Tobacco Documents Online

Shows that Philip Morris intended to get around a total ban on advertising in Singapore by introducing a wine cooler (made by its winery in Australia) with the same brand name as the cigarette they wanted to introduce in that country.

This document (from Philip Morris' files) shows how the global tobacco industry fights efforts to restrict the advertising of tobacco products. The report was produced by Infotab (the international information clearinghouse and monitoring organization formed by the major multinational tobacco companies around the late 1970s-early 1980s to help confront the global anti-tobacco movement). The report discusses the weakness and lack of credibility of the global tobacco industry's main argument against advertising bans, namely the claim that cigarette advertising doesn't increase total market size, but just causes existing smokers to switch brands.

The document shows that this argument directly contradicts the truth. The reality, according to this report, is that the total cigarette market grows in developing countries in accordance with the amount of money the tobacco companies spend to advertise their products in those countries.

The author of the report, listed as Ron Tully (who served as Documentation Manager of Information Services at Infotab in 1989) grapples with how the industry can persist with such an incredible argument when the facts don't support their case:

"The general argumentation used by the industry is beginning to look extremely weak and the presentation of these arguments to the 'public' and 'opinion formers' needs to be examined in detail.

This is best illustrated in the advertising bans and consumption argument, where the industry argues that 'advertising does not increase total market size', yet we are presented with a dilemma in developing markets where the total market is growing and advertising expenditure is rising accordingly. How can we reconcile this?"

Tully urges the industry to "consider new arguments." He laments the tobacco industry's lack of credibility, comparing it to the respect and authority enjoyed by the World Health Organization:

"The anti-smoking lobby continue to coordinate their data on smoking through the WHO, providing respectability and authority which industry data is unable to match."

He points out that the tobacco industry does not have the credibility to put forth new arguments against advertising bans in a believable manner, and recommends instead that any new data the industry accumulates in support of a new argument be put forth by "a respected independent international organization" which "should be used to publish the results."

To help stave off advertising bans, Tully suggests that the industry invest in "a high dollar spend, over a sustained period of time to innovative campaigns aimed at an ill-informed public," saying the industry must "[meet] the challenge of anti smoking campaigns with 'real money', which means matching the anti-smoking groups dollar for dollar..."

In his conclusion, Tully frames health authorities and tobacco control policies essentially as competitors to the tobacco industry, warning

"Just remember, we lose more to the bottom line each year in markets as a direct result of policies pushed by the anti-smoking fraternity. Can we afford to let these groups continue their propaganda unabated??"

In this 1990 speech by John Dollison (Vice President of Philip Morris' International Corporate Affairs Department) before a marketing conference, Dollison clearly describes public health as PM's opponent in a "guerilla war. " He describes public health officials as "snipers" who have "laid their minefields," and even makes biblical references to the fight: "Our opponents sit and wait, watching our every move, every new product and every new marketing project... Like the proverbial lion in the Bible, they are poised to devour us whenever we give them an opportunity, and sometimes even when we don't....Today we are engaged in a "war" against our industry... The kind of war we are engaged in is a guerrilla war.. the most difficult kind of all. Our enemy might not be invisible but it often seems that way. Their tactics are to hit and run and then hit again...They have positioned their snipers and laid their minefields it is the job of Corporate Affairs to discover where these threats are,and to warn you."

In a bold and revealing description of PM's under-the-radar corporate tactics, Dollison boasts about how PM created and completely controlled a supposedly "independent" coalition called "The Committee for Freedom of Commercial Expression" in Denmark to oppose a tobacco ad ban directive. Dollison boasts about how this coalition was able to convince no less than the Danish Ministry of Health into opposing a tobacco ad ban, lists other countries where PM has used this secret tactic, and proposes that PM expand this tactic further to other countries:

"In Denmark, for example, we have created a coalition known (in English) as the Committee for Freedom of Commercial Expression...we were able to recruit more than 50 prominent Danes...The group has conducted media briefings, participated in debates, and written articles and conducted and publicized an opinion poll...Members of Government (including the Minister of Health) now regularly...consult with coalition members...The coalition was instrumental in securing the commitment and public declaration of the Minister Of Health to oppose an advertising ban...And, finally, the functioning of the coalition is managed at arms length - distanced from P.M., although completely controlled by P.M....We have set up similar coalitions in Holland, New Zealand and EEC for sport. Many more are required..."

Dollison also describes how voluntary, self-imposed "advertising codes" (which, he admits, make no more concessions than PM has already made in most countries in which they operate) help deflect further restrictions on tobacco advertising:

"What I am talking about is a list of self-imposed [advertising] constraints which will enable us to more plausibly claim the high moral ground in future controversies and, not least, to more easily manage and possible triumph in future crises...Such a regime, effectively implemented and sold, I believe, have the inestimable advantage of repositioning Philip Morris in the world-wide debate over the rights and wrongs of tobacco. It would gain us support from those with no affection for our enemies but who also harbour deep suspicion of our motives and methods. It would give us just that little bit more breathing space, just that little bit more room to maneuver. Believe me, we need it."

This 187-page report is primarily a marketing plan, but contains sections that describe strategies Philip Morris (PM) planned to use in Switzerland from 1993-95 to defeat smoking restrictions, bans on cigarette advertising, increased cigarette taxes and more.

PM states its rationale for organizing smokers against public health efforts, stating (page -5910): "Smokers, as a consumer group, are today numerically as well as politically, a minority. Furthermore, they lack efficient and powerful organisation for the defence and preservation of their rights and interests. By consequence, it is mainly up to the industry to play this role."

The document also states PM's objective is to reverse existing public health gains against tobacco use: "stop the decline, and eventually start rebuilding the social acceptability of smokers and smoking in society." Other lofty objectives were to "Lead politicians to reorder their priorities...on and around the S&H [smoking and health] debate," and "Restore and strengthen smokers' confidence." Such corporate objectives were completely at odds with the goals of public health authorities.

PM further had as an ally J.P. Dewalder, a psychology professor at Lausanne University and Director of the Lausanne University Institute of Psychology. Dewalder sent a proposal to PM to do a research project in which he would study "the field of social engineering, mandates for lifestyle modifications...the dynamics of tolerant behaviour in society." PM also planned to use Dewaulder as a seemingly independent third party to organize international symposia and spread PM's corporate views on "socio-political themes like tolerance, freedom of speech, the nanny state, health and lifestyle engineering, etc."

This 1991 Philip Morris (PM) memo reveals a confidential discussion among PM executives and attorneys on Project Rainbow. (The document was marked privileged and confidential, but privilege has been removed and the document is now public.) Project Rainbow was a PM bargaining strategy to preserve the company's alleged preemption from personal injury liability claims that resulted from the warning labels the federal government required on cigarette packs in 1969 (pursuant to the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, or FCLAA).

Anticipating a possible adverse ruling in a major American court case occurring at that time (Cipollone), PM worked quickly to devise a strategy to achieve some measure of legal protection, while the company still had bargaining power to do so. If an adverse ruling resulted from Cipollone, or if Congress decided to place major advertising restrictions on the industry amid a social climate hostile to tobacco, PM's bargaining power and leverage would be greatly reduced. Thus PM hurriedly strategized a way to bargain with Congress to preserve a measure of immunity from liability claims.

The document contains several important lessons:

1) In negotiations, PM will concede measures that it perceives are "not very important to us [but are] probably quite important to our antagonists (e.g. bans on vending machines and sampling)."

2) Philip Morris was prepared in 1991, if necessary, to agree to a complete ban on all advertising and event sponsorship in the U.S. (provided it be phased in over a 5 year period) in return for something it wanted very badly -- a reaffirmation of preemption.

3) A benefit exists for the tobacco industry in a complete advertising ban. As the memo points out:

"...the elimination or severe restriction of cigarette advertising would diminish one of the principal focal points of our antagonists' criticism. This could lead to a diminution of the attacks against us and of the level of hostile rhetoric..."

4) When PM feels very threatened, it may concede far more than health advocates or legislators realize.

This situation in 1991 that gave rise to Project Rainbow roughly parallels PM's efforts today to enact FDA regulation, which are occurring coincidentally just as the largest lawsuit ever brought against the industry goes to court: the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) lawsuit.

PM has good reason to hustle now to try and enact FDA regulations on its own terms: a 2002 Wall Street Journal article revealed that the U.S. DOJ is likely to seek truly effective cigarette marketing restrictions in its lawsuit as compared to those in the presently-proposed FDA legislation. (That article is below.)

If PM loses the DOJ suit, the company will have far less leverage and bargaining power, and may be subjected to truly effective FDA regulations that are well beyond its comfort zone-- all the more reason for the company to push hard for FDA regulations now, and to try and drive that process, instead of waiting.

Perhaps with the DOJ suit looming, PM would be willing to concede to far more than advocates and legislators realize--far more now than at any other time in history.

In this 1977 paper, Don Hoel of the tobacco industry's law firm Shook Hardy and Bacon argues against laws to require health warning labels on cigarette packages. Hoel argues that the public is already well-informed about smoking and health claims, and says that warnings on labels "may mislead the public":

"A warning which lists specific diseases supposedly associated with cigarette smoking could be interpreted in two different ways by the public: that smoking alone causes these diseases or that smoking always causes these diseases. Since neither interpretations is supported by scientific evidence, the warnings my mislead the public..."

Hoel further argues against health warning labels, saying

"[R]egulations that would...require the placement of health warning labels on cigarette packages and in advertising are inadvisable for several reasons. Experience has demonstrated that the declared goals of such regulations (i.e., to educate the public and to reduce sales) will not be met. Satisfactory factual language for warning labels has not been found, and misleading wording can only confuse the public. Attempts to single out one industry for such restrictive treatment are discriminatory and unnecessary...For all these reasons, efforts to...implement helath warning labels are inappropriate limitations of the freedom of the individual and should be avoided."

This Philip Morris (PM) Regional Corporate Affairs plan lists as an objective to "Stop the decline in, and start re-building the social acceptability of smokers and smoking in society," thus revealing PM's internal corporate goal of reversing the gains made by public health authorities against tobacco use since the 1964 Surgeon General's report. PM worried that the EPA's looming classification of environmental tobacco smoke (ETS, or secondhand smoke) as a Class A carcinogen could cause "the ultimate threat" of "widespread smoking bans." In this report, PM also links public concern about secondhand smoke to the double threat of declining cigarette sales and reduced influence with policymakers: "We also risk consumption decreased due to shrinking possibilities to smoke at the workplace as well as a deterioration of the social acceptability of smokers and smoking. With the lack of social acceptability, we will face further problems in ally-building and government relations work."

A PM strategy was to shift discussion about ETS away from science, saying "The messages on ETS-related issues will focus on solutions and accommodation rather than on a scientific debate." PM also worked to influence indoor air quality and ventilation standards in part to "focus more on standards and regulations and less on scientific base work." The report also discusses the emergence of concern about "the primary issue" [smoking-induced illness] in less developed countries of Africa and Eastern Europe, saying the information had been "channeled effectively to the global media by our opponents."

The document reveals PM's internal corporate policies were squarely at odds with the goals of governments around the world to reduce tobacco use. It describes PM's vast activities to derail and minimize public policy attempts to regulate tobacco in Switzerland, Finland, Sweden, Norway, Austria, Poland, Hungary, Russia, Turkey, the Gulf Council Countries, Egypt, the Czech Republic and North Africa.