Tobacco Documents Online

This R.J. Reynolds (RJR) marketing document shows how cigarette companies exploit young people's need for "peer acceptance" to market cigarettes. This RJR document notes that young males are "extremely image sensitive and peer-approval oriented" and shows how they planned to leverage those psychological needs and tendencies to market a new brand of cigarette to young men in the military. Project DB was an attempt to increase RJR's military market share by introducing a new brand with imagery targeting young adult males' need for "peer acceptance" and "masculine user imagery." The brand was to appeal to "middle and lower income males" in the military and was to be sold at a price competitive with generic cigarettes.

The document refers to "younger adult males smokers" as "a lucrative source of business."

It repeatedly refers to young males' "needs for a sense of social belonging," "peer acceptance," "peer approval" and "masculine" or "virile imagery." Following is sample language from the marketing document that will give you an idea of how cigarette marketing minds view their young "prime prospects":

"DB's imagery should, therefore, project the male target smoker as a part of a group of male friends who share the same interests, lifestyles and attitudes. The group with whom the target associates emanates a special kinship and social rapport. They enjoy a group friendship which spans enough mutual experiences and private jokes for these men to know each other well and appreciate each other's company. Because of their collective history, they are completely at ease with each other...

They group reassures and reinforces its member's sense of social belonging and well-being. They talk and listen to each other about their everyday wins and losses; they back each other up; they have been through something together; they have a good time together and basically see the world the same way. While their individual personalities may be different, collectively they form a balanced personality, compensating for each other's shorts and strengths. This group reinforcement mechanism will be positioned in DB's favor, acting as a peer endorsement for selecting a good cigarette at a substantially lower price. The group recognizes the real value which DB offers."

This document is an excellent example of the misuse (perversion?) of psychology to sell a deadly, addictive product to young, low-income males who decided to serve the U.S. in the military.

This 1991 market research "creative presentation" was written for the Philip Morris tobacco company to market a new brand of cigarettes called "Battistoni" to young adults.

The research concludes that young adults of the time were heavily influenced by the rock star Madonna, craved control over their lives and suffered from "dimmed financial hopes." Building on these conclusions, the report states that this need for some sense of control over their world led young adults to create social action groups Greenpeace and Act Up.

The writers state that Philip Morris's advertising should "empower" young adults with "permission to smoke":

"In this era when smoking is under attack as dirty imposition on a just-say-no society, smokers need to be empowered with permission to smoke. For young adults, the single most powerful argument that can be made in defense of smoking is, 'no matter what others say, I am entitled to enjoy my pleasure because I chose it....' With the exception of Camel--who well understands defiance as part of the smoking experience--no cigarette offers smokers a way of saying, '______ off, it's my life and my pleasure....'

In a blantant attempt to disguise the addictive aspects of smoking, the advertising plan says the company must manipulate the "target" (young adult consumers) into believing that it is " 'correct' or socially appropriate to smoke," and that that the brand must "help him justify his belief that the decision to smoke is calculated, reflecting his own free will" and help him "avoid feeling that a cigarette company is inducing him to smoke with advertising that 'insults his intelligence,' telling him what to do.

The writer cites the Joe Camel campaign as a prime example of how a cigarette company can respond to the new anti-smoking environment in a defiant way that appeals to younger people:

"In the U.S.A., Camel's new positioning reflects an understanding of how to respond to the anti-smoking environment in a fresh, new way that engages the sympathies of a certain segment of young Americans. The Smooth Character's mischievous wink endorses a defiant juvenile delinquency that sums up a certain response to authority and growing up."

This paper offers insight into how advertising companies play on human frailties to boost sales of a deadly product. It also shows the part advertising companies have played in helping tobacco companies undermine public health messages about tobacco.

This 1987 marketing document reveals an ad agency testing various themes about secondhand smoke on behalf of the Philip Morris Tobacco Company (PM). The ads themselves show how PM intended to respond to the public health threat caused by secondhand smoke from their products, and how the company intended to manipulate the public's understanding of health information. PM's ad agency described its mission this way:

"The purpose of the overall [ad] project was to look for a way to stem the ever increasing tide of legal restrictions on smoking. Philip Morris is looking for a way to avoid further legislation to restrict where people can smoke...It was hoped that disarming the issue of secondary smoke would be a strong device to slow anti-smoking legislation."

A major theme of the ads was that "the case isn't proven" that secondhand tobacco smoke harms nonsmokers, ironically the same theme that the tobacco industry used for years to reassure smokers about primary smoking and keep them smoking.

The people who viewed these ads were surprisingly savvy about the tobacco industry's intent and methods. The first ad, entitled "Scientist," featured a woman pharmacologist dressed in a white lab coat telling the audience that the case hasn't been proven that secondhand smoke is harmful. Participants questioned the credibility of the woman, pointed out that she was a pharmacologist and not a doctor, and that the purpose of her wearing a white lab coat was to manipulate the audience into believing she was a legitimate authority figure.

Another ad, "Black Man/White Man," equated smoking restrictions with racism. Participants had a strong negative reaction to this analogy, and pointed out its absurdity:

"...most disagreed that smokers suffer from discrimination. Non-smokers were quick to voice the fact that smokers can go anywhere, they just may not be able to smoke: 'How have his rights been violated? He can go anywhere. That's a bunch of garbage... ' '...it was ridiculous, because they can go into a restaurant.' Although some credence was given to the rights of the smoker, non-smokers were not about to give up their own rights. '...one smoker in this room would infringe on the rights of seven people.' 'The way I feel about it, my sitting here and not smoking is not bothering anybody, but if I was sitting here smoking, I'd be bothering somebody. So, he (smoker) is the one who is infringing on the rights.'

General comments by the focus group leader indicate the participants' cynical attitude about secondhand smoke ads in general:

"From listening to all six groups, several points were brought up that seemed universal across smokers and non-smokers: 1. The use of the Phillip Morris name as a sponsor for the advertisements was a definite negative. Smokers and non-smokers alike tended to not believe the ads based on the use of the Philip Morris name. One respondent stated: "...I wouldn't trust it because it came from the manufacturer and it almost constitutes an ad for smoking... I don't trust what a cigarette manufacturer would tell me about it (second-hand smoke)."

The tester reported that some participants felt "all of the ads were thinly veiled attempts to get advertising for cigarette companies back on the air." He commented that many of the smokers tested were "guilty" smokers who wanted to quit smoking because they knew they were hurting themselves. The tester pointed out that "For this reason, smokers were not anxious to jump on the bandwagon that says secondhand smoke isn't harmful to non-smokers."

Handwritten comments on the document, ostensibly by cigarette company representative or proponent, trivialize the public health knowledge held by the participants and request a toning down of adjectives like "all" and "many" in describing the universality of feeling among them. An interesting example is at the bottom of Page 2041096511, where the tester wrote that "There was a basic DISBELIEF across all groups that secondhand smoke is not harmful." The handwritten comment next to this statement dismisses this important obervation out of hand, saying merely

"Tone down. Bothersome."

This landmark 6 page memo was written in 1980 by J. Kendrick Wells, III, Assistant General Counsel for production for litigation for the Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corporation (B&W). In it, Wells provides his legal analysis of a newly-proposed legal strategy emanating from B&W's parent company, British American Tobacco in London. The new strategy, known as "the Causation Concession," proposed that BAT (and hence B&W) "acknowledge the probability that smoking is harmful to a small percentage of heavy smokers."

The document contains the following stunning quote:

"If we admit that smoking is harmful to 'heavy' smokers, do we not admit that BAT has killed a lot of people each year for a very long time? Moreover, if the evidence we have today is not significantly different from the evidence we had five years ago, might it not be argued that we have been 'willfully' killing our customers for this long period? Aside from the catastrophic civil damage and governmental regulation which would flow from such an admission, I foresee serious criminal liability problems."

This one-page Tobacco Institute document is the text of a proposed print ad designed to confuse the public about the link between smoking and lung cancer. It was one of five ads drafted and tested by Ted Bates & Company, Inc. Advertising for the Tobacco Institute in the wake of the publication of the 1967 Surgeon General's Report, The Health Consequences of Smoking. A partial quote from the document:

"COMMUNISM CAUSES CANCER

You don't believe it? Well, wait a second. Let's use the same kind of statistical analysis the Public Health Service is using to 'prove' that cigarettes cause cancer. We'll use only statistical facts taken from bona fide population surveys.

1. Americans smoke a lot and some of them die of lung cancer. The Dutch smoke less than Americans, but more of them die of lung cancer.

2. The Australians smoke a lot and some of them die of lung cancer. The British smoke as much as the Australians, but twice as many British have lung cancer...

One statistical inference is very clear. In each pair of countries, the higher cancer rate is in the country closer to the Iron Curtain...By the same means that some public servants are using to indict cigarettes, we've just proved that Communism causes cancer. But you know and we know, Communism is not guilty. And nobody yet knows about cigarettes."

In this 1990 speech by John Dollison (Vice President of Philip Morris' International Corporate Affairs Department) before a marketing conference, Dollison clearly describes public health as PM's opponent in a "guerilla war. " He describes public health officials as "snipers" who have "laid their minefields," and even makes biblical references to the fight: "Our opponents sit and wait, watching our every move, every new product and every new marketing project... Like the proverbial lion in the Bible, they are poised to devour us whenever we give them an opportunity, and sometimes even when we don't....Today we are engaged in a "war" against our industry... The kind of war we are engaged in is a guerrilla war.. the most difficult kind of all. Our enemy might not be invisible but it often seems that way. Their tactics are to hit and run and then hit again...They have positioned their snipers and laid their minefields it is the job of Corporate Affairs to discover where these threats are,and to warn you."

In a bold and revealing description of PM's under-the-radar corporate tactics, Dollison boasts about how PM created and completely controlled a supposedly "independent" coalition called "The Committee for Freedom of Commercial Expression" in Denmark to oppose a tobacco ad ban directive. Dollison boasts about how this coalition was able to convince no less than the Danish Ministry of Health into opposing a tobacco ad ban, lists other countries where PM has used this secret tactic, and proposes that PM expand this tactic further to other countries:

"In Denmark, for example, we have created a coalition known (in English) as the Committee for Freedom of Commercial Expression...we were able to recruit more than 50 prominent Danes...The group has conducted media briefings, participated in debates, and written articles and conducted and publicized an opinion poll...Members of Government (including the Minister of Health) now regularly...consult with coalition members...The coalition was instrumental in securing the commitment and public declaration of the Minister Of Health to oppose an advertising ban...And, finally, the functioning of the coalition is managed at arms length - distanced from P.M., although completely controlled by P.M....We have set up similar coalitions in Holland, New Zealand and EEC for sport. Many more are required..."

Dollison also describes how voluntary, self-imposed "advertising codes" (which, he admits, make no more concessions than PM has already made in most countries in which they operate) help deflect further restrictions on tobacco advertising:

"What I am talking about is a list of self-imposed [advertising] constraints which will enable us to more plausibly claim the high moral ground in future controversies and, not least, to more easily manage and possible triumph in future crises...Such a regime, effectively implemented and sold, I believe, have the inestimable advantage of repositioning Philip Morris in the world-wide debate over the rights and wrongs of tobacco. It would gain us support from those with no affection for our enemies but who also harbour deep suspicion of our motives and methods. It would give us just that little bit more breathing space, just that little bit more room to maneuver. Believe me, we need it."

This fascinating marketing report for R.J. Reynolds plumbs the imagery that smokers have of various types of cigarettes and suggests that these images can be used to improve cigarette marketing and advertising. The introduction states the report's intended use:

"It is envisaged that the report will be used as a reference document when designing marketing programs in which various attribute 'components' must be blended with theme advertising into coherent sets of symbols that powerfully address consumer benefits..."

Statements of intended uses for the report are followed by the findings of focus group testing about cigarette imagery. As an example, the report discusses images smokers have of non-filter cigarettes:

"...smokers tend to regard non-filter products as 'traditional', strong, high tar cigarettes that are smoked by rugged, male, blue collar workers... Some smokers believe that non-filter cigarettes provide more pleasure than filter products. However, they also perceive that it is necessary to suffer unpleasant sensations to attain this pleasure. They believe, for example, that non-filter cigarettes are especially -- even unpleasantly -- strong and 'difficult to take'...They are tantamount to a test, and a demonstration, of virility. Smokers believe that 'you'd have to be a real man to handle a cigarette like that.' In turn, the blue collar image of non-filters derives in part from this image, since the more active and physically oriented worker is perceived, as "more of a real man" ....The use of these allegedly 'dangerous' products acts as a further test and demonstration of masculinity, since 'real men are unafraid of danger.'..."

From the section of the report about low tar cigarette imagery:

"Moderation behaviors in general -- including switching to low tar cigarettes -- are perceived as 'intelligent' behaviors. The benefit of low tar is not that it enables the smoker to appear intelligent, but rather that it enables him to 'be' intelligent -- that is, to act and feel intelligent."

The document implies that the tobacco industry caters to the images smokers already have of certain types of cigarettes, including the notion that some cigarettes are safer, and (whether this information is factually correct or not) trades on these notions.

Tobacco company documents about marketing to Hispanics for some reason reveal a much stronger concern with this group than any other that cigarette advertising aimed at men avoid depicting any nuances of homosexuality among the males in the ads. Great care is taken to focus-group test cigarette ads aimed at Hispanic males to "screen" the ads for images that could in any way be construed as being gay. This R. J. Reynolds memo is an example of such focus group testing:

"The purpose of these focus groups was to specifically address the issue of homosexuality that arose in previous focus groups. Because masculine imagery is an important element in the Hispanic campaign, revisions were made in the generic executions to change elements contributing to the homosexual image...All groups felt that the relationship between the models in the ads was perfectly natural and that no homosexuality could be implied...

The Mexican American ads successfully communicated the desired user imagery of a masculine, hard-working man...

...As was the case with Mexican-Americans, Puerto Rican smokers did not feel that the models could be regarded as homosexuals... Respondents also stated that it was unlikely that an advertising campaign would ever use a homosexual as a model...

Cuban smokers felt that the relationship between the three models in the ad was perfectly natural and that no homosexuality could be implied. The masculine imagery of the models was unquestioned...

The memo also shows how RJR also took some care to avoid overt depictions of construction sites in ads aimed at Hispanic males, and to associate the cigarette with a jobs that Hispanics perceive as more "upscale" than a construction job, such as a supervisor or architect.

This Philip Morris marketing document evaluates Marlboro advertising to find ways to make the imagery more appealing to young Saudi Arabian men. The idea was to find out what emotional, psychological and cultural needs and values young male Saudis have, and then determine how PM could exploit these in their cigarette advertising.

Page 39 of the document (Bates No. 2501055413) reports on reactions of Saudi men to a Marlboro ad that depicted three cowboys leaning on a fence and talking. The middle cowboy held coiled up rope in his hand. The report says, "Values disliked [about this ad] were...the ropes, which gave uncomfortable feeling -- ropes are used to bind people and hang them in Saudi Arabia."

The report also generalizes about Saudi men:

"There is a strong thread of violence just below the surface of the Arab personality, linked to ideas of vengeance and the protection of property (including women) but there is at the same time a desire to suppress this in favour of the more acceptable public face of masculinity, which is more calm and controlled."

The report defines values of Saudi men:

"The aspiration for them is very definitely to have friends who have status and wealth - and especially a big car. Belonging to such a peer group, even if you do not personally have the wealth, enables you to enjoy the reflected status. Cigarettes it seems are often shared, and within the peer group there is also pressure to smoke the same brand..."

A brief discussion of smoking and health in the document reveals a belief among Saudi men that certain types of cigarettes are "healthier" than others, and indicates that Saudi smokers may lack key information about smoking and health in general:

"There is ample evidence that smoking is regarded [among Saudis] as harmful, although this was not expressed directly, it was indirectly through the description of the personality of brands...For Marlboro Red smokers, if you smoke a light cigarette, then you are not strong/healthy enough to be able to smoke a strong cigarette. For Marlboro Lights smokers, if you smoke a strong cigarette, then you are stupid, ignorant."

While it is not surprising that a corporation would tailor its advertising to appeal to foreign cultures, by the time this document was written (1993) tobacco use had already long been labeled by authorities worldwide as a major public health problem. Despite this, PM continued to emphasize spreading the use of tobacco in foreign countries (as well as in the U.S.). It is also interesting to see how American cigarette companies scrutinize foreign cultures and pinpoint the emotional and psychological needs and held by people of these cultures to devise ways of better exploiting them.

This Tobacco Institute document shows how the tobacco industry scares the health care industry out of supporting increased taxes on cigarettes. The paper describes an ad campaign that portrays doctors as money-grubbing party-hounds and hospital firms as greedy profiteers. The tobacco industry also tries to make it appear as though tobacco is allied with some health care groups in opposing the tax. "Goals:

(1) To reduce the eagerness of the health care industry to support higher taxes on cigarettes.

(2) To start positioning the battle as people with white uniforms on one side vs. people with white uniforms + the tobacco industry and taxpayer groups on the other side, rather than white coats vs. TI alone."

The document describes an ad campaign that shows a "cork flying out of [a] champagne bottle suspended on an intravenous solution rack, with IV tube running into arm of a partially seen person lying in a hospital bed." The doctors are partying because they are going to start making more money. The rest of the ad claims that personal choices about health care will become more restricted and that some other health care groups (like dentists, chiropractors and therapists) join the tobacco industry in opposing the tax.

The industry's political strategy regarding tax measures is specifically aimed at confusing voters, as described by the following quotes from a related document (Bates No. TIOR0020292/0307) :

"Make our hat whiter, make their hat blacker. Through involvement in two health care initiatives, blur tobacco's relationship to the health care community."

and,

"Create an environment where there are some doctors on our side (of health care reform) and some doctors against us--make voters a little uneasy about who the good guys really are." http://www.tobaccoinstitute.com/getallimg.asp?DOCID=TIOR0020292/0307

In this 1977 paper, Don Hoel of the tobacco industry's law firm Shook Hardy and Bacon argues against laws to require health warning labels on cigarette packages. Hoel argues that the public is already well-informed about smoking and health claims, and says that warnings on labels "may mislead the public":

"A warning which lists specific diseases supposedly associated with cigarette smoking could be interpreted in two different ways by the public: that smoking alone causes these diseases or that smoking always causes these diseases. Since neither interpretations is supported by scientific evidence, the warnings my mislead the public..."

Hoel further argues against health warning labels, saying

"[R]egulations that would...require the placement of health warning labels on cigarette packages and in advertising are inadvisable for several reasons. Experience has demonstrated that the declared goals of such regulations (i.e., to educate the public and to reduce sales) will not be met. Satisfactory factual language for warning labels has not been found, and misleading wording can only confuse the public. Attempts to single out one industry for such restrictive treatment are discriminatory and unnecessary...For all these reasons, efforts to...implement helath warning labels are inappropriate limitations of the freedom of the individual and should be avoided."

This Tobacco Institute position paper was originally drafted by the Institute in 1967 during the debate over tar and nicotine labeling, but it applies strongly today to the idea of 'lights' and 'low-tar' labeling by the companies. The document is also important in light of Philip Morris' renewed interest in broadcasting TV advertisements. PM's use of the phrase "there is no safe cigarette" in its television ads without also stating that there "is no safer cigarette" is blatantly misleading.* As the document puts it

"It has been said that there is no risk of misleading and perhaps endangering the smoker by requiring tar and nicotine labeling, because of the warning of potential hazard. True, the smoker may be reminded that the cigarette is not absolutely safe. But he may well conclude that the cigarette is substantially safer. Indeed, that conclusion is virtually inescapable, since the very reason for the proposed labeling of tar and nicotine content is to encourage reduction of that content, thereby purportedly making the cigarette ‘safer’."

The document is stridently written and brimming with denials and obfuscations about the link between smoking and disease, as well as denials about the need to alert people to this link through appropriate labeling.

This R.J. Reynolds document shows how RJR uses advertising and special events to help increase the social acceptability of smoking. RJR planned to "Develop and execute advertising campaigns which show people in smoking-related social situations that heighten the social acceptability of smoking." The paper cites as examples RJR's VANTAGE "Pleasures" ad campaign [Samples of these ads are at http://roswell.tobaccodocuments.org/pollay/images/Vant03.01_display.jpg and http://roswell.tobaccodocuments.org/pollay/images/Vant01.13_display.jpg ]

...and ads for WINSTON and SALEM that show people smoking in social situations. RJR also planned to "capitalize on Special Events activities which reinforce smoking in public, highly visible environments and provide excellent political/thought leadership contacts to combat anti-smoking activists."

Cigarette companies insist that their advertising is aimed solely at reinforcing brand loyalty or getting people to change brands. This document shows that is not the case, that cigarette companies also have also used advertising to increase and reinforce the social acceptability of smoking and "combat" public health efforts to decrease smoking.

Philip Morris ran this advertisement in the Richmond News Leader on March 7, 1986. The ad attacks the Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone Company over its workplace smoking restrictions. The ad gives an idea of the intimidation tactics employers could expect from tobacco companies in retaliation for enacting smoking policies to protect the health of their workers. The ad says, "Never mind that world-class scientific minds have found no conclusive health risk to others from ambient smoke, information available to C&P for the asking." The tag line says the ad was "presented in the public interest" by Philip Morris USA.

Today Philip Morris' web site displays different point of view, saying:

"Public health officials have concluded that secondhand smoke from cigarettes causes disease, including lung cancer and heart disease, in non-smoking adults...We also believe that the conclusions of public health officials concerning environmental tobacco smoke are sufficient to warrant measures that regulate smoking in public places..." http://www.philipmorrisusa.com/en/health_issues/secondhand_smoke.asp

It remains unknown whether PM ever apologized to the Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone company for running this ad. The entire text of PM's ad is below. A clipping of the ad from the News Leader (showing it actually ran publicly) can be seen at http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/cgi/getdoc?tid=etk46e00&fmt=pdf&ref=results

This R.J. Reynolds marketing development report focuses on the "deeper" reasons that underly people's cigarette brand selections, describes the positive benefits people derive from smoking, how smoking facilitates social interaction, the symbolism of smoking, and how to market to both the problems and benefits of smoking. It lists the basic market segments for cigarettes, giving examples of each: "Traditional" (Pall Mall, Lucky Strike, L&M), "Virile" (Marlboro, Winston), "Coolness" (Salem, Kool, Newport), "Stylish" (Benson & Hedges, Virginia Slims), "Moderation" (Merit, Vantage, Tareyton), and "Concerned" (Kent, Carlton, Barclay). It further discusses the type of imagery used to sell these brands to each specific market segment, and uses the brand almost as a psychoanalytic tool to define the segment, for example: "Smokers of Moderation brands tend to use the act of smoking as a personal ritual. This ritual functions as a "security blanket." It gives them a means to occupy their time, something to do with their hands, something to do while talking, or just something to do when there is nothing else to do. Smokers of Moderation brands also benefit from smoking in the course of controlling their moods. They feel that it perks them up and gets them going -- and yet they also feel that it calms them down and relaxes them. They use smoking for a wide variety of functions, including thinking through a problem, and regaining their self-control in stressful situations."

This document is a must-read to better understand how the tobacco industry exploits human physical and emotional needs, and how they use psychology and imagery to market cigarettes to very specific target markets.

This 1987 Brown & Williamson document recommends a theme for an advertising campaign to sell a new brand of cigarettes to young adult, blue-collar males who are stuck in boring, repetitive union jobs. A pejorative description of the blue collar life pervades the piece, and forms a theme that is repeated throughout. The proposal reads:

"Roger Rhu...is depicted as the outdoors man. The fresh-water fisherman of mid-America and the prototypical blue-collar, larder-enhancing sport hunter. Primary images show him on location in the early morning, backgrounded by chums. Accompanied by hounds, sometimes in, on or hear his old 'pick up,' in the mist or midst of primeval America, readying for, or resting after, pursuit of his quarry."

When not in the field, "Roger Rhu" would tie flies, clean his weapons, pan-fry steelheads (fish) and "show the taxidermists a thing or two."

Overall, the proposed ad campaign has a strongly anti-social undercurrent and portrays American men as war-hungry, fawning over weapons, having Neanderthal tendencies and a need to escape from women in order to cope with them.

B&W says hunter "Roger" would take joy in the "paramilitary planning and execution of a womanless trek back into a somehow prehistoric, simple, meat-gathering past...He lights up a cigarette at those special times when contentment seems especially profound. A good drag talks louder about how he feels and what he enjoys than anything his family or friends can drag out of him."

The rationale for the ad campaign is as follows:

"...IN A WORLD WHERE MAN'S NATURAL BELLIGERENCE AND RISK SEEKING ARE SCORNED AND EVEN RIDICULED BY THE EMERGENT COMMON-SENSE, SENTIMENTAL VALUE SYSTEMS OF A PEACETIME FEMINIST SENSIBILITY, HUNTING AND FISHING REMAIN THE FEW MASCULINE PASTIMES ACCEPTABLE AS ALTERNATIVES TO WAR..."

Describing the target audience, B&W states,

"The primary appeal is directed to the blue-collar, time-clocked, dues-paying union member, working at a boring, repetitive, good-paying job. He's married, about to be, or looking to be. He goes fishing or hunting when he can. When she doesn't give him too much grief. Sometimes because she does."

This document shows us that the corporate advertising mentality can be aimed at reinforcing negative stereotypes while simultaneously pushing harmful products.

In 1994, the R.J. Reynolds tobacco company "orchestrated a massive, unprecedented public relations blitz," (1) aimed at linking tobacco control efforts directly to Prohibition in the public mind, even though the prohibition of tobacco has never been a stated goal of public health authorities in the U.S.. (Prohibition was an American social movement in the 1920s and 1930s in the U.S. that attempted to eliminate the sale and use of alcohol. It is generally considered to have been extreme and to have ended in failure.) RJR called the effort "Project Breakthrough." It was described this way in a planning document: "PROJECT BREAKTHROUGH

1. Objective: create a campaign which frames and answers this question: Does America want prohibition? Will we tolerate a puritanical wave to infringe, to restrict and possibly to eliminate personal freedoms and individual choices?

2.Goals:

* reframe the debate: efforts all aim at return to prohibition, either front-door or back-door.

* make prohibition a clear and present danger now in our society; give it pejorative currency similar to the tax and spend issue in the early 1980s.

* directly tie the anti-smoker rhetoric with the stigma of prohibition; that's what they really want.

* spread the stigma to others: who's next; alcohol, beef, pork, private property, logging, fur, cholesterol, motorcycles, and others.

The campaign had several different phases designed generally to instill fear in Americans that rules restricting smoking would lead to increased crime and smuggling, economic failure, inability to purchase and use a host of other products, and the elimination of civil rights and freedoms.

Sample Project Breakthrough ads can be seen at the following URLs:

"COME OUT SLOWLY SIR, WITH YOUR CIGARETTE ABOVE YOUR HEAD." http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/ogp61d00

"TODAY IT'S CIGARETTES. TOMORROW?" http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/dhp61d00

"NO SMOKING. IS THE GOVERNMENT GOING TOO FAR?" http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/ehp61d00

RJR ran these ads, and others like them, in 32 major American daily newspapers, plus magazines like TIME, U.S. News and World Report,(2) Vanity Fair,(3) ethnically targeted publications like Blacks in Law Enforcement,(4), and popular publications like Rolling Stone and People.

Other campaign components included direct mailings to individuals and a "video petition" sent to legislators in Washington, D.C. The campaign appears to have lasted about 4 years. RJR considered the effort successful, according to an October, 1994 update on the project prepared by Thomas Griscom, Executive Vice President of External Relations and sent to Charles M. Harper, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of RJR Nabisco Holdings Corp. Griscom's report claimed the campaign resulted in decreased support for raising the federal tax on cigarettes, generated 29,000 calls to a toll-free hotline, and put the Occupational Safety and Health Administration on the defensive, among other successes.

"Project Breakthrough" appears to have been RJR's response to a number of public health initiatives occuring at the time, including the broadcast of an ABC news program ("Day One") about spiking of nicotine in cigarettes, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration's efforts to regulate nicotine as a drug, a proposal to fund health care nationally through an increase in the federal cigarette tax.

This document shows that the creation and spread of the arguments that smoking laws are a form of creeping prohibition can be linked directly to RJR.