, the Federal Trade Commission investigating charges by anti-smoking groups, did decline to restrain Reynolds use of the Joe Camel ads, but the chairman of the commission released a strongly worded descent in which he wrote there was reason to believe that the Camel campaign induced underage people to start smoking. The Food and Drug Administration's Dr. Kessler. Well the tobacco company would say to Camel is designed for an eighteen year-old, eighteen year-old habits, he talks about pursuits. you: 'Look, Joe he pursues eighteen year-old Kessler: Eighteen year-olds and not seventeen year-olds? Jennings: That's not the issue perhaps. Kessler: Yes it is the issue. Tell me how you design an advertising campaign that affects only eighteen year-olds. Jennings: Maybe you can't, but perfectly legitimate in saying: a legal product to advertise to is the tobacco company not 'I'm entitled, I'm selling eighteen year-olds. Kessler: And you say that if you're a tobacco company with a straight face. That an ad.like Joe Camel affects eighteen year-olds and not slxteen year-olds, or seventeen year-olds. Peter, I just don't think that's credible. Jennings: Last year, Dr. Kessler proposed a series of measures to regulate tobacco products. The FDA would like to limit cigarette advertising, and impose tighter restrictions on retailers who sell cigarettes in their stores. Kessler: Every medical organization, every scientific organization that's looked at it over the last decade has concluded that nigotine is an addictive substance. And it is our job to regulate those products. The law is very clear on that. Jennings: The tobacco companies have filed suit against the FDA challenging its right to regulate them. They also cl~im they regulate themselves. They do provide retailers with training videos like this one. (Visual: Training video -- to sell tobacco products to 'It's against the law for you minors'.) Jer~dings: They also provide stickers and signs warning that minors can't buy cigarettes. But sting operations like these, conducted by local media and law enforcement across the country, r@peatedly suggest are often ignored. Government studies minors are never asked for ID, and the up among people under eighteen. that those warnings show that most tobacco use is going TI38900272

Vt£1~0 MONtTOR|NG SERVICES OF AMERICA, INC Page 7 Unidentified #3 (Teenager): Some places will say to you like, they'll say: 'Do you have ID', and if you're like: no, I'm eighteen, they're like: 'Alright, but put them in your pocket before you walk out the store', something like that. Unidentified #4: (Teenager): Most of them are like, cigarettes and everything, they're directed for kids, you know. Unidentified #5 (Teenager): Definitely. Unidentified #6 (Teenager): Remember when you were little and you wanted a pony? What does the Marlboro man ride? Jennings: To test how serious the cigarette companies are about policing themselves, we examined a program called "Action Against Access", created by the Philip Morris Company. Their Marlboro brand is, by far, the most popular cigarette among smokers eighteen years and younger. Philip Morris launched "Action Against Access" just as the FDA was preparing to unveil its proposed regulations. In ads, identical to this one in Congressional Quarterly, read by the political establishment in Washington, Philip Morris said it would cut off merchandising fees to any retailer caught selling cigarettes to minors. Jeannie Wycomb (Anti-Smoking Activist): Well they failed to do what they said they were gonna do, they said they were gonna punish the retailers, and they haven't punished their retailers. Jennings: Jeannie Wycomb is an anti-smoking activist who works with law enforcement running compliance checks on shops around St. Paul, Minnesota. When she saw the "Action Against Access" ads, she wrote Philip Morris seventeen letters citing stores that had been caught selling cigarettes to minors, and she included the police case number for every one. Wycomb: And said congratulations, I'm glad you're taking this problem seriously, and now I'd like you to withhold these premium payments that you're making. Jennings: The company told Wycomb it needed to hear from a more official source. So Minnesota Attorney General Hubert Humphrey wrote Philip Morris, and confirmed that fifteen of those stores had indeed broken the law. When the attorney general of Minnesota writes to Philip Morris, or any other tobacco company and says 'We want you to do this to comply with what you agreed to do', what do they say to you? Hubert Humphrey (Attorney General, Minnesota): They've TI38900273

~ MONffORING SERVICES OF AMERICA, INC Pag~ s said: "Well we have contracts that we have to abide by, and this program was not in place at the time, we're hoping to have it sometime in the future'. Excuses after excuses. The fact is they're just not going to follow through, and we have no information that they're following through even to this date. Jennings: In October 1995, Philip Morris wrote to Mr. Humphrey and said they would only penalize retailers who violated the law after January 1996. When we wrote to Philip Morris ourselves last week, the company couldn't point to a single retailer they had penalized so far. They wrote us that now they were prepared to punish only repeat offenders. A year after the first "Action Against Access" promise appeared, they told us they were still gathering information from the fifty states. In order to understand the relationship between the tobacco companies and their retailers, two of our producers posed as investors, thinking of opening a deli and smoke shop in Louisville, Kentucky. They met with sales reps from each of the major tobacco companies in this empty storefront. In each case, we were warned to obey the law. Philip Morris representatives told us repeatedly not to sell to minors. Unidentified Philip Morris Representative: They come in and buy all the chips and all the pop and all the milkshakes, or whatever you might want to sell them, but you got to walk the fine line and just don't sell them the cigarettes. Jennings: The salesman for RJ Reynolds, which makes Camels told us to obey the law. Unidentified R J Reynolds Representative: We ~hape or form advocating any kind of sales to fact we're dead set against it. are in no Way minors, in Jennings: But listen to the Philip Morris rep, when we asked them about their "Action Against Access" program. Unidentified Philip Morris Representative: For us to go out and aggressively try to pull retailers off of our program, would not be a good business decision for us. We're trying to keep the government out of it, is the reason we're kind of pushing what we're doing, trying to keep Washington off our backs, we've got the FDArulings, all this other stuff. Jennings: Though a few moments later, he added this. Philip Morris Representative: It's also we feel the right thing to do. TI38900274

MONITORING SERVICES OF AMER~A, INC Page:. Jennings: We requested an interview with a senior manager at Philip Morris. Our request for an interview was turned down. But last month, under pressure from the White House, Philip Morris held a press conference in New York. Steven Parrish (Philip Morris): We offer this comprehensive plan in the hope that all sides in the debate will set aside the hostility of the past and work together. Jennings: This time Philip Morris said it would support federal legislation which would restrain how cigarettes are advertised, marketed and sold to young people, though at the moment there is no such legislation before the Congress. But Philip Morris said it would support such legislation only if Congress would agree that the Food and Drug Administration should never have a role in the regulation of tobacco products. Dr. Kessler is not impressed. Last month Philip Morris offered a very public compromise, why did you reject it? Kessler: It fell short. History's which the government is posed and ready to do and the companies say: 'Hold it, we have the Jennings: Dr. Kessler would like this to be filled with examples in something, solution'. the moment in history when the tobacco companies find themselves finally, unable to pre-empt or delay or step around government regulations. We'll have more in just a moment. (Commercial break.) Unidentified Congresswoman: It takes courage to go up against the tobacco industry, you not only get a lot of calls to your office, you also get a lot of pressure. Unidentified Congressman: It talks about a tobacco lobbyist, it talks about all the money he received to walk around here and convince you and convince me. Congressman Dick Durbin (Illinois): The tobacco lobby in this town, they are everywhere. They are undoubtedly watching this and writing down every word to use it against all of us. Jennings: Congressman Dick Durbin from Illinois, who has fought the tobacco industry often, understands its long reach in Washington. Durbin:. If you look closely on the podium behind where the President delivers the State of the Union Address, you'll see tobacco leaves carved in the wood. That is how deep the connection is between the tobacco production in this TI38900275

VIOEO MONITORING SERVICES OF AMERICA, |NC I:'age: 10 country and the politics of this country. Jennings: Today the bond between tobacco and the Republican party, now the majority in Congress, is stronger than ever. And as the FDA commissioner tries to regulate tobacco, he runs into enormous hostility. (Kessler speaking to Subcommittee: 'Excuse me, are you saying that the agency violated a court order here?') Je~ings: The House Subcommittee on Oversight in Investigations never mentioned tobacco, but it held hearings on the FDA last December. In fact, there have been no congressional hearings on tobacco since the Republicans took control of Congress, though the subcommittee has accused Dr. Kessler of mismanaging agency and even of cheating on his expense account. his He had not. The committee also accused Dr. Kessler's chief aid on tobacco, Mitch Zeller, of perjury, a charge he denies. Representative Joe Barton of Texas is chairman of the subcommittee that investigated Dr. Kessler and the FDA. Do you honestly believe that the leaking of information about Dr. Kessler and the accusations of Mr. Zeller on perjury have nothing whatsoever to do with their position on regulating tobacco? Representative Joe Barton (Texas): Let's see here. This is the Holy Bible, I'm a United Methodist, and I swear on everything that I hold dear to this country and to my family and to my God, that my concern about FDA reform and my responsibilities and duties have absolutely nothing to do whatsoever with tobacco. Jennings: But Dr. Kessler supporters do believe the real motive behind the recent FDA hearings is to cripple the agency so that Dr. Kessler cannot regulate tobacco. The tobacco industry has contributed significantly to most of the Republican members who investigated the FDA. When the tobacco companies give you money, what do you think they want from you? Barton: Well not many do, even according to the people that compile the list. Jennings: That's quite a number Joe, RJR gives you money, Brown & Williamson, Philip Morris, U.S_ Tobacco, the Tobacco Institute, Nabisco. Barton: I've never had anybody directly relating to tobacco issue in this office, so it's not an issue with me. It should be possible to have an intelligent policy debate on the merits on our review process in this country for food, drugs and medical devices. I have attempted to do that o TI38900276