Tobacco Documents Online

This 20 page report/outline from the Philip Morris document site discusses the current (1990) status of the cigarette industry in the U.S.(consumption rates, quantity sold, brand activity, etc.). It also discusses cigarette exports and objections to exports, recent reports on smoking and health, and much more.

In a section entitled "Advertising," it points out that Dr. Alan Blum (described as "a noted medical antagonist" surveyed the appearance of Marlboro and Winston cars at nationally televised car and motorcycle races. Blum reported that at the 1989 Marlboro Grand Prix the brand name "Marlboro" was telecast 5,933 times, in spite of the Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969, which prohibits the promotion of cigarete brands on television. The paper states that "P.M. denied allegations that it skirts a ban on television."

On Bates page 2028467456 there is another section entitled "Advertising." Here is describes the real hidden reason for the tobacco industry's "It's the Law" program, and how this program succeeded in snookering a major, big-city newspaper into writing an editorial in support of the tobacco industry:

The Tobacco Institute launched major advertising and education programs "It's the Law" to stop individuals under 18 from smoking. It supports a legal smoking age of 18...In part, this is intended to undercut the Waxman and Kennedy bills. There has been tremendous dialogue on TV and in the press pro and con this action. The motives of the industry have been questioned. The Chicago Tribune, (December 26) states that the industry is behaving in a way that warrants praise, not condemnation.

This document describes the imagery associated with individual cigarette brands, which may or may not be intentional. Some of the associations are quite amusing. It is unclear whether this document was the result of focus group testing or not, but it appears that is was.

It is interesting that smokers of TRUE brand cigarettes are perceived as "Female -- very hyperactive, runs around in circles but doesn't get anything done, all activity, but no progress--flutter-brained, surface value only." Users of MORE brand cigarettes are female: "Woman -- liberated, but not ball-busting," and users of generic cigarettes are felt to be "Not mentally stable ...imageless,hobos, tramps, rag pickers."

This R.J. Reynolds document, A Qualitative Study on Yax-Phase II, relates the results of focus group testing done with young people (some still in high school) to find out their reactions to proposed cigarette ads that were designed to appeal to their inner wants for serenity, calm, romance, excitement, friends, fantasy, etc.

The surpisingly frank responses of some the young people often made great sense, and may have been comments that the cigarette company overlooked too easily. For example, when viewing a cigarette ad that had the word "America" in the headline, several respondents pointed out that "It is not appropriate to sell America when selling cigarettes." When viewing a cigarette ad with a backdrop of natural scenery, some respondents said they felt that "the natural scenery would be defiled by smoking a cigarette, i.e. the scenery and the product category did not really fit..." When shown an action-based ad with an actor engaging in a physical activity that was daring and challenging, some respondents said "They could not connect the activities shown with smoking, i.e., 'how could someone in that position be smoking a cigarette.'"

Aside from helping us understand how cigarette companies position their advertising to appeal to young people's psychological desires, this document shows us that young people deserve credit for pointing out the obvious absurdities of such ads.

R.J. Reynolds' "Project Scum" was a plan to ramp up marketing of Camel cigarettes to "consumer subcultures" in the San Francisco area, specifically to gay people in the Castro district, "rebellious, Generation X" -ers, people of "International influence" and "street people." The plan was to introduce Camel cigarettes into less traditional retail outlets, like "head shops."

The report notes that a rationale for this was the higher incidence of smoking and drug use in subcultures.

There are several versions of this report, ranging in date from 1995-97. They offer revealing "marginalia" (handwritten markings) on the pages. For example, the words "Gay/Castro" and "Tenderloin" are hand-written next to a bulleted list of consumer subcultures on one page. On another page that discusses the rationale for the program, a sentence that reads "higher incidents of smoking in subcultures" has the phrase "and drugs" written in. On a subsequent copy, the phrase "and drugs" is crossed out. One copy of the document has the word "Scum" in the title crossed out and the word "Sourdough" hand-written in, as though RJR realized too late the degrading manner in which they were referring to their customers.

The bigger question about this document might be, what consumer would buy a company's products if he or she knew that that in the back boardroom, the company was referring to customers as "scum"?

Shows that Philip Morris intended to get around a total ban on advertising in Singapore by introducing a wine cooler (made by its winery in Australia) with the same brand name as the cigarette they wanted to introduce in that country.

This 1996 Philip Morris (PM) memo from a Philip Morris Issues Manager demonstrates PM's strategy to target legislators with "issue advertising." Issue advertising is advertising that Philip Morris creates to make a favorable impression on legislators.

In this memo, the cigarette company's government affairs and media specialists discuss plans to rent ad space on hundreds of taxi cabs in New Orleans at the time when a meeting of the National Conference of State Legislators was in town, because, after all:

"During NCSL, state legislators and their families may take a lot of cab rides."

The memo also suggests they consider including 501(c)(3) groups (nonprofit groups) in the plan. Philip Morris set up and/or backed numerous nonprofit groups that served its interests, like smokers rights groups, groups against government intervention, etc. It is likely that these are the types of nonprofit groups that the writer, Josh Slavitt, is referring to.

This 1991 market research "creative presentation" was written for the Philip Morris tobacco company to market a new brand of cigarettes called "Battistoni" to young adults.

The research concludes that young adults of the time were heavily influenced by the rock star Madonna, craved control over their lives and suffered from "dimmed financial hopes." Building on these conclusions, the report states that this need for some sense of control over their world led young adults to create social action groups Greenpeace and Act Up.

The writers state that Philip Morris's advertising should "empower" young adults with "permission to smoke":

"In this era when smoking is under attack as dirty imposition on a just-say-no society, smokers need to be empowered with permission to smoke. For young adults, the single most powerful argument that can be made in defense of smoking is, 'no matter what others say, I am entitled to enjoy my pleasure because I chose it....' With the exception of Camel--who well understands defiance as part of the smoking experience--no cigarette offers smokers a way of saying, '______ off, it's my life and my pleasure....'

In a blantant attempt to disguise the addictive aspects of smoking, the advertising plan says the company must manipulate the "target" (young adult consumers) into believing that it is " 'correct' or socially appropriate to smoke," and that that the brand must "help him justify his belief that the decision to smoke is calculated, reflecting his own free will" and help him "avoid feeling that a cigarette company is inducing him to smoke with advertising that 'insults his intelligence,' telling him what to do.

The writer cites the Joe Camel campaign as a prime example of how a cigarette company can respond to the new anti-smoking environment in a defiant way that appeals to younger people:

"In the U.S.A., Camel's new positioning reflects an understanding of how to respond to the anti-smoking environment in a fresh, new way that engages the sympathies of a certain segment of young Americans. The Smooth Character's mischievous wink endorses a defiant juvenile delinquency that sums up a certain response to authority and growing up."

This paper offers insight into how advertising companies play on human frailties to boost sales of a deadly product. It also shows the part advertising companies have played in helping tobacco companies undermine public health messages about tobacco.

This 1987 marketing document reveals an ad agency testing various themes about secondhand smoke on behalf of the Philip Morris Tobacco Company (PM). The ads themselves show how PM intended to respond to the public health threat caused by secondhand smoke from their products, and how the company intended to manipulate the public's understanding of health information. PM's ad agency described its mission this way:

"The purpose of the overall [ad] project was to look for a way to stem the ever increasing tide of legal restrictions on smoking. Philip Morris is looking for a way to avoid further legislation to restrict where people can smoke...It was hoped that disarming the issue of secondary smoke would be a strong device to slow anti-smoking legislation."

A major theme of the ads was that "the case isn't proven" that secondhand tobacco smoke harms nonsmokers, ironically the same theme that the tobacco industry used for years to reassure smokers about primary smoking and keep them smoking.

The people who viewed these ads were surprisingly savvy about the tobacco industry's intent and methods. The first ad, entitled "Scientist," featured a woman pharmacologist dressed in a white lab coat telling the audience that the case hasn't been proven that secondhand smoke is harmful. Participants questioned the credibility of the woman, pointed out that she was a pharmacologist and not a doctor, and that the purpose of her wearing a white lab coat was to manipulate the audience into believing she was a legitimate authority figure.

Another ad, "Black Man/White Man," equated smoking restrictions with racism. Participants had a strong negative reaction to this analogy, and pointed out its absurdity:

"...most disagreed that smokers suffer from discrimination. Non-smokers were quick to voice the fact that smokers can go anywhere, they just may not be able to smoke: 'How have his rights been violated? He can go anywhere. That's a bunch of garbage... ' '...it was ridiculous, because they can go into a restaurant.' Although some credence was given to the rights of the smoker, non-smokers were not about to give up their own rights. '...one smoker in this room would infringe on the rights of seven people.' 'The way I feel about it, my sitting here and not smoking is not bothering anybody, but if I was sitting here smoking, I'd be bothering somebody. So, he (smoker) is the one who is infringing on the rights.'

General comments by the focus group leader indicate the participants' cynical attitude about secondhand smoke ads in general:

"From listening to all six groups, several points were brought up that seemed universal across smokers and non-smokers: 1. The use of the Phillip Morris name as a sponsor for the advertisements was a definite negative. Smokers and non-smokers alike tended to not believe the ads based on the use of the Philip Morris name. One respondent stated: "...I wouldn't trust it because it came from the manufacturer and it almost constitutes an ad for smoking... I don't trust what a cigarette manufacturer would tell me about it (second-hand smoke)."

The tester reported that some participants felt "all of the ads were thinly veiled attempts to get advertising for cigarette companies back on the air." He commented that many of the smokers tested were "guilty" smokers who wanted to quit smoking because they knew they were hurting themselves. The tester pointed out that "For this reason, smokers were not anxious to jump on the bandwagon that says secondhand smoke isn't harmful to non-smokers."

Handwritten comments on the document, ostensibly by cigarette company representative or proponent, trivialize the public health knowledge held by the participants and request a toning down of adjectives like "all" and "many" in describing the universality of feeling among them. An interesting example is at the bottom of Page 2041096511, where the tester wrote that "There was a basic DISBELIEF across all groups that secondhand smoke is not harmful." The handwritten comment next to this statement dismisses this important obervation out of hand, saying merely

"Tone down. Bothersome."

This 1963 advertisement for Winston cigarettes targeted American Jews and ran in newspapers and Jewish magazines in 1963. The ad features a line of people dancing the hora (shot from above, looking down on the dancers). The text along side and below the photo links smoking with the joy of the Jewish holidays:

"Shevouth time is the season for many of the happiest celebrations in Jewish life. And at some point during the festivities...SOMETHING WONDERFUL HAPPENS. The music stops, then it starts again. The beat is faster, exciting. A circle forms and spirits soar into the joyous, lively world of the irresistible hora!

And certainly joy abounds in smoking when your cigarette is Winston, America's best-selling filter cigarette. The special pleasure begins up fron, ahead of the pure white, modern filter. That's where only winston puts filter blend tobaccos specially selected and specially processed for the best taste in filter smoking. Try Winston. Winston tastes good--like a cigarette should!"

A FRANK STATEMENT TO CIGARETTE SMOKERS was an infamous tobacco industry advertisement from 1954. The ad marked the turning point: the beginning of the tobacco industry's lengthy U.S. misinformation campaign about the health effects of tobacco. Coached by John Hill of the public relations firm Hill & Knowlton, the "Frank Statement" was published in over 400 major newspapers and magazines across the United States as a response to initial public scientific disclosures that cigarette smoking was linked with lung cancer.

Researcher Norbert Hirschhorn M.D. has found a fascinating original draft of The Frank Statement among the Ness-Motley collection of documents on Tobacco Documents Online. The draft contains handwritten marginalia and stricken portions of original text. One can see that the changes made in the original text of the Frank Statement were carefully designed to keep the truth further at bay. In today's posting I have showed the wording that was lined out by using strikeout text and the handwritten comments added in are indicated by italicized text. Following is an example of both the changes and how they are documented:

"We accept an interest in people's health as a basic responsibility paramount to every other consideration in our business.

We believe the products we make are not injurious to health. Science has no proof to the contrary.

We will never produce and market a product shown to be the cause of any serious human ailment.

We always have and always will cooperate closely with the Governmental authorities those whose task it is to safeguard the public health."

This report, prepared in 1994 for Philip Morris by a company called Marketing Perceptions, Inc. relates the results of focus group testing done to evaluate two names proposed for a new brand of cigarette targeted at young men: "Barking Dog" and "Barking Fish" brand cigarettes.

The name "Barking Dog" was meant to convey images of loyalty, "tried and true," "never bites" and "man's best friend."

It backfired completely. Instead, the document says in each focus group,

"Most of the men rejected the positioning. They weren't certain if, these days they could think of their cigarettes as 'my best friend.'... Some also suggested that there could be a 'negative spin' in interpreting the positioning, 'being dependent on your DOG'...In each group, men noted that a Barking Dog is angry, vicious, noisy, annoying or an intrusion."

As for "Barking Fish" cigarettes, as might be expected, "...Most found the images unsettling."

"There was general agreement that the pack with the fish graphic was 'the worst," immediately bringing to mind smelly, fishy, wet-tasting cigarettes."

Well, duh.

Kudos to the young men who recognized that cigarettes are far from "man's best friend," and to those who refused to swallow the "Barking Fish" hook.

These two Tobacco Institute advertisements appeared in the 1970s to cast doubt on the link between smoking and disease by turning the focus of tobacco-related illness onto people's personality traits. The first ad says that lots of things have been blamed for causing disease ("bread, butter, milk, sugar, cigarettes..." ) and suggests that people who use these substances "unthinkingly and excessively" are "special types of people." The ad suggests that "hard drivers" and "perfectionists" may have "used up their inherited capital of resistance to disease." While the piece claims this is "still a theory," its underlying purpose seems to be to cast doubt on the scientific certainty of the link between smoking and disease.

The ads appear to be part of a project initiated in 1967 by the Brown & Williamson Tobacco Company called Project Lighthouse, in which B&W hired the Tiderock Foundation to gather studies and personal commentary from scientists that cast doubt on the link between smoking and disease.

This one-page Tobacco Institute document is the text of a proposed print ad designed to confuse the public about the link between smoking and lung cancer. It was one of five ads drafted and tested by Ted Bates & Company, Inc. Advertising for the Tobacco Institute in the wake of the publication of the 1967 Surgeon General's Report, The Health Consequences of Smoking. A partial quote from the document:

"COMMUNISM CAUSES CANCER

You don't believe it? Well, wait a second. Let's use the same kind of statistical analysis the Public Health Service is using to 'prove' that cigarettes cause cancer. We'll use only statistical facts taken from bona fide population surveys.

1. Americans smoke a lot and some of them die of lung cancer. The Dutch smoke less than Americans, but more of them die of lung cancer.

2. The Australians smoke a lot and some of them die of lung cancer. The British smoke as much as the Australians, but twice as many British have lung cancer...

One statistical inference is very clear. In each pair of countries, the higher cancer rate is in the country closer to the Iron Curtain...By the same means that some public servants are using to indict cigarettes, we've just proved that Communism causes cancer. But you know and we know, Communism is not guilty. And nobody yet knows about cigarettes."

In this 1990 speech by John Dollison (Vice President of Philip Morris' International Corporate Affairs Department) before a marketing conference, Dollison clearly describes public health as PM's opponent in a "guerilla war. " He describes public health officials as "snipers" who have "laid their minefields," and even makes biblical references to the fight: "Our opponents sit and wait, watching our every move, every new product and every new marketing project... Like the proverbial lion in the Bible, they are poised to devour us whenever we give them an opportunity, and sometimes even when we don't....Today we are engaged in a "war" against our industry... The kind of war we are engaged in is a guerrilla war.. the most difficult kind of all. Our enemy might not be invisible but it often seems that way. Their tactics are to hit and run and then hit again...They have positioned their snipers and laid their minefields it is the job of Corporate Affairs to discover where these threats are,and to warn you."

In a bold and revealing description of PM's under-the-radar corporate tactics, Dollison boasts about how PM created and completely controlled a supposedly "independent" coalition called "The Committee for Freedom of Commercial Expression" in Denmark to oppose a tobacco ad ban directive. Dollison boasts about how this coalition was able to convince no less than the Danish Ministry of Health into opposing a tobacco ad ban, lists other countries where PM has used this secret tactic, and proposes that PM expand this tactic further to other countries:

"In Denmark, for example, we have created a coalition known (in English) as the Committee for Freedom of Commercial Expression...we were able to recruit more than 50 prominent Danes...The group has conducted media briefings, participated in debates, and written articles and conducted and publicized an opinion poll...Members of Government (including the Minister of Health) now regularly...consult with coalition members...The coalition was instrumental in securing the commitment and public declaration of the Minister Of Health to oppose an advertising ban...And, finally, the functioning of the coalition is managed at arms length - distanced from P.M., although completely controlled by P.M....We have set up similar coalitions in Holland, New Zealand and EEC for sport. Many more are required..."

Dollison also describes how voluntary, self-imposed "advertising codes" (which, he admits, make no more concessions than PM has already made in most countries in which they operate) help deflect further restrictions on tobacco advertising:

"What I am talking about is a list of self-imposed [advertising] constraints which will enable us to more plausibly claim the high moral ground in future controversies and, not least, to more easily manage and possible triumph in future crises...Such a regime, effectively implemented and sold, I believe, have the inestimable advantage of repositioning Philip Morris in the world-wide debate over the rights and wrongs of tobacco. It would gain us support from those with no affection for our enemies but who also harbour deep suspicion of our motives and methods. It would give us just that little bit more breathing space, just that little bit more room to maneuver. Believe me, we need it."

While quite old, this 1936 Camel cigarette advertisement gives an important perspective on the origins of errant beliefs regarding smoking and health, as well as insight into how the notion first arose that smoking and eating go together. The title of the ad announces,

"Recent findings show that smoking Camels benefits Digestion."

The describes how these "findings" came about:

"...physiological laboratories established the fact that smoking Camel cigarettes has a marked beneficial effect on the processes of digestion...American scientists actually measured the increased digestive fluids brought about by smoking Camels. They found that Camels assist the flow of digestive fluids...exercise a favorable alkalizing effect."

Photos show professional people who lend credibility to these claims: dieticians and scientists.

Ads like this show that the tobacco industry did indeed make very straightforward health claims about their products earlier in the century.

This Philip Morris (PM) document is a case study showing how PM uses cigarette advertising to help undermine public health messages about tobacco.

In 1995 PM planned to launch a new, humorous ad campaign for "Benson and Hedges" cigarettes. The launch was strategically timed to coincide with the opening of new (Philip Morris-sponsored) smoking lounges in Denver's new International Airport (DIA, 1995). The inclusion of smoking lounges at DIA was quite controversial at the time, and would have been expected to draw crticism of the company. Objectives of the ad campaign (and its timing) were to help keep PM in the driver's seat on smoking issues in Denver at that time:

"OBJECTIVES:

--Maintain control of the story and preempt potential activists' criticism of ads --Reinforce messages of accommodating smokers. --Preempt possible activists' claims of victory in 'changing the form of cigarette advertising"... --Frame appropriate messages regarding ETS and accommodation issues." The plan included training spokespeople in advance of the ad campaign "to counter activist positions [and]...incorporate accommodation messages into discussion of campaign."

The campaign even provided PM with "hooks" to create future positive stories and promotions for target audiences. Burson-Marstellar (B-M, the public relations company that generated the media plan) suggests that, in the wake of the ad campaign, "Specific accommodation storylines can be developed for pitch to women's book, gay books, restaurant magazines/inserts, etc." B-M also suggested that PM "[Develop] promotions to 'make smoker feel like a hero'".

PM has long held that the intent of its cigarette advertising is merely to convince smokers to switch brands, but this document shows an intent that is actually quite different. The cigarette company used this ad campaign:

1) To take the focus off tobacco as a public health problem and turn the discussion instead into one of economics and "accommodation,"

2) as a shield to pre-empt criticism of its actions and products,

3) To minimize public health messages about tobacco and secondhand smoke and prevent these messages from taking the forefront,

3) To provide the company with access to major media in a way that gave the company control over the coverage it received.

4) To launch other, similar efforts and campaigns around the country and to obtain further "positive" coverage for the company's brands and smoking in general.

In the 1970s, the Brown and Williamson Tobacco Comany (B&W) developed a brand of "low gas" cigarettes called FACT. The ensuing ad campaign for FACT that actually drew smokers' attention to some of the dangerous gases (aldehydes, acetaldehyde, priopionaldehyde, acrolein) that are present in cigarette smoke. FACT was aimed at the health-conscious smoker, much like Lorillard Tobacco Company's Kent cigarettes with the Micronite filter of the 1950s.

This 1978 B&W memo, however, indicates that B&W's management eventually saw tremendous danger in this type of marketing, saying

"B&W should not pursue a new product positioned as a low gas-low 'tar'...

...We do not support definition in advertising of the problem of gas in order to specifically communicate its consumer benefit and distinguish it from low 'tar.' To supply such a definition would require overt references to the alleged ciliatoxic and cardiovascular ill effects of smoking. The possible ramifications of this in the Legal, Regulatory and Policy area are appalling....A likely result of such activity on our part would be escalation of quitting rates among smokers...

This Tobacco Institute document shows how the tobacco industry scares the health care industry out of supporting increased taxes on cigarettes. The paper describes an ad campaign that portrays doctors as money-grubbing party-hounds and hospital firms as greedy profiteers. The tobacco industry also tries to make it appear as though tobacco is allied with some health care groups in opposing the tax. "Goals:

(1) To reduce the eagerness of the health care industry to support higher taxes on cigarettes.

(2) To start positioning the battle as people with white uniforms on one side vs. people with white uniforms + the tobacco industry and taxpayer groups on the other side, rather than white coats vs. TI alone."

The document describes an ad campaign that shows a "cork flying out of [a] champagne bottle suspended on an intravenous solution rack, with IV tube running into arm of a partially seen person lying in a hospital bed." The doctors are partying because they are going to start making more money. The rest of the ad claims that personal choices about health care will become more restricted and that some other health care groups (like dentists, chiropractors and therapists) join the tobacco industry in opposing the tax.

The industry's political strategy regarding tax measures is specifically aimed at confusing voters, as described by the following quotes from a related document (Bates No. TIOR0020292/0307) :

"Make our hat whiter, make their hat blacker. Through involvement in two health care initiatives, blur tobacco's relationship to the health care community."

and,

"Create an environment where there are some doctors on our side (of health care reform) and some doctors against us--make voters a little uneasy about who the good guys really are." http://www.tobaccoinstitute.com/getallimg.asp?DOCID=TIOR0020292/0307

This document mostly consists of sociological observations of the behavior and lifestyles of young male citizens of the Ivory Coast for the purpose of marketing cigarettes to this group. The paper makes some intimate observations about life in the Ivory Coast. Buried in the document are inferences that the cigarette pack is important for developing peer pressure to smoke a certain brand. The document notes in several places that this type of marketing tool is absent in poorer countries, where smokers typically purchase cigarettes "by the stick" rather they by the pack.

Perhaps most important are inferences in the document that a goal of cigarette advertising is less to merely influence brand choice than to stimulate increased consumption of cigarettes, a point the tobacco industry typically denies. This is evident in the following passages:

"Even if brand choices are not influenced by outdoor or POS [point of sale advertising] materials, when a smoker is just walking around there is the potential for stimulating the desire to smoke by appropriate materials. One would judge that such materials, in order to achieve that effect, should themselves show smoking."

and

"It is quite common for people when they have nothing to do, to just walk around...there are opportunities in this "empty time" to stimulate consumption using materials which show smoking as a trigger to the desire to smoke..." ..."

This Tobacco Institute position paper was originally drafted by the Institute in 1967 during the debate over tar and nicotine labeling, but it applies strongly today to the idea of 'lights' and 'low-tar' labeling by the companies. The document is also important in light of Philip Morris' renewed interest in broadcasting TV advertisements. PM's use of the phrase "there is no safe cigarette" in its television ads without also stating that there "is no safer cigarette" is blatantly misleading.* As the document puts it

"It has been said that there is no risk of misleading and perhaps endangering the smoker by requiring tar and nicotine labeling, because of the warning of potential hazard. True, the smoker may be reminded that the cigarette is not absolutely safe. But he may well conclude that the cigarette is substantially safer. Indeed, that conclusion is virtually inescapable, since the very reason for the proposed labeling of tar and nicotine content is to encourage reduction of that content, thereby purportedly making the cigarette ‘safer’."

The document is stridently written and brimming with denials and obfuscations about the link between smoking and disease, as well as denials about the need to alert people to this link through appropriate labeling.

From 1984-86 the R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company ran a widespread print advertisement campaign aimed at convincing the lay public that a controversy existed about whether secondhand tobacco smoke posed any harm to the non-smoker. RJR's ads ran in publications like Better Homes and Gardens, Family Circle, the New York Times, the Los Angeles Times, Chicago Tribune, Cleveland Plain Dealer and the Washington Post, to name a few. The ads themselves sparked significant controversy, drawing fire from individuals and health organizations, as well as praise from smokers. RJR's document database contains numerous letters from people angry about these ads, or from people who wrote to correct the company or describe situations where either they or their family members had been harmed by, or suffered from exposure to secondhand smoke. In today's document, someone who suffers adverse health effects from secondhand smoke exposure has scrawled an angry answer to RJR on a copy of the ad and mailed it back to the company. Following (in the "Quotes" section) are both the text of the ad and the writer's response.

This Philip Morris document provides insight into the creation of "Dave's" cigarettes, a discount brand targeted at "YAMS" (Young Adult Male Smokers). The idea was to create a discount brand that would make broke YAMS feel as though they were buying by choice, not because they were broke. This presentation, by the advertising firm Young and Rubicam, describes the plight of YAMS and the gap "Dave's" would strive to fill: "Economic reality forces a trade down...Nothing comes close to cigarettes in terms of a degrading trade-down...In a category that is supposed to be a reward and indulgence, a discount cigarette stands for the antithesis of what smoking is all about. Therefore YAMS can't feel good about purchasing discount cigarettes when they have to. In their heart of hearts, they would like to feel that when they buy a discount brand, it's because they choose to -- not because they happen to be cheap, broke or desperate."

Dave's was designed to be that magical brand that would make it okay for YAMS to buy discount cigarettes.

To sell "Dave's," Philip Morris created a fictional cigarette company run by a fictional, independent, honest, hard-working guy named "Dave" who got around in a down-to-earth 1957 yellow pickup truck. Ads for "Dave's" cigarettes touted "Dave" as a youthful renegade who got fed up with the establishment and struck out on his own. There was no hint in the ads that the product was made by Philip Morris.

(One ad read:

"Dave was fed up with cheap, fast burning smokes. Instead of just getting mad, he did something about it. He read some books, cleared twenty acres and got to work. He put a down payment on a tractor and traded his lawn mower for a weather radio. And then it was just a matter of waiting for the final frost of the season and a new moon. In early April, Dave sowed his first seeds. A few sunny days later, Dave's Tobacco Company was born. Word spread about Dave's "different smokes." His tobacco leaves were hand picked, then barn cured and barrel aged for rich taste. And to make sure they burned perfectly, each smoke was packed tight. People started buying these new smokes that didn't burn fast and tasted great. They told their friends..who told their friends. Now Dave works for nobody but himself. And it all started with a few tobacco seeds..and a dream." [See the ad, The tale of Dave's Original Blend Link: http://tobaccodocuments.org/pollay_ads/Dave01.06.html]

Focus group testing showed, though, that if and when YAMS did find out that "Dave's" cigarettes were really made by the Philip Morris Tobacco Company, the felt disappointed and betrayed. PM minimized the importance of this finding, however, and pressed ahead with the marketing brand [see the PM document Dave's Seattle Research (1994) http://tobaccodocuments.org/pm/2045165728.html]

Shortly after "Dave's" hit the market, humor columnist Dave Barry wrote a scathing column ripping "Dave's" cigarettes:

I want to stress that I'm not bitter about what the Philip Morris Corp. is trying to do with the name "Dave." In case you didn't know, Philip Morris is test-marketing a new brand of cigarettes called "Dave's." Over the past year I've seen big billboard advertisements for "Dave's" cigarettes in Seattle and Denver. These are folksy ads; one of them features a tractor. The message is that "Dave's" is a folksy brand of cigarette, produced by a down-to-earth, tractor-driving guy named "Dave" for ordinary people who work hard and make an honest living, at least until they start coughing up big folksy chunks of trachea. .." http://www.s-t.com/daily/07-96/07-28-96/e02li154.htm:

A 1995 Wall Street Journal article also ripped PM's effort to deceive smokers with "Dave":

"Dave's Cigarettes" has become a trend setter in anti-establishment marketing. The promotional literature describes Dave as "an entrepreneur who believes in the value of home made products and the concept of offering folks quality cigarettes at the right price." Dave is such a populist he tells store owners he doesn't even want his folksy cigs to "mix with the 'corporate' cigarettes." Now take a guess as to which $60 billion tobacco giant owns Dave's? If you said Phillip Morris you win a half case of Red Dog beer (also owned by PM). Nowhere does Phillip Morris, in it's self-described effort to "convey cutting edge hipness," acknowledge it's relation to "Dave." Just being "plain folks" I guess. (WSJ 3/2/95)

Today "Dave's" appears to be a failed brand, along with another brand PM proposed to be targeted at young men (but that never made it off the drawing board), "Barking Fish" cigarettes http://tobaccodocuments.org/landman/2041490669-0681.html )

This R.J. Reynolds document shows how RJR uses advertising and special events to help increase the social acceptability of smoking. RJR planned to "Develop and execute advertising campaigns which show people in smoking-related social situations that heighten the social acceptability of smoking." The paper cites as examples RJR's VANTAGE "Pleasures" ad campaign [Samples of these ads are at http://roswell.tobaccodocuments.org/pollay/images/Vant03.01_display.jpg and http://roswell.tobaccodocuments.org/pollay/images/Vant01.13_display.jpg ]

...and ads for WINSTON and SALEM that show people smoking in social situations. RJR also planned to "capitalize on Special Events activities which reinforce smoking in public, highly visible environments and provide excellent political/thought leadership contacts to combat anti-smoking activists."

Cigarette companies insist that their advertising is aimed solely at reinforcing brand loyalty or getting people to change brands. This document shows that is not the case, that cigarette companies also have also used advertising to increase and reinforce the social acceptability of smoking and "combat" public health efforts to decrease smoking.

This Philip Morris (PM) document from the marketing department of PM's Lausanne, Switzerland office discusses how to market Chesterfield cigarettes in West Africa. The document states that an overall objective is "To gain a very young audience" for the brand, but then states the "prime prospect" is 18 to 30 years. The "source of [sales] volume" is to be "new smokers." In discussing what "key consumer benefit" of the cigarette PM should advertised, the author states quite frankly that there is no tangible benefit to the cigarette, so the advertising must rely on "lifestyle" imagery to sell the brand:

"There is no tangible product plus, except a possible price advantage...So, the key consumer benefit must be purely psychological and projected through the lifestyle of the people featured in the advertising. Chesterfield is the famous American cigarette sole internationally, and now available in your country for the first time."

This 1975 document outlines the Tobacco Institute's plans for a "courteous smoking" campaign called "Cigarettiquette" to "dilute and counter the efforts of anti-smoking activist groups" and "aid in preventing the enactment of unreasonable legislation to prohibit smoking in public places." It says that the threat of social ostracism for smokers was "serious" but "not all that serious" because, "if the fear of cancer, heart disease emphysema could not diminish the popularity of smoking, we somewhat doubt that social segregation can." The paper further states, "We believe smoking is stronger than all its foes in and out of government."

Campaign plans included designing print ads that would avoid "the look of the tobacco industry's 'big dollars.'" Ads would portray smoking as a civil right, and promote the fear that government was taking away human rights through installing public smoking restrictions.

The industry, and Philip Morris in particular, has continued to use variations on the "courtesy" theme throughout the years to help avoid meaningful regulation of smoking. A few examples:

In Italy in 1987, the industry ran a courteous-smoking print ad campaign in four Italian magazines to discourage smoking restrictions in that country (such campaigns are usually in print due to their "thoughtful" nature): [See page -7806]: http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/dlv44d00

In 1989 an industry-formed smokers' rights club in Denmark called "Hen-Ry" was portrayed as a "courteous smokers' club" : (memo) http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/nbf87e00

In 1990, Philip Morris ran "courteous smoking" ads in the Pan European press and received thousands of responses: http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/rks19e00

In 1995 in Europe, PM ran a campaign called "Courtesy and Tolerance" that attempted to generate fear in Europe of the smoking restrictions increasingly being enacted in the United States: (Pamphlet) http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/buh52c00

...and of course, Philip Morris' cast its "Accommodation" program (begun in the U.S. in 1993) as a program to encourage and reinforce the "courtesy" of allowing indoor smoking in restaurants and other hospitality venues.

The theme of "courtesy," then, is used to help tobacco companies marginalize public health advocates and portray them as extreme, to undermine smoking restrictions, to boost the industry's credibility and to provide cover for the industry to foment discontent with governments over efforts to regulate smoking.