This 1991 Philip Morris (PM) internal report outlines PM's strategic plans for combating the proliferation of smoking bans in Europe, particularly voluntary bans in workplaces and restaurants. It reveals a desperate company utterly unaware of the absurdity of many of its own contradictions.
Rather than seeking out or acknowledging the truth about the health effects of environmental tobacco smoke (ETS), one of PM's objectives with regard to ETS science was to "Maintain the debate on the primary [health]issue and ETS."(from Page 2). Other goals were to "Minimize total smoke bans in European companies" and "position PM as a reasonable company and a credible source of information."
Despite wanting to position itself as a "credible source of information," Page 17 reveals that PM planned to commission "counter-surveys," whose pre-determined results would emanate from a different (presumably more credible)source:
"For example, if the [World Health Organization] claims that 75% of the people want smoking bans on international flights, we can counter with our own survey. Since the polling firm would be responsible for the dissemination, the poll would gain credibility."
PM realized that smoking bans were, in truth, popular enough that without the tobacco industry's interference, such bans would soon become widespread: "Left to chance, many companies will adopt the most restrictive type of smoking policies..." PM obviously felt it could not leave such matters to chance, yet one of the company's media strategies to fight the ETS issue was to "Promote the desires of employees to decide for themselves" about whether to ban smoking or not (from Page 3).
PM also targets airlines and trains: "Research shows that most people will accept smoke bans on short plane and train rides...PM must fight for its consumers' right to smoke on long plane and train rides." (From page 12)
Positioning itself as the height of rationality, Page 25 of the report urges a calm dialogue on the ETS issue. PM urges that "Relations between smokers and non-smokers must be guided by dialogue and tolerance." Yet fostering widespread social discontent was also on the other end of PM's to-do list: the same page states that an objective of PM's ETS Communication Plan was to "create a public backlash" (against the decreasing acceptability of smoking (from page 18). Part of PM's plan also included "Establish[ing] SRG's [Smokers Rights Groups] as counterpart of Anti-groups" (from page 25).
In this document, PM also establishes itself as the ultimate actor in the industry's struggle to de-fuse the damaging ETS issue, declaring that if other sectors of the industry fail to take action, PM itself will jump in:
"This plan is complete and ambitious...All aspects covered in this plan must be addressed in each market, but not necessarily by PM. Whenver possible, these issues should be handled by the industry. Nevertheless, in the absence of industry action, PM will fill the void."
Perhaps the necessary outcome of these contradictions is PM's ultimate failure, despite all these desperate measures, to stop the world from advancing towards a smoke-free society.