Tobacco Documents Online

In a strong denial of the public health role of the World Health Organization and the global health threat caused by their tobacco products, this Philip Morris International (PM) internal memo from Geoffrey Bible speaks of the "extraordinary influence" the World Health Organization has on government and consumers saying, "we must find a way to diffuse this and re-orient [the WHO's] activities to their prescribed mandate." Bible further discusses how PM can use its vast resources (like technology and access to food) to influence governments to turn against the WHO: "In addition, we need to think through how we could use our food companies, size, technology and capability with governments by helping them with their food problems and give us a more balanced profile with the government than we now have against WHO's powerful influence."

Bible mentions that a WHO initiative, a levy on tobacco sales in Victoria and South Australia to buy out tobacco sports and cultural sponsorships, "is a very effective strategy that we must stop."

Bible also speaks of "destroying" government attempts to regulate maximum constituent levels (MCL's) of toxic chemicals cigarette smoke, and links Philip Morris to the set-up of the smokers rights group Forest as well as a seemingly "independent" group called Libertad, which PM used to influence legislation. Bible proposes extending Libertad from France and Australia into other countries "so as to become a major influence in the formation of public policy."

This 1991 Philip Morris (PM) internal report outlines PM's strategic plans for combating the proliferation of smoking bans in Europe, particularly voluntary bans in workplaces and restaurants. It reveals a desperate company utterly unaware of the absurdity of many of its own contradictions. Rather than seeking out or acknowledging the truth about the health effects of environmental tobacco smoke (ETS), one of PM's objectives with regard to ETS science was to "Maintain the debate on the primary [health]issue and ETS."(from Page 2). Other goals were to "Minimize total smoke bans in European companies" and "position PM as a reasonable company and a credible source of information."

Despite wanting to position itself as a "credible source of information," Page 17 reveals that PM planned to commission "counter-surveys," whose pre-determined results would emanate from a different (presumably more credible)source:

"For example, if the [World Health Organization] claims that 75% of the people want smoking bans on international flights, we can counter with our own survey. Since the polling firm would be responsible for the dissemination, the poll would gain credibility."

PM realized that smoking bans were, in truth, popular enough that without the tobacco industry's interference, such bans would soon become widespread: "Left to chance, many companies will adopt the most restrictive type of smoking policies..." PM obviously felt it could not leave such matters to chance, yet one of the company's media strategies to fight the ETS issue was to "Promote the desires of employees to decide for themselves" about whether to ban smoking or not (from Page 3).

PM also targets airlines and trains: "Research shows that most people will accept smoke bans on short plane and train rides...PM must fight for its consumers' right to smoke on long plane and train rides." (From page 12)

Positioning itself as the height of rationality, Page 25 of the report urges a calm dialogue on the ETS issue. PM urges that "Relations between smokers and non-smokers must be guided by dialogue and tolerance." Yet fostering widespread social discontent was also on the other end of PM's to-do list: the same page states that an objective of PM's ETS Communication Plan was to "create a public backlash" (against the decreasing acceptability of smoking (from page 18). Part of PM's plan also included "Establish[ing] SRG's [Smokers Rights Groups] as counterpart of Anti-groups" (from page 25).

In this document, PM also establishes itself as the ultimate actor in the industry's struggle to de-fuse the damaging ETS issue, declaring that if other sectors of the industry fail to take action, PM itself will jump in:

"This plan is complete and ambitious...All aspects covered in this plan must be addressed in each market, but not necessarily by PM. Whenver possible, these issues should be handled by the industry. Nevertheless, in the absence of industry action, PM will fill the void."

Perhaps the necessary outcome of these contradictions is PM's ultimate failure, despite all these desperate measures, to stop the world from advancing towards a smoke-free society.

This document (from Philip Morris' files) shows how the global tobacco industry fights efforts to restrict the advertising of tobacco products. The report was produced by Infotab (the international information clearinghouse and monitoring organization formed by the major multinational tobacco companies around the late 1970s-early 1980s to help confront the global anti-tobacco movement). The report discusses the weakness and lack of credibility of the global tobacco industry's main argument against advertising bans, namely the claim that cigarette advertising doesn't increase total market size, but just causes existing smokers to switch brands.

The document shows that this argument directly contradicts the truth. The reality, according to this report, is that the total cigarette market grows in developing countries in accordance with the amount of money the tobacco companies spend to advertise their products in those countries.

The author of the report, listed as Ron Tully (who served as Documentation Manager of Information Services at Infotab in 1989) grapples with how the industry can persist with such an incredible argument when the facts don't support their case:

"The general argumentation used by the industry is beginning to look extremely weak and the presentation of these arguments to the 'public' and 'opinion formers' needs to be examined in detail.

This is best illustrated in the advertising bans and consumption argument, where the industry argues that 'advertising does not increase total market size', yet we are presented with a dilemma in developing markets where the total market is growing and advertising expenditure is rising accordingly. How can we reconcile this?"

Tully urges the industry to "consider new arguments." He laments the tobacco industry's lack of credibility, comparing it to the respect and authority enjoyed by the World Health Organization:

"The anti-smoking lobby continue to coordinate their data on smoking through the WHO, providing respectability and authority which industry data is unable to match."

He points out that the tobacco industry does not have the credibility to put forth new arguments against advertising bans in a believable manner, and recommends instead that any new data the industry accumulates in support of a new argument be put forth by "a respected independent international organization" which "should be used to publish the results."

To help stave off advertising bans, Tully suggests that the industry invest in "a high dollar spend, over a sustained period of time to innovative campaigns aimed at an ill-informed public," saying the industry must "[meet] the challenge of anti smoking campaigns with 'real money', which means matching the anti-smoking groups dollar for dollar..."

In his conclusion, Tully frames health authorities and tobacco control policies essentially as competitors to the tobacco industry, warning

"Just remember, we lose more to the bottom line each year in markets as a direct result of policies pushed by the anti-smoking fraternity. Can we afford to let these groups continue their propaganda unabated??"

In this letter, Washington, D.C. media consultant (and Philip Morris contractor) Richard Hines responds to a request from Philip Morris for assistance in influencing the European Media. Hines proposes to Matthew Winokur (of Philip Morris Worldwide Regulatory Affairs) that PM fund a journalism internship program through the National Journalism Center to produce a stable of journalists sympathetic to PM issues.

As a follow-up to this proposal Hines adds,

"In turn we could promote the 'care and feeding' of journalists to develop a network sympathetic to Philip Morris."

Hines describes the success of similar existing programs, bragging about how they succesfully influence major media in the U.S.:

"Using this approach in the U.S. we have been able to get favorable articles/commentaries in major publications such as the Wall Street Journal, National Review and reach millions of the public through the numerous syndicated columnists that are in our network. Moreoever, using this approach we can develop a sustainable media presence in Europe that can be accessed for numerous issues."