Tobacco Documents Online

In this 1990 speech by John Dollison (Vice President of Philip Morris' International Corporate Affairs Department) before a marketing conference, Dollison clearly describes public health as PM's opponent in a "guerilla war. " He describes public health officials as "snipers" who have "laid their minefields," and even makes biblical references to the fight: "Our opponents sit and wait, watching our every move, every new product and every new marketing project... Like the proverbial lion in the Bible, they are poised to devour us whenever we give them an opportunity, and sometimes even when we don't....Today we are engaged in a "war" against our industry... The kind of war we are engaged in is a guerrilla war.. the most difficult kind of all. Our enemy might not be invisible but it often seems that way. Their tactics are to hit and run and then hit again...They have positioned their snipers and laid their minefields it is the job of Corporate Affairs to discover where these threats are,and to warn you."

In a bold and revealing description of PM's under-the-radar corporate tactics, Dollison boasts about how PM created and completely controlled a supposedly "independent" coalition called "The Committee for Freedom of Commercial Expression" in Denmark to oppose a tobacco ad ban directive. Dollison boasts about how this coalition was able to convince no less than the Danish Ministry of Health into opposing a tobacco ad ban, lists other countries where PM has used this secret tactic, and proposes that PM expand this tactic further to other countries:

"In Denmark, for example, we have created a coalition known (in English) as the Committee for Freedom of Commercial Expression...we were able to recruit more than 50 prominent Danes...The group has conducted media briefings, participated in debates, and written articles and conducted and publicized an opinion poll...Members of Government (including the Minister of Health) now regularly...consult with coalition members...The coalition was instrumental in securing the commitment and public declaration of the Minister Of Health to oppose an advertising ban...And, finally, the functioning of the coalition is managed at arms length - distanced from P.M., although completely controlled by P.M....We have set up similar coalitions in Holland, New Zealand and EEC for sport. Many more are required..."

Dollison also describes how voluntary, self-imposed "advertising codes" (which, he admits, make no more concessions than PM has already made in most countries in which they operate) help deflect further restrictions on tobacco advertising:

"What I am talking about is a list of self-imposed [advertising] constraints which will enable us to more plausibly claim the high moral ground in future controversies and, not least, to more easily manage and possible triumph in future crises...Such a regime, effectively implemented and sold, I believe, have the inestimable advantage of repositioning Philip Morris in the world-wide debate over the rights and wrongs of tobacco. It would gain us support from those with no affection for our enemies but who also harbour deep suspicion of our motives and methods. It would give us just that little bit more breathing space, just that little bit more room to maneuver. Believe me, we need it."

This draft letter appears to be written by an R.J. Reynolds (RJR) employee, as it refers to "our coupons,"and "our younger smokers," and mentions RJR brands. While it reads like something from a marketing department employee, the writer signed the letter with the title "Elec. Tech. #72111" The writer suggests RJR produce decals with cigarette brand logos on them that would be "targeted to our younger smokers" who "might place them on notebooks, lockers, purses, jackets or clothing items...". The writer says,

"It is important that we develope [sic] either a series of 10 different color schemes or 10 different decals for each brand targeted to our younger smokers since they usually purchase one pack at a time...[E]ach carton will have a complete series of decals and be much more attractive to our younger smokers."

The writer suggests targeting both young smokers and non-smokers to increase RJR's market share:

"The youth of this day are very decal conscious and logo orientated [sic]; Therefore, by targeting our younger smokers and non-smokers with quality decals, we should be able to capture a larger share of that fast-growing market."

A search on the writer's name failed to reveal more information about who this employee was or what department he actually worked in, but a search of the adjacent Bates numbers proved quite revealing. An adjacent Bates number-document (507747289) is a memo from RJR's Director of Special Markets (T.C. Harris) revealing that Mr. Richardson formally presented his ideas to RJR's marketing department, praising Mr. Richardson for his ideas, promising to follow up on them and encouraging submission of these kinds of ideas from all RJR company employees:

"Last Friday Lynn Beasley and I attended a presentation by John Richardson in which he submitted his suggestions for a younger adult smoker targeted decal program. Not only did the presentation reflect a great deal of quality thought and preparation, it also contained some excellent ideas...I assure you that the program idea will be thoroughly evaluated and actively pursued...Doug, on behalf of the entire Marketing Department, I would like to thank you for soliciting this type of input from your people. By focusing the commitment of every employee of RJR against our key business issues, our chances of finding the answers are bound to increase." http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/cgi/getdoc?tid=isv28c00&fmt=pdf&ref=results

The above letter from Harris was written on 4 December 1989, just 2 months after Richardson made his suggestion to target youth with cigarette-brand decals. This dispels the notion that Mr. Richardson might have been a "rogue employee" acting without approval, and shows that the corporate culture at RJR encouraged all employees to think of, and suggest new ways to target youth.

This report on the effects of cigarette advertising on consumer behavior was commissioned by Imperial Tobacco and RJR-Macdonald of Canada. It was written by Joel B. Cohen, Ph.D. (Distinguished Service Professor of Marketing, Adjunct Professor of Anthropology and Director, Center for Consumer Research) of the University of Florida. In the report, Dr. Cohen disputes the industry's oft-repeated claim that its advertising is aimed only at getting existing adult smokers to switch brands. Cohen says,

"The need to replace smokers who either quit or are casualties of smoking has led many to question cigarette industry claims that their advertising is intended primarily to encourage brand switching...the U.S. evidence indicates that the tobacco industry spends about $9 per person per day for advertising and promotion, and only 10% of smokers switch brands in an average year...Accordingly, such expenditure--purely for brand switching--would seem to be difficult to justify economically...." [Pages 3-4] In Section 1.40 Cohen poses the question, "Couldn't the advertising only make the particular cigarette attractive for existing smokers?" Response: "The answer is essentially 'No,'" and explains why this is the case.

Cohen ridicules the industry's claim that cigarette advertising would only appeal to adults who already smoke, saying,

"Nonsmokers, and particularly adolescents, cannot be made immune to advertising effects...[the industry's argument] is as if a magic curtain could be put in place to shield children, teenagers and others from the impact of these appeals. No convincing theoretical argument or empirical evidence has yet been introduced by the cigarette industry to demonstrate that otherwise effective advertising is mysteriously ineffective for adolescents who have yet to become smokers. Until such evidence is provided, this proposition cannot be taken seriously." [Page 8]

Thus it appears that RJR-Macdonald and Imperial hired an advertising expert who concluded that the companies' most common arguments about the reach and effects of their advertising cannot not possibly be true.

This confidential 1993 Philip Morris memo shows that TIME magazine entered into an agreement with Philip Morris to merge its customer database with PM's smoker database to help PM sell cigarettes. An objective "was to create 'smoker' editions of TIME's publications" and to help PM "speak to smokers in innovative and highly targeted ways."

Selective binding is a computerized, database-driven binding process allows publishers to break out regional or interest-specific advertising and/or editorial editions of a given issue. Presumably, such a system would enable TIME to remove cigarette ads from issues of the magazine going to schools, however apparently TIME has not done this, as many issues of the magazine arriving at school libraries continue to carry cigarette advertisements. Photos of TIME magazine issues carrying tobacco ads that were mailed to schools can be seen at http://whyquit.com/ads/Time_Warner.html

TIME Inc., is the publisher of more than 125 magazines that carry tobacco ads, and five that don't.

Recently, the American Legacy Foundation (the organization set up by the 1998 Master Settlement Agreement to fight tobacco use) held a $500 a plate award dinner where it presented TIME magazine with a prestigious tobacco control award for “helping the American Legacy Foundation reach a national audience in support of the foundation’s educational and awareness campaigns.”

Several public health physicians strongly criticized Legacy's giving TIME this award in an article published in the March 4, 2005 edition of The Cancer Letter. [Legacy Foundation Calls Time Inc. "Hero" Of Tobacco Control, But Activists See Villain, By Kirsten Boyd Goldberg, The Cancer Letter, March 4, 2005 (Vol. 31 No. 9)www.cancerletter.com ] Legacy was also criticized for its action by the American Council on Science and Health in a February 4 editorial entitled, "TIME is not on our side," by Rivka Weiser, who said,

"While Time, Inc. has taken some steps to support tobacco control, it is shocking that the corporation is being given a high-profile award for its advancement of the cause. Time, Inc.’s four most highly-circulated magazines -TIME (its flagship magazine), Family Circle, People, and Sports Illustrated - which reach a paid circulation of over 15 million readers combined (and therefore bring in much advertising revenue), all promote smoking through their cigarette ads." http://www.acsh.org/factsfears/newsID.510/news_detail.asp

This Philip Morris (PM) document from the marketing department of PM's Lausanne, Switzerland office discusses how to market Chesterfield cigarettes in West Africa. The document states that an overall objective is "To gain a very young audience" for the brand, but then states the "prime prospect" is 18 to 30 years. The "source of [sales] volume" is to be "new smokers." In discussing what "key consumer benefit" of the cigarette PM should advertised, the author states quite frankly that there is no tangible benefit to the cigarette, so the advertising must rely on "lifestyle" imagery to sell the brand:

"There is no tangible product plus, except a possible price advantage...So, the key consumer benefit must be purely psychological and projected through the lifestyle of the people featured in the advertising. Chesterfield is the famous American cigarette sole internationally, and now available in your country for the first time."