Tobacco Documents Online

This confidential Philip Morris document lists the arguments that the tobacco industry "must cover" in hearings for public smoking bills. Note the arguments that smoking bans discriminate against women, the disabled and blue collar workers while favoring white male executives, and the argument that smoking bans on airplanes will cause a fire hazard, because it will drive smokers into smoking in dangerous ways and places to evade the ban.

Today's document is a print ad that was apparently published by the Tobacco Advisory Council in response to a ban on smoking on British flights in 1988 "Welcome aboard This Flight to Glasgow. Will All Smokers Kindly Extinguish Their Personal Freedom.

This 67 page R.J. Reynolds (RJR) document is a run-down on how the tobacco industry deals with threats. In one example from this document, RJR was threatened by a government-instituted smoking cessation program, and worked to defeat the program:

In 1986 the U.S. Department of Defense initiated smoking cessation programs in all branches of the armed services with a goal of reducing smoking prevalence among military personnel to 10%. The RJR document concludes, "Reports indicate that such goals are reachable," and then says, "RJR is seeking to limit the impact of cessation program." The financial impact, RJR determined, was "Possibly as high as $1.8 million annually" in cigarette sales. RJR's "Action Plan" was to "Posture [the cessation program] as discriminatory and unfair toward class of individuals loyal to and serving their country." Specific actions to fight the program were: "Organize and maintain Congressional opposition to continuation of [the program]. Continue contacts with Department of Defense officials and individual services to limit the impact of cessation programs." (Bates Page 507604615)

RJR also planned to fight measures that would allow states to mandate more informative health warnings on cigarette packages, saying "This would greatly increase RJR's exposure to adverse results in smoking and health litigation." RJR put the potential loss at "upward of several hundred million dollars annually." The overall strategy to fight these measures was to "Focus the debate on the success of [existing federally-mandated warning label] provision in communicating health warnings about smoking to the public." Their "fallback plan" was to throw communities a harmless bone, permitting laws to be passed instead that would only "Limit scope of preemption so that it does not prevent localities from reasonably regulating placement of billboards advertising cigarettes." (Bates page 507604591).

To fight cigarette excise taxes, RJR's overall plan was to "Focus debate on excise taxes as regressive, working man's tax rather than 'sin' taxes or user fee." Specific plans to oppose taxes included "Reintroduce legislative resolutions opposing increase in excise taxes," and "placing favorable op-ed articles from noted economists in major and select local papers." Costs to implement this plan included fees paid to anti-tax front groups, public relations groups, RJR employees and the Tobacco Institute.

For the issue of environmental tobacco smoke (ETS), RJR says, "Increased smoking restrictions affect consumption, and the beginnigns of lawsuit exposure in U.S. offer prediction of things to come internationally." RJR deems the financial impact of smoking restrictions to be "Substantial (expressed both in consumption fall-off and defense and political costs)..." It's also clear that Philip Morris was the leader in fighting efforts to regulate ETS worldwide: "Action Plan: Evaluate effectiveness and decide whether to join the current international activities led by PM." (Bates Page 507604593).

This memo from Philip Morris (PM) shows the company's behind-the-scenes activities to combat voluntary and legislated smoking bans on northern European airlines in the late 1980s.

"OBJECTIVE: Persuade the management of airlines to adopt policies which permit smokers to enjoy cigarettes during flights."

The strategy was to get airline management to defer the bans while the tobacco industry's nonprofit front organization, the supposedly independent Center for Indoor Air Research (CIAR) performed "studies" of in-flight indoor air quality. The "research" (the outcome of which was evidently pre-determined) was to be paid for by CIAR so "CIAR then can be correctly named as a sponsor of the research--which will diminish the effectiveness of the anti's PR efforts to challenge the credibility of the research." The results of the "studies" of in-flight air quality would then be shopped around to strategic media targets:

"Via ETS Whitecoats, the results of this IFAQ [In-flight Air Quality] research should be published in airline trade press and scientific/medical journals in the Nordic countries."

NOTE: "ETS Whitecoats" were part of Philip Morris' "Whitecoat Project," through which PM screened and recruited a worldwide stable of scientific witnesses who were paid by the tobacco industry to make pro-industry comments on secondhand smoke issues. Their work was "filtered" by industry attorneys to assure it agreed with industry positions.

Other tobacco industry tactics for fighting in-flight smoking bans included

"...Organize a direct mail campaign to stimulate letters, postcards and telephone calls to Finnair urging that smokers be permitted to smoke cigarettes on Finnair flgiths. This campaign should target Finnish tobacco company managers, union/employees & shareholders. Wholesalers and retailers should also be asked to participate...[W]e should consider discussing in advance with Finnair's CEO, Mr. Potila, this 'market research.' "

It is striking to note that the tobacco industry portrays itself as an advocate of "free choice," while behind the scenes they work to combat voluntary smoking bans.

This R.J. Reynolds "Action Plan" describes the company's strategy for opposing the airline smoking ban of 1988 (which prohibited smoking on flights of two hours or less for two years in the United States). Plans were to divert attention from the health aspects of secondhand smoke exposure by refocusing the debate to another topic:

"Focus debate on cabin air quality and ventilation, not environmental tobacco smoke"

The document also lists plans to fight a federal law to restrict sale of cigarettes to people over 18 years old. RJR opposed this measure, and in arguing against it planned to change the focus of this issue as well, away from youth smoking: "Focus debate as states-rights issue..."

However, R.J.R. had a fallback position on this measure:

"Fallback Position: Accept minimum federal standard of 16 years of age in return for maintaining federal preemption of health warning labels.

This Philip Morris (PM) document outlines strategies and tactics for fighting legislated and voluntary smoking restrictions in Italy, Holland, Spain and Germany in 1993. It reveals PM's intentions to undermine and overturn an existing Dutch law restricting smoking ("Strategies: To overturn the Dutch short-haul train smoking ban before its planned implementation on January 1, 1994" p. 2501140159). It shows that PM created smokers rights groups in Europe and worked through them to clandestinely oppose smoking restrictions ("Develop Smokers' Rights Group," and "Mobilize Smokers Rights Group against ban," pages 2501140160 and 2501140159, respectively). It shows that PM was a leader in organizing opposition to smoking restrictions in Europe ( "...Work through NMA's" [National Manufacturing Associations] to overturn Dutch train smoking ban, to defeat smoking restriction initiatives in Germany, etc.).

The document also proposes a list of possible strategies PM could use to orchestrate an economic attack on the French airline Air France for its decision to ban smoking on all its European flights under 2 hours starting January 1, 1993:

"- Have smokers in EC cancel reservations on basis of the ban.

- Mobilize PM travel agents and allies against ban. - Mobilize Smokers' Rights Groups. - PM companies boycott of Air France. - Initiate cigarette industry boycott of Air France."

This 1994 Philip Morris (PM/Altria) presentation describes the cigarette maker's strategies to fight public health efforts in Europe to reduce secondhand smoke (SHS) exposure and counter activities of the International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC) and the World Health Organization (WHO). PM's objectives, clearly aligned with fighting public health, include "maintain debate on ETS science among EU legislators," "counter anti influence," "delay EU legislation," "interdict national legislation via [European Union] resolution on [Good Epidemiological Practices]," and "ensure legislation accommodates smokers."

The document also communicates PM's plans to use its typical hospitality allies to fight regulations on secondhand smoke:

"Build upon existing relationships with the International Hotel Association, European Restaurant Association and European Chefs Association to target advocacy on EU policymakers."

The plan's wording also suggests that public opposition to smoking bans in Europe was not forthcoming particularly among white collar workers and unions, and that therefore PM had to create opposition:

"Develop public opposition to bans among EU groupings of independent...white collar and public sector unions...using U.S. workplace kit."

PM strove to hide its overbearing influence from European media by using third parties:

"Create a European Tobacco Information Centre to disseminate third party news to EU influencers including policy makers and the media..."

The document further reveals PM as the driving force behind the creation of supposedly "independent" smokers rights groups:

"Create a European Smokers Rights Group to bring smokers' voice to EU legislative debate and to provide a network for coordinated actions and information sharing by national SRGs."

and

"... where gaps exist (Germany, Belgium, UK, Spain) create smokers rights groups to defend against ban threats direct[ly] with legislators and via the media."

PM was also behind the creation and touring of a bizarre front group called ARISE ("Associates for Research in the Science of Enjoyment"), an industry-funded "scientific" group out of the United Kingdom which toured Europe putting forth the message that a little pleasure is essential to stress relief and hence good health. In their public proclamations, ARISE members subtly grouped tobacco use in with benign, pleasurable and stress-relieving activities such as drinking tea, shopping, and eating chocolate.

The PM document further describes as a "THREAT" a European "directive for the protection of transport workers' health and safety" because it "provides for a de facto total smoking ban" on "all modes of transport operating within EU territory." The document further lists plans to fight this "threat."

The document also reveals PM's strategy of working through Libertarian groups to influence the media and to "communicate messages of tolerance and...extremism" about public health smoking restrictions.

Quotes:

EU legislative threat driven by IARC ETS activities • Introduce mechanism to prevent legislation on flawed epidemiology • Maintain debate on ETS science • Mobilize allies • Counter anti influence • Current EU transport threat EU - 1994/1997 THREAT

THREAT:

EU legislation to ban smoking in workplaces, public places and on transport, driven by IARC ETS study and monograph and ensuing media hype.

--Delay EU legislation

--Interdict national legislation via EU Resolution on GEP --Ensure legislation accommodates smokers --Maintain debate on ETS science among EU legislators... --Build support amongst Pan European groupings of business owners and employees for mobilisation against severe legislation --Build upon existing relationships with the International Hotel Association, European Restaurant Association and European Chefs Association to target advocacy on EU policy makers. --Encourage the European Trade Union Confederation to support accommodation vs bans via collaborating on a Pan European workers' attitude survey to demonstrate discriminatory nature of bans and wide support for tolerance in the workplace.

--Develop public opposition to bans among EU groupings of independent (CESI), white collar(CEC) and public sector (CEEP), Unions and the European Personnel Managers Association (EAPM) using US workplace kit.

--Collaborate with the European Tourism Action Group to promote economic impact of bans in Horeca and Transport sectors.

Counter influence of WHO, BASP and anti-cancer groupings.

--Create a European Tobacco Information Centre to disseminate third party news to EU influencers including policy makers and the media including positive scientific studies, public opinion data, favourable legislative developments, economic impact data, libertarian views.

• Expand ARISE network and through bi-annual attitude surveys (1995- stress in the workplace) generate maximum publicity for ARISE message of pleasure as beneficial to health.

• Create a European Smokers Rights Group to bring smokers' voice to EU legislative debate and to provide a network for coordinated actions and information sharing by national SRGs.

• Develop PM Communications tool on accommodation to support direct dialogue with legislators and allies.

• Encourage opposition to bans within EP.

• Encourage European Public Health Alliance and EP Health intergroup to prioritise non-tobacco health concerns with DGV.

THREAT: 1993 proposed Directive for the protection of transport workers' health and safety amended by the European Parliament to provide for a de facto total smoking ban with application to all modes of transport operating within EU territory.

OBJECTIVE: Obtain Commission withdrawal Of proposal in accordance with subsidiarity principle during German Presidency; ensure new proposal provides maximum flexibility in line with existing health and safety directives

STRATEGY:

. Reinforce and support German Government position to obtain withdrawal by promoting subsidiarity argumentation among other Governments.

• Mobilize international Transport/Health and Safety bodies using jurisdictional argumentation

• Reinforce UK Government position for withdrawal.

• Encourage through provision of legal argumentation, other governments to support German position (France, Holland, Italy and Denmark) via national transport groupings

• Determine feasibility of obtaining additional support from other governments

• Develop support for withdrawal among Commissioners and DG VII

THREAT:

Legislation banning Smoking in the workplace, public places and on transport driven by EPA, IARC activities, SCOTH (UK), ICAO and political opportunism

OBJECTIVES:

. Capitalise on EU Resolution on GEP to prevent governments legislating on basis of flawed epidemiology.

• Lock in and defend legislation that provides for accommodation.

• Defend against further airline bans and other key public impact ban threats in transport sector...

CONSUMERS:

• Support and expand existing SRGs and where gaps exist (Germany, Belgium, UK, Spain) create smokers rights groups to defend against ban threats direct with legislators and via the media.

MEDIA OUTREACH

--Communicate messages of tolerance, and US extremism both directly and via libertarian and smokers rights groups.

--Encourage a balanced coverage of ETS science via libertarian groups, independent scientists pre, during and post IARC study release.

--Promote examples of other low level risks, confounders arguments and other weaknesses of epidemiology via scientists and libertarian groups to undermine public confidence in science and to provide perspective.

--Educate targeted scientific editors on ETS science via scientific consultants.

--Encourage business owners to advocate accommodation via speaking opportunities.

This 205-page document from Philip Morris (PM) is a compendium of resources to help allies fight clean indoor air measures. It lists PM's restaurant objectives: "Preempt the need for legislated smoking restrictions," and "Develop allies in hospitality industry [in] opposing legislation to restrict/ban smoking." PM's objective for airlines is "Maintain smoking areas on airlines."

The document contains articles by PM's scientific allies and front groups that claim there isn't enough data available to determine whether secondhand smoke causes illness in nonsmokers, and that ventilation is the best solution to the problem of secondhand smoke. Also, similar to the document posted 26 September (entitled Restaurants and Smoking Restrictions, wherein industry consultant Peter Sparber suggested casting restaurant workers as carriers and spreaders of disease rather than the victims of secondhand smoke), this document contains articles with titles like "The Role of Aircraft in Transmission of Disease" and "Dissemination of Human Pathogens by Airline Travel" that, in effect, blame airplanes, flight attendants and passengers for illnesses that occur as a result of air travel. One statement in the report blames the airlines themselves for tobacco smoke pollution on airplanes:

"Tobacco smoke accumulation aboard aircraft is an indicator of inadequate ventilation. Airlines reduce fresh air intake to economize on fuel..."

Another statement cites unnamed "UK researchers" who concluded airline employees complain about secondhand smoke on their jobs because they may be "disgruntled about a totally unrelated matter":

"When two UK researchers looked at the technology of the aircraft cabin and addressed the human factor as part of the equation, they concluded: 'Industrial experience of Human Factors has on many occasions shown that complaints about an aspect of the work situation such as noise or temperature, become more frequent when the work-force is disgruntled about a totally unrelated matter."

PM's long-standing twin strategies of fighting smoking restrictions and claiming ventilation is the best solution to secondhand smoke stand in stark contrast to statements the company now makes on its domestic (U.S.) website:

"Public health officials have concluded that secondhand smoke from cigarettes causes disease... in non-smoking adults...Philip Morris USA believes that the conclusions of public health officials concerning environmental tobacco smoke are sufficient to warrant measures that regulate smoking in public places..." [PMUSA web site, 30 Sept 2003]

Perhaps most importantly, PM now quietly admits that ventilation really doesn't address the health problems posed by secondhand smoke:

"While not shown to address the health effects of secondhand smoke, ventilation can help improve the air quality of an establishment..." (Underlining emphasis added. Found in the last paragraph on the page on PM USA's current web site entitled "Policies, Practices and Positions -- Public Place Smoking." http://www.pmusa.com/policies_practices/public_place_smoking.asp

Interestingly, the above statement regarding ventilation does NOT appear on PM's International web site, http://www.philipmorrisinternational.com/

This 6 page document contains the 1994 testimony of American Airlines flight attendant Patricia Young, in which she urged Congress to ban smoking on all international flights. Ms. Young stated that when she was forced to work on smoking flights, "at times my tears and mucus were the color or coffee or tea." Some of the effects of her chronic exposure to tobacco smoke at work, according to her testimony, included chronic bronchitis, asthma, chronic laryngitis, chronic sinus disease and severe debilitating headaches with vomiting and diarrhea. Ms. Young stated that that "When asked by company employees...when smoking would be eliminated on all flights [Mr. Robert Crandall, Chairman and President of AMR Corporation, parent company of American Airlines] would smile, light up a cigarette, blow out the smoke and say: 'Does that answer your question?' " The second document in this group is a stockholder resolution to the AMR Corporation asking that AMR act to "protect the health and well-being of its passengers and employees [and] eliminate smoking from all American flights by January 1, 1995." The paper states, "The Board of Directors recommends a vote AGAINST the proposal."

The third document is a letter Mr. Crandall sent to Ms. Young responding to her request that he support a ban on smoking on commercial aircraft. Mr. Crandall's response is incredible when viewed in retrospect of what has been accomplished since that time:

"Dear Patty:

Unfortunately, I simply cannot make a public statement against smoking on commercial aircraft. While I could tolerate such a prohibition, a great many of our passengers continue to tell us that long flights -- transcons, etc. -- on a nonsmoking airline would simply be unacceptable. Additionally, of course, no U.S. carrier can go "nonsmoking" internationally since all the foreign flag carriers are much more liberal than we and a higher percentage of foreign than domestic customers smoke. A second consideration is our community relationships. As I'm sure you know, cigarette manufacturing is a very important industry in many of the states in the Southeast and particularly important in North Carolina -- where our Raleigh-Durham hub is located. Can you imagine the reaction of community leaders -- and the many thousands of people who work for the cigarette companies -- to an antismoking initiative by American Airlines? As you pursue your efforts, I hope you will consider their impact on others. There are a great many people whose lives and welfare would be adversely impacted by further antismoking legislation. In advancing your cause, I think you should carefully consider the other guy's point of view. In any event, I cannot do as you ask because doing so would damage our stockholders, our business and ultimately, many of our employees. We shall not oppose the spread of no-smoking legislation -- since I can understand the desire of many to avoid smoking's passive effects -- but we cannot advocate it.

Very truly yours,

R.L. Crandall"

Taken together, this brief series of documents give a look at the extreme difficulties and lack of support that flight attendants faced--even from their own employers--in their fight to attain a smoke-free workplace.

Early advocacy efforts to make commercial airliners smoke-free between 1969 and 1984 generally resulted in only modest measures enacted, such as creation of smoking and non-smoking sections of aircraft, and a ban on cigar and pipe smoking. In May of 1973, the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) required domestic airlines to provide ‘‘no smoking’’ areas aboard aircraft for consumer comfort and protection. The rule became effective July 1, 1973. In January of 1979, CAB modified its 1973 rule, making it more comprehensive: the new rules required airlines to segregate cigar and pipe smokers, ban smoking when the airplane's ventilation system is not fully functional, ensure that non-smokers are not unreasonably burdened when a no-smoking section is sandwiched between two smoking sections, provide a sufficient number of seats in the non-smoking areas be made available to accommodate all persons who wish to be seated in such rows, and expand the non-smoking areas to meet passenger demand. In 1981 CAB re-evaluated its smoking regulations and backtracked, eliminating the absolute right of passengers to a no-smoking seat if they arrived late for check-in. The Board also decided that aircraft with fewer than 30 seats should be exempt from smoking rules entirely, and that carriers should decide for themselves what level of smoking should be allowed when the ventilation is not fully functional.

The health advocacy group Action on Smoking and Health reacted to the backtracking by filing a motion to stay this loosening of the rules governing smoking on airplanes. This document contains briefs filed by the airline companies opposing the stay. Of interest is the statement by Kevin Kelly of Transamerica Airlines' Passenger Services Department, where he complains about that the stay would cause morale problems among employees, and that the new rules would make it take longer to seat passengers.

Also of interest are the discussions of segregating pipe and cigar smokers in particular, "requiring smoking areas consist of at least two rows" of the aircraft, rules that failed to limit the number of smoking areas in each compartment, and measures to provide specific segregation of cigar and pipe smokers.

This document indicates the difficulty airlines had in dealing with smoking and nonsmoking sections aboard aircraft, and how far we have come in removing smoking from commercial airplanes.