Tobacco Documents Online

0 17) Phillip Morris Inter-office Correspondence, 3/31/81, Research Center Report on "Young Smokers - Prevalence, Trends, Implications, And Related Demographics" 18) Philip Morris Inter-office Correspondence, 9/17/81, Memo From Myron Johnson to Harry Daniel re "Teenage Smoking And The Federal Excise Tax on Cigarettes" 19) RJR Inter-office Correspondence From E.A. Horrigan re "Smoking And Health Briefing Document" Interview Qs&As For Tobacco Executives 20) Philip Morris Memo From Myron Johnson to Dr. Al Udow re "Still More on Trends in Cigarette Smoking Prevalence", Charts Attached re High School Smokers 21) Letter From Sylvester Stallone Agreeing to Feature Brown And Williamson Tobacco in 5 Films For a Fee of 500,000. 22) RJR Statement "We Don't Advertise to Children" 23) Philip Morris Memo From A1 Udow to J.J. Morgan re "Why People Start to Smoke" 24) 27th October, 1976, "Cigarette Smoking And Casual Relationships" 25) Lorillard Memo From R.E. Smith to F. J. Schultz re "Lowered Nicotine Project", 11/9/76 26) Philip Morris "Report on Policy Aspects of The Smoking And Health Situation in The USA", October 1964 27) R.B. Griffin, Report to The Executive Committee 28) Brown & Williamson, 10/25/88, Smoking And Health Research 29) Brown & Williamson Memo From Mick Mcgraw re "Nicotine Delivery Systems", 4/24/92 30) Brown & Williamson Report "B&Ws Public Issue Environment" 31) Press Clippings From BAT, 1960 & 1961 32) Butler Research Associates Memo From Shirley Witkins And Bud Roper to Steve Fountaine re "Suggestions For Research to Answer Questions Raised on Philip Morris Benchmark Study" 00 Page 9 of 17 N) w ~ ~ ~ Cn Ln

64) Eimo Roper And Associates "Volume I, a Study of Attitudes Toward Cigarette Smoking And Different Types of Cigarettes" January, 1959 65) The American Tobacco Company "Suggestions For Industry Public Relations Policy", June 18, 1959 66) • Philip Morris Memo From Dunn, Johnston, et al. to P.A. Eichorn Replans For 1972, 9/8/71 67) Philip Morris Memo From T.S. Osdene to File re "Recommendations For Long-term Plan For Ctr; 11/13/78 68) Lorillard Memo From Richard E. Smith to Ave, Flinn, And Spears re "Goal to Determine The Minimum Level of Nicotine That Will Allow Continued Smoking" 2/13/80 69) Leonard Zahn And Associates Letter to Henry Tom From L.S.Z. 70) Letter From F.H. Christopher, Jr. July 3, 1974 re "What Causes Smokers to Select Their First Brand of Cigarette 71) Report of Conference by C.S. Muije From Louisville Kentucky on September 16,1974 re Young Smokers 72) B&W Minnesota-Memo 73) Memo From JCB Ehringhaus to William Kloepfer re The Tobacco Institutes Project re Teenage Smoking, August 2,1979 74) Philip Morris Memo From Myron Johnston to R.B. Seligman re "The Decline in The Rate of Growth of Marlboro Red", May 21, 1975 F. Tobacco Company Representatives' Statements I have reviewed the transcript of the 1994 Congressional Hearing on Tobacco entitled: "Regulation on Tobacco Products", and the April 14, 1994 witness testimonies submitted by the tobacco companies to Congress as follows: 1) William Campbell, President & CEO, Philip Morris USA 2) James J. Johnston, Chairman and CEO, RJR 3) Joseph Taddeo, President, U.S. Tobacco Company 4) Andrew H. Tisch, Chairman and CEO, Lorillard Tobacco 5) Edward A. Horrigan, Chairman and CEO, Liggett Group 6) Thomas E. Sandefur, Chairman and CEO, Brown and Williamson 7) Donald S. Johnston, President and CEO, American Tobacco Page 12 of 17

0 addiction. Below is a list of medical and scientific articles and studies I have recently reviewed in connection with this case: 1) "Smoking and Health" - A Report of the Advisory Committee to the Surgeon General of the Public Health Service (1964). 2) "The Health Consequences of Smoking" - A Report of the Surgeon General (1988). 3) "Commentary on Nicotine IS/IS NOT Addictive Debate", By Jaffe J., Psychopharmacology, Vol. 117 (No. 1)(January 1995). 4) "Nomenclature and Classification of Drug and Alcohol related problems: a WHO memorandum", Bulletin of the World Health Organization, Vol. 59 (1981). 5) "WHO Expert Committee on Addiction Producing Drugs - Thirteenth Report", World Health Organization Technical Report Series No. 273 (1964). 6) "Drug Dependence: its Significance and Characteristics", By Eddy N., Halbach H., Isbell H., and Seevers M., in Bulletin of the World Health Organization, Vol. 32, No. 5(1965). 7) "Perceived Risks of Heart Disease and Cancer Among Cigarette Smokers", By Ayanian J. and Cleary P., JAMA (March 17, 1999). 8) "The Scientific Case that Nicotine is Addictive", By Stolerman I. and Jarvis M., Psychopharmacology Vol. 117, No. 1 (January 1995). 9) "Is Nicotine More Addictive than Cocaine", By Henningfield J., Cohen C., and Slade J., British Journal of Addiction Vol. 86, No. 5(1991). 10) "The Nicotine Addiction Trap: a 40 year Sentence for Four Cigarettes" by Russell M_, British Journal of Addiction, Vol. 85, No. 2(1990). 11) Hearings before the Subcommittee on Health and the Environment of the Committee on Energy and Commerce, House of Representative (103~d Congress, 2"d Session) - Testimony of David A. Kessler, taken on March 25, 1994 and June-21, 1994, including the "Statement on Page 6 of 17

4. The Medical Community and General Public's Knowl_edge That Tobacco and Cigarette Smokina Causes Luna Cancer I received my medical degree in 1946. At that time it was not universally accepted in the medical community nor set out in the medical literature that smoking caused cancer. There was no appreciation in the general medical community that cigarettes were physically addictive. The first studies identifying the causal link between tobacco and lung cancer were published beginning in 1950, including studies authored by Dr. Richard Doll. The evidence continued to mount and more studies and reports confirmed that smoking cigarettes was the primary cause of lung cancer. In 1977, as Director of the National Cancer Institute, I was asked by Health, Education and Welfare Secretary Joseph Califano to brief him on the National Cancer Program, and in the course of my briefing I brought to his attention the articles by Richard Doll and others on the health impacts of smoking. These studies and reports clearly demonstrated that cigarette smoking causes lung cancer, as well as other diseases, and the National Institutes of Health instituted further studies to confirm these findings and programs to educate the general public about the dangers of tobacco and to discourage them from smoking cigarettes. Until the above mentioned studies were published, the general medical community was not aware that cigarette smoking was carcinogenic. Neither did pathologists generally recognize the causal connection between smoking and cancer before this time. It did not become commonly accepted among the medical community until the late 1950's that cigarette smoking was carcinogenic. Up to this time, it was not common knowledge among the general public that cigarette smoking caused cancer. Indeed, warning labels were not placed on cigarette packages until after the 1964 U.S. Surgeon General's Report on Smoking and Health. Prior to the 1950's, a member of the general public would have no reason to believe that cigarette smoking caused cancer or other diseases. After I, as Director of the National Cancer Institute, first briefed HEW secretary Joseph Califano on the health impacts of smoking, in 1977, he requested additional briefings from me and other officials at NIH. As a result of these briefings, the Secretary ultimately decided to declare "war" on smoking, characterizing the cigarette as "public health enemy number one". Recognizing that warnings themselves were insufficient to address the serious health problems posed by smoking, he also banned smoking in all HEW buildings, except in designated areas, and he mounted a campaign to strengthen anti-smoking efforts by the Page 15 of 17

• 1970's, although the medical profession did not appreciate the addictive nature of smoking tobacco, the tobacco companies had conducted research on the subject and were aware of the addictive nature of the nicotine contained in tobacco products. The tobacco company documents reveal not only their awareness of tobacco's addictive quality, but their plans to capitalize on it and to conceal it from the general public and the medical community. I have reviewed studies and articles related to tobacco since the 1960's. At no time from the 1960's through the 1980's have I seen the tobacco companies, the Tobacco Institute, or the Council for Tobacco Research, publish any findings, studies, articles or reports warning or admitting that nicotine or tobacco products are addictive. In fact, the tobacco companies publicly asserted that tobacco was not addictive in their testimony before Congress during the "Hearings on Tobacco Regulation" in 1994. Having reviewed both the medical and scientific literature, and the internal tobacco company documents, and based on my personal experience with representatives of the tobacco industry during my tenure at the National Institute of Health, it is my opinion that the tobacco companies have withheld and negatively impacted the scientific literature on the health hazards of cigarettes. The failure to disclose information about the hazzards of smoking was unethical and detrimental to public health. The companies disseminated false advertising, concealed knowledge, stifled and misdirected the medical community's research on the carcinogenic and addictive properties of nicotine, and pressured and lobbied to keep information out of the public domain. These methods set back the public's and the scientific and medical community's knowledge and appreciation of the risks and dangers of tobacco. It would have been valuable and important to me as head of the National Cancer Institute and advisor to the President and to the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare to have been aware of the "confidential" documents describing the health hazards of smoking authored by the tobacco companies which have only recently become public. 0 i t Arthur C. Upton, M.D. Date: "I 'I `~- 3I Page 17 of 17

I have also reviewed the January 1998 Congressional Hearings on Tobacco, including the testimony of officers of the tobacco companies as follows: 1) Geoffrey Bible, Chairman and CEO Philip Morris Companies 2) Steven Goldstone, Chairman and CEO RJR Nabisco 3) Vincent Gierer, Jr. Chairman and CEO United States Tobacco 4) Laurence Tisch, Co-Chairman Loews Corporation 5) Nicholas Brooks, Chairman and CEO Brown and Williamson Tobacco Corporation While I was Director of the National Cancer Institute, I met with representatives of the tobacco companies about the health consequences of smoking. VI. OPINIONS AND BASES The following opinions are based on my education, training, personal experience, research, and review of the above listed materials. These opinions are based on a reasonable degree of scientific and medical probability. 1. Diagnosis: lung_cancer, advanced cardiovascular disease, and chronic obstructive nulmonary disease Based on my review of David McLean's medical records, David McLean's pathology reports, David McLean's Death Certificate, and slides of tissue samples taken from David McLean's thoracoscopy (lung surgery) and abdomen surgery, it is my opinion that David McLean, after a heavy smoking history of more than 50 years, died from carcinoma of the lung with widespread metastasises to his brain and other organs. He also suffered from advanced cardiovascular disease and chronic obstructive pulmonary disease. These conditions impaired Mr. McLean's capacity to function, required various levels of treatment, and caused differing levels of disability and pain over his life. All these health problems were caused by his addiction to cigarette smoking beginning in early adolescence at about the age of 12 or 13. 2. Mr. M T an's h ai h o obt ms werQ cauGed by 50 years of heavv smokina I have studied the causal connection between smoking and lung cancer as a medical doctor and pathologist. The first studies suggesting that cigarette smoking causes lung cancer began to be published in the 1950's. One of the ground breaking works establishing the causal connection between tobacco and lung cancer was authored by Sir Richard Doll, entitled "Smoking and Page 13 of 17

nation's public health establishment at large. These developments soon prompted Congressional hearings, at which the Secretary, was called upon to explain and justify his actions, and to which I and the Surgeon General usually accompanied him in support of his testimony. To counter the Secretary's anti-smoking efforts, the Tobacco Institute sent a delegation to my office at NIH, to persuade me that the evidence implicating smoking in the causation of cancer and other diseases.was inconclusive and that the Secretary's anti-smoking efforts were therefore unjustified. When I failed to accept their arguments, the members of the delegation informed me that they had "powerful friends in Congress" who would take away NCI's budget if the Secretary and I did not cease and desist. The meeting was also followed by intimidating telephone calls to my home at night from unidentified callers, which eventually became so distressing that we had our phone number changed to an unlisted number. 5. ea Knowledge of h Add iv ob r of Toba o ~ OMM f and General Public's When I was trained as a doctor in the forties and as a practicing doctor into the sixties and seventies, I was not aware that tobacco is an addictive substance. I did not advise Secretary Califano that smoking should be treated as an addictive drug like cocaine and heroin for example. Before 1964, the World Health Organization described cigarette smoking as a "habit." In 1965, the World Health Organization redefined cigarette smoking as an addiction. Up until 1964, the medical community considered smoking only a "habit", as evidenced by the U.S. Surgeon General's Report in 1964, and many in the medical community continued to debate whether or not the nicotine in tobacco was "addictive" through the 1960's and 1970's. It was not until 1988 that the U.S. Surgeon General's Report was published identifying smoking as addictive, as opposed to merely habitual behavior. When I was Director of the National Cancer Institute and working with the Secretary of HEW, Joseph Califano in the 1960's, I myself did not appreciate that tobacco was physically addictive, as contrasted with merely habit forming, and I did not recommend that Secretary Califano take action to require that the warning include the addictive property of tobacco. 6. Tobacco Companies' Knowledge of Addiction Through my review of the internal studies, memoranda, and reports, as well as the published statements and advertisements of the tqbacco companies, it is my opinion that in the 1960's and Page 16 of 17