Tobacco Documents Online

The Roper organization was a market research and polling organization that was retained by the Tobacco Institute for many years. The Roper organization proposed ideas for studies that would help take the focus of smoking as a source of disease.

In this Philip Morris memo Thomas Osdene (Philip Morris (PM) director of Science and Technology) reviews yet another proposal from Roper. This time, Roper proposed the "Theory of Excesses," which assumed that some people were doomed to excessive behavior, and that as a result of their inherent nature, these people did things to extremes, including cigarette smoking.

In this memo, Thomas Osdene of Philip Morris critiques the "Theory of Excesses," and says that while the "thesis is probabably valid," that such a study should not be done for a number of reasons which primarily revolved around marketing and liability considerations.

One reason not to do the study was that such a study would not deter anti-smoking forces. Another reason was that a study blaming smokers for their illnesses would "alienate certain segments of the smoking population and in today's climate we need to keep all the dedicated smokers we can." Another reason was that could cause trouble for their beer business "which has its own battles to fight." Yet another reason was that

"An admission by the industry that excessive cigarette smoking is bad for you is tantamount to an admission of guilt with regard to the lung cancer problem. This could open the door the legal suits in which the industry would have no defense."

The last reason Osdene gave not to do the study was that such a study would convey to people that they have little control over their lives, and that "A tobacco industry sponsored study which suggests that [the people]are doomed to excessive behavior...does not constitute good faith on the part of the industry towards its customers."

This Philip Morris (PM) memo discusses a proposed research project to determine the addictiveness of nicotine. The writer, PM scientist William L. Dunn, announces that he has given approval for the study to be done, but says if the results prove adverse and show that the results with nicotine "are similar to those gotten with morphine and caffein, we will want to bury it."

This document was a Minnesota trial exhibit. It is a 'classic' and points out how the Tobacco Institute understood that if the industry ever admitted their product was addictive, their defense of "free choice" in liability suits would go right out the window.

In this 1963 document, Addison Yeaman, General Counsel of Brown and Williamson Tobacco Company, discusses strategies the tobacco industry can use to get away with continuing to manufacture and sell its products in the face of adverse sugeon general's warnings and dire health claims. This document contains the famous quote:

"Moreover, nicotine is addictive.

We are, then, in the business of selling nicotine, an addictive drug..."

Yeaman proposes the formation of a new "lavishly funded" research organization to give the appearance of researching the causes of lung disease, cancer, etc. because doing so would allow the industry to say:

"We challenge those charges [that smoking causes illness] and we have assumed our obligation to determine their truth or falsity by creating the new Tobacco Research Foudnation. In the mean time (we say) here is our triple, or quadruple or quintuple filter, capable of removing whatever constituent of smoke is currently suspect while delivering full flavor -- and incidentally-- a nice jolt of nicotine. And if we are the first to be able to make and sustain that claim, what price Kent?"

In this letter to Philip Morris, Inc. from a Marlboro Lights smoker, the writer makes the point that the Morlboro labels warn about the health dangers of smoking, but omit any mention of addictiveness. He pleads the company for help to overcome his addiction to their product.

This is the legal analysis by Shook Hardy and Bacon (SHB) attorney Patrick Sirridge explaining why the results of internal studies being done at Philip Morris by scientists Victor DeNoble and Paul Mele in the early 1980s on the behavioral effects of nicotine posed a danger to the tobacco industry.

At one point, after noting that DeNoble and Mele's experiments proved that animals develop a tolerance for nicotine (a hallmark of addiction), the SHB attorney warns PM counsel that this is contrary to the industry's position of not portraying nicotine as an addictive substance:

"...The bottom line is that the authors are maintaining that there is tolerance to nicotine, which involves both behavioral and phsyiological factors...It is obvious that such a report has undesirable implications for smoking and health litigation. Tolerance is frequently cited as one of the hallmarks of addiction. It is the industry's position that one of the classic criteria for addiction is tolerance, and that such has not been demonstrated in the case of nicotine."

Another passage by SHB says,

"...Thus, research such as [DeNoble and Mele's] strengthens the adverse case against nicotine as an addictive drug... The addiction view of cigarette smoking posits that cigarette smoking is influenced by circulating levels of blood nicotine. The DeNoble, et al. study is consistent with this notion...As with the previous point, this serves to strengthen the adverse case of cigarette smoking as an addicion."

Philip Morris ultimately fired DeNoble and Mele, destroyed their lab and experimental animals, and prevented them from publishing the findings that resulted from much of their work at PM.

Victor DeNoble now gives talks about his experiences at PM.

This 67 page R.J. Reynolds (RJR) document is a run-down on how the tobacco industry deals with threats. In one example from this document, RJR was threatened by a government-instituted smoking cessation program, and worked to defeat the program:

In 1986 the U.S. Department of Defense initiated smoking cessation programs in all branches of the armed services with a goal of reducing smoking prevalence among military personnel to 10%. The RJR document concludes, "Reports indicate that such goals are reachable," and then says, "RJR is seeking to limit the impact of cessation program." The financial impact, RJR determined, was "Possibly as high as $1.8 million annually" in cigarette sales. RJR's "Action Plan" was to "Posture [the cessation program] as discriminatory and unfair toward class of individuals loyal to and serving their country." Specific actions to fight the program were: "Organize and maintain Congressional opposition to continuation of [the program]. Continue contacts with Department of Defense officials and individual services to limit the impact of cessation programs." (Bates Page 507604615)

RJR also planned to fight measures that would allow states to mandate more informative health warnings on cigarette packages, saying "This would greatly increase RJR's exposure to adverse results in smoking and health litigation." RJR put the potential loss at "upward of several hundred million dollars annually." The overall strategy to fight these measures was to "Focus the debate on the success of [existing federally-mandated warning label] provision in communicating health warnings about smoking to the public." Their "fallback plan" was to throw communities a harmless bone, permitting laws to be passed instead that would only "Limit scope of preemption so that it does not prevent localities from reasonably regulating placement of billboards advertising cigarettes." (Bates page 507604591).

To fight cigarette excise taxes, RJR's overall plan was to "Focus debate on excise taxes as regressive, working man's tax rather than 'sin' taxes or user fee." Specific plans to oppose taxes included "Reintroduce legislative resolutions opposing increase in excise taxes," and "placing favorable op-ed articles from noted economists in major and select local papers." Costs to implement this plan included fees paid to anti-tax front groups, public relations groups, RJR employees and the Tobacco Institute.

For the issue of environmental tobacco smoke (ETS), RJR says, "Increased smoking restrictions affect consumption, and the beginnigns of lawsuit exposure in U.S. offer prediction of things to come internationally." RJR deems the financial impact of smoking restrictions to be "Substantial (expressed both in consumption fall-off and defense and political costs)..." It's also clear that Philip Morris was the leader in fighting efforts to regulate ETS worldwide: "Action Plan: Evaluate effectiveness and decide whether to join the current international activities led by PM." (Bates Page 507604593).

The letters that smokers write to tobacco companies reveal interesting interactions with the manufacturers of their drug administration devices. In this case, down-on-his-luck, long-time loyal customer of the R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company penned this very sad but hopeful letter to RJR's President, asking the company to help him out as a reward for smoking 2 cartons of their cigarettes every week for the last 40 years.

This is a handwritten letter to the R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company from an aging two and a half pack-per-day smoker who has emphysma, isn't eligible for Medicare of Medicaid and can't quit smoking. He fears for his life, and pleads with R.J.R. to proivde him with financial assistance to help him quit smoking. He says in exchange for the assistance he would be willing to sign a document relieving RJR of any liability.

This internal memo from Jim Charles, then a senior scientist at Philip Morris Tobacco Company (PM) to Thomas Osdene (then Director of Research at PM), inasmuch as admits that nicotine fits the criteria for a dependence-producing drug, as defined by the American Psychiatric Association's Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders. Ironically, Charles comes to this conclusion in the course of looking for ways to discredit a paper done by another party that comes to the same conclusion.

At 74 pages in length, this 1982 marketing research document written for Imperial Tobacco is the most overt and comprehensive examination of the smoking habits of children that I have come across. With alarming alacrity, it examines why children start to smoke, why they persist, and why they quit (if they can). It discusses their fears of health consequences (and their ignoring of same), beliefs about acceptance and rejection by their peers, their attempts to quit smoking, and the power the addiction has over them.

Among other things, the paper hypothesizes that since children start smoking due to peer pressure, that peer pressure could conversely give rise to a wave of youth quitting, saying:

"The more smokers who quit, the more pressure there is on those still smoking to do so, too. No smoker can put up with the anxiety that they might end up as the only person left smoking."

A chilling passage notes the power that the addiction has over children, saying, "The smoker, even the young one with very limited means, always finds money to buy cigarettes. Some willingly trade smoking for other expenditures including lunch; if they have just enough money for cigarettes or food, smoking wins every time..."

The paper also paints a clear picture of the child psychology of why we play into the tobacco industry's hands when we portray smoking as "an adult custom" and an "adult behavior":

"The child, though, is told not to smoke, not even to think about it. What better way, then, to feel grown up than by flying in the face of such an apparent contradiction and trying it to learn firsthand?...Rebelliousness and boldness, beyond curiosity, accounted for many early trials..."

The paper extensively covers a multitude of youth smoking issues.

If legislators, parents and youngsters alike could see how the tobacco companies have examined and drooled over children as prospective customers, the world might be a very different place for this industry today. But such documents have been hidden away from society, until now.

This 1978 internal Brown & Williamson memo shows that the company knew cigarette consumers were ignorant about the addictiveness and poisonous natures of nicotine:

"Very few consumers are aware of the effects of nicotine i.e., its addictive nature and that nicotine is a poison..."

Yet without the tobacco industry ever publicly offering the above information to consumers, it often now defends itself by claiming "everyone has long known the effects" of their products.

The most interesting section of this 80+ page R.J. Reynolds marketing document is from Pages 78-86, where it discusses how to turn "smoking negatives" into "product opportunities." The report lists the negative feelings that smokers experience, like alienation, isolation, loneliness, powerlessness and social rejection--and explores "product positionings" that the company could use to leverage these feelings into "marketing opportunities."

Examples:

"Self indulgent behavior/i.e. smoking enjoyment...increasingly difficult given secondhand smoke issue and social unacceptability...

--Restore belief that smokers smoke for pleasure...Depict smoking in guilt free situations (e.g. bars) to alleviate guilt...Associate with other indulgent products such as coffee, etc."

In a section on Page 83 (Bates No. 513866062) entitled "EMPOWERMENT LOSS," the paper discusses smokers' feelings of powerlessness:

"Ever-changing world creates feelings of being small, weak, unable to cope with changes...due to lack of power and control and personal feelings of helplessness. Smokers, in particular, are strongly affected by this trend given expanding restrictions, rising taxes/prices and decreasing social acceptability of cigarettes converging to impact the largely downscale (and thus less powerful smoker population. Smokers are overwhelmed by these dynamics and (in view of second hand smoke issue) readily relinquish power."

The paper then discusses how to turn these feelings of powerlessness and helplessness into an effective ad campaign for cigarettes (A goal is to "counter the antis story that smokers are powerless/addicted" ):

"Application:

General Opportunity for products which offer empowerment: Dimensions Power, Force, Might, Vigor, Pep, Fortify, Effort, Strength, Performance, Vitality, Potency, Activity, Ability, Fuel. Empowerment, Taking control, Taking on the system, David and Goliath, Not becoming a number.

RJR Applications:

• Counter the Anti's story that smokers are powerless/addicted. Emphasize Choice and smoking benefits: pleasure/stress relief/enhanced mental acuity.

• Continue to chip away at second-hand smoke issue..."

With great irony, the paper points out that smokers are "not joiners," saying the company needs to find some way to get smokers to "act together." It then suggests basing an ad campaign on the theme, "It's YOUR choice."

This marketing research report done for the Brown & Williamson Tobacco Company (B&W) in 1978 sought to explore the smokers' attitudes towards smoking filter cigarettes. It discusses the results of focus group sessions held among smokers in various cities in the U.S. in 1978. The report made B&W aware that smoking frequently begins during youth, and how it comes about:

"By far the majority [of focus group participants] claimed the motivation for this initial step [beginning smoking] had been peer pressure while they were in school. Others spoke of boredom in the military service as a contributing factor, or rebellion against parental or educational authority, or the fact that smoking represented 'forbidden fruit.' Or they said that they had begun with cigarettes to try and become adults, to look tough, to impress girls, or to have something to do in secret with a good friend."

Despite the fact that the tobacco industry often claims smokers are well informed about all the dangers posed by cigarette smoking, this report showed that these smokers were quite ignorant and confused about such basics as the tar and nicotine in tobacco products:

"...Only a very few of the respondents appeared to have given any thought as to what tar and nicotine were...Others advanced all types of definitions, descriptions, and ideas about what tar and nicotine did and how they acted...It followed, not surprisingly, that there was a proportionate amount of confusion as to what were the actual nicotine levels of the brands that these people were now smoking. In many cases even the units of measurements were uncertain..."

Despite such findings, no concerted effort has ever been made by a major tobacco company to explain to smokers what these components are or how they affect smokers' bodies.

In this draft speech, Lee Pollok (Executive Vice President and Assistant General Counsel for Philip Morris International) infers that cigarette smoking aids society's overall mental health by reducing stress: "As we observe the world today, we note that many of society's problems result from the state of our mental health or, putting it more simply, the mere difficulty of coping... Although I do not mean to suggest that cigarette smoking is any panacea for these problems, does it really make sense to bear down relentlessly on those who choose to relieve the daily stress of life through smoking?"

Pollok also claims that the public health issues around tobacco are "exaggerated," and proceeds to minimize the toll that tobacco takes on human life (and works off an assumption that he himself is unsure of):

"Nor does it help to exaggerate the public health issues involved. If today science were to develop a preventative or cure which would completely eliminate lung cancer, life expectancy would be increased by less than three months. [This fact -- as well as all others -- must be checked.]"

He also disputes the increased medical costs tobacco causes society, and infers that lung cancer is merely a disease of old age:

"And as one recognizes that lung cancer is a disease of older age and that non-smokers also collect social security and incur medical expenses, one recognizes the absurdity of the contention that smoking results in a financial cost to society."

The document also touches on the subjects of advertising bans, the absence of health warnings on packs destined for export, ingredients, public smoking and secondhand smoke. It ends with an unusual invitation for public health advocates to apply to work at Philip Morris, suggesting they could put their ingenuity to work selling Miracle Whip or Crystal Light:

"We never cease to be amazed with the ability of the anti-tobacco activists to come up with something new...We could certainly use such ingenuity at Philip Morris and let me say here and now, we would be glad to receive the resumes of members of the anti-tobacco movement after they become bored with the cigarette and health controversy. Who knows? If they still have a problem with Merit or Parliament, perhaps we could give them a go with Crystal Light or Miracle Whip."

While testifying in Florida's lawsuit against the tobacco industry in 1997, Philip Morris CEO Geoffrey Bible admitted that cigarettes were addictive and may have killed more than 100,000 smokers. He also said under oath that when scientists prove that cigarettes caused lung cancer, he would order the company's plants to stop production immediately. Here are the key portions of Mr. Bible's testimony: Mr. Motley [plaintiff's attorney]: Would Philip Morris agree that a single American citizen who smoked their products for 30 or more years has ever died of a disease caused in part by smoking cigarettes?

Mr. Bible: I think there's a fair chance that one would have, yes. Might have.

Mr. Motley: How about a thousand?

Mr. Bible: Might have.

Mr. Motley: A hundred thousand?

Mr. Bible: Might have.

Asked what he would do with his manufacturing plants if scientists proved "that cigarettes were a cause of lung cancer," Mr. Bible said he would "shut it down instantly."

Lorillard chairman and CEO Alexander Spears also testified in the same trial. He said he "didn't think any Americans dies of diseases caused by cigarette smoking." He also said that if scientists proved cigarettes were cancer-causing, he would continue to make cigarettes "until the government padlocked his doors."

Today, in 2003, under a section entitled "Health Issues," Philip Morris's web site says:

"We agree with the overwhelming medical and scientific consensus that cigarette smoking causes lung cancer, heart disease, emphysema and other serious diseases in smokers." http://www.philipmorrisusa.com/health_issues/cigarette_smoking_and_disease.asp According to attorney Dick Daynard of the Tobacco Products Liability Project at Northeastern University School of Law in Boston, Bible's testimony doesn't have any force of law, but could be "damned persuasive to a jury."

This marketing research report prepared for British American Tobacco (BAT) explores what visual cigarette design cues mean to smokers. For example, the report states that "longer [filter] tips are associated with lower tar, milder cigarettes" and are seen as being for the "more health conscious." Shorter, thicker cigarettes are associated with cheaper, harsher brands; paler paper suggests mildness; and darker tobacco indicates strength.

The report also discusses various types of smokers, starting with

1. ADDICT [handwritten in "hard smoker"] Total dependence, physical and mental. 40+ a day, smoked evenly throughout the day. Cigarette for breakfast, even in the bath/bed. Always have a pack handy. Generally brand loyal but will smoke anything if desperate. The "habitual smoker" is described as "more self-controlled than addict" (and at this point, the word "addict" is crossed out and the words "hard smoker" are handwritten in.).

While not written directly by a tobacco company, this document the acknowledges the existence of such classifications as "addicted smokers" and "reluctant smokers" without acknowledging the detriment these situations have on their consumers. Quite the opposite, the document classifies consumers this way for purposes of further marketing to them and profiting from their addiction and inability to quit. The report also recognizes that "health conscious" smokers are basing their choice of cigarette brands on nebulous assumptions and beliefs about visual characteristics of cigarettes rather than any factual information about how cigarettes really affect their health.

This is the famous 1994 testimony by the R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company (RJR) to the House Committee on Energy and Commerce, where the company compared the addictiveness of cigarettes to that of tea, coffee, Twinkies and even carrots. While not stated, presumably the statement was given by James W. Johnson, CEO of R.J. Reynolds from 1989 to 1996. Mr. Johnson should not be confused with another former CEO of RJR named F. (Frederick) Ross Johnson, who was quoted that same year in the Wall Street Journal as saying the following about tobacco: "Of course it's addictive. That's why you smoke the stuff." [Eben Shapiro, "Big Spender Finds a New Place to Spend," Wall Street Journal , October 6, 1994, p. B1.]

Six years prior to this testimony by RJR, the 1988 U.S. Surgeon General's report focused on nicotine addiction and stated clearly:

"Cigarettes and other forms of tobacco are addicting. • Nicotine is the drug in tobacco that causes addiction. • The pharmacologic and behavioral processes that determine tobacco addiction are similar to those that determine addiction to drugs such as heroin and cocaine." (http://www.cdc.gov/tobacco/sgr/sgr_1988/1988SGR-Intro.pdf)

In this 1983 confidential Philip Morris (PM) memo, James Charles (Vice President of Research at PM) writes to Thomas Osdene (Director of Extramural Research at PM) to discuss how PM could attack a Public Health Service report called "Why People Smoke." The PHS report affirmed the view that tobacco use is a substance addiction disorder. *(See "Notes," below) Charles warns that the company cannot defend against claims of addictiveness based tolerance, saying tolerance to nicotine is a "well established fact",

"There is one caution that should be considered before attacking the document. This third edition of the American Psychiatric Association's Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders defines substance dependance as...'requires physiological dependence, evidenced by either tolerance or withdrawal.' The key word is either. We can successfully defend the absence of withdrawal under controlled experiments, but we cannot defend tolerance. Tolerance to nicotine is a well established fact."

This 1972 Philip Morris Research Center (PM) scientific report was used as a trial exhibit in Minnesota, Florida, Missouri and Texas, and in the Broin case (the flight attendants' suit for injuries due to secondhand smoke exposure in aircraft cabins). It describes experiments done at Philip Morris that showed the number of cigarettes smokers smoke can be manipulated by varying the nicotine levels in cigarettes. The report confirmed a theory that smokers develop a "daily nicotine intake quota" and that they "tend to modify their consumption rate in order to maintain their normal quota."

The report states:

"Cigarette consumption rate, i.e., number of cigarettes smoked per day, was found to vary as a function of the nicotine delivery of these cigarettes. Specifically, as nicotine increased, cigarette consumption rate decreased. This finding supports the notion that smokers develop a daily nicotine intake quota and that when smoking cigarettes differing in nicotine delivery from that which they are accustomed they tend to modify their consumption rate in order to maintain their normal quota."

This confidential 1982 RJR memo was featured as an exhibit last week in the United States' Department of Justice case against the tobacco industry. It was written by Diane S. Burrows of RJR's Marketing Development Department and was used to demonstrate the marketing of cigarettes to youth. The memo discusses the effects that price increases have on cigarette sales and points out that price affects the incidence of smoking (the rate at which people start to smoke). It contains a chart describing the price elasticity of various groups of smokers by age. One group listed is "TEENS 12-17." Page two of Burrow's memo states, "...[T]he loss of younger adult makes and teenagers is more important to the long term, drying up the supply of new smokers to replace the old. This is not a fixed loss to the industry: its importance increases with time. In ten years, increased rate per day would have been expected to raise this group's consumption by more than 50%." The memo shows not only RJR's interest in marketing cigarettes to youth but also the importance of this group to the industry and RJR's awareness of the phenomenon of tolerance (the need to increase the amount of substance used over time, which is one of the diagnostic criteria for substance dependence).

This typewritten, post-holiday greeting card was sent to R.J. Reynolds (RJR) by a five pack-a-day smoker of Salem Preferred Light 100's. After describing obstacles she encountered over the holidays (difficulties in keeping herself supplied with Salem cigarettes, persistent family complaints about her smoking, an assortment of respiratory and cardiac illnesses, difficulty getting around the mall due to shortness of breath), the writer asks RJR to "keep those coupons coming" because her Salems are expensive.

Despite the text describing multiple illnesses, she signs the letter, "A serious, heavy, healthy Salem addict since the tender age of nine!" A handwritten note at the top of the card (apparently added by someone at RJR) reads,

"Abuser. NR [No Response] 01-31-00"

Occasionally the letters smokers write to their tobacco companies are so bizarre that there is a temptation to believe they aren't real. This is one such letter. The handwritten notation on the card leads us to assume that RJR took the card at face value, and may also offer tacit recognition by someone at RJR that cigarettes are a drug subject to abuse. If the letter is real, the letter is emblematic of the irrational relationship smokers develop with a product that maims and kills them (even when the harm is already obvious).

Warning: The letter contains profanity. Full text is below.

This presentation describes the global tobacco industry's European front group "Associates for Research into the Science of Enjoyment," or ARISE. ARISE was funded primarily by Philip Morris, Rothmans, R.J. Reynolds, British American Tobacco and their food and drink subsidiaries like Kraft, Miller Beer and Nestle. The group was created as a direct response to the 1988 U.S. Surgeon General's report that compared the process of becoming addicted to nicotine to the processes of becoming addicted to heroin and cocaine. This public comparison of nicotine to heroin and cocaine statement sent up red flags in the global tobacco industry, who responded by forming ARISE (without letting the public know they were behind the formation of ARISE).

Page 5 of the presentation is entitled "How ARISE arose!" and says,

"In 1988 the U.S. Surgeon General said: 'Nicotine was as addictive as heroin or cocaine." The industry responded. A group of academics was identified and called together to: review the science of substance abuse, separate nicotine from these substances, act as a forum for scientists who think objectively."

ARISE participants were put forth as sociological experts who purportedly addressed the "science of 'pleasure." They stated that when people are pleased, their cortisol levels drop, and the immune system becomes more effective. When a person fails to experience pleasure, their immune system becomes depressed which leads to "increased disease levels including cancers, heart disease, ulcers and infections." Activities like drinking tea, eating chocolate, shopping and smoking tobacco, they rationalized, caused pleasure and hence enhanced good health. Participating in pleasurable activities like smoking, they claimed, thus gave people personal control over their lives which in turn reduced stress and improved health.

ARISE attacked the comparisons of nicotine to heroin and cocaine, railed against "forcing a 'uniform healthy society,'" and proclaimed that nicotine enhanced performance. They aligned smoking with use of food and drink, and activities like spending time with family, having sex and shopping. ARISE toured Europe generating newspaper headlines like

"HEALTH SCARES ARE BAD FOR YOUR HEALTH" http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/zhq37e00

"NINE THINGS MORE PLEASURABLE THAN SEX" http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/eko32e00

"HEALTH PURITANS ACCUSED OF RUINING QUALITY OF LIFE" http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/cld34e00

"PURITANS 'TRY TO RUIN QUALITY OF LIFE' " http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/pqc96e00

"THE EC AS A KILL-JOY PURITANS ARE DESTROYING PEOPLE'S ENJOYMENT OF LIFE" http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/oyh29e00

ARISE participants held conferences, published books, toured several continents, generated media events, newspaper articles, made video news releases, press releases, and wrote letters to the editor.

It was not disclosed that ARISE was formed and funded by the tobacco industry, or that the industry paid for extensive public relations campaigns for the group from 1988-99.