Tobacco Documents Online

Shows that Philip Morris intended to get around a total ban on advertising in Singapore by introducing a wine cooler (made by its winery in Australia) with the same brand name as the cigarette they wanted to introduce in that country.

This 1996 Philip Morris (PM) memo from a Philip Morris Issues Manager demonstrates PM's strategy to target legislators with "issue advertising." Issue advertising is advertising that Philip Morris creates to make a favorable impression on legislators.

In this memo, the cigarette company's government affairs and media specialists discuss plans to rent ad space on hundreds of taxi cabs in New Orleans at the time when a meeting of the National Conference of State Legislators was in town, because, after all:

"During NCSL, state legislators and their families may take a lot of cab rides."

The memo also suggests they consider including 501(c)(3) groups (nonprofit groups) in the plan. Philip Morris set up and/or backed numerous nonprofit groups that served its interests, like smokers rights groups, groups against government intervention, etc. It is likely that these are the types of nonprofit groups that the writer, Josh Slavitt, is referring to.

This letter sent to the Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corporation's marketing department exposes in detail the behind-the-scenes activities cigarette companies go through to get cigarettes placed into major movies.

It is quite revealing. Little do today's moviegoers realize the extent to which they are being be advertised to when viewing major movies. Little do they realize either that (much to the corporations' glee) they are actually paying for the "privilege" of absorbing this unique subliminal advertising.

The writer of this document explains to B & W:

"Cigarettes as Props

1. Recently there have been a number of high-visibility feature films in which one or more of the central characters smoke a particular brand of cigarettes. This has been happening because cigarette manufacturers have been paying for the exposure. Following are some notable examples:

Movie Actor/Character Brand

"Continental Divide" John Belushi Marlboro "Superman II" Margot Kidder Marlboro "Pennies from Heaven" Steve Martin Camel "Prince of the City" Treat Williams & Merit or key supporting players Marlboro "Absence of Malice" Sally Fields Carleton

Participation in movies is not limited merely to actors smoking a particular brand. For example, 'Superman II' also included a classic fight scene in which Superman and the bad guys throw a Marlboro truck back and forth at each other on Lexington Avenue. This truck was produced solely for the movie and exists nowhere else. There are other instances of cigarette advertising serving as part of the scenery (c.f. 'Neighbors', 'Pennies from Heaven')."

Under the section entitled "RATIONALE," the writer explains that:

"By appearing in movies, RALEIGH will be receiving an implied third party endorsement. In the movie context this endorsement is considered very impactful since unlike the passive exposure of advertising and PR, the movie exposure requires a pro-active role for the viewer (i.e, the viewer must _go_ to the theatre and _pay_ to watch the films)."

He also explains how the placement of cigarettes in the movies favorably impacts the audience towards the brand"

"...Although the placement _may_ not be consistent with RALEIGH's image, the placements will almost certainly be consistent ith some psycho framework into which the viewer wants to project. The Brand can become identified with something or someone that is desireable to a specific viewer set."

According to this document, the practice of paying to place products in movies is practically ubiquitous. The writer lists some other products whose manufacturers and/or service providers have placed them in movies: "Coppertone, Budweiser, Coors, Apple Computers, Kawasaki, United Airlines and American Airlines are a few other sponsors who have recently bought into films."

This 1991 market research "creative presentation" was written for the Philip Morris tobacco company to market a new brand of cigarettes called "Battistoni" to young adults.

The research concludes that young adults of the time were heavily influenced by the rock star Madonna, craved control over their lives and suffered from "dimmed financial hopes." Building on these conclusions, the report states that this need for some sense of control over their world led young adults to create social action groups Greenpeace and Act Up.

The writers state that Philip Morris's advertising should "empower" young adults with "permission to smoke":

"In this era when smoking is under attack as dirty imposition on a just-say-no society, smokers need to be empowered with permission to smoke. For young adults, the single most powerful argument that can be made in defense of smoking is, 'no matter what others say, I am entitled to enjoy my pleasure because I chose it....' With the exception of Camel--who well understands defiance as part of the smoking experience--no cigarette offers smokers a way of saying, '______ off, it's my life and my pleasure....'

In a blantant attempt to disguise the addictive aspects of smoking, the advertising plan says the company must manipulate the "target" (young adult consumers) into believing that it is " 'correct' or socially appropriate to smoke," and that that the brand must "help him justify his belief that the decision to smoke is calculated, reflecting his own free will" and help him "avoid feeling that a cigarette company is inducing him to smoke with advertising that 'insults his intelligence,' telling him what to do.

The writer cites the Joe Camel campaign as a prime example of how a cigarette company can respond to the new anti-smoking environment in a defiant way that appeals to younger people:

"In the U.S.A., Camel's new positioning reflects an understanding of how to respond to the anti-smoking environment in a fresh, new way that engages the sympathies of a certain segment of young Americans. The Smooth Character's mischievous wink endorses a defiant juvenile delinquency that sums up a certain response to authority and growing up."

This paper offers insight into how advertising companies play on human frailties to boost sales of a deadly product. It also shows the part advertising companies have played in helping tobacco companies undermine public health messages about tobacco.

These two Tobacco Institute advertisements appeared in the 1970s to cast doubt on the link between smoking and disease by turning the focus of tobacco-related illness onto people's personality traits. The first ad says that lots of things have been blamed for causing disease ("bread, butter, milk, sugar, cigarettes..." ) and suggests that people who use these substances "unthinkingly and excessively" are "special types of people." The ad suggests that "hard drivers" and "perfectionists" may have "used up their inherited capital of resistance to disease." While the piece claims this is "still a theory," its underlying purpose seems to be to cast doubt on the scientific certainty of the link between smoking and disease.

The ads appear to be part of a project initiated in 1967 by the Brown & Williamson Tobacco Company called Project Lighthouse, in which B&W hired the Tiderock Foundation to gather studies and personal commentary from scientists that cast doubt on the link between smoking and disease.

This one-page Tobacco Institute document is the text of a proposed print ad designed to confuse the public about the link between smoking and lung cancer. It was one of five ads drafted and tested by Ted Bates & Company, Inc. Advertising for the Tobacco Institute in the wake of the publication of the 1967 Surgeon General's Report, The Health Consequences of Smoking. A partial quote from the document:

"COMMUNISM CAUSES CANCER

You don't believe it? Well, wait a second. Let's use the same kind of statistical analysis the Public Health Service is using to 'prove' that cigarettes cause cancer. We'll use only statistical facts taken from bona fide population surveys.

1. Americans smoke a lot and some of them die of lung cancer. The Dutch smoke less than Americans, but more of them die of lung cancer.

2. The Australians smoke a lot and some of them die of lung cancer. The British smoke as much as the Australians, but twice as many British have lung cancer...

One statistical inference is very clear. In each pair of countries, the higher cancer rate is in the country closer to the Iron Curtain...By the same means that some public servants are using to indict cigarettes, we've just proved that Communism causes cancer. But you know and we know, Communism is not guilty. And nobody yet knows about cigarettes."

In this 1990 speech by John Dollison (Vice President of Philip Morris' International Corporate Affairs Department) before a marketing conference, Dollison clearly describes public health as PM's opponent in a "guerilla war. " He describes public health officials as "snipers" who have "laid their minefields," and even makes biblical references to the fight: "Our opponents sit and wait, watching our every move, every new product and every new marketing project... Like the proverbial lion in the Bible, they are poised to devour us whenever we give them an opportunity, and sometimes even when we don't....Today we are engaged in a "war" against our industry... The kind of war we are engaged in is a guerrilla war.. the most difficult kind of all. Our enemy might not be invisible but it often seems that way. Their tactics are to hit and run and then hit again...They have positioned their snipers and laid their minefields it is the job of Corporate Affairs to discover where these threats are,and to warn you."

In a bold and revealing description of PM's under-the-radar corporate tactics, Dollison boasts about how PM created and completely controlled a supposedly "independent" coalition called "The Committee for Freedom of Commercial Expression" in Denmark to oppose a tobacco ad ban directive. Dollison boasts about how this coalition was able to convince no less than the Danish Ministry of Health into opposing a tobacco ad ban, lists other countries where PM has used this secret tactic, and proposes that PM expand this tactic further to other countries:

"In Denmark, for example, we have created a coalition known (in English) as the Committee for Freedom of Commercial Expression...we were able to recruit more than 50 prominent Danes...The group has conducted media briefings, participated in debates, and written articles and conducted and publicized an opinion poll...Members of Government (including the Minister of Health) now regularly...consult with coalition members...The coalition was instrumental in securing the commitment and public declaration of the Minister Of Health to oppose an advertising ban...And, finally, the functioning of the coalition is managed at arms length - distanced from P.M., although completely controlled by P.M....We have set up similar coalitions in Holland, New Zealand and EEC for sport. Many more are required..."

Dollison also describes how voluntary, self-imposed "advertising codes" (which, he admits, make no more concessions than PM has already made in most countries in which they operate) help deflect further restrictions on tobacco advertising:

"What I am talking about is a list of self-imposed [advertising] constraints which will enable us to more plausibly claim the high moral ground in future controversies and, not least, to more easily manage and possible triumph in future crises...Such a regime, effectively implemented and sold, I believe, have the inestimable advantage of repositioning Philip Morris in the world-wide debate over the rights and wrongs of tobacco. It would gain us support from those with no affection for our enemies but who also harbour deep suspicion of our motives and methods. It would give us just that little bit more breathing space, just that little bit more room to maneuver. Believe me, we need it."

While quite old, this 1936 Camel cigarette advertisement gives an important perspective on the origins of errant beliefs regarding smoking and health, as well as insight into how the notion first arose that smoking and eating go together. The title of the ad announces,

"Recent findings show that smoking Camels benefits Digestion."

The describes how these "findings" came about:

"...physiological laboratories established the fact that smoking Camel cigarettes has a marked beneficial effect on the processes of digestion...American scientists actually measured the increased digestive fluids brought about by smoking Camels. They found that Camels assist the flow of digestive fluids...exercise a favorable alkalizing effect."

Photos show professional people who lend credibility to these claims: dieticians and scientists.

Ads like this show that the tobacco industry did indeed make very straightforward health claims about their products earlier in the century.

Tobacco company documents about marketing to Hispanics for some reason reveal a much stronger concern with this group than any other that cigarette advertising aimed at men avoid depicting any nuances of homosexuality among the males in the ads. Great care is taken to focus-group test cigarette ads aimed at Hispanic males to "screen" the ads for images that could in any way be construed as being gay. This R. J. Reynolds memo is an example of such focus group testing:

"The purpose of these focus groups was to specifically address the issue of homosexuality that arose in previous focus groups. Because masculine imagery is an important element in the Hispanic campaign, revisions were made in the generic executions to change elements contributing to the homosexual image...All groups felt that the relationship between the models in the ads was perfectly natural and that no homosexuality could be implied...

The Mexican American ads successfully communicated the desired user imagery of a masculine, hard-working man...

...As was the case with Mexican-Americans, Puerto Rican smokers did not feel that the models could be regarded as homosexuals... Respondents also stated that it was unlikely that an advertising campaign would ever use a homosexual as a model...

Cuban smokers felt that the relationship between the three models in the ad was perfectly natural and that no homosexuality could be implied. The masculine imagery of the models was unquestioned...

The memo also shows how RJR also took some care to avoid overt depictions of construction sites in ads aimed at Hispanic males, and to associate the cigarette with a jobs that Hispanics perceive as more "upscale" than a construction job, such as a supervisor or architect.

This report from Brown & Williamson (B&W) describes the mechanism through which movie stars were recruited to use specific cigarette brands in their films in exchange for money and gifts.

The report explains the benefits of movie placement, and how cigarette companies use stars and their images to subtly market cigarettes through film:

"Placement of signage/product in movies allows BWT to receive extensive exposure at minimal costs..." and,

"Product usage/association with a specific star provides exposure and linkage with a star's personality/character. Stars tend to set trends, e.g., disco dancing with 'Saturday Night Fever...Association with a specific star's image can enhance/build a brand's personality -- more so than traditional media."

Movie placement also allows tobacco companies to "reach smokers who are light readers."

One "con" listed to placement of cigarette brands in the movies is that it "could be construed as aiding and abetting tax evasion--primarily because AFP [the promotion company in charge of placing the product] has been making payments in cash and gifts, rather than by check." Another "con" is that the cigarette companies could be required to place a health warning in the film...an indication that the cigarette companies took advantage of a situation in which their products could be freely promoted to the public without a health warning.

The five-page report recommends that the company continue its program of product placement in movies, even though the company risks adverse publicity by doing so. In a section entitled "Rationale," the report minimizes the risk to itself, saying any adverse publicity would be shared by many companies, and not just them:

"Adverse publicity, if any, will be leveled against entire industry, or all packaged goods advertisers who use this medium...not just BWT. Thus, the potential for embarassment to BWT specifically, is limited."

This document's historical significance is that it shows how cigarettes were placed in movies without leaving a paper trail, e.g. by "making payments in cash and gifts, rather than by check," and shows clearly how fully utilizing a new route of promotion (and beating the compeition in doing it) became the prime focus of cigarette companies, to the detriment of public health.

This Philip Morris marketing document evaluates Marlboro advertising to find ways to make the imagery more appealing to young Saudi Arabian men. The idea was to find out what emotional, psychological and cultural needs and values young male Saudis have, and then determine how PM could exploit these in their cigarette advertising.

Page 39 of the document (Bates No. 2501055413) reports on reactions of Saudi men to a Marlboro ad that depicted three cowboys leaning on a fence and talking. The middle cowboy held coiled up rope in his hand. The report says, "Values disliked [about this ad] were...the ropes, which gave uncomfortable feeling -- ropes are used to bind people and hang them in Saudi Arabia."

The report also generalizes about Saudi men:

"There is a strong thread of violence just below the surface of the Arab personality, linked to ideas of vengeance and the protection of property (including women) but there is at the same time a desire to suppress this in favour of the more acceptable public face of masculinity, which is more calm and controlled."

The report defines values of Saudi men:

"The aspiration for them is very definitely to have friends who have status and wealth - and especially a big car. Belonging to such a peer group, even if you do not personally have the wealth, enables you to enjoy the reflected status. Cigarettes it seems are often shared, and within the peer group there is also pressure to smoke the same brand..."

A brief discussion of smoking and health in the document reveals a belief among Saudi men that certain types of cigarettes are "healthier" than others, and indicates that Saudi smokers may lack key information about smoking and health in general:

"There is ample evidence that smoking is regarded [among Saudis] as harmful, although this was not expressed directly, it was indirectly through the description of the personality of brands...For Marlboro Red smokers, if you smoke a light cigarette, then you are not strong/healthy enough to be able to smoke a strong cigarette. For Marlboro Lights smokers, if you smoke a strong cigarette, then you are stupid, ignorant."

While it is not surprising that a corporation would tailor its advertising to appeal to foreign cultures, by the time this document was written (1993) tobacco use had already long been labeled by authorities worldwide as a major public health problem. Despite this, PM continued to emphasize spreading the use of tobacco in foreign countries (as well as in the U.S.). It is also interesting to see how American cigarette companies scrutinize foreign cultures and pinpoint the emotional and psychological needs and held by people of these cultures to devise ways of better exploiting them.

This Philip Morris (PM) document is a case study showing how PM uses cigarette advertising to help undermine public health messages about tobacco.

In 1995 PM planned to launch a new, humorous ad campaign for "Benson and Hedges" cigarettes. The launch was strategically timed to coincide with the opening of new (Philip Morris-sponsored) smoking lounges in Denver's new International Airport (DIA, 1995). The inclusion of smoking lounges at DIA was quite controversial at the time, and would have been expected to draw crticism of the company. Objectives of the ad campaign (and its timing) were to help keep PM in the driver's seat on smoking issues in Denver at that time:

"OBJECTIVES:

--Maintain control of the story and preempt potential activists' criticism of ads --Reinforce messages of accommodating smokers. --Preempt possible activists' claims of victory in 'changing the form of cigarette advertising"... --Frame appropriate messages regarding ETS and accommodation issues." The plan included training spokespeople in advance of the ad campaign "to counter activist positions [and]...incorporate accommodation messages into discussion of campaign."

The campaign even provided PM with "hooks" to create future positive stories and promotions for target audiences. Burson-Marstellar (B-M, the public relations company that generated the media plan) suggests that, in the wake of the ad campaign, "Specific accommodation storylines can be developed for pitch to women's book, gay books, restaurant magazines/inserts, etc." B-M also suggested that PM "[Develop] promotions to 'make smoker feel like a hero'".

PM has long held that the intent of its cigarette advertising is merely to convince smokers to switch brands, but this document shows an intent that is actually quite different. The cigarette company used this ad campaign:

1) To take the focus off tobacco as a public health problem and turn the discussion instead into one of economics and "accommodation,"

2) as a shield to pre-empt criticism of its actions and products,

3) To minimize public health messages about tobacco and secondhand smoke and prevent these messages from taking the forefront,

3) To provide the company with access to major media in a way that gave the company control over the coverage it received.

4) To launch other, similar efforts and campaigns around the country and to obtain further "positive" coverage for the company's brands and smoking in general.

In the 1970s, the Brown and Williamson Tobacco Comany (B&W) developed a brand of "low gas" cigarettes called FACT. The ensuing ad campaign for FACT that actually drew smokers' attention to some of the dangerous gases (aldehydes, acetaldehyde, priopionaldehyde, acrolein) that are present in cigarette smoke. FACT was aimed at the health-conscious smoker, much like Lorillard Tobacco Company's Kent cigarettes with the Micronite filter of the 1950s.

This 1978 B&W memo, however, indicates that B&W's management eventually saw tremendous danger in this type of marketing, saying

"B&W should not pursue a new product positioned as a low gas-low 'tar'...

...We do not support definition in advertising of the problem of gas in order to specifically communicate its consumer benefit and distinguish it from low 'tar.' To supply such a definition would require overt references to the alleged ciliatoxic and cardiovascular ill effects of smoking. The possible ramifications of this in the Legal, Regulatory and Policy area are appalling....A likely result of such activity on our part would be escalation of quitting rates among smokers...

This Tobacco Institute document shows how the tobacco industry scares the health care industry out of supporting increased taxes on cigarettes. The paper describes an ad campaign that portrays doctors as money-grubbing party-hounds and hospital firms as greedy profiteers. The tobacco industry also tries to make it appear as though tobacco is allied with some health care groups in opposing the tax. "Goals:

(1) To reduce the eagerness of the health care industry to support higher taxes on cigarettes.

(2) To start positioning the battle as people with white uniforms on one side vs. people with white uniforms + the tobacco industry and taxpayer groups on the other side, rather than white coats vs. TI alone."

The document describes an ad campaign that shows a "cork flying out of [a] champagne bottle suspended on an intravenous solution rack, with IV tube running into arm of a partially seen person lying in a hospital bed." The doctors are partying because they are going to start making more money. The rest of the ad claims that personal choices about health care will become more restricted and that some other health care groups (like dentists, chiropractors and therapists) join the tobacco industry in opposing the tax.

The industry's political strategy regarding tax measures is specifically aimed at confusing voters, as described by the following quotes from a related document (Bates No. TIOR0020292/0307) :

"Make our hat whiter, make their hat blacker. Through involvement in two health care initiatives, blur tobacco's relationship to the health care community."

and,

"Create an environment where there are some doctors on our side (of health care reform) and some doctors against us--make voters a little uneasy about who the good guys really are." http://www.tobaccoinstitute.com/getallimg.asp?DOCID=TIOR0020292/0307

In this January 1988 speech to the Philip Morris (PM) Australian sales force, John Dollisson, head of PM Corporate Affairs Australia, describes the company as "at war" with public health advocates. On Page 13, he describes the sales force as "our most effective weapons" in that war. Dollisson displays extreme contempt for public health authorities, to the extent that he calls them "Meusli-eating, stool-watching joggers who know what is best for all of us."[Page 2] Dollisson describes the strategies PM has employed to defeat public health efforts in Australia: funding lawsuits against the government, supporting a "spontaneous" smokers' rights group, finding ways around state advertising bans, running their own ad campaigns during national "quit smoking" campaigns, using strategic sports sponsorships to deliver audiences to favored politicians, forming a "business/liberty group" to "defend freedoms and question the legitimacy of anti-business groups," giving away gold "Benson & Hedges" pens actually worth $10 that customers "perceive" as being worth $50-60, and much more.

In reviewing the industry's losses in the region, Dollisson complains "Worst of all, the government obtained approval to increase tobacco taxes by 5% to fund health campaigns, including ant-smoking campaign, i.e., we are funding our own demise." Talking about a successful advertising ban, he says, "That's not to say we will sit back and take it. We will be pursuing amendments, extensions, legal challenges, changes of government, etc., and most importantly stopping its spread to other states."

Dollisson ends his talk by listing what he perceives are the major threats to the industry. At the top of his list are "health claims." At the bottom: "industry/smoker legitimacy."

This document shows PM's contempt for public health authorities, and how the company fought public health efforts in Australia

This Tobacco Institute position paper was originally drafted by the Institute in 1967 during the debate over tar and nicotine labeling, but it applies strongly today to the idea of 'lights' and 'low-tar' labeling by the companies. The document is also important in light of Philip Morris' renewed interest in broadcasting TV advertisements. PM's use of the phrase "there is no safe cigarette" in its television ads without also stating that there "is no safer cigarette" is blatantly misleading.* As the document puts it

"It has been said that there is no risk of misleading and perhaps endangering the smoker by requiring tar and nicotine labeling, because of the warning of potential hazard. True, the smoker may be reminded that the cigarette is not absolutely safe. But he may well conclude that the cigarette is substantially safer. Indeed, that conclusion is virtually inescapable, since the very reason for the proposed labeling of tar and nicotine content is to encourage reduction of that content, thereby purportedly making the cigarette ‘safer’."

The document is stridently written and brimming with denials and obfuscations about the link between smoking and disease, as well as denials about the need to alert people to this link through appropriate labeling.

From 1984-86 the R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company ran a widespread print advertisement campaign aimed at convincing the lay public that a controversy existed about whether secondhand tobacco smoke posed any harm to the non-smoker. RJR's ads ran in publications like Better Homes and Gardens, Family Circle, the New York Times, the Los Angeles Times, Chicago Tribune, Cleveland Plain Dealer and the Washington Post, to name a few. The ads themselves sparked significant controversy, drawing fire from individuals and health organizations, as well as praise from smokers. RJR's document database contains numerous letters from people angry about these ads, or from people who wrote to correct the company or describe situations where either they or their family members had been harmed by, or suffered from exposure to secondhand smoke. In today's document, someone who suffers adverse health effects from secondhand smoke exposure has scrawled an angry answer to RJR on a copy of the ad and mailed it back to the company. Following (in the "Quotes" section) are both the text of the ad and the writer's response.

This Philip Morris document provides insight into the creation of "Dave's" cigarettes, a discount brand targeted at "YAMS" (Young Adult Male Smokers). The idea was to create a discount brand that would make broke YAMS feel as though they were buying by choice, not because they were broke. This presentation, by the advertising firm Young and Rubicam, describes the plight of YAMS and the gap "Dave's" would strive to fill: "Economic reality forces a trade down...Nothing comes close to cigarettes in terms of a degrading trade-down...In a category that is supposed to be a reward and indulgence, a discount cigarette stands for the antithesis of what smoking is all about. Therefore YAMS can't feel good about purchasing discount cigarettes when they have to. In their heart of hearts, they would like to feel that when they buy a discount brand, it's because they choose to -- not because they happen to be cheap, broke or desperate."

Dave's was designed to be that magical brand that would make it okay for YAMS to buy discount cigarettes.

To sell "Dave's," Philip Morris created a fictional cigarette company run by a fictional, independent, honest, hard-working guy named "Dave" who got around in a down-to-earth 1957 yellow pickup truck. Ads for "Dave's" cigarettes touted "Dave" as a youthful renegade who got fed up with the establishment and struck out on his own. There was no hint in the ads that the product was made by Philip Morris.

(One ad read:

"Dave was fed up with cheap, fast burning smokes. Instead of just getting mad, he did something about it. He read some books, cleared twenty acres and got to work. He put a down payment on a tractor and traded his lawn mower for a weather radio. And then it was just a matter of waiting for the final frost of the season and a new moon. In early April, Dave sowed his first seeds. A few sunny days later, Dave's Tobacco Company was born. Word spread about Dave's "different smokes." His tobacco leaves were hand picked, then barn cured and barrel aged for rich taste. And to make sure they burned perfectly, each smoke was packed tight. People started buying these new smokes that didn't burn fast and tasted great. They told their friends..who told their friends. Now Dave works for nobody but himself. And it all started with a few tobacco seeds..and a dream." [See the ad, The tale of Dave's Original Blend Link: http://tobaccodocuments.org/pollay_ads/Dave01.06.html]

Focus group testing showed, though, that if and when YAMS did find out that "Dave's" cigarettes were really made by the Philip Morris Tobacco Company, the felt disappointed and betrayed. PM minimized the importance of this finding, however, and pressed ahead with the marketing brand [see the PM document Dave's Seattle Research (1994) http://tobaccodocuments.org/pm/2045165728.html]

Shortly after "Dave's" hit the market, humor columnist Dave Barry wrote a scathing column ripping "Dave's" cigarettes:

I want to stress that I'm not bitter about what the Philip Morris Corp. is trying to do with the name "Dave." In case you didn't know, Philip Morris is test-marketing a new brand of cigarettes called "Dave's." Over the past year I've seen big billboard advertisements for "Dave's" cigarettes in Seattle and Denver. These are folksy ads; one of them features a tractor. The message is that "Dave's" is a folksy brand of cigarette, produced by a down-to-earth, tractor-driving guy named "Dave" for ordinary people who work hard and make an honest living, at least until they start coughing up big folksy chunks of trachea. .." http://www.s-t.com/daily/07-96/07-28-96/e02li154.htm:

A 1995 Wall Street Journal article also ripped PM's effort to deceive smokers with "Dave":

"Dave's Cigarettes" has become a trend setter in anti-establishment marketing. The promotional literature describes Dave as "an entrepreneur who believes in the value of home made products and the concept of offering folks quality cigarettes at the right price." Dave is such a populist he tells store owners he doesn't even want his folksy cigs to "mix with the 'corporate' cigarettes." Now take a guess as to which $60 billion tobacco giant owns Dave's? If you said Phillip Morris you win a half case of Red Dog beer (also owned by PM). Nowhere does Phillip Morris, in it's self-described effort to "convey cutting edge hipness," acknowledge it's relation to "Dave." Just being "plain folks" I guess. (WSJ 3/2/95)

Today "Dave's" appears to be a failed brand, along with another brand PM proposed to be targeted at young men (but that never made it off the drawing board), "Barking Fish" cigarettes http://tobaccodocuments.org/landman/2041490669-0681.html )

This R.J. Reynolds document shows how RJR uses advertising and special events to help increase the social acceptability of smoking. RJR planned to "Develop and execute advertising campaigns which show people in smoking-related social situations that heighten the social acceptability of smoking." The paper cites as examples RJR's VANTAGE "Pleasures" ad campaign [Samples of these ads are at http://roswell.tobaccodocuments.org/pollay/images/Vant03.01_display.jpg and http://roswell.tobaccodocuments.org/pollay/images/Vant01.13_display.jpg ]

...and ads for WINSTON and SALEM that show people smoking in social situations. RJR also planned to "capitalize on Special Events activities which reinforce smoking in public, highly visible environments and provide excellent political/thought leadership contacts to combat anti-smoking activists."

Cigarette companies insist that their advertising is aimed solely at reinforcing brand loyalty or getting people to change brands. This document shows that is not the case, that cigarette companies also have also used advertising to increase and reinforce the social acceptability of smoking and "combat" public health efforts to decrease smoking.

Philip Morris ran this advertisement in the Richmond News Leader on March 7, 1986. The ad attacks the Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone Company over its workplace smoking restrictions. The ad gives an idea of the intimidation tactics employers could expect from tobacco companies in retaliation for enacting smoking policies to protect the health of their workers. The ad says, "Never mind that world-class scientific minds have found no conclusive health risk to others from ambient smoke, information available to C&P for the asking." The tag line says the ad was "presented in the public interest" by Philip Morris USA.

Today Philip Morris' web site displays different point of view, saying:

"Public health officials have concluded that secondhand smoke from cigarettes causes disease, including lung cancer and heart disease, in non-smoking adults...We also believe that the conclusions of public health officials concerning environmental tobacco smoke are sufficient to warrant measures that regulate smoking in public places..." http://www.philipmorrisusa.com/en/health_issues/secondhand_smoke.asp

It remains unknown whether PM ever apologized to the Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone company for running this ad. The entire text of PM's ad is below. A clipping of the ad from the News Leader (showing it actually ran publicly) can be seen at http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/cgi/getdoc?tid=etk46e00&fmt=pdf&ref=results

This confidential 1993 Philip Morris memo shows that TIME magazine entered into an agreement with Philip Morris to merge its customer database with PM's smoker database to help PM sell cigarettes. An objective "was to create 'smoker' editions of TIME's publications" and to help PM "speak to smokers in innovative and highly targeted ways."

Selective binding is a computerized, database-driven binding process allows publishers to break out regional or interest-specific advertising and/or editorial editions of a given issue. Presumably, such a system would enable TIME to remove cigarette ads from issues of the magazine going to schools, however apparently TIME has not done this, as many issues of the magazine arriving at school libraries continue to carry cigarette advertisements. Photos of TIME magazine issues carrying tobacco ads that were mailed to schools can be seen at http://whyquit.com/ads/Time_Warner.html

TIME Inc., is the publisher of more than 125 magazines that carry tobacco ads, and five that don't.

Recently, the American Legacy Foundation (the organization set up by the 1998 Master Settlement Agreement to fight tobacco use) held a $500 a plate award dinner where it presented TIME magazine with a prestigious tobacco control award for “helping the American Legacy Foundation reach a national audience in support of the foundation’s educational and awareness campaigns.”

Several public health physicians strongly criticized Legacy's giving TIME this award in an article published in the March 4, 2005 edition of The Cancer Letter. [Legacy Foundation Calls Time Inc. "Hero" Of Tobacco Control, But Activists See Villain, By Kirsten Boyd Goldberg, The Cancer Letter, March 4, 2005 (Vol. 31 No. 9)www.cancerletter.com ] Legacy was also criticized for its action by the American Council on Science and Health in a February 4 editorial entitled, "TIME is not on our side," by Rivka Weiser, who said,

"While Time, Inc. has taken some steps to support tobacco control, it is shocking that the corporation is being given a high-profile award for its advancement of the cause. Time, Inc.’s four most highly-circulated magazines -TIME (its flagship magazine), Family Circle, People, and Sports Illustrated - which reach a paid circulation of over 15 million readers combined (and therefore bring in much advertising revenue), all promote smoking through their cigarette ads." http://www.acsh.org/factsfears/newsID.510/news_detail.asp

This 1975 document outlines the Tobacco Institute's plans for a "courteous smoking" campaign called "Cigarettiquette" to "dilute and counter the efforts of anti-smoking activist groups" and "aid in preventing the enactment of unreasonable legislation to prohibit smoking in public places." It says that the threat of social ostracism for smokers was "serious" but "not all that serious" because, "if the fear of cancer, heart disease emphysema could not diminish the popularity of smoking, we somewhat doubt that social segregation can." The paper further states, "We believe smoking is stronger than all its foes in and out of government."

Campaign plans included designing print ads that would avoid "the look of the tobacco industry's 'big dollars.'" Ads would portray smoking as a civil right, and promote the fear that government was taking away human rights through installing public smoking restrictions.

The industry, and Philip Morris in particular, has continued to use variations on the "courtesy" theme throughout the years to help avoid meaningful regulation of smoking. A few examples:

In Italy in 1987, the industry ran a courteous-smoking print ad campaign in four Italian magazines to discourage smoking restrictions in that country (such campaigns are usually in print due to their "thoughtful" nature): [See page -7806]: http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/dlv44d00

In 1989 an industry-formed smokers' rights club in Denmark called "Hen-Ry" was portrayed as a "courteous smokers' club" : (memo) http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/nbf87e00

In 1990, Philip Morris ran "courteous smoking" ads in the Pan European press and received thousands of responses: http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/rks19e00

In 1995 in Europe, PM ran a campaign called "Courtesy and Tolerance" that attempted to generate fear in Europe of the smoking restrictions increasingly being enacted in the United States: (Pamphlet) http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/buh52c00

...and of course, Philip Morris' cast its "Accommodation" program (begun in the U.S. in 1993) as a program to encourage and reinforce the "courtesy" of allowing indoor smoking in restaurants and other hospitality venues.

The theme of "courtesy," then, is used to help tobacco companies marginalize public health advocates and portray them as extreme, to undermine smoking restrictions, to boost the industry's credibility and to provide cover for the industry to foment discontent with governments over efforts to regulate smoking.

In 1994, the R.J. Reynolds tobacco company "orchestrated a massive, unprecedented public relations blitz," (1) aimed at linking tobacco control efforts directly to Prohibition in the public mind, even though the prohibition of tobacco has never been a stated goal of public health authorities in the U.S.. (Prohibition was an American social movement in the 1920s and 1930s in the U.S. that attempted to eliminate the sale and use of alcohol. It is generally considered to have been extreme and to have ended in failure.) RJR called the effort "Project Breakthrough." It was described this way in a planning document: "PROJECT BREAKTHROUGH

1. Objective: create a campaign which frames and answers this question: Does America want prohibition? Will we tolerate a puritanical wave to infringe, to restrict and possibly to eliminate personal freedoms and individual choices?

2.Goals:

* reframe the debate: efforts all aim at return to prohibition, either front-door or back-door.

* make prohibition a clear and present danger now in our society; give it pejorative currency similar to the tax and spend issue in the early 1980s.

* directly tie the anti-smoker rhetoric with the stigma of prohibition; that's what they really want.

* spread the stigma to others: who's next; alcohol, beef, pork, private property, logging, fur, cholesterol, motorcycles, and others.

The campaign had several different phases designed generally to instill fear in Americans that rules restricting smoking would lead to increased crime and smuggling, economic failure, inability to purchase and use a host of other products, and the elimination of civil rights and freedoms.

Sample Project Breakthrough ads can be seen at the following URLs:

"COME OUT SLOWLY SIR, WITH YOUR CIGARETTE ABOVE YOUR HEAD." http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/ogp61d00

"TODAY IT'S CIGARETTES. TOMORROW?" http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/dhp61d00

"NO SMOKING. IS THE GOVERNMENT GOING TOO FAR?" http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/ehp61d00

RJR ran these ads, and others like them, in 32 major American daily newspapers, plus magazines like TIME, U.S. News and World Report,(2) Vanity Fair,(3) ethnically targeted publications like Blacks in Law Enforcement,(4), and popular publications like Rolling Stone and People.

Other campaign components included direct mailings to individuals and a "video petition" sent to legislators in Washington, D.C. The campaign appears to have lasted about 4 years. RJR considered the effort successful, according to an October, 1994 update on the project prepared by Thomas Griscom, Executive Vice President of External Relations and sent to Charles M. Harper, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of RJR Nabisco Holdings Corp. Griscom's report claimed the campaign resulted in decreased support for raising the federal tax on cigarettes, generated 29,000 calls to a toll-free hotline, and put the Occupational Safety and Health Administration on the defensive, among other successes.

"Project Breakthrough" appears to have been RJR's response to a number of public health initiatives occuring at the time, including the broadcast of an ABC news program ("Day One") about spiking of nicotine in cigarettes, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration's efforts to regulate nicotine as a drug, a proposal to fund health care nationally through an increase in the federal cigarette tax.

This document shows that the creation and spread of the arguments that smoking laws are a form of creeping prohibition can be linked directly to RJR.

Rite Aid is a national pharmacy chain in the United States that claims publicly to be a health care company while also selling cigarettes. Rite Aid is currently engaging in a promotion with the American Heart Association claiming it is "taking a stand against heart disease in women." Large red posters touting Rite Aid's "healthy heart" campaign are located in Rite Aid stores, often near their cigarette displays, allowing Rite Aid to promote both cigarettes and health simultaneously. (See photos at http://www.rawbw.com/~jpk/stand/Pictures.html. Links to documents indicating Rite Aid's plans to make money selling cigarettes are also available at that site.)

Rite Aid not only knows that cigarettes cause heart disease, they have been protected from claims arising from that fact. Brown & Williamson signed a contract holding Rite Aid harmless against legal action taken for damages, illness, or personal injury arising from selling cigarettes, and promising to pay for Rite Aid's defense in court: http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/fzg21c00

Today's document is a 1988 advertisement for Rite Aid brand generic cigarettes, which Rite Aid apparently sold around 1985-1988. In addition to carrying the Rite Aid logo, the ad carries the U.S. Surgeon General's warning stating Rite Aid brand cigarettes cause heart disease.

This newspaper advertising recap from 1984 shows that cigarette ad placement in newspapers was a problematic affair. Philip Morris demanded that its cigarette ads not be placed near or adjacent to obituaries, funeral notices, unflattering smoking-related cartoons, smoking-related editorials, ads for other cigarette brands, editorials about heart disease, fire tragedies caused by smoking, or near editorials or articles that linked fires to careless smoking.

Placement of cigarette ads in publications has been a thorny issue as far back as 1935, when William Randolph Hearst wrote a letter protesting the placement of cigarette ads in the children's comic section. Hearst observed, "These cigarette ads in the comics seem to be a direct effort to teach the children to smoke cigarettes. I think somebody ought to tell the tobacco people, in the friendliest way and with honest consideration for their interests, not to try to make cigarette smokers of the children, not to try it openly and obviously, and in a way to arouse the protest of the parents." http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/glf39d00

Newspapers capitulated for their errors by re-running PM's ads a second time, or giving the company a credit.

In recent years, many newspapers have voluntarily discontinued running cigarette ads. Documents like this show that eliminating such ads also ended a host of headaches for newspapers.