Presumed Philip Morris and other worldwide tobacco companies on whose behalf Infotab was created.
This document (from Philip Morris' files) shows how the global tobacco industry fights efforts to restrict the advertising of tobacco products. The report was produced by Infotab (the international information clearinghouse and monitoring organization formed by the major multinational tobacco companies around the late 1970s-early 1980s to help confront the global anti-tobacco movement). The report discusses the weakness and lack of credibility of the global tobacco industry's main argument against advertising bans, namely the claim that cigarette advertising doesn't increase total market size, but just causes existing smokers to switch brands.
The document shows that this argument directly contradicts the truth. The reality, according to this report, is that the total cigarette market grows in developing countries in accordance with the amount of money the tobacco companies spend to advertise their products in those countries.
The author of the report, listed as Ron Tully (who served as Documentation Manager of Information Services at Infotab in 1989) grapples with how the industry can persist with such an incredible argument when the facts don't support their case:
"The general argumentation used by the industry is beginning to look extremely weak and the presentation of these arguments to the 'public' and 'opinion formers' needs to be examined in detail.
This is best illustrated in the advertising bans and consumption argument, where the industry argues that 'advertising does not increase total market size', yet we are presented with a dilemma in developing markets where the total market is growing and advertising expenditure is rising accordingly. How can we reconcile this?"
Tully urges the industry to "consider new arguments." He laments the tobacco industry's lack of credibility, comparing it to the respect and authority enjoyed by the World Health Organization:
"The anti-smoking lobby continue to coordinate their data on smoking through the WHO, providing respectability and authority which industry data is unable to match."
He points out that the tobacco industry does not have the credibility to put forth new arguments against advertising bans in a believable manner, and recommends instead that any new data the industry accumulates in support of a new argument be put forth by "a respected independent international organization" which "should be used to publish the results."
To help stave off advertising bans, Tully suggests that the industry invest in "a high dollar spend, over a sustained period of time to innovative campaigns aimed at an ill-informed public," saying the industry must "[meet] the challenge of anti smoking campaigns with 'real money', which means matching the anti-smoking groups dollar for dollar..."
In his conclusion, Tully frames health authorities and tobacco control policies essentially as competitors to the tobacco industry, warning
"Just remember, we lose more to the bottom line each year in markets as a direct result of policies pushed by the anti-smoking fraternity. Can we afford to let these groups continue their propaganda unabated??"