Tobacco Documents Online

Participants at a Philip Morris (PM) meeting were asked to brainstorm about what a headline should read for a PM-paid, full-page editorial in a major European newspaper. This document contains ideas from that brainstorming session. Some ideas:

Life Causes Death! (Explain how lifestyles differ, the importance of lifestyle freedom and diversity, and the relation between lifestyle and risk...

The Greatest Myth of the Century: Passive smoking is a pajor (public health) problem. (Explain why passive smoking is not a major problem. Describe how and why activists have turned itinto a giant Pink Elephant. Explain in detail how all the attention and resources dedicated to ETS/smoking distracts from more pressing political 'real life' problems...

Smokers outside: Are smokers drug addicts?...Explain clearly the differences between smokers an drug addicts as to ridicule the comparison...Focus on the increasingly common phenomenon of having to smoke outside...

Is American Intolerance/Puritanism coming to Europe?

Do non-smokers have the right to "smoke-free air"? (One of the claims often made is that N-S have the right to "smoke-free" or "clean" air...Develop arguments that show flawed logic, i.e., if we accept the anti's premise, then all cars should be banned also...

If stop smoking, the Stress Will Kill You! (Develop and support the argument that anti-smoking scare tactics lead to increased stress because of smoker harassment/discrimination which turns out to be a worse problem. Society needs its pressure release valves and if we shut off smoking as a pressure release, stress will build and be released in a more destructive manner than smoking. Use specific examples like the smoker who punched a flight attendant.)

Later in the document, employees worked to find a new name for "ETS," (environmental tobacco smoke) that would be "more representative of the issue." Some proposals:

Neighboring Tobacco Smoke Other People's Smoke Tobacco Smoke Remnants Trace Tobacco Smoke

The document also states "we must position [the antis] as extreme and unreasonable," and proposes ways PM could do this:

--Anti-smoking has become a profit business in its own industry. --Expose anti links to pharmaceutical/WHO, Mormons, bureaucrats, public health officials, other... --CDevelop arguments through research on antis and Intolerance, Zeal and Puritanism...

This report, found in the files of Victor Han (Director of Communications for Philip Morris Worldwide Regulatory Affairs) describes the threat that the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) 1993 rating of secondhand or environmental tobacco smoke (ETS) as a Group A Human Carcinogen posed to the cigarette industry.

"Indirectly, ETS will have considerable influence on all other tobacco-related legislation, including taxation, marketing freedoms, etc. Of critical importance will be the effect on consumers, practically deprived of more and more locations in which they can smoke, and psychologically given more incentive to quit."

The Philip Morris (PM) report characterizes the EPA as "at worst corrupt and controlled by environmental terrorists" and states that "...without an effort to build considerable reasonable doubt about [EPA's case against secondhand smoke]--particularly among consumers--then virutally all other efforts [to fight the ETS issue] will be diminished in effectiveness."

PM's strategy is laid out: not to fight the ETS issue on its merits, but instead to destroy the credibility of the government agency that declared it dangerous:

"The credibility of the EPA is defeatable, but not on the basis of ETS alone. It must be part of a larger mosaic that concentrates all of the EPA's enemies against it at one time."

The paper describes how the media's focus would be taken off of ETS by the generation of non-ETS stories, stories that focus on "general EPA bashing by credible, authoritative sources." and "EPA ineptitude and, when possible, corruption."

The 13-page report reveals Philip Morris' strategies for a full-bore attack on the U.S. EPA over its efforts to better inform American citizens about the health dangers posed by the company's ubiquitous and largely unregulated products.

This Philip Morris document proposes setting up a new front group called "Parents for Priorities" to distract attention away from tobacco issues.

The purpose of the proposed "parental group," according to the document, would be to "redirect the priorities of elected officials" and "force elected officials and anti-smoking organizations to focus on important public/community issues such as crime and education" (instead of tobacco).

The paper explains,

"For example, when [New York City activist] Joe Cherner offered a million dollars to the city of New York for anti-smoking advertisements, the parental group could challenge him to redirect these funds for more important community issues such as buying guns off the streets,"

The proposal says the parental group could be supported financially "via existing 501(c)(3) organizations," a technique which would effectively hide Philip Morris' involvement in the group's formation and activities.

The paper also proposes that the conservative television network (National Empowerment Television or NET)

"[dedicate] a news crew and programming to the health care issue as well as other challenges to the industry."

It recommends NET produce a pro-tobacco-industry news magazine show along the lines of CBS' 60 Minutes:

"NET could produce their own version of a 60 Minutes show demonstrating the industry's side of controversial issues such as FDA/nicotine and the EPA's risk assessment of ETS."

To fund this lofty endeavor, the propsal says,

"Since NET is a TV network, we could fund these activities via product advertisements from the food and beer business."

This document indicates how Philip Morris creates and applies front groups to influence public opinion, how it strategically uses advertising dollars to influence television programming, and how it uses its food and drink subsidiaries hide to the fact that a cigarette company is involved in generating this influence.

This 1995 budget for Philip Morris'(PM) Worldwide Regulatory Affairs office lists the company's activities to fight public health-tobacco control efforts around the globe during that year and what it cost PM to carry out these activities. It lists PM's consultants by name and/or company, tells how much PM budgeted to pay them, and lists the countries where PM applied this interference.

PM's activities included persuading restaurant owners, airport officials and employers around the world that they needed too install new ventilation equipment instead of banning smoking entirely, developing strategies and programs to protect smoking in the workplace, subsidizing construction and renovation of airport smoking lounges, working to prevent and pre-empt smoking restrictions, "slowing down the spread of smoking bans on international [airline] carriers," promoting acceptance of indoor air quality standards that would allow smoking, funding front groups like ARISE (Associate for Research in the Science of Enjoyment) and TASSC (The Advancement of Sound Science Coalition), funding of public relations groups like the Dolphin Group and Burson Marstellar to push their agenda, and much more. According to this document, in 1995 PM planned to implement the above activities in Brazil, Costa Rica, Japan, Sweden, Hungary, Switzerland, Hong Kong, Malaysia, Puerto Rico, Finland, Czech Republic, Korea, Belgium, Spain, Germany, Italy, Columbia, Poland, Norway, Gulf Council Countries (GCC), Argentina, United States and Australia.

PM's total budget for these activities in 1995 was over $17 million, which does not include legal costs for 1995, which are listed on Page 20 of the document. The total cost of legal assistance to PM's Worldwide Regulatory Affairs Department in 1995 was $25,785,000, which includes the costs of lawsuits against the ABC Television Network, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, and legal work on cigarette issues like ingredients disclosure and ignition propensity. The law firm of Shook, Hardy and Bacon alone was budgeted to make over $7.3 million from Philip Morris in this single year.

This Philip Morris (PM) Corporate Affairs plan discusses the company's goals, objectives and strategies for achieving them during 1994-1996 in the areas of Eastern Europe, Middle East and Africa (EEMA). One objective of PM's Corporate Affair plan was nothing short of "Stop the decline in, and start re-building to social acceptability of smokers and smoking in society." Reasons given for PM's concern about the declining social acceptability of smoking were the threat this situation posed to PM's profits, as well as the effect it had on the company's ability to recruit allies and influence government:

"While the ultimate threat is widespread public smoking bans...we also risk consumption decreases due to shrinking possibilities to smoke at the workplace as well as a deterioration of the social acceptability of smokers and smoking. With the lack of social acceptability, we will face further problems in ally-building and Government Relations work."

As part of its '94-96 plan on the secondhand smoke issue in this region, PM hoped to "...influence the setting of indoor air quality and ventilation standards."

PM also sought to take the focus of the secondhand smoke issue off of science and health: "The messages on ETS related issues will focus on solutions and accommodation, rather than on a scientific debate," and "We will encourage [Philip Morris Inc.] to initiate and fund research into the causes and consequences of social intolerance, aiming at broadening the political debate about bans / laws / tolerance in our societies."

The document also discusses PM's corporate activities on topics of excise taxes, fighting restrictions on advertising and sponsorship, strategies for corporate contributions and more, in the countries of Switzerland, Sweden, Norway, the Czech Republic, the Slovak Republic, Poland, Egypt, Denmark Austria, Hungary, Russia, Kazakhstan, the Gulf Council Countries (GCC), Baltic States and Syria.

This 1991 budget from the Philip Morris (PM) collection describes tobacco industry activities to "maintain the controversy" on secondhand smoke. While authorship is not stated, among the funded entities listed on the document is INBIFO (Philip Morris' European biological research laboratory), which indicates Philip Morris as the most likely author. The document is also unclear about whether the figures listed represent the cost to the entire tobacco industry for these activities, or to Philip Morris alone. We assume the figures listed are in dollars. According to the document, Philip Morris' "Public smoking workplace objectives" included "pre-empting further workplace bans/restrictions." Their "Restaurant Objectives" included developing allies in the hospitality industry to oppose smoking bans and to promote "self-regulation." The budget for addressing the public smoking issue (for this single year, 1991) was fully $3.95 million, and for their work with restaurants alone was $1.2 million.

"Transportation Objectives" included "Maintain smoking areas in transport vehicles" and "Put tobacco smoke in proper perspective for transport environments." The budget for transportation objectives alone was $465,000.

"Science Objectives" were estimated to cost a whopping $16,688,400 and included "Develop and support activities and research which maintain the controversy..." about seonchand smoke and "Maintain research activity...to provide support for our position."

Among the "Science Objectives" were "Develop[ing] and support[ing] activities and research which maintain the controversy" about tobacco smoke.

This Philip Morris (a.k.a. Altria Group or PM) Corporate Affairs Plan for Europe (1994-96) is rich with corporate strategies to reverse the decline in social acceptability of smoking in Europe. In the Plan, PM reveals its understanding that a huge majority of Europeans actually favor smoking restrictions in public places:

"Europeans are highly in favor of smoking restrictions in public places (82%) and 88% are in favor of clear separation in the workplace."

Despite this, PM planned to fight smoking restrictions with all resources it could muster.

PM viewed laws to protect worker health and safety as a threat:

"A proposed Directive was issued in early 1993 with the aim of protecting transport worker's health and safety...This is the biggest threat at European Community level which needs to be addressed."

The Plan also reveals PM as the organizing and driving force behind Smokers Rights Groups (SRGs) all over Europe:

"Smokers' Rights Groups (SRG's) are an essential medium for presenting [the tobacco industry's] views in favor of reasonable solutions because a) they have no commercial interest and, as such, are more credible voice than the tobacco industry and b) they are able to position themselves as a large but discriminated "minority" of individuals who have rights. The Plan foresees continued support [to SRGs] provided by PM/industry to the groups in Italy, Spain, France, the Netherlands and Greece to help them expand in both number of members and in influence."

PM lamented the lack of organization among Smokers Rights Groups and anticipated the benefits that could accrue if the company assisted further in organizing them:

"The real weakness of the SRG network is the absence of any co-ordinating body or secretariat which can share information, techniques and ideas between the various SRG's. We should examine the feasibility of creating a pan-European SRG secretariat or Smokers' movement to... have an organization that can rightly claim to represent 100 million European smokers (and voters) which could function as a central media and lobbying "voice". Rothmans Int. have expressed their interest in this project and would co-fund with us."

PM also planned to foster and promote misunderstanding between the people of the United States and Europe to promote its own ends:

"Europeans believe that Americans tend to be fanatical extremists went it comes to public health issues. We shall take this opportunity to use US-sourced 'ETS excess stories' (dismissal from work over smoking, career discrimination due to smoking, etc.) to help discredit all anti-smoking initiatives -American as well as European."

And once again, PM reveals its strategy of hiding behind, and working through, third-party Libertarian groups to do its bidding:

"The Plan calls for using libertarian groups (e.g., Social Affairs Unit, Arise) whenever possible to communicate this message..."

PM's Plan also explains the logic behind its urgent efforts to preserve smoking on airplanes, despite the relatively small amount of time people actually spend on airplanes:

"Although the time a smoker may spend in the air and at the airport may not constitute a large amount of time relative to the amount of time spent in the workplace for example, bans on airlines are highly visible and may disproportionately contribute to the deterioration of the social acceptability of smoking."

Only a few of PM's planned strategies are listed in this summary or in the quotes below. The document contains much more information and, at only 13 pages, is worth a read in its entirety, especially for Europeans.

This 1994 Philip Morris (PM/Altria) presentation describes the cigarette maker's strategies to fight public health efforts in Europe to reduce secondhand smoke (SHS) exposure and counter activities of the International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC) and the World Health Organization (WHO). PM's objectives, clearly aligned with fighting public health, include "maintain debate on ETS science among EU legislators," "counter anti influence," "delay EU legislation," "interdict national legislation via [European Union] resolution on [Good Epidemiological Practices]," and "ensure legislation accommodates smokers."

The document also communicates PM's plans to use its typical hospitality allies to fight regulations on secondhand smoke:

"Build upon existing relationships with the International Hotel Association, European Restaurant Association and European Chefs Association to target advocacy on EU policymakers."

The plan's wording also suggests that public opposition to smoking bans in Europe was not forthcoming particularly among white collar workers and unions, and that therefore PM had to create opposition:

"Develop public opposition to bans among EU groupings of independent...white collar and public sector unions...using U.S. workplace kit."

PM strove to hide its overbearing influence from European media by using third parties:

"Create a European Tobacco Information Centre to disseminate third party news to EU influencers including policy makers and the media..."

The document further reveals PM as the driving force behind the creation of supposedly "independent" smokers rights groups:

"Create a European Smokers Rights Group to bring smokers' voice to EU legislative debate and to provide a network for coordinated actions and information sharing by national SRGs."

and

"... where gaps exist (Germany, Belgium, UK, Spain) create smokers rights groups to defend against ban threats direct[ly] with legislators and via the media."

PM was also behind the creation and touring of a bizarre front group called ARISE ("Associates for Research in the Science of Enjoyment"), an industry-funded "scientific" group out of the United Kingdom which toured Europe putting forth the message that a little pleasure is essential to stress relief and hence good health. In their public proclamations, ARISE members subtly grouped tobacco use in with benign, pleasurable and stress-relieving activities such as drinking tea, shopping, and eating chocolate.

The PM document further describes as a "THREAT" a European "directive for the protection of transport workers' health and safety" because it "provides for a de facto total smoking ban" on "all modes of transport operating within EU territory." The document further lists plans to fight this "threat."

The document also reveals PM's strategy of working through Libertarian groups to influence the media and to "communicate messages of tolerance and...extremism" about public health smoking restrictions.

Quotes:

EU legislative threat driven by IARC ETS activities • Introduce mechanism to prevent legislation on flawed epidemiology • Maintain debate on ETS science • Mobilize allies • Counter anti influence • Current EU transport threat EU - 1994/1997 THREAT

THREAT:

EU legislation to ban smoking in workplaces, public places and on transport, driven by IARC ETS study and monograph and ensuing media hype.

--Delay EU legislation

--Interdict national legislation via EU Resolution on GEP --Ensure legislation accommodates smokers --Maintain debate on ETS science among EU legislators... --Build support amongst Pan European groupings of business owners and employees for mobilisation against severe legislation --Build upon existing relationships with the International Hotel Association, European Restaurant Association and European Chefs Association to target advocacy on EU policy makers. --Encourage the European Trade Union Confederation to support accommodation vs bans via collaborating on a Pan European workers' attitude survey to demonstrate discriminatory nature of bans and wide support for tolerance in the workplace.

--Develop public opposition to bans among EU groupings of independent (CESI), white collar(CEC) and public sector (CEEP), Unions and the European Personnel Managers Association (EAPM) using US workplace kit.

--Collaborate with the European Tourism Action Group to promote economic impact of bans in Horeca and Transport sectors.

Counter influence of WHO, BASP and anti-cancer groupings.

--Create a European Tobacco Information Centre to disseminate third party news to EU influencers including policy makers and the media including positive scientific studies, public opinion data, favourable legislative developments, economic impact data, libertarian views.

• Expand ARISE network and through bi-annual attitude surveys (1995- stress in the workplace) generate maximum publicity for ARISE message of pleasure as beneficial to health.

• Create a European Smokers Rights Group to bring smokers' voice to EU legislative debate and to provide a network for coordinated actions and information sharing by national SRGs.

• Develop PM Communications tool on accommodation to support direct dialogue with legislators and allies.

• Encourage opposition to bans within EP.

• Encourage European Public Health Alliance and EP Health intergroup to prioritise non-tobacco health concerns with DGV.

THREAT: 1993 proposed Directive for the protection of transport workers' health and safety amended by the European Parliament to provide for a de facto total smoking ban with application to all modes of transport operating within EU territory.

OBJECTIVE: Obtain Commission withdrawal Of proposal in accordance with subsidiarity principle during German Presidency; ensure new proposal provides maximum flexibility in line with existing health and safety directives

STRATEGY:

. Reinforce and support German Government position to obtain withdrawal by promoting subsidiarity argumentation among other Governments.

• Mobilize international Transport/Health and Safety bodies using jurisdictional argumentation

• Reinforce UK Government position for withdrawal.

• Encourage through provision of legal argumentation, other governments to support German position (France, Holland, Italy and Denmark) via national transport groupings

• Determine feasibility of obtaining additional support from other governments

• Develop support for withdrawal among Commissioners and DG VII

THREAT:

Legislation banning Smoking in the workplace, public places and on transport driven by EPA, IARC activities, SCOTH (UK), ICAO and political opportunism

OBJECTIVES:

. Capitalise on EU Resolution on GEP to prevent governments legislating on basis of flawed epidemiology.

• Lock in and defend legislation that provides for accommodation.

• Defend against further airline bans and other key public impact ban threats in transport sector...

CONSUMERS:

• Support and expand existing SRGs and where gaps exist (Germany, Belgium, UK, Spain) create smokers rights groups to defend against ban threats direct with legislators and via the media.

MEDIA OUTREACH

--Communicate messages of tolerance, and US extremism both directly and via libertarian and smokers rights groups.

--Encourage a balanced coverage of ETS science via libertarian groups, independent scientists pre, during and post IARC study release.

--Promote examples of other low level risks, confounders arguments and other weaknesses of epidemiology via scientists and libertarian groups to undermine public confidence in science and to provide perspective.

--Educate targeted scientific editors on ETS science via scientific consultants.

--Encourage business owners to advocate accommodation via speaking opportunities.

This 1994 report to the Philip Morris (PM) Board discusses the onslaught of public health actions to regulate tobacco that occurred in the U.S. under the Clinton administration. It also discusses a television news show (An ABC News' "Day One" segment) that claimed that Philip Morris spiked cigarettes with nicotine to keep smokers addicted.

While the entire document is of interest, one portion near the end discusses the tobacco industry's inside view of the particular threat that accrues when smoking is focused upon as an addiction rather than a "choice."

In 1994, David Kessler (then -commissioner of the U.S. Food and Drug Administration or FDA) asserted that nicotine was an addictive drug intended to affect the structure and function of the body and that therefore cigarettes should be regulated by the FDA. This document conveys why PM executives considered references to the addictiveness of smoking to be a major threat:

"...The most serious concern that I have is that the adverse media attention...being leveled at the industry may ultimately impact on jurors' attitudes about our defense in product liability cases...But even if jurors do not believe that we 'spike' our products, they could nevertheless adopt a more skeptical attitude in the future toward our principal defense--personal liability...If he [Kessler] were to declare that nicotine in cigarettes is addictive and must be regulated, that action could affect the way in which jurors approach the issues of addiction and choice."

[Italicized emphasis added]

Widespread belief that smoking is a normative personal choice rather than an addiction is central to the industry's ability to continue to defend itself in liability suits. This portion of the document shows that the notion of smoking as "free choice" is undermined when smoking becomes widely viewed as nicotine addiction, which is actually a diagnosable disorder.

This Philip Morris (PM) email by Robert Pages, a PM scientist, discusses an "ETS World Conference" that Philip Morris was to hold on February 24-25, 1993. PM's executives worldwide were invited to attend the meeting to discuss the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) rating of secondhand tobacco smoke as a Group A Human Carcinogen, and PM's strategies to deal with it. Some passages in the document communicate the attitude within PM about how the company viewed this public health ruling:

"What is being done by PM-USA to 'crush' EPA's conclusions?"

Another line indicates doubt from within PM's ranks about the company's ability to generate a scientific answer that could help deflect EPA's classification:

"...If we don't have a realistic plan to win the scientific debate on ETS, then do we need to quickly implement our 'damage limitation' strategies?"

In this 1991 speech (presumably before an audience of tobacco allies) R.J. Reynolds (RJR) executive Herbert Osmon displays his antipathy towards the scientific case linking tobacco use with disease, and demonstrates the adversarial attitude his tobacco company harbors towards organizations and government offices concerned with safeguarding the public's health. Osmon gives a historical perspective of the anti-tobacco movement, stating that,

"The negative cycle [of opinion against tobacco]...got its momentum from the first surgeon general's report on smoking in 1964. That report once again raised the claimed health effects of smoking [and] began two decades of activity focused on convincing smokers of the claimed dangers of smoking. The goal was to scare them into quitting."

Osmon belittles and rails against anti-tobacco groups like STAT, ASH and GASP, but says that individuals have caused the industry the most trouble:

"...GASP and ASH and other such rabble rousers would by themselves be mostly just annoyances who nibble at the industry like ducks. Our serious opposition--the real core of the anti-smoking movement -- is a group of key people in a small number of tightly knit organizations..."

Osmon claims that the "anti-tobacco industry" is far from being a grassroots movement, and names as enemies people like Joe Tye of STAT, Mark Pertschuk of Americans for Nonsmokers' Rights and Stanton Glantz ("an anti-smoking extremist and a loud and vocal critic of ETS who is well connected at the Environmental Protection Agency,") saying these people "work hard to communicate with the worker bees in the movement and teach them how to be troublemakers."

Osmon decries the increasing organization and communications improvements within the anti-tobacco movement, and laments the fact that the government is allied with the anti-tobacco movement:

"The anti-smoking industry is not just made up of private organizations. Government also plays an important part...the Office on Smoking and Health (OSH) is administered by Ron David and sees its job as 'educating' both adults and children. The National Cancer Institute administers a huge stockpile ($2 Billion) of government funds that are given out as grants to fund cancer research...Finally, in Congress itself, there is an anti-smoking organization called 'The Congressional Task Force on Tobacco and Health...46 members of Congress who have banded together to support the agenda of the anti-smoking movement..."

Finally, Osmon states,

"We believe [the] attack on the manufacturers will increase in intensity and viciousness, and we believe it has one clear goal. The anti-smoking zealots want to break up the tobacco family. They want to put a wedge between the manufacturers and the smokers...They want to fracture our united front...They know that if they get us fighting among ourselves, they will eventually be able to dance on our graves, because we won't be able to resist the pressures if we are not united....But if we do not take their bait, if we do remain united and continue to do everything we can to resist the efforts to destroy our business, then history can repeat itself....We must remain united, and we must fight the anti-smokers at every opportunity..."

This speech shows the antipathy tobacco company executives harbor towards public health efforts to control the spread of nicotine addiction and tobacco-caused illness.

This 11 page document from the Philip Morris collection reveals the tobacco industry's detailed strategies to fight public health smoking restrictions. Strategies include

"Promote ventilation as the best solution to all indoor air quality problems, including smoking....Oppose all legislative, regulatory, judicial and voluntary efforts to discriminate unfairly against smokers. Attempt to reverse all existing restrictions...Strategy 5: Reduce superficial public debate of ETS....Promote the need for ventilation standards through news media, advertising, direct mail, videos, print materials, and coalitions.

The industry is also aware that businesses are unlikely to support and promote ventilation systems as an answer to smoking bans unless "they perceive a financial interest in doing so."

The industry is also aware that their "freedom of choice" argument cannot be effectively used in arguments about secondhand smoke because it also applies to people who want freedom to enter places without being forced to inhale secondhand smoke (and this is why they have to shift the debate away from "freedom of choice"):

"The argument of 'freedom of choice' with regard to workplace smoking is becoming increasingly difficult to sell because those who are opposed to smoking have used the same argument effectively. The concept of "indoor air quality" (with an emphasis on science) has much more credibility and will draw in a wider audience.

In February 1993 Philip Morris held an "ETS World Conference" at the Macklowe Hotel in New York City. According to a pamphlet about it, the event appears to have been primarily for Philip Morris employees worldwide: http://www.pmdocs.com/getallimg.asp?if=avpidx&DOCID=2023544793/4810

The following document is a follow-up memo about the corporate objectives and strategies for dealing with secondhand smoke issues apparently put forth at the meeting, along with assignments as to who was to handle which tasks.

Tasks listed include:

"Development of a global coalition against 'junk science' as a parallel to PM USA coalition now underway...

Shift concern over ETS to slippery slope argumentation and/or tolerance...

How to package comprehensive improvements in ventilation to forestall tobacco specific bans...

Shifting debate from ETS [environmental tobacco smoke] to IAQ [indoor air quality]...

[I]dentifying other risk parallels...cellular phones, chlorinated water; identify currently regulated carcinogens for which acceptable levels have been set...

...Shift concern over ETS in the workplace from the health issue to one of annoyance.

...Shift the concern over ETS in restaurants from bans to accommodation.

...Develop an 'ETS Task Force' with global PM representation to develop strategies to combat smoking restrictions.

People very high up in the company were involved in the conference, including Steve Parrish (VP of External Affairs and General Counsel at PM USA), Clare Purcell (Manager, Legal Issues, PM USA), Mary "Mopsy" Pottorff (Manager, PM Corporate Scientific Affairs), Matthew Winokur (Director, Corporate Affairs, PM International), and Robert Pages (Director, Science and Technology, PMUSA).

This 1993 Tobacco Institute (TI) memo outlines sample tactics and strategies the industry could use to fight legislated and voluntary smoking bans in restaurants. It was written by Joanna Hamilton and Peter Sparber of the TI's consulting firm Sparber & Associates.

In order to prevent the public from becoming sympathetic towards restaurant workers who are exposed to secondhand smoke on their jobs, the authors recommend raising public antipathy towards restaurant workers (particularly immigrant workers from South America, it seems) by portraying them as spreaders, rather than victims, of disease:

"Since restaurant workers are largely incapable of speaking out for themselves, we believe the only way that the 'restaurant workers as victims of ETS' issue can grow is if the anti-smokers can generate sympathy for them. But, given the public health problems reportedly caused by restaurant workers, it is ironic that restaurant workers could ever be seen as victims of any sort. The best way of countering the antis, is to encourage third parties to increase public awareness of the public health threat posed by restaurant workers. It may be hard to generate public concern over restaurant worker exposure to ETS, when the public is more concerned about contracting rare, Central American strains of tuberculosis from restaurant workers."

Although this document was written ten years ago, many of the strategies it describes are currently in use in communities throughout the country that are trying to go smoke-free. One example is the strategy of portraying smoking bans as an attack on low-income workers and small businesses:

"IV. Portray restaurant smoking bans as hitting the 'little guy' by focusing the issue on down-scale restaurants.

COMMENT: Banning smoking to protect public health is a less attractive issue when it becomes a case of upper middle class political activists telling blue-collar workers whether they can smoke a cigarette with their beer and hamburger platter."

There is also almost constant mention throughout the document of the need to deploy these strategies using third parties, like state and national restaurant associations. Such use of third parties helps keep the tobacco industry's involvement invisible.

This 1995 Philip Morris (PM) document lists six "principal threats" that European initiatives posed to the tobacco industry. Listed among the "threats" are Europe's energy-saving programs designed to reduce admissions of greenhouse gases. "[T]he EU and many Member States have undertaken to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases. Among other things, this means reduction in the uses of energy. DG XVII [Directorate General for Energy & Transport] has a number of programs designed to encourage energy-saving..."

Initiatives to reduce energy use threaten the tobacco industry because the industry pushes ventilation as the solution to problems caused by indoor smoking (more ventilation = more energy use). This puts energy (and greenhouse gas) reduction programs directly in conflict with the tobacco industry's efforts to preserve the social acceptability of smoking.

The authors of this document (Jennifer Green and Charles Lister of the law firm Covington and Burling's London office) warn PM that smoking restrictions will meet several important goals of the European Commission:

"...[I]mproved indoor air and energy saving are generally competing goals...but the two goals are arguably consistent in one important respect -- both would arguably be served by additional smoking restrictions. You should expect that it will be argued that public and workplace smoking restrictions both contribute to improved [indoor air quality] AND reduce the higher ventilation rates (and energy usages) demanded for smoking areas."

Thus, smoking restrictions are a simple, inexpensive way to help meet a host of international goals: saving energy, reducing greenhouse gas emissions and improving indoor air quality.

One must wonder, since the Bush administration in the U.S. is known to be friendly to tobacco interests, could these facts have had any bearing on the Bush Administration's refusal to join other countries in the ongoing worldwide efforts to reduce greenhouse gases?

This 1989 Philip Morris (PM) interoffice memo shows PM's Senior Vice President of Corporate Affairs, Andrew Whist, plotting to organize a tightly controlled, tobacco industry-financed "scientific conference" about secondhand smoke. The purpose of the conference was to "neutralize two reports that are scheduled to be released [about environmental tobacco smoke (ETS)]: an ETS risk assessment that is being prepared by EPA and a detailed assessment of ETS health effects under preparattion at Rockefeller University." The reason for hastily organizing the conference:

"The EPA and Spitzer reports would cause substantial damage unless they are somehow countered."

PM's plan was to stock the conference with scientists who were either already industry consultants or who espoused the company's views on ETS (e.g., that "more research is needed"). Whist also planned to keep the conference "both closed and private until the release, shortly after the conference of a monograph summarizing the proceedings." He needed to "make sure that the publisher" the company selected for the post-conference monograph"is prepared to guarantee an almost unprecedented quick turnaround on the symposium monograph," and "mak[e] sure that we reach the appropriate audiences in just the right way before the EPA and Spitzer reports are released."

This memo was copied to then-Director of PM Geoffrey Bible, who later became the company's Chief Executive Officer.

This document shows Philip Morris actively working to counteract the conclusions of legitimate scientific reports on secondhand smoke.

This scientific report from Philip Morris' overseas lab in Germany (INBIFO, which stands for "Institut Fur Biologische Forschung," or Institute for Biological Research) explains what different types of toxicity tests (assays) measure, and what assays were in use at the time at INBIFO. The paper is not dated, but the last page indicates it was produced at the earliest in 1992.

Of interest in this document are the reasons it lists on how INBIFO chooses to use one type of toxicity test over another:

From Page 4 (2501403695):

"Selection Criteria for in Vitro Toxicity Assays: 1) most informative 2) best validated 3) most helpful in a legislative context."

This 1996 Philip Morris Corporate Affairs (PM) document discusses strategies the cigarette company uses to stop local public health activity and control state legislatures on tobacco issues. The report shows that PM considers California a "bellweather state" which "continues to require cutting edge techniques" to thwart public health efforts. PM learned early lessons in California about forming a comprehensive strategy to "combat the antis" on local smoking bans. [Page 55]

According to this document, PM employs its comprehensive strategy to fight the "antis" (public health advocates and authorities) in states that have a high amount of local tobacco control activity: In the legislature, PM's strategy is to "Put antis on the Defensive" by introducing multiple bills (like Indoor Air Quality Standards, and "restaurant bills" introduced by local restaurant associations). At the local level, PM "introduces Accommodation in a friendly, small localities" to "scatter the antis resources." PM also tracks the funding and expenditures of tobacco control programs and then attacks these expenditures, framing them as "abuses." Simultaneously PM works to divert the financial resources of tobacco control programs, or, as PM says, "Reallocate [tobacco control] funds for Other Purposes Such as Youth Education."

PM seeks to hamstring charitable public health organizations by pushing for laws capping their salaries and lobbying expenditures and requiring a minimum percentage of their funds go toward research [Page 60].

The report also shows PM's interference in local activities around a smoking ban effort in Austin, Texas. PM's strategy in Austin was to "create a coalition to Kill Ordinance in One Week," and "activate PM and RJR smokers to call city council members prior to the hearing and testify at the hearing." PM also "hired a consultant to organize the Hospitality Industry." The consultant "convinced Austin Restaurant Association to oppose the ordinance and join the Texas Restaurant Association's activities."

The document also makes it clear that legislative term limits do not benefit Philip Morris because they result in "Less power for lobbyists who, pre term limits, could develop contacts and groom [legislative] members attitudes toward our issues." It also reveals that PM would not support (now former) Vermont Governor Dr. Howard Dean, currently a candidate for the Democratic presidential nomination for president in the U.S. [Page 21]. PM opposed Gov. Dean because he supported a $.24 tax increase in cigarettes and he did "not support our position on modified smoking restrictions." http://tobaccodocuments.org/pm/2062905212-5259.p21-30.html#p22

This document contains a wealth of information about how PM operates to oppose public health efforts at all levels of society.

This Philip Morris (PM) document is a brass-tacks discussion of concessions the embattled tobacco industry is willing to make, and for what gains. For bargaining purposes, the list is divided into "must haves," "Must haves-plus," and "want to haves." "Must Haves" include keeping cigarettes legal, making sure smoking remains a "tolerated social activity," maintaining a retail distribution infrastructure for cigarettes and eliminating lawsuit liability threats from "the primary issue" (the health issue) and the ETS issue (environmental tobacco smoke). To get these "must-haves," PM is willing to concede to "incremental, intermittent tax increases, ingredients disclosure...smoking bans in transient and common areas...bans on sampling...bans on vending machines, industry marketing code, youth no-smoking advertising...industry marketing code written into law."

The paper describes the circumstances under which the company (or the industry) would trade a "want to have" in order to keep a "must have." Many of their "want to have" items have already been traded away for the 1998 Master Settlement Agreement (MSA). Those concessions included bans on sampling through the mail, bans on vending machines and some forms of advertising, incorporating youth no-smoking advertising, etc.

The document indicates exactly where government needs to step in to regulate the industry:

"All give-ups should have a legislative or specific business purpose--only law can destroy must-haves or want-to-haves."

Government can, then look at PM's list of "must-haves" and see where it needs to take action against cigarette companies to improve public health.

Another PM statement is that "Public opinion and media coverage are only important insofar as they affect government." This can be interpreted as meaning that PM's "feel good" advertising (ads that show PM feeding the hungry, aiding domestic violence victims, etc.) is ultimately aimed at the government.

The paper makes some interesting observations about the significance of advertising in American vs. European culture:

"Commercial advertising in Europe is less central to culture than in U.S. -- ads in Europe are more a mark of 'illegitimacy' than 'legitimacy."

and...

"In Europe, overall media coverage of arcane risks is less sensational and smoking among social elite is more widespread making social acceptability of smoking higher..."

This is a very rich document about the tobacco industry's strategies to defeat public health efforts on all fronts--public and private. It also shows that the tobacco industry "thinks" and plans about a decade ahead of public health advocates and government authorities to plan how to head off actions these groups will take against it. It also shows that the industry has a very clear game plan for how to deal with actions that threaten their profits and control of their product.

After the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) ruled in 1993 that secondhand tobacco smoke was a Group A Human Carcinogen, Tom Humber (of Philip Morris' public relations firm Burson Marstellar) wrote this memo urging PM to apply a list of strategies to fight public health authorities on the issue of environmental tobacco smoke, or ETS. Humber's objectives included discrediting the EPA and its report, working to prevent private businesses from voluntarily enacting smoking bans, and "blunt[ing] the thrust of employer and manufacturer liability suits" over employees' exposure to secondhand smoke in the workplace. Humber urged PM to "Sue the bastards!" (EPA) to "at the very least, delay or cloud precipitous actions against us," and to help "regain some percentage of industry credibility." Humber also postulated that suing the EPA would help "stimulate other [businesses], who have heretofore been too timid to fight back against the EPA, to summon up their own courage for their own battles."

Humber recommends these activities be carried out through others, rather than by PM directly. Humber says,

"...[I]n the interests of overall strategy, all activities...require the recruitment of outside organizations or individuals...against ETS specifics or more general objectives."

He lists agencies through which PM could apply these strategies, and proposed these groups be used to "achieve a rapid start and broadscale umbrellas under which other specific operations can be unfolded."

Humber's memo also reveals his awareness of the risk of potential lawsuits against PM from exposure of employees to ETS in the workplace. To help defray such suits, Humber suggested the immediate establishment of a sort of ETS legal-aid group he called the "ETS Defense Resources Council." Humber claimed this strategy has been effective for other companies, and says,

"While [forming such a legal advisory group] will obviously not prevent new laws nor stop employers from imposing workplace smoking bans based on the threat of litigation, the rapid institutionalization of...such a [legal consulting] center would...signal the antis and plaintiffs bar that there will be no free ride on this tobacco issue either."

PM eventually carried out Humber's "sue the bastards" strategy. In 1993, the same year this memo was written, PM filed a lawsuit in North Carolina before Judge William Osteen (a former tobacco lobbyist) claiming the EPA's ruling on secondhand smoke was invalid. Judge Osteen ruled against the EPA, saying the agency had used bad science. The EPA stood by its report and appealed. On December 11, 2002--almost 10 years after the EPA fist issue its report--the U.S. Court of Appeals ruled in the EPA’s favor, and vacated Judge Osteen's opinion.

This memo was sent to PM's Vice President of Corporate Affairs, Ellen Merlo. It shows that Thomas Humber may have played a significant part in masterminding Philip Morris' interference with government efforts to educate the public about the health effects of secondhand smoke. Thomas Humber also served as President and CEO of the National Smokers' Alliance (the front Philip Morris used to fight public health smoking restrictions on the local level throughout the U.S.).

This 69-page confidential Philip Morris (PM) document resulted from a meeting held by R.J. Reynolds, Imperial, British-American Tobacco, Gallaher and Philip Morris in 1977 to discuss how the global tobacco industry could reverse the declining social acceptability of smoking. Dennis Durden, Vice President of R.J. Reynolds Industries, Inc., in his introductory speech refers to the "health victory" public authorities had achieved in reducing smoking: "They [public health authorities] feel that their health victory is in hand...it is logical that the anti-smoking forces turn to social acceptability as a key issue. However, they could not make this turn if they did not feel that they had their "health victory." The "health victory" had to come first."

Durden alludes to the industry's efforts to reverse medical conclusions on the health effects of smoking, stating that "the health issue is closed, until there has been sufficient additional medical research to reopen the Surgeon General's report." He further acknowledges that opinion surveys show "more and more of the American public tends to agree with the anti-smoking forces."

Subsequent charts in the document show the effects that public health efforts have had on cigarette sales over the years: A chart shows the negative impact that "Anti-smoking Publicity by Doctors, Scientists and Reader's Digest" had on cigarette sales between 1952 and 1954 (page -5042). Another chart shows a decrease in cigarette sales after the 1964 Surgeon General's report was released. A chart entitled "Actual vs. Potential U.S. Cigarette Consumption" shows the amount of cigarette sales the industry believed it had lost as a result of effective public health efforts. (Page -5049-- a gap of 90 billion cigarettes is described for 1976).

A list of tobacco industry opponents identifies the U.S. Government's National Clearinghouse for Smoking and Health antagonistically as "Chief Anti-Smoking propaganda arm of Government."

The tobacco companies' objectives were to undermine this public health progress by "Develop[ing] strategies to retard or reverse the trend [of declining social acceptability] where feasible or desired" and to "recommend counter-measures."

Toward the end of the paper, Durden says that the industry's only hope is to "counterattack" public health efforts. In the absence of such an attack, he says, "there is virtually no real chance for increasing the social acceptability of smoking":

"More and more citizens and public leaders believe that smoking is a health hazard to non-smokers. As long as this belief grows without being subjected to effective challenge and counterattack, there is virtually no real chance for increasing the social acceptability of smoking." (Page -5086).

This document shows that cigarette makers from around the world conspired to undermine common knowledge that tobacco smoke is harmful to health, and that they actually worked to reverse the progress that public health authorities had made in convincing people not to smoke.

In a May 1991 letter, Federico Peña (the mayor of Denver, Colorado) writes to Louis Sullivan, the Secretary of the United States Department of Health and Human Services, about his efforts to reduce or eliminate people's exposure to secondhand smoke from tobacco products. Mayor Peña talks about the difficulties he encountered from the tobacco industry in trying to make the city's new airport (then in the planning stages) 100% smoke-free. Revealing a major tobacco industry tactic, Mayor Peña says "The tobacco industry targeted the airport restrictions with a massive lobbying effort which included an 800 number the industry set up so that people from throughout the country could call members of [Denver's] city council at no expense. City Council bowed to the pressure and passed an ordinance repealing the restrictions at the airport."

Mayor Peña discussed how restricting smoking in the existing airport made a "significant difference in the indoor air quality compared to other airports throughout the country." He urges the Secretary to support efforts throughout the country to restrict smoking in airports saying, "It's clearly a matter of health."

This Philip Morris Corporate Affairs Plan describes the company's strategic rationale for befriending and contributing financially to ethnic and minority groups, making clear that such affiliations are a strategy to undermine the "antis" (public health authorities): "Develop offsetting relationships among groups that are often used by the "antis" suggesting they are victims because they use the company's products. The relationships developed are designed to insure that our case is understood, thus undermining the opposition's ability to organize against the company's interests with leading community organizations..."

(This description is found under the "Public Affairs" section of the report, which describes the function of PM's Public Affairs group as focusing on contributions.)

The document also shows that PM realizes that strong smoking restrictions throughout the country are inevitable:

"At the end of the planning period it is likely that smokers will elect to smoke only in designated smoking areas when in public or at homes or the homes of friends who smoke. It is also likely that only a fraction of workplaces will allow smoking at all inside buildings. These assumptions are based on an analysis of well established trends."

The document also makes clear that PM believes the worst possible tax is one that ties cigarette sales to health care funding:

"Indeed, no tax threat is as great as being included in some way in a health care funding program."