R, P.J.; T, G.F.
This rich document is an exhaustive report written by two members of British tobacco industry recounting a month-long trip they took to the United States in 1964, 8 months after the U.S. Surgeon General issue the first report on Smoking and Health. The purpose of the trip was to investigate the current status of smoking and health issues in the U.S., and research ongoing lawsuits against tobacco companies in the U.S. The authors (who are identified only by their initials) begin by saying that the executive officers of R.J. Reynolds, American Tobacco and Brown & Williamson "firmly believe that is has not been proved that smoking is harmful to health." They also say, "On this important point, however, Mr. Cullman (Philip Morris), Mr. Harrington (L&M) and Mr. Cramer (Lorillard) would hedge a little." [Note: In 1969, Cullman categorically denied, in testimony before a Congressional Committee, that smoking was causally related to disease. See http://tobaccodocuments.org/landman/TIMN0124175-4186.html]
The authors also point out the dilemma U.S. cigarette manufacturers faced by performing in-house smoking and health research, and the road they ultimately chose to follow: [From Page 16]:
"The [U.S.] manufacturers have to choose between - (a) Doing no smoking and health research and being represented in law suits as negligent (although "to meet public concern", they finance CTR and AMA research) [and] (b) Doing smoking and health research and being forced to admit in law suits that their experiments have caused cancer in animals and yet that they have made no changes in tobacco smoke to eliminate the tumours. The manufacturers have chosen (a)..."
The U.S. cigarette manufacturers also feared British tobacco companies' internal bioassay research programs would be construed as an admission that cigarettes caused disease. [Page 8]:
"The main criticism of TRC's research programme was that bio-assay research at Harrogate was an implied admission that cigarettes are harmful...We agreed that Harrogate bio-assay research could be represented as an implied admission, but we made the points that TRC...research was based on the needs of the situation in the U.K., including...a need from the legal point of view to give no grounds for an accusation of negligence against the manufacturers."
The authors also describes Philip Morris' intent to hold back any breakthrough information on smoking and health until they could make a profit from it first:
[From page 23]
"...Mr. Cullman added that he could not say when breakthrough information would be pooled -- e.g. they might want to use it first themselves in their markets including the U.K."
The authors also point out that the American companies' attitudes and actions on smoking and health were driven by lawyers ("who exercise close control over all aspects of the problem"), while in the U.K., industry behavior was driven by the "necessity of avoiding clashes with the 'medical establishment' - i.e., the Ministry of Health, the Medical Research Council, the Royal College of Physicians, leaders of medical opinion, etc." This was because in the U.S., the "Department of Health, Education and Welfare has much less public status than the Ministry of Health." They also observed that the "A.M.A. [American Medical Association] appears more concerned with safeguarding the financial interests of doctors...than with the doctors' patients."
The document also confirms the industry's interest in youth smoking, saying [on Page 29]: "There was more anti-smoking propaganda in the schools but no sign of it being effective. The percentage of smokers in the 16-24 age group has not declined."
This report points out differences between the U.S. and British tobacco companies and how they approached the difficult issue of smoking and health in the two countries.