Tobacco Documents Online

This remarkable memorandum, written by lawyer Thomas Silfen of Philip Morris' law firm Arnold and Porter, comes about as close to soul-searching as a tobacco industry operative probably could. In the memo, Silfen muses about what can be done "to relieve the industry's long agony over health issues--to get the industry out of the 'it hasn't been proven' trap once and for all." Silfen mulls over the utility of the "hasn't been proven" stance, but discloses its shortfalls when it comes to litigation and public health:

"In litigation, we have sought to defuse the issue by adopting the slightly softened risk factor position: i.e., there is a statistical association which could possibly be causal, but the evidence is still not conclusive. Out of court, and especially before Congress, that position will not suffice. When the issue is public health not scientific proof, admitting that tobacco is a 'risk' actually highlights the hard questions. How big is the risk: is it 20% proven or 40% proven or 55%?... Given that risk, how many people die from smoking: if not 350,000, is it 200,000 or 100,000? What would it take to convince us that it is proven; are we waiting until every doctor in the world agrees? And what are we going to do once we are finally convinced; will we stop selling the, product, as some company officials have said in the past?"

Despite this, Silfen argues against admitting causation, putting higher priority on the image and liability problems that would be caused if the industry admitted that cigarettes kill people. Silfen counsels that abandoning the industry's long-standing "case isn't proven" stance without a sizeable scientific event

"...would look bad in the public forum and, perhaps, in court as well. More importantly, admitting causation leaves the really significant public health questions unanswered: What do we do next? Do we stop selling cigarettes altogether or stop advertising or submit to FDA jurisdiction? We are right back on the spot, maybe worse off."

Silfen envies the model of the alcohol industry, since their product has similar problems. He says,

"Why do we tolerate alcohol sales and promotion, despite the attendant death, crime and misery. Several elements seem to contribute. Everybody knows the danger of alcohol (or at least, we all assume that everybody knows). The alcohol manufacturers do not deny the negative aspects of their product and, in fact, counsel both moderation and adult use....as a matter of law, alcohol use is restricted to adults. Finally, we tried prohibition in this country and it was a miserable failure. That is the position we want for tobacco. Once a product is used only by fully informed, competent adults, all that remains (we would say) is prohibition."

However, Silfen recognizes a major difference from the "alcohol model":

"Cohen tells us that we have created an inconsistent information environment in which vulnerable smokers are able to disbelieve even the best known health warnings. This is, of course, a major difference from the 'alcohol model.' "

This is a fascinating look into the ruminations of an industry attorney who knows well the tobacco industry's track record for deception and who is left trying to find ways to get the industry out of the difficulties it created for itself by its history of denial.

This document is a "memo to file" written by Alan M. Darnell, a plaintiff's attorney who worked on the Cipollone case in 1987. Rose Cipollone was the first case in which a tobacco company was found partly liable for a smoker's lung cancer. Rose Cipollone smoked cigarettes for 40 years and died from lung cancer in 1984, four years before the case led to a verdict. The jury awarded $400,000 to Rose's husband, Antonio Cipollone. While this document was not written by anyone inside the tobacco industry, it is posted on www.tobaccodocuments.org and as such it is in the public realm, and it does provide a road map to the industry documents that were used with some success in the Cipollone trial.

This "PERSONAL & CONFIDENTIAL" 1981 Philip Morris (PM) internal memo discusses how PM and the tobacco industry should react to the publication of the 1981 U.S. Surgeon General's report entitled The Health Consequences of Smoking: The Changing Cigarette. The memo was written by Robert B. Seligman, Vice President of Research and Development for PM at the time, and was sent to PM's president, another PM Vice President, Assistant General Counsel and several high-level PM scientists. In the memo, Seligman states the need for the tobacco industry to begin supporting and publishing studies that would "reverse the ground swell of public opinion which has emerged as a result of antismoking activity."

Seligman says,

"... It is our opinion that Philip Morris (or the tobacco industry) take a more aggressive posture to counterattack the antismoking movement. We're suggesting funding studies (primarily outside the United States) with the intent to publish data which refutes specific assertions by the antismoking forces...." He also suggests PM study the action of nicotine in the human body and use the findings to enhance their products. As Seligman put it, PM should "Explore and define the action of nicotine in the human, and if possible, optimize products utilizing this knowledge..." Exactly why, in the midst of a memo primarily about battling smoking and health issues, Seligman brought up the need to optimize the effects of nicotine in the human body is not explained.

Seligman suggests that studies should be done to counter the existing studies on smoking and health and that they should be "controlled and sponsored by Philip Morris...to deal with domestic and international problems affecting the Corporation and its products." He further suggests "many of the studies would be directed to overseas laboratories."

Seligman states that the industry's "Response must be global in concept because adverse reports from any country immediately have worldwide impact..."

Several times in the memo Selgiman acknowledges that "despite the fact that there are potential legal risks in directly supporting and publishing [such] studies" that nevertheless the industry "must enter this arena." He refers to the industry's current situation as "trying to do battle without armament."

From this memo it appears that Seligman knew the legal risks of funding and producing studies specifically to counter emerging information about the health dangers of tobacco smoke, but that he felt PM should undertake these risks anyway.

This 1992 Philip Morris (PM) document about the funding of various research projects around the world indicates that there are a number of less-then-obvious reasons why PM funds research projects in various countries. The author of the document is Charles Wall, Vice President and Associate General Counsel for PM. According to the document, PM funded some research projects in part because the scientists performing them had good contacts with government officials and within the research community in that country: "While the research recommended for funding in 1993 through Tassin,Dusser, Molimard, Micheletti, Hirt and Symann is good, another reason for funding them is due to the importance of those researchers in their respective countries. For the most part, they have excellent contacts within the scientific community and the government and, therefore, are of assistance to Philip Morris..."

The document also makes it apparent that PM funded research simply to create a "presence" in a given country that might yield political benefit to the company:

"I view with some concern the research effort in Germany...Much of the research focuses on nicotine...There are a number of projects which could easily be canceled, or not started, that could save us several hundred thousand DM. ...Our scientists feel, however, that it is important to keep the research money in Germany, i.e., continue to support researchers in Germany... [W]hile Paul may not have any problem with the reduction [in funding], my guess is that he will feel that we should attempt to locate worthwhile research projects in Germany, so that we are in a position, in dealing with the German government, to point to ongoing research projects in that country. The relationship between the industry and the German government seems to be a good deal better than the relationship between the industry and the government in this country [the United States]. As I understand it, there are regular consultations between government and industry scientists, as well as constructive discussions regarding smoking-related laws and regulations. The industry in Germany appears to be more influential with the government than the industry in the U.S., and, for that reason, the industry feels it is important to maintain a substantial research presence [in Germany]."

PM also sponsored research in a given country in anticipation of litigation, in hopes of helping sway court decisions in their favor:

"Although I do not believe litigation is imminent in Germany, should it occur, the fact that we are sponsoring research...could be of substantial help in convincing a court that we are fulfilling our duty to conduct research."

This document is a transcript of a Philip Morris (PM) Corporate Affairs World Conference from 1984. It contains key speeches by people who were formatively involved in PM corporate affairs. It describes PM's attitudes and tactics for fighting public health. For example, it describes how PM pressed its food and beer subsidiaries into service to provide a "grassroots" response against legislative proposals to regulate tobacco. It also contains other telling comments, like: "We're now facing a global anti-smoking campaign...Here and abroad, passive smoking is a particularly dangerous issue because it supports restrictions on smoking where smokers spend nearly half of their waking hours--in the workplace. " [2025421661]

and

"We're increasingly sophisticated at reaching minority constituencies. Our pace-setting support for the [blank..presumed "minorities"] softens our controversial edges with influential friends." [2025421664]

The document also shows PM's battle-mentality against the will of U.S. citizens. Citing the company's first loss on a ballot initiative in the U.S. (in San Francisco,1983) a speaker says,

"Well we've learned from that. We've sharpened our weapons and the next time around, we did, in fact, preclude similar legislation in other cities in this nation and we'll do even better in the future...That's what we've got to do, over and over, year in and year out in city after city, state after state, country-- sharpen our tools, do battle..."

Perhaps most telling is the bizarre attitude expressed by Harvey Sapolsky, a professor of Political Science from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and a featured speaker at the conference. Sapolsky complains that society discriminates against smokers because people are no longer allowed to smoke while taking the bar exam, while waiting in hospital emergency rooms, or while serving on a jury. Sapolsky laments,

"A friend of mine a few years back [took] the Federal Bar Exam. And I assume it's a tense experience. I haven't taken it, but I presume that smokers who have taken that wouldn't mind lighting up every once in a while. But she wasn't permitted to do that. She was marched out every hour for a cigarette break out in the hall by a marshal and had to stand there and waste her time on her exam while the non-smokers were allowed to continue. I think that's unfair--discriminatory.

I've also seen clips in the newspapers that there are now jury rooms, I think the state is Oregon, where there's no smoking around. Perhaps it's more widespread than that. That's terrible. It's unfair to the people on trial as well as the people who are on the juries. And that's discrimination...

I accompanied someone to an emergency room and I was in the waiting room. And they don't allow smoking in the waiting room. That's discriminatory. People are waiting there for their loved ones, maybe a terrible accident and they're not allowed to show any signs of being human and smoking at that time. They're supposed to go out in the rain or something like that, [and] that's unfair. And something ought to be done about that..."

In his speech, Leonard Zahn (a public relations consultant to the industry) says the conclusion that nicotine is addictive is "the second-most serious problem...facing the industry today," and claims that the National Institute on Drug Abuse (NIDA) "are doing that to cover up for their failure to deal with their assignment--drug abuse."

This document reveals the antipathy and disrespect that the Philip Morris tobacco company held for public health authorities, describes the tactics PM used to fight these authorities, and gives us a look into the belief systems of key people who influenced the tobacco industry to engage in such a furious, behind-the-scenes battle against public health.

This is the famous Philip Morris (PM) document wherein William L. Dunn, principal scientist and leader of "smoker psychology" programs at PM, exhorts his colleagues to "Think of the cigarette pack as a storage container for a day's supply of nicotine...Think of the cigarette as a dispenser for a dose unit of nicotine...Think of a puff of smoke as the vehicle of nicotine..."

Dunn also summarizes the individual personality traits that distinguish smokers from nonsmokers, saying studies show that smokers have "greater anti-social tendencies, poorer mental health, greater reliance on 'external' than 'internal' controls, [are] more emotional, less agreeable, [have] poorer academic performance, higher incidence of prior hospitalizations...more auto accidents."

In perhaps the oddest part of the paper, Dunn cites psychoanalytic theory that refers to smoking as "pulmonary eroticism," saying in smoking "the lungs have become sexualized and smoking is but another form of the sexual act...."

This 1977 R.J Reynolds (RJR) presentation portrays "the international anti-smoking lobby" (public health authorities, governments and health advocacy organizations) as a global threat to the cigarette industry because the efforts "are aimed at making smokers stop smoking." It also shows RJR's complete denial of the link between smoking and disease, and the company's decision to take a "leadership role" in organizing the global tobacco industry to fight public health efforts to decrease smoking.

In excerpts taken from throughout the document, RJR states,

"These [anti-smoking] efforts, based on scientifically unproven arguments that smoking injures health, present a very serious threat to the industry and RJR throughout the world...The threat to the industry and to RJR is growing worldwide. Smoking is becoming less socially acceptable, smoking is becoming downscale, the incidence of smoking is declining, particularly among young adults...For the first time the Industry is organizing worldwide to fight this threat....It will be extremely difficult to counter this movement, but the economic consequences are enormous. We are prepared to organize and fund whatever efforts are deemed appropriate to protect the rights of the smoker and the Industry..."

The document shows RJR was boxed into a corner by widespread public and government acceptance that smoking is harmful to health, and their inability to refute this:

"The public universally BELIEVES that smoking is harmful to one's health and frequently causes disease and death. The governments of MOST western countries support this position. We cannot openly refute this position without increasing the threat to our ability to market out products..."

The document shows that RJR was not been satisfied with allowing smokers to follow their natural inclinations to stop smoking after receiving information about tobacco's harmful effects. The safety of its customers did not matter to the company even after three of the most world's most respected health authorities (the U.K. Royal College of Physicians, the U.S. Surgeon General and the American Medical Association) declared that smoking was a health hazard causally related to lung cancer, bronchitis and coronary disease.

The document reveals an embattled company--and industry--desperately trying to overcome the forces of human nature, as millions of people attempted to quit smoking, smoking fell out of favor with society, and governments acted on factual health information about tobacco use issued by respected global authorities

This rich document is an exhaustive report written by two members of British tobacco industry recounting a month-long trip they took to the United States in 1964, 8 months after the U.S. Surgeon General issue the first report on Smoking and Health. The purpose of the trip was to investigate the current status of smoking and health issues in the U.S., and research ongoing lawsuits against tobacco companies in the U.S. The authors (who are identified only by their initials) begin by saying that the executive officers of R.J. Reynolds, American Tobacco and Brown & Williamson "firmly believe that is has not been proved that smoking is harmful to health." They also say, "On this important point, however, Mr. Cullman (Philip Morris), Mr. Harrington (L&M) and Mr. Cramer (Lorillard) would hedge a little." [Note: In 1969, Cullman categorically denied, in testimony before a Congressional Committee, that smoking was causally related to disease. See http://tobaccodocuments.org/landman/TIMN0124175-4186.html] The authors also point out the dilemma U.S. cigarette manufacturers faced by performing in-house smoking and health research, and the road they ultimately chose to follow: [From Page 16]:

"The [U.S.] manufacturers have to choose between - (a) Doing no smoking and health research and being represented in law suits as negligent (although "to meet public concern", they finance CTR and AMA research) [and] (b) Doing smoking and health research and being forced to admit in law suits that their experiments have caused cancer in animals and yet that they have made no changes in tobacco smoke to eliminate the tumours. The manufacturers have chosen (a)..."

The U.S. cigarette manufacturers also feared British tobacco companies' internal bioassay research programs would be construed as an admission that cigarettes caused disease. [Page 8]:

"The main criticism of TRC's research programme was that bio-assay research at Harrogate was an implied admission that cigarettes are harmful...We agreed that Harrogate bio-assay research could be represented as an implied admission, but we made the points that TRC...research was based on the needs of the situation in the U.K., including...a need from the legal point of view to give no grounds for an accusation of negligence against the manufacturers."

The authors also describes Philip Morris' intent to hold back any breakthrough information on smoking and health until they could make a profit from it first:

[From page 23]

"...Mr. Cullman added that he could not say when breakthrough information would be pooled -- e.g. they might want to use it first themselves in their markets including the U.K."

The authors also point out that the American companies' attitudes and actions on smoking and health were driven by lawyers ("who exercise close control over all aspects of the problem"), while in the U.K., industry behavior was driven by the "necessity of avoiding clashes with the 'medical establishment' - i.e., the Ministry of Health, the Medical Research Council, the Royal College of Physicians, leaders of medical opinion, etc." This was because in the U.S., the "Department of Health, Education and Welfare has much less public status than the Ministry of Health." They also observed that the "A.M.A. [American Medical Association] appears more concerned with safeguarding the financial interests of doctors...than with the doctors' patients."

The document also confirms the industry's interest in youth smoking, saying [on Page 29]: "There was more anti-smoking propaganda in the schools but no sign of it being effective. The percentage of smokers in the 16-24 age group has not declined."

This report points out differences between the U.S. and British tobacco companies and how they approached the difficult issue of smoking and health in the two countries.

Philip Morris' proposal to organize a scientific conference about the benefits of smoking to "provide the scientific facts for a pro-cigarette public relations campaign" (see Doc-Alert posting of 7 Feb. 2005) was borne out. In January, 1972 PM convened a gathering of scientists on the island of St. Martin in the French Antilles "to reflect upon human cigarette smoking behavior." Dr. William Dunn of Philip Morris Research Center wrote, "It was hoped that such a conference would redirect the scientific community's interest to the fundamental motivation question" about smoking, and "correct for a dearth of interdisciplinary cross talk among those conducting research on smoking." The official sponsor of the conference was the Council for Tobacco Research-USA (CTR). The gathering was located in a warm tropical locale during the dead of winter, and PM picked up all the expenses for participants to attend. The roster of scientists attending was impressive. A conference objective was to re-direct the scientific focus on smoking onto the behavior of the smoker, and away from the dangers of tobacco use. To help disguise the true goal of the conference to the participants, PM changed the originally-proposed title ("A Scientific Conference on the Benefits of Smoking") to"Smoking Behavior: Motives and Incentives."

After the conference, Dr. Dunn wrote a somewhat flowery summary of the proceedings that extolled the virtues of cigarettes. This document contains the now-famous words, "Think of the cigarette pack as a storage container for a day's supply of nicotine...Think of the cigarette as a dispenser for a dose unit of nicotine...Think of a puff of smoke as the vehicle of nicotine..." http://tobaccodocuments.org/landman/2024273959-3975.html

Presented during the conference was an entirely new hypothesis about smoking, which proposed that smokers self-select themselves in an unconscious effort to modify a genetic glucose metabolism deficiency with nicotine. [Tobacco Institute Newsletter #83, 1 Oct. 1973, 500081795 at -1800]. The conference also examined the attempt of an entire town to quit smoking (Greenfield, Iowa, during the filming of the 1969 movie Cold Turkey, starring Dick Van Dyke--see Doc-Alert posting http://tobaccodocuments.org/landman/140507.html) and concluded that the people of the town had a high failure rate and that few people remained quitters after the experiment.

To spread ideas generated during the conference into the global scientific and medical community, PM compiled a 312-page book from the proceedings, published and distributed it to medical schools, clinics, hospitals and research institutions throughout the U.S. and abroad. (The book can be seen at http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/ywl94f00). A review of the book in the American Psychiatric Association's publication Contemporary Psychology noted that it conspicuously avoided the word "addiction," pointed out that the word was mentioned only three times in the entire book and that and two of these times were in reference to alcohol and morphine. The review writer also noted the "obvious omission" of any discussion about medical developments regarding smoking, attributing it to the fact that the conference was industry-sponsored. The book review was entitled "All the Dirt About the Filthy Weed," which did not sit particularly well with members of the tobacco industry (The review can be seen at http://tobaccodocuments.org/landman/2060489392-9422.pdf ).

The document referenced in this posting is a 31-page excerpt of the book.

This memo describes a discussion between Maurice C. Kaplan (a Philip Morris stockholder and member of the Board of the University of California San Diego Cancer Center Foundation), and Chuck Wall, Vice President and Associate General Counsel for Philip Morris. Mr. Kaplan considered the public relations needs of the cigarette maker while working to convince PM to make a huge grant to fund research into chronic disease at his university (UCSD). The memo describes the breadth and value of public relations benefits a cigarette company derives from funding medical research at such an institution.. Kaplan argued the "public attitude toward the tobacco industry has rapidly deteriorated" and that "the announcement of a major research commitment will improve the public attitude (and the stock value)" for PM. Kaplan also suggested that "such a financial commitment will do much to improve employee morale and productivity." Kaplan sympathized with the plight of PM employees when he said to Wall, "...employees must find it difficult to listen to the constant and consistent attacks upon the company without having their pride and morale significantly effected. How can they be proud of working for a company that is accused of making a product which causes hundreds of thousands of deaths each year? [Kaplan] argues that the company owes it to the employees to give them something about which to be proud."

Kaplan proposed that PM first test the waters by making a $50,000 commitment to UCSD over 10 years to fund research in cellular medicine. "If this commitment is well received in the scientific community," Kaplan suggested, "Philip Morris [should] follow with a $450,000,000 commitment over 10 years to other institutions in the same field."

Mr. Wall expressed concern that such a grant would draw additional accusations that the company was misleading the public into believing there is still doubt about whether cigarette smoking causes cancer. He was concerned that the institutions might refuse the money. He wondered to Kaplan whether UCSD scientists would be willing to speak out favorably about the commitment and defend Philip Morris against attacks.

Mr. Kaplan assured Mr. Wall that "the institutions and scientists will take the money because they desperately need it." He said he was confident that UCSD scientists, including a Nobel Laureate on staff there, would defend PM and the award. Kaplan further suggested that money for the grant should "come out of [PM's] advertising budget" because it would "be the best advertising of all."

This memo demonstrates the double-edged sword that universities walk when taking tobacco industry funding: While a university may desperately need the money, taking it confers a host of benefits --including increased stock value--upon the cigarette maker, and in practice constitutes a de facto form of advertising for the company, both within and outside its walls. The memo also shows the sticky dilemma created when a key figure in a university holds stock interest in a cigarette company, prompting him to advocate for the cigarette company while advocating for the university.