Tobacco Documents Online

Type of Document: Memorandum (Lorillard), Market Research Report From: M. Yellen To: M.J. Kramer, President and CEO Date: September 15, 1964 Subject: Lorillard Sales Position Site: http://www.lorillarddocs.com URL: http://www.lorillarddocs.com/getimg.asp?pgno=0&start=0&bool=01124257&docid=01124257/4265

This document, Social-Political Context of Cigarette Sales and Use in the U.S. - 1987, analyzes problems facing the tobacco industry, including: the decrease in social acceptability of smoking, the increase in attemtps to enact local public-smoking restrictions, product liability suits, the possibility of advertising restrictions, federal excise taxes, and legislation to require that cigarettes be fire-safe. The document reveals not only the industry's attitudes on these subjects, but also tells us what it fears most and what, in the industry's perception, really works to decrease smoking rates. (Note: this copy is very hard to read, but readability is greatly improved by using the magnification function on the site). --> This document was found using the search criteria: 'Political and Confidential'

This 1993 Philip Morris (PM) document offers a thorough description of the strategies Philip Morris (PM) uses to achieve its powerful influence over legislators in the U.S. According to the document, PM has analyzed every part of a legislator's world and misses no opportunity to exert influence, even to the point of influencing legislators through their spouses:

"...We also make sure that we know the legislator's -- and his or her spouse's -- favorite philanthropies and try to support them."

PM provides legislators with trips to "promotional and cultural events" in nice places. One passage in the document cites a trip given a group of American legislators to Brussels, Belgium:

"We make sure legislators are aware of, and invited to, promotional and cultural events funded by Philip Morris. {CITE ALEC 1992 TRIP TO BRUSSELS AS AN EXAMPLE}"

The author also mentions several times PM's strategy of keeping itself out of the media by using third parties to "carry its baggage":

"...we try to keep Philip Morris out of the media on issues like taxation, smoking bans and marketing restrictions. Instead, we try to provide the media with statements in support of our positions from third party sources, which carry more credibility than our company and have no apparent vested interest..."

and

"...we create coalitions of third party sources to help carry our baggage on issues. For example, on excise taxes, we work with state and local CARTS, the acronym for Committee Against Regressive Taxation...restaurant owners on smoking bans...retailers on the minimum age issue...and influential groups like the Association of National Advertisers on marketing restrictions."

PM's strategy of eliminating discussion of health and safety issues by altering the focus of the issues at hand is also outlined very frankly:

"...Finally, we try to change the focus on the issues. Cigarette tax become[s] an issue of fairness and effective tax policy. Cigarette marketing is an issue of freedom of commercial speech. Environmental tobacco smoke becomes an issue of accommodation. Cigarette-related fires become an issue of prudent fire safety programs. And so on."

The long-term failure of American legislatures to enact meaningful tobacco control in the face of recognition of the epidemic of tobacco-induced disease is testimony to the effectiveness of PM's efforts to control the machinations of government in its favor.

This confidential internal Philip Morris memo marked "attorney work product" shows that in all likelihood Philip Morris (PM) masterminded the 1997 and 1998 Master Settlement Agreement proposals. PM lawyers first came up with the idea of voluntarily accepting a total ban on tobacco advertising and event promotions ("Project Rainbow") in return for immunity from personal-injury lawsuits involving their products around 1990--many years before the attorneys general of 46 states ever thought of suing the tobacco industry.

The memo reveals that that the industry considers some types of limitations on their advertising and promotion to be quite minor, but perceives they are of great importance to the anti-tobacco community. These concessions are valuable bargaining chips to the industry because they can give away something of little value to them and in doing so, avoid more serious restrictions:

"Some concessions that may not be very important to us are probably important to our antagonists (e.g. bans on vending machines and sampling.) Therefore, we may be able to achieve a compromise without offering the most we are willing to concede."

Clearly the Cipollone case "rattled Philip Morris' cage," as it seems to have triggered them to start thinking about how they could manipulate the U.S. Congress into protecting them by enacting the "mother of all preemption"--the assurance of blanket immunity from future lawsuits.

It is also amazing to see that PM was fully prepared a full decade ago to voluntarily agree to severe restrictions on advertising and promotion--and yet so little has been achieved towards that end by the government and public health officials. Indeed, when people try to ban their advertising and promotion for public health reasons without handing them a "plum," the industry cries that this is a violation of their first amendment rights.

If government officials, attorneys general and health groups only knew back in 1991 how much Philip Morris was prepared to give up, perhaps we would have some more meaningful restrictions on their promotional activities in place today.

This 20 page report/outline from the Philip Morris document site discusses the current (1990) status of the cigarette industry in the U.S.(consumption rates, quantity sold, brand activity, etc.). It also discusses cigarette exports and objections to exports, recent reports on smoking and health, and much more.

In a section entitled "Advertising," it points out that Dr. Alan Blum (described as "a noted medical antagonist" surveyed the appearance of Marlboro and Winston cars at nationally televised car and motorcycle races. Blum reported that at the 1989 Marlboro Grand Prix the brand name "Marlboro" was telecast 5,933 times, in spite of the Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969, which prohibits the promotion of cigarete brands on television. The paper states that "P.M. denied allegations that it skirts a ban on television."

On Bates page 2028467456 there is another section entitled "Advertising." Here is describes the real hidden reason for the tobacco industry's "It's the Law" program, and how this program succeeded in snookering a major, big-city newspaper into writing an editorial in support of the tobacco industry:

The Tobacco Institute launched major advertising and education programs "It's the Law" to stop individuals under 18 from smoking. It supports a legal smoking age of 18...In part, this is intended to undercut the Waxman and Kennedy bills. There has been tremendous dialogue on TV and in the press pro and con this action. The motives of the industry have been questioned. The Chicago Tribune, (December 26) states that the industry is behaving in a way that warrants praise, not condemnation.

This document describes the imagery associated with individual cigarette brands, which may or may not be intentional. Some of the associations are quite amusing. It is unclear whether this document was the result of focus group testing or not, but it appears that is was.

It is interesting that smokers of TRUE brand cigarettes are perceived as "Female -- very hyperactive, runs around in circles but doesn't get anything done, all activity, but no progress--flutter-brained, surface value only." Users of MORE brand cigarettes are female: "Woman -- liberated, but not ball-busting," and users of generic cigarettes are felt to be "Not mentally stable ...imageless,hobos, tramps, rag pickers."

This R.J. Reynolds document, A Qualitative Study on Yax-Phase II, relates the results of focus group testing done with young people (some still in high school) to find out their reactions to proposed cigarette ads that were designed to appeal to their inner wants for serenity, calm, romance, excitement, friends, fantasy, etc.

The surpisingly frank responses of some the young people often made great sense, and may have been comments that the cigarette company overlooked too easily. For example, when viewing a cigarette ad that had the word "America" in the headline, several respondents pointed out that "It is not appropriate to sell America when selling cigarettes." When viewing a cigarette ad with a backdrop of natural scenery, some respondents said they felt that "the natural scenery would be defiled by smoking a cigarette, i.e. the scenery and the product category did not really fit..." When shown an action-based ad with an actor engaging in a physical activity that was daring and challenging, some respondents said "They could not connect the activities shown with smoking, i.e., 'how could someone in that position be smoking a cigarette.'"

Aside from helping us understand how cigarette companies position their advertising to appeal to young people's psychological desires, this document shows us that young people deserve credit for pointing out the obvious absurdities of such ads.

This is a letter to the president of R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company from a market research firm proposing that RJR "tap into the next generation"of "future customers of your cigarettes" by creating a children's video advertising Camel products.

The letter says,

"Children love cartoons and these can be incorporated into the purchasing of cartons/packets of Camel cigarettes...The camel symbol can be transformed into a moving, talking animated cartoon for children. It can also include the actual footage of visiting live camels in the zoo and in their native environment. Children love to watch animals (repeateability) and this video can incorporate an education/entertainment theme. How often smokers are told, 'It is a bad example for children in our home to see you smoke.' Here is a positive way to enhance the image of R.J. Reynolds in the home--to engrain a positive image of the company to the children and non-smoker while linking the video to purchase of cigarettes."

As stated on the University of California San Francisco site (where the document is also posted), RJR can claim that they never used this document, but it does illustrate their knowledge of the power of cartoons in marketing to youngsters.

In this letter, Horace Kornegay (then president of the Tobacco Institute) castigates the Occidental Life Insurance Company for running ads that "suggest that an individual may remove himself or herself from a relatively high-risk disease groups merely by becoming a non-smoker." Kornegay says that by doing so, Occidental Life is "oversimplify serious health questions" and might be "misleading the public."

Shows that Philip Morris intended to get around a total ban on advertising in Singapore by introducing a wine cooler (made by its winery in Australia) with the same brand name as the cigarette they wanted to introduce in that country.

This Philip Morris memo was selected as a Trial Exhibit by the state of Minnesota in its lawsuit against the industry. In it, George Weissman, Chairman of Philip Morris, discusses where the industry's stance on the health issue has led them, and where it may take them in the future. (The stance was essentially that "the case is not proven" against cigarettes.) Weissman says the company's position had been a plus saying "We bought time, in the past and for the future."

Weissman says one negative of the stance has been the company's lost credibility in government, scientific and public circles, and laments the "morale problem" is has caused "among our own employees and prospective employees to some degree." He admits that

"...the credibility gap has been incurred because fundamentally we have nothing positive to offer...Instead, our answers for 15 years have been 'not proven' or quoting favorable surveys which were in the minority of so-called scientific reports. But even the favorable surveys always have some element our enemies can turn against us..."

Still, Weissman says the company shouldn't abandon its disastrous stance, but says that he is simply pointing out "the difficulties posed when a manufacturer moves against an avalanche of government and do-gooders."

Weissman points out that the company needs to appear responsible and credible, and portray smoking "as an adult habit."

Contrary to what the tobacco industry usually says about advertising (that the purpose of cigarette ads is to get people to change brands rather than to get them to take up smoking), Weissman says,

"If you want to stretch a legal point, any ad we put in is an invitation for people to smoke."

This 1996 Philip Morris (PM) memo from a Philip Morris Issues Manager demonstrates PM's strategy to target legislators with "issue advertising." Issue advertising is advertising that Philip Morris creates to make a favorable impression on legislators.

In this memo, the cigarette company's government affairs and media specialists discuss plans to rent ad space on hundreds of taxi cabs in New Orleans at the time when a meeting of the National Conference of State Legislators was in town, because, after all:

"During NCSL, state legislators and their families may take a lot of cab rides."

The memo also suggests they consider including 501(c)(3) groups (nonprofit groups) in the plan. Philip Morris set up and/or backed numerous nonprofit groups that served its interests, like smokers rights groups, groups against government intervention, etc. It is likely that these are the types of nonprofit groups that the writer, Josh Slavitt, is referring to.

This letter sent to the Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corporation's marketing department exposes in detail the behind-the-scenes activities cigarette companies go through to get cigarettes placed into major movies.

It is quite revealing. Little do today's moviegoers realize the extent to which they are being be advertised to when viewing major movies. Little do they realize either that (much to the corporations' glee) they are actually paying for the "privilege" of absorbing this unique subliminal advertising.

The writer of this document explains to B & W:

"Cigarettes as Props

1. Recently there have been a number of high-visibility feature films in which one or more of the central characters smoke a particular brand of cigarettes. This has been happening because cigarette manufacturers have been paying for the exposure. Following are some notable examples:

Movie Actor/Character Brand

"Continental Divide" John Belushi Marlboro "Superman II" Margot Kidder Marlboro "Pennies from Heaven" Steve Martin Camel "Prince of the City" Treat Williams & Merit or key supporting players Marlboro "Absence of Malice" Sally Fields Carleton

Participation in movies is not limited merely to actors smoking a particular brand. For example, 'Superman II' also included a classic fight scene in which Superman and the bad guys throw a Marlboro truck back and forth at each other on Lexington Avenue. This truck was produced solely for the movie and exists nowhere else. There are other instances of cigarette advertising serving as part of the scenery (c.f. 'Neighbors', 'Pennies from Heaven')."

Under the section entitled "RATIONALE," the writer explains that:

"By appearing in movies, RALEIGH will be receiving an implied third party endorsement. In the movie context this endorsement is considered very impactful since unlike the passive exposure of advertising and PR, the movie exposure requires a pro-active role for the viewer (i.e, the viewer must _go_ to the theatre and _pay_ to watch the films)."

He also explains how the placement of cigarettes in the movies favorably impacts the audience towards the brand"

"...Although the placement _may_ not be consistent with RALEIGH's image, the placements will almost certainly be consistent ith some psycho framework into which the viewer wants to project. The Brand can become identified with something or someone that is desireable to a specific viewer set."

According to this document, the practice of paying to place products in movies is practically ubiquitous. The writer lists some other products whose manufacturers and/or service providers have placed them in movies: "Coppertone, Budweiser, Coors, Apple Computers, Kawasaki, United Airlines and American Airlines are a few other sponsors who have recently bought into films."

These notes from an RJR marketing meeting list various ideas for new cigarettes, including Project HIP, a cigarette for women, whose advertising was to depict "Female agressor in male/female situation," that would "position women as independent and in control in provocative situations." Would "exploit the anti-fashion trend," and possibly have "pearlescent filter tipping." Would be "built for the way women smoke -- e.g. smaller, more frequent puffs." The pack would be adapted for women: "Use a slide pack -- more elegant ritual to remove cigarette." One idea was to have a re-lightable cigarette with the ad slogan, "How to Save Your Butt." A marketing concept included "Humorous cartoon-like approach depicting ways to "save your butt," and "humorous series of "what can happen if you don't save your butt properly."

This letter from the senior vice-president of an advertising agency to the Vice President of the Lorillard Tobacco Company (makers of Newport cigarettes) was used as a trial exhibit against the tobacco industry in Washington and Texas. It accompanies a photograph of a child accepting a cigarette being offered by two well-dressed adults, who look on grinning broadly. The child may be the actor who played "Ritchie" from the reknowned 1960's-era American situation comedy TV series, the Dick Van Dyke Show.

This 1991 market research "creative presentation" was written for the Philip Morris tobacco company to market a new brand of cigarettes called "Battistoni" to young adults.

The research concludes that young adults of the time were heavily influenced by the rock star Madonna, craved control over their lives and suffered from "dimmed financial hopes." Building on these conclusions, the report states that this need for some sense of control over their world led young adults to create social action groups Greenpeace and Act Up.

The writers state that Philip Morris's advertising should "empower" young adults with "permission to smoke":

"In this era when smoking is under attack as dirty imposition on a just-say-no society, smokers need to be empowered with permission to smoke. For young adults, the single most powerful argument that can be made in defense of smoking is, 'no matter what others say, I am entitled to enjoy my pleasure because I chose it....' With the exception of Camel--who well understands defiance as part of the smoking experience--no cigarette offers smokers a way of saying, '______ off, it's my life and my pleasure....'

In a blantant attempt to disguise the addictive aspects of smoking, the advertising plan says the company must manipulate the "target" (young adult consumers) into believing that it is " 'correct' or socially appropriate to smoke," and that that the brand must "help him justify his belief that the decision to smoke is calculated, reflecting his own free will" and help him "avoid feeling that a cigarette company is inducing him to smoke with advertising that 'insults his intelligence,' telling him what to do.

The writer cites the Joe Camel campaign as a prime example of how a cigarette company can respond to the new anti-smoking environment in a defiant way that appeals to younger people:

"In the U.S.A., Camel's new positioning reflects an understanding of how to respond to the anti-smoking environment in a fresh, new way that engages the sympathies of a certain segment of young Americans. The Smooth Character's mischievous wink endorses a defiant juvenile delinquency that sums up a certain response to authority and growing up."

This paper offers insight into how advertising companies play on human frailties to boost sales of a deadly product. It also shows the part advertising companies have played in helping tobacco companies undermine public health messages about tobacco.

This 1987 marketing document reveals an ad agency testing various themes about secondhand smoke on behalf of the Philip Morris Tobacco Company (PM). The ads themselves show how PM intended to respond to the public health threat caused by secondhand smoke from their products, and how the company intended to manipulate the public's understanding of health information. PM's ad agency described its mission this way:

"The purpose of the overall [ad] project was to look for a way to stem the ever increasing tide of legal restrictions on smoking. Philip Morris is looking for a way to avoid further legislation to restrict where people can smoke...It was hoped that disarming the issue of secondary smoke would be a strong device to slow anti-smoking legislation."

A major theme of the ads was that "the case isn't proven" that secondhand tobacco smoke harms nonsmokers, ironically the same theme that the tobacco industry used for years to reassure smokers about primary smoking and keep them smoking.

The people who viewed these ads were surprisingly savvy about the tobacco industry's intent and methods. The first ad, entitled "Scientist," featured a woman pharmacologist dressed in a white lab coat telling the audience that the case hasn't been proven that secondhand smoke is harmful. Participants questioned the credibility of the woman, pointed out that she was a pharmacologist and not a doctor, and that the purpose of her wearing a white lab coat was to manipulate the audience into believing she was a legitimate authority figure.

Another ad, "Black Man/White Man," equated smoking restrictions with racism. Participants had a strong negative reaction to this analogy, and pointed out its absurdity:

"...most disagreed that smokers suffer from discrimination. Non-smokers were quick to voice the fact that smokers can go anywhere, they just may not be able to smoke: 'How have his rights been violated? He can go anywhere. That's a bunch of garbage... ' '...it was ridiculous, because they can go into a restaurant.' Although some credence was given to the rights of the smoker, non-smokers were not about to give up their own rights. '...one smoker in this room would infringe on the rights of seven people.' 'The way I feel about it, my sitting here and not smoking is not bothering anybody, but if I was sitting here smoking, I'd be bothering somebody. So, he (smoker) is the one who is infringing on the rights.'

General comments by the focus group leader indicate the participants' cynical attitude about secondhand smoke ads in general:

"From listening to all six groups, several points were brought up that seemed universal across smokers and non-smokers: 1. The use of the Phillip Morris name as a sponsor for the advertisements was a definite negative. Smokers and non-smokers alike tended to not believe the ads based on the use of the Philip Morris name. One respondent stated: "...I wouldn't trust it because it came from the manufacturer and it almost constitutes an ad for smoking... I don't trust what a cigarette manufacturer would tell me about it (second-hand smoke)."

The tester reported that some participants felt "all of the ads were thinly veiled attempts to get advertising for cigarette companies back on the air." He commented that many of the smokers tested were "guilty" smokers who wanted to quit smoking because they knew they were hurting themselves. The tester pointed out that "For this reason, smokers were not anxious to jump on the bandwagon that says secondhand smoke isn't harmful to non-smokers."

Handwritten comments on the document, ostensibly by cigarette company representative or proponent, trivialize the public health knowledge held by the participants and request a toning down of adjectives like "all" and "many" in describing the universality of feeling among them. An interesting example is at the bottom of Page 2041096511, where the tester wrote that "There was a basic DISBELIEF across all groups that secondhand smoke is not harmful." The handwritten comment next to this statement dismisses this important obervation out of hand, saying merely

"Tone down. Bothersome."

This 1963 advertisement for Winston cigarettes targeted American Jews and ran in newspapers and Jewish magazines in 1963. The ad features a line of people dancing the hora (shot from above, looking down on the dancers). The text along side and below the photo links smoking with the joy of the Jewish holidays:

"Shevouth time is the season for many of the happiest celebrations in Jewish life. And at some point during the festivities...SOMETHING WONDERFUL HAPPENS. The music stops, then it starts again. The beat is faster, exciting. A circle forms and spirits soar into the joyous, lively world of the irresistible hora!

And certainly joy abounds in smoking when your cigarette is Winston, America's best-selling filter cigarette. The special pleasure begins up fron, ahead of the pure white, modern filter. That's where only winston puts filter blend tobaccos specially selected and specially processed for the best taste in filter smoking. Try Winston. Winston tastes good--like a cigarette should!"

This document (from Philip Morris' files) shows how the global tobacco industry fights efforts to restrict the advertising of tobacco products. The report was produced by Infotab (the international information clearinghouse and monitoring organization formed by the major multinational tobacco companies around the late 1970s-early 1980s to help confront the global anti-tobacco movement). The report discusses the weakness and lack of credibility of the global tobacco industry's main argument against advertising bans, namely the claim that cigarette advertising doesn't increase total market size, but just causes existing smokers to switch brands.

The document shows that this argument directly contradicts the truth. The reality, according to this report, is that the total cigarette market grows in developing countries in accordance with the amount of money the tobacco companies spend to advertise their products in those countries.

The author of the report, listed as Ron Tully (who served as Documentation Manager of Information Services at Infotab in 1989) grapples with how the industry can persist with such an incredible argument when the facts don't support their case:

"The general argumentation used by the industry is beginning to look extremely weak and the presentation of these arguments to the 'public' and 'opinion formers' needs to be examined in detail.

This is best illustrated in the advertising bans and consumption argument, where the industry argues that 'advertising does not increase total market size', yet we are presented with a dilemma in developing markets where the total market is growing and advertising expenditure is rising accordingly. How can we reconcile this?"

Tully urges the industry to "consider new arguments." He laments the tobacco industry's lack of credibility, comparing it to the respect and authority enjoyed by the World Health Organization:

"The anti-smoking lobby continue to coordinate their data on smoking through the WHO, providing respectability and authority which industry data is unable to match."

He points out that the tobacco industry does not have the credibility to put forth new arguments against advertising bans in a believable manner, and recommends instead that any new data the industry accumulates in support of a new argument be put forth by "a respected independent international organization" which "should be used to publish the results."

To help stave off advertising bans, Tully suggests that the industry invest in "a high dollar spend, over a sustained period of time to innovative campaigns aimed at an ill-informed public," saying the industry must "[meet] the challenge of anti smoking campaigns with 'real money', which means matching the anti-smoking groups dollar for dollar..."

In his conclusion, Tully frames health authorities and tobacco control policies essentially as competitors to the tobacco industry, warning

"Just remember, we lose more to the bottom line each year in markets as a direct result of policies pushed by the anti-smoking fraternity. Can we afford to let these groups continue their propaganda unabated??"

This report, prepared in 1994 for Philip Morris by a company called Marketing Perceptions, Inc. relates the results of focus group testing done to evaluate two names proposed for a new brand of cigarette targeted at young men: "Barking Dog" and "Barking Fish" brand cigarettes.

The name "Barking Dog" was meant to convey images of loyalty, "tried and true," "never bites" and "man's best friend."

It backfired completely. Instead, the document says in each focus group,

"Most of the men rejected the positioning. They weren't certain if, these days they could think of their cigarettes as 'my best friend.'... Some also suggested that there could be a 'negative spin' in interpreting the positioning, 'being dependent on your DOG'...In each group, men noted that a Barking Dog is angry, vicious, noisy, annoying or an intrusion."

As for "Barking Fish" cigarettes, as might be expected, "...Most found the images unsettling."

"There was general agreement that the pack with the fish graphic was 'the worst," immediately bringing to mind smelly, fishy, wet-tasting cigarettes."

Well, duh.

Kudos to the young men who recognized that cigarettes are far from "man's best friend," and to those who refused to swallow the "Barking Fish" hook.

These two Tobacco Institute advertisements appeared in the 1970s to cast doubt on the link between smoking and disease by turning the focus of tobacco-related illness onto people's personality traits. The first ad says that lots of things have been blamed for causing disease ("bread, butter, milk, sugar, cigarettes..." ) and suggests that people who use these substances "unthinkingly and excessively" are "special types of people." The ad suggests that "hard drivers" and "perfectionists" may have "used up their inherited capital of resistance to disease." While the piece claims this is "still a theory," its underlying purpose seems to be to cast doubt on the scientific certainty of the link between smoking and disease.

The ads appear to be part of a project initiated in 1967 by the Brown & Williamson Tobacco Company called Project Lighthouse, in which B&W hired the Tiderock Foundation to gather studies and personal commentary from scientists that cast doubt on the link between smoking and disease.

This landmark 6 page memo was written in 1980 by J. Kendrick Wells, III, Assistant General Counsel for production for litigation for the Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corporation (B&W). In it, Wells provides his legal analysis of a newly-proposed legal strategy emanating from B&W's parent company, British American Tobacco in London. The new strategy, known as "the Causation Concession," proposed that BAT (and hence B&W) "acknowledge the probability that smoking is harmful to a small percentage of heavy smokers."

The document contains the following stunning quote:

"If we admit that smoking is harmful to 'heavy' smokers, do we not admit that BAT has killed a lot of people each year for a very long time? Moreover, if the evidence we have today is not significantly different from the evidence we had five years ago, might it not be argued that we have been 'willfully' killing our customers for this long period? Aside from the catastrophic civil damage and governmental regulation which would flow from such an admission, I foresee serious criminal liability problems."

This 1997 Philip Morris (PM) Corporate Affairs Plan discusses PM's activities in Asia. Page 5 (Bates No. 2074188965) lists PM's "Regional Opponent Groups," which include health groups in Malaysia, Taipei, Thailand, India and Hong Kong. Included on the list are the World Health Organization and Rural Doctors in Thailand. The document laments a low smoking incidence in Hong Kong and looming further restrictions:

"...And in Hong Kong, where the smoking incidence is 17 percent (among the lowest in the world), the FDA's assertions and PM USA's proposals to address youth smoking are now cited as a basis for further restrictions [on tobacco]..."

The document also describes the real reasons PM sponsors the arts in Asia: to gain access to senior government officials (from Page 19, Bates No. 2074188979):

"The Philip Morris Group of Companies ASEAN Art Awards--an art competition involving sevel ASEAN markets that provides Corporate Affairs and management with direct access to senior government officials in each country and [has] given us strong relationships at the ASEAN Secretariat..."

The document shows that secondhand smoke issues were a priority in Asia, and that PM strove to hide its authorship of materials regarding secondhand smoke so as to get a better reception:

[From Page 38, Bates No. 2074188998]:

"The ETS book, although written and worked on entirely by Philip Morris, was issued in the name of the Asia Tobacco Council. As a result, it has been used extensively by the industry in many countries--which certainly would not have been the case had it gone out only under the Philip Morris byline."

It also shows PM's boasting of control over the media [also from Page 38],

"Earlier in the year, when the Asia Pacific Association for the Control of Tobacco held its annual meeting in Bangkok, we monitored the event... We were also able, discreetly, to manage much of the media reporting of the Conference."

In this draft speech, Lee Pollok (Executive Vice President and Assistant General Counsel for Philip Morris International) infers that cigarette smoking aids society's overall mental health by reducing stress: "As we observe the world today, we note that many of society's problems result from the state of our mental health or, putting it more simply, the mere difficulty of coping... Although I do not mean to suggest that cigarette smoking is any panacea for these problems, does it really make sense to bear down relentlessly on those who choose to relieve the daily stress of life through smoking?"

Pollok also claims that the public health issues around tobacco are "exaggerated," and proceeds to minimize the toll that tobacco takes on human life (and works off an assumption that he himself is unsure of):

"Nor does it help to exaggerate the public health issues involved. If today science were to develop a preventative or cure which would completely eliminate lung cancer, life expectancy would be increased by less than three months. [This fact -- as well as all others -- must be checked.]"

He also disputes the increased medical costs tobacco causes society, and infers that lung cancer is merely a disease of old age:

"And as one recognizes that lung cancer is a disease of older age and that non-smokers also collect social security and incur medical expenses, one recognizes the absurdity of the contention that smoking results in a financial cost to society."

The document also touches on the subjects of advertising bans, the absence of health warnings on packs destined for export, ingredients, public smoking and secondhand smoke. It ends with an unusual invitation for public health advocates to apply to work at Philip Morris, suggesting they could put their ingenuity to work selling Miracle Whip or Crystal Light:

"We never cease to be amazed with the ability of the anti-tobacco activists to come up with something new...We could certainly use such ingenuity at Philip Morris and let me say here and now, we would be glad to receive the resumes of members of the anti-tobacco movement after they become bored with the cigarette and health controversy. Who knows? If they still have a problem with Merit or Parliament, perhaps we could give them a go with Crystal Light or Miracle Whip."

This 1994 report to the Philip Morris (PM) Board discusses the onslaught of public health actions to regulate tobacco that occurred in the U.S. under the Clinton administration. It also discusses a television news show (An ABC News' "Day One" segment) that claimed that Philip Morris spiked cigarettes with nicotine to keep smokers addicted.

While the entire document is of interest, one portion near the end discusses the tobacco industry's inside view of the particular threat that accrues when smoking is focused upon as an addiction rather than a "choice."

In 1994, David Kessler (then -commissioner of the U.S. Food and Drug Administration or FDA) asserted that nicotine was an addictive drug intended to affect the structure and function of the body and that therefore cigarettes should be regulated by the FDA. This document conveys why PM executives considered references to the addictiveness of smoking to be a major threat:

"...The most serious concern that I have is that the adverse media attention...being leveled at the industry may ultimately impact on jurors' attitudes about our defense in product liability cases...But even if jurors do not believe that we 'spike' our products, they could nevertheless adopt a more skeptical attitude in the future toward our principal defense--personal liability...If he [Kessler] were to declare that nicotine in cigarettes is addictive and must be regulated, that action could affect the way in which jurors approach the issues of addiction and choice."

[Italicized emphasis added]

Widespread belief that smoking is a normative personal choice rather than an addiction is central to the industry's ability to continue to defend itself in liability suits. This portion of the document shows that the notion of smoking as "free choice" is undermined when smoking becomes widely viewed as nicotine addiction, which is actually a diagnosable disorder.