Tobacco Documents Online

This 1988 Philip Morris (PM)document discusses the company's strategy for combating the secondhand smoke ("environmental tobacco smoke," or ETS) issue in the European Economic Community. It comments on the type of consultants PM felt it needed in various European countries, for example, France ("...a Gray Robertson type, preferably with a medical background [who would] also be able to put any discussion of smoking in the general context of other French public health issues, i.e., traffic accidents, alcoholism, AIDS, nuclear power, etc."), Italy ("...Most needed in Italy right now is someone credible...this exercise would be all the more useful if the [Italian] consultant could "campaign" on a ticket that points the blame in another direction, for example diesel fumes...", Greece ("...we should line up someone...[who ideally] should be able to raise serious doubts on the primary issue as well.") The paper also reveals the difficulty PM had in getting ventilation companies to do its bidding and start pushing ventilation as a solution to the secondhand smoke problem (a strategy which took the focus off of restricting indoor smoking):

"The fundamental reasoning behind the IAQ [Indoor Air Quality] plan was to push this [ventilation] technology in the hope that a self-sustaining commercial niche could be created... The burden of pushing the "IAQ" issue would then fall to the [ventilation] companies involved, who would have a commercial reason for doing so. For some reason, all this has not happened. ...Therefore, we should address this problem before all others...One possibility is to subsidize the creation of ACVA [Air Conditioning and Ventilation Associates, a PM consultant] licensees... potential ventilation companies have to be identified and then supported (with technical and marketing expertise) until they can stand alone..."

PM also discusses the type of scientists who should be avoided for recruitment for their consultancy program (and reveals the company's need to remain clandestinely involved in promoting their point of view on secondhand smoke): "Of least use are those consultants who have already been identified with the tobacco industry..."

PM also recognized the delicate issues of credibility involved in getting a reputable external laboratories to work with them:

"At all times PM should take maximum care to safeguard the credibility and good name of these laboratories. If we in any way damage the reputation of one, the rest will go nowhere near us....We should [not] leak the fact that laboratory X is doing a study for us. Projects should be presented to the laboratories as doing something which will enhance their prestige as well as their business, not something which they might regret doing..."

PM acknowledged the increasing difficulty of showing that exposure to secondhand smoke carries "zero risk":

"As the sophistication of measuring, methodologies and epidemiology advance, finding 'zero risk' is getting more and more difficult."

PM also considered shifting the focus of the "right to smoke-free air" health argument to outdoor air quality and funding studies to "show the risks incurred by urban outdoor workers such as cab and bus drivers, street vendors, policemen, news agents and kiosk operators, etc." PM admits, however, that if it overtly funded such studies, the results would have little credibility, saying "Of course, a credible, non-tobacco 'source' for such studies would have to be found or created."

This Philip Morris Europe (PME) interim scientific report shows that PME performed detailed testing to find out the quantities of dangerous and irritating chemicals that smoking of cigarettes puts into ambient air. A special airtight room was created just for the experiments: "Airtightness

It is extremely important that the experimental room be airtight to prevent smoke escaping or air entering during the experiments. Every possible precaution was taken to effectively seal the experimental room. All joints were sealed with silicone glue, the rivet holes were plugged with epoxide glue and a good seal was made at the door."

PME used a smoking machine to smoke beween 5 and 60 cigarettes in the room and then tested the air of the room for carbon monoxide, nicotine, hydrogen cyanide, ammonia, aldehydes, and other dangerous or irritating chemicals. Some of the testing was done using two different methods to verify accuracy, and some tests were done twice.

Charts in the appendix of the document indicate that the amount of carbon dioxide in the air of the experimental room increased almost linearly with the number of cigarettes smoked. The ammonia concentration also increased in almost perfect linear fashion proportional to the number of cigarettes smoked. The same was true with hydrogen cyanide. The report states that the concentration of hydrogen cyanide in the room failed to decrease for over an hour after smoking ceased:

"Five, 15, 30 and 60 cigarettes...were smoked in the experimental room under standard smoking conditions...Measured HCN concentrations were found to be proportional to the number of cigarettes smoked over the investigated range....It was found that HCN concentrations in the room did not decay over a period of one hour."

The report also states,

"In all cases investigated concentrations [of the investigated chemicals] were proportional to the number of cigarettes smoked, all deviations being with the range of experimental errors."

So the more cigarettes that were smoked in an enclosed space, the higher the concentrations of chemicals were put into the air.

All testing was done in overseas labs in Europe.

This 11-page Philip Morris (PM) document outlines the company's strategies to fight public health restrictions on secondhand smoke in hospitality, transport and workplace venues. The estimated date of the document is 1989, but it tracks very closely with the strategies PM uses today to fight regulation of secondhand smoke. Authorship is inferred from references to Philip Morris within the text. The document was found in a Philip Morris file called "Workplace Kit" in the area of employee Aurora Gonzalez, who was a member of PM's ETS Work Group. Page one of the document states that "specific goals" of PM are to "maintain the controversy" about secondhand smoke, to "pre-empt further public smoking restrictions" and "demonstrate to general public...that tobacco smoke is a minor contributor to the quality of indoor environments."

Yet another objective is to "Maintain research activity...to provide support for our positions." The document then discusses how PM must stay behind the scenes to accomplish their objectives. The methods described are the same ones PM still uses today to fight public health regulation of secondhand smoke:

"In most markets it is difficult to attain the overall objective directly as Philip Morris. Therefore, we have developed...allies/coalitions which in turn communicate our messages...The goal is to reach decision makers or those who can favorably influence decisions regarding public smoking environments."

Likewise, the "key messages" PM's lists for use with hospitality groups are still in use today:

"Legislated smoking restrictions/bans in the hospitality trade are undesirable.

• Such legislation can have negative impact on business.

• Owners and operators --not government-- are in the best position to determine what arrangements best accommodate their patrons preferences."

The document discusses strategies to pre-empt workplace bans on smoking, recruit and work through hospitality groups, and lists "key messages" to be used with each group to fight smoking restrictions. One key message is that "Tobacco smoke is a minor contributor to the indoor air environment." Another is designed to take the focus off of tobacco smoke entirely: "Expand the workplace smoking issue to a discussion of overall indoor air environment."

Yet another strategy calls for Philip Morris employees to begin infiltrating and influencing local community groups:

"Encourage appropriate Philip Morris personnel to become active members of local Chambers of Commerce, personnel management associations, business management associations and community groups. Utilize their forums, e.g., meetings and newsletters, to communicate key messages."

Also note the careful manner in which PM crafts its statement regarding the health effects of smoking on board aircraft,(minimizing but not completely ruling out the potential for harm from passive smoking):

"Health effects from exposure to tobacco smoke aboard aircraft are highly unlikely."

This 1977 British American Tobacco (BAT) document relates the tobacco industry's early fears that European health ministries were starting to view tobacco as a public health problem. It discusses a proposed meeting of European Health Ministers wherein cigarette smoking was to be discussed as a public health hazard, right along with other subjects like poor food hygiene, alcohol consumption, drugs and abuse of medical remedies. It proposes first steps of how the tobacco industry could "block this activity at birth."

Of the meeting, the document states, "We fear this may have the consequence that in the future 'Smoking and Health' will become a subject of European policy not only under the aspect of consumer protection but in all of its dimensions. The already most alarming approach which Mr. DeGave's Working Party on Tobacco has taken on behalf of the Consumers Consultative Committee may very well serve as a stepping stone on the way towards wider horizons of anti-smoking action...What appears most startling about all this is the impact with which the EEC action in this field seems to be gaining speed in the last few months. We shall have to find out which institutions and individual countries could be approached in order to block this activity at birth..."

This Philip Morris (a.k.a. Altria Group or PM) Corporate Affairs Plan for Europe (1994-96) is rich with corporate strategies to reverse the decline in social acceptability of smoking in Europe. In the Plan, PM reveals its understanding that a huge majority of Europeans actually favor smoking restrictions in public places:

"Europeans are highly in favor of smoking restrictions in public places (82%) and 88% are in favor of clear separation in the workplace."

Despite this, PM planned to fight smoking restrictions with all resources it could muster.

PM viewed laws to protect worker health and safety as a threat:

"A proposed Directive was issued in early 1993 with the aim of protecting transport worker's health and safety...This is the biggest threat at European Community level which needs to be addressed."

The Plan also reveals PM as the organizing and driving force behind Smokers Rights Groups (SRGs) all over Europe:

"Smokers' Rights Groups (SRG's) are an essential medium for presenting [the tobacco industry's] views in favor of reasonable solutions because a) they have no commercial interest and, as such, are more credible voice than the tobacco industry and b) they are able to position themselves as a large but discriminated "minority" of individuals who have rights. The Plan foresees continued support [to SRGs] provided by PM/industry to the groups in Italy, Spain, France, the Netherlands and Greece to help them expand in both number of members and in influence."

PM lamented the lack of organization among Smokers Rights Groups and anticipated the benefits that could accrue if the company assisted further in organizing them:

"The real weakness of the SRG network is the absence of any co-ordinating body or secretariat which can share information, techniques and ideas between the various SRG's. We should examine the feasibility of creating a pan-European SRG secretariat or Smokers' movement to... have an organization that can rightly claim to represent 100 million European smokers (and voters) which could function as a central media and lobbying "voice". Rothmans Int. have expressed their interest in this project and would co-fund with us."

PM also planned to foster and promote misunderstanding between the people of the United States and Europe to promote its own ends:

"Europeans believe that Americans tend to be fanatical extremists went it comes to public health issues. We shall take this opportunity to use US-sourced 'ETS excess stories' (dismissal from work over smoking, career discrimination due to smoking, etc.) to help discredit all anti-smoking initiatives -American as well as European."

And once again, PM reveals its strategy of hiding behind, and working through, third-party Libertarian groups to do its bidding:

"The Plan calls for using libertarian groups (e.g., Social Affairs Unit, Arise) whenever possible to communicate this message..."

PM's Plan also explains the logic behind its urgent efforts to preserve smoking on airplanes, despite the relatively small amount of time people actually spend on airplanes:

"Although the time a smoker may spend in the air and at the airport may not constitute a large amount of time relative to the amount of time spent in the workplace for example, bans on airlines are highly visible and may disproportionately contribute to the deterioration of the social acceptability of smoking."

Only a few of PM's planned strategies are listed in this summary or in the quotes below. The document contains much more information and, at only 13 pages, is worth a read in its entirety, especially for Europeans.

This 1994 Philip Morris (PM/Altria) presentation describes the cigarette maker's strategies to fight public health efforts in Europe to reduce secondhand smoke (SHS) exposure and counter activities of the International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC) and the World Health Organization (WHO). PM's objectives, clearly aligned with fighting public health, include "maintain debate on ETS science among EU legislators," "counter anti influence," "delay EU legislation," "interdict national legislation via [European Union] resolution on [Good Epidemiological Practices]," and "ensure legislation accommodates smokers."

The document also communicates PM's plans to use its typical hospitality allies to fight regulations on secondhand smoke:

"Build upon existing relationships with the International Hotel Association, European Restaurant Association and European Chefs Association to target advocacy on EU policymakers."

The plan's wording also suggests that public opposition to smoking bans in Europe was not forthcoming particularly among white collar workers and unions, and that therefore PM had to create opposition:

"Develop public opposition to bans among EU groupings of independent...white collar and public sector unions...using U.S. workplace kit."

PM strove to hide its overbearing influence from European media by using third parties:

"Create a European Tobacco Information Centre to disseminate third party news to EU influencers including policy makers and the media..."

The document further reveals PM as the driving force behind the creation of supposedly "independent" smokers rights groups:

"Create a European Smokers Rights Group to bring smokers' voice to EU legislative debate and to provide a network for coordinated actions and information sharing by national SRGs."

and

"... where gaps exist (Germany, Belgium, UK, Spain) create smokers rights groups to defend against ban threats direct[ly] with legislators and via the media."

PM was also behind the creation and touring of a bizarre front group called ARISE ("Associates for Research in the Science of Enjoyment"), an industry-funded "scientific" group out of the United Kingdom which toured Europe putting forth the message that a little pleasure is essential to stress relief and hence good health. In their public proclamations, ARISE members subtly grouped tobacco use in with benign, pleasurable and stress-relieving activities such as drinking tea, shopping, and eating chocolate.

The PM document further describes as a "THREAT" a European "directive for the protection of transport workers' health and safety" because it "provides for a de facto total smoking ban" on "all modes of transport operating within EU territory." The document further lists plans to fight this "threat."

The document also reveals PM's strategy of working through Libertarian groups to influence the media and to "communicate messages of tolerance and...extremism" about public health smoking restrictions.

Quotes:

EU legislative threat driven by IARC ETS activities • Introduce mechanism to prevent legislation on flawed epidemiology • Maintain debate on ETS science • Mobilize allies • Counter anti influence • Current EU transport threat EU - 1994/1997 THREAT

THREAT:

EU legislation to ban smoking in workplaces, public places and on transport, driven by IARC ETS study and monograph and ensuing media hype.

--Delay EU legislation

--Interdict national legislation via EU Resolution on GEP --Ensure legislation accommodates smokers --Maintain debate on ETS science among EU legislators... --Build support amongst Pan European groupings of business owners and employees for mobilisation against severe legislation --Build upon existing relationships with the International Hotel Association, European Restaurant Association and European Chefs Association to target advocacy on EU policy makers. --Encourage the European Trade Union Confederation to support accommodation vs bans via collaborating on a Pan European workers' attitude survey to demonstrate discriminatory nature of bans and wide support for tolerance in the workplace.

--Develop public opposition to bans among EU groupings of independent (CESI), white collar(CEC) and public sector (CEEP), Unions and the European Personnel Managers Association (EAPM) using US workplace kit.

--Collaborate with the European Tourism Action Group to promote economic impact of bans in Horeca and Transport sectors.

Counter influence of WHO, BASP and anti-cancer groupings.

--Create a European Tobacco Information Centre to disseminate third party news to EU influencers including policy makers and the media including positive scientific studies, public opinion data, favourable legislative developments, economic impact data, libertarian views.

• Expand ARISE network and through bi-annual attitude surveys (1995- stress in the workplace) generate maximum publicity for ARISE message of pleasure as beneficial to health.

• Create a European Smokers Rights Group to bring smokers' voice to EU legislative debate and to provide a network for coordinated actions and information sharing by national SRGs.

• Develop PM Communications tool on accommodation to support direct dialogue with legislators and allies.

• Encourage opposition to bans within EP.

• Encourage European Public Health Alliance and EP Health intergroup to prioritise non-tobacco health concerns with DGV.

THREAT: 1993 proposed Directive for the protection of transport workers' health and safety amended by the European Parliament to provide for a de facto total smoking ban with application to all modes of transport operating within EU territory.

OBJECTIVE: Obtain Commission withdrawal Of proposal in accordance with subsidiarity principle during German Presidency; ensure new proposal provides maximum flexibility in line with existing health and safety directives

STRATEGY:

. Reinforce and support German Government position to obtain withdrawal by promoting subsidiarity argumentation among other Governments.

• Mobilize international Transport/Health and Safety bodies using jurisdictional argumentation

• Reinforce UK Government position for withdrawal.

• Encourage through provision of legal argumentation, other governments to support German position (France, Holland, Italy and Denmark) via national transport groupings

• Determine feasibility of obtaining additional support from other governments

• Develop support for withdrawal among Commissioners and DG VII

THREAT:

Legislation banning Smoking in the workplace, public places and on transport driven by EPA, IARC activities, SCOTH (UK), ICAO and political opportunism

OBJECTIVES:

. Capitalise on EU Resolution on GEP to prevent governments legislating on basis of flawed epidemiology.

• Lock in and defend legislation that provides for accommodation.

• Defend against further airline bans and other key public impact ban threats in transport sector...

CONSUMERS:

• Support and expand existing SRGs and where gaps exist (Germany, Belgium, UK, Spain) create smokers rights groups to defend against ban threats direct with legislators and via the media.

MEDIA OUTREACH

--Communicate messages of tolerance, and US extremism both directly and via libertarian and smokers rights groups.

--Encourage a balanced coverage of ETS science via libertarian groups, independent scientists pre, during and post IARC study release.

--Promote examples of other low level risks, confounders arguments and other weaknesses of epidemiology via scientists and libertarian groups to undermine public confidence in science and to provide perspective.

--Educate targeted scientific editors on ETS science via scientific consultants.

--Encourage business owners to advocate accommodation via speaking opportunities.

This Philip Morris (PM) email by Robert Pages, a PM scientist, discusses an "ETS World Conference" that Philip Morris was to hold on February 24-25, 1993. PM's executives worldwide were invited to attend the meeting to discuss the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) rating of secondhand tobacco smoke as a Group A Human Carcinogen, and PM's strategies to deal with it. Some passages in the document communicate the attitude within PM about how the company viewed this public health ruling:

"What is being done by PM-USA to 'crush' EPA's conclusions?"

Another line indicates doubt from within PM's ranks about the company's ability to generate a scientific answer that could help deflect EPA's classification:

"...If we don't have a realistic plan to win the scientific debate on ETS, then do we need to quickly implement our 'damage limitation' strategies?"

This is a translation of a letter written by a German scientist named Dietrich Schmaehl, who was performing biological research for Philip Morris in 1979 in a quest to find a "safer cigarette." Schmaehl was doing experiments to determine the carcinogenic effect of the smoke condensates from specific brands of cigarettes.

Philip Morris threatened to cut off Schmaehl's funding. After finding this out, Schmael wrote to Dr. Franz Adlkofer (presumably his boss), "In our conversation it was argued that the Industry could not support such experiments since this might prove that the previously manufactured products have a carcinogenic effect and that such experiments could especially not be supported because they would be financed with Industry funds. I am totally unable to follow these arguments."

Schmaehl in no uncertain terms threatened that if his funding was cut off, he would continue performing the investigations on his own and publish the results, naming the brands (currently on the market) that he used in the experiments:

"I want to tell you again that in case this project...is refused support by the Industry, I will carry out such investigations in my Institute on my own account; in that case I will, in my publication of this work, call a 'spade a spade'; this means I will name the brands currently on the market which were used to prepare the smoke condensates."

According to another internal memo from Alex Holtzman (PM Assistant General Counsel) to Thomas Osdene (Director of Research) about Schmael's letter, PM clearly considered Schmaehl's threats blackmail, but decided to fund his work anyway to keep him quiet. Holtzman says, "I do feel that this letter is tantamount to blackmail by Schmaehl . I am very much afraid that unless financial support be provided to Schmaehl he will chastise the industry." That memo can be seen at http://www.pmdocs.com/getallimg.asp?if=avpidx&DOCID=1000774066

This document from the Philip Morris collection predicts a dismal future for the tobacco industry with regard to smoke-free policies, especially in workplaces. It makes such assessments as,

"Political and societal trends [on secondhand smoke] are negative...we are in danger of losing the war...the battle for public opinion has been lost...public believe ETS [environmental tobacco smoke] to be a significant health hazard..."

The paper concludes that,

"Workplace is the battleground but legislators, employers, non-smoking workers, and even smoking workers, are against us...our action priorities must now include the defence of the right to smoke at work as a major priority..."

The writer mentions places where the industry has had some success in deflecting workplace smoking bans: "The Italian experiment of working with personnel managers...the Dutch and Belgian campaigns for mutual tolerance...based on the use of humour...the Irish voluntary codes on smoking in the workplace."

Strategies include forming "strategic alliances with those who exercise social control, e.g. personnel managers, owners of catering establishments, trade unions....we can only fight htose systems through those who manage them."

It concludes by saying,

"If the battle for the work place is lost there will be significant loss of consumption...[the] object of the antis will be virtually achieved of engineering smoking into a private pursuit...we must determine to make our stand on this one."

This internal Philip Morris (PM) memo from Matt Winokur (manager of PM Worldwide Regulatory Affairs in Europe) proposes strategies the company could use to change to focus of a 1993 conference in Oslo, Norway on passive smoking. The conference was sponsored by the "Europe Against Cancer program" and the Nordic Cancer Union, and was going to focus on the health hazards of children's exposure to secondhand tobacco smoke. The conference was to be held during "European Cancer Week" 1993.

PM's Winokur felt that anyone speaking on behalf of the tobacco industry should avoid the health debate and might "risk ridicule for being a mouthpiece of the industry." He also believed that if PM sent someone from Covington and Burling (C&B, the law firm PM used to help deceive the public about secondhand smoke) that person might "run the likely risk of exposing the relationship" between PM and the law firm. Winokur then suggests how PM could take the meeting's focus off of the health effects of secondhand smoke on children and "sow seeds of discontent within the health fraternity." Winokur says,

"...a more attractive idea...would be to try to create some countervailing publicity concerning the other REAL threats to the health of children and cancer prevention in general that are being overlooked while all this PR time is being spent on smoking...Two approaches come to mind...

1. Find out what cancer related causes and illnesses are NOT getting the support (funding $$$ and PR) their advocates believe they deserve. Find out who those advocates are and find routes to inform them with the information about underfunding. They may not come out publicly but in the long term this may sow seeds of discontent within the health fraternity."

Winokur's second proposal was to find a third party to represent the industry's point of view at the conference "and make sure they have a position which puts the ETS issue in a broader context...For example, the workforce people should say that while ETS may be an issue, it should not... be allowed to overshadow the many other important issues that affect the workplace...and so forth."

This memo shows how PM worked to obscure the link between secondhand smoke exposure and illness (especially regarding children). It was copied to some of the highest executives at PM, including Steven Parrish (Senior Vice President of PM USA in 1993, who later become head of the company), Anthony Andrade (Associate General Counsel for PM), and Marc Firestone, who served as Senior Vice President of PM Worldwide Regulatory Affairs.

In February 1993 Philip Morris held an "ETS World Conference" at the Macklowe Hotel in New York City. According to a pamphlet about it, the event appears to have been primarily for Philip Morris employees worldwide: http://www.pmdocs.com/getallimg.asp?if=avpidx&DOCID=2023544793/4810

The following document is a follow-up memo about the corporate objectives and strategies for dealing with secondhand smoke issues apparently put forth at the meeting, along with assignments as to who was to handle which tasks.

Tasks listed include:

"Development of a global coalition against 'junk science' as a parallel to PM USA coalition now underway...

Shift concern over ETS to slippery slope argumentation and/or tolerance...

How to package comprehensive improvements in ventilation to forestall tobacco specific bans...

Shifting debate from ETS [environmental tobacco smoke] to IAQ [indoor air quality]...

[I]dentifying other risk parallels...cellular phones, chlorinated water; identify currently regulated carcinogens for which acceptable levels have been set...

...Shift concern over ETS in the workplace from the health issue to one of annoyance.

...Shift the concern over ETS in restaurants from bans to accommodation.

...Develop an 'ETS Task Force' with global PM representation to develop strategies to combat smoking restrictions.

People very high up in the company were involved in the conference, including Steve Parrish (VP of External Affairs and General Counsel at PM USA), Clare Purcell (Manager, Legal Issues, PM USA), Mary "Mopsy" Pottorff (Manager, PM Corporate Scientific Affairs), Matthew Winokur (Director, Corporate Affairs, PM International), and Robert Pages (Director, Science and Technology, PMUSA).

This 205-page document from Philip Morris (PM) is a compendium of resources to help allies fight clean indoor air measures. It lists PM's restaurant objectives: "Preempt the need for legislated smoking restrictions," and "Develop allies in hospitality industry [in] opposing legislation to restrict/ban smoking." PM's objective for airlines is "Maintain smoking areas on airlines."

The document contains articles by PM's scientific allies and front groups that claim there isn't enough data available to determine whether secondhand smoke causes illness in nonsmokers, and that ventilation is the best solution to the problem of secondhand smoke. Also, similar to the document posted 26 September (entitled Restaurants and Smoking Restrictions, wherein industry consultant Peter Sparber suggested casting restaurant workers as carriers and spreaders of disease rather than the victims of secondhand smoke), this document contains articles with titles like "The Role of Aircraft in Transmission of Disease" and "Dissemination of Human Pathogens by Airline Travel" that, in effect, blame airplanes, flight attendants and passengers for illnesses that occur as a result of air travel. One statement in the report blames the airlines themselves for tobacco smoke pollution on airplanes:

"Tobacco smoke accumulation aboard aircraft is an indicator of inadequate ventilation. Airlines reduce fresh air intake to economize on fuel..."

Another statement cites unnamed "UK researchers" who concluded airline employees complain about secondhand smoke on their jobs because they may be "disgruntled about a totally unrelated matter":

"When two UK researchers looked at the technology of the aircraft cabin and addressed the human factor as part of the equation, they concluded: 'Industrial experience of Human Factors has on many occasions shown that complaints about an aspect of the work situation such as noise or temperature, become more frequent when the work-force is disgruntled about a totally unrelated matter."

PM's long-standing twin strategies of fighting smoking restrictions and claiming ventilation is the best solution to secondhand smoke stand in stark contrast to statements the company now makes on its domestic (U.S.) website:

"Public health officials have concluded that secondhand smoke from cigarettes causes disease... in non-smoking adults...Philip Morris USA believes that the conclusions of public health officials concerning environmental tobacco smoke are sufficient to warrant measures that regulate smoking in public places..." [PMUSA web site, 30 Sept 2003]

Perhaps most importantly, PM now quietly admits that ventilation really doesn't address the health problems posed by secondhand smoke:

"While not shown to address the health effects of secondhand smoke, ventilation can help improve the air quality of an establishment..." (Underlining emphasis added. Found in the last paragraph on the page on PM USA's current web site entitled "Policies, Practices and Positions -- Public Place Smoking." http://www.pmusa.com/policies_practices/public_place_smoking.asp

Interestingly, the above statement regarding ventilation does NOT appear on PM's International web site, http://www.philipmorrisinternational.com/

This 1995 Philip Morris (PM) document lists six "principal threats" that European initiatives posed to the tobacco industry. Listed among the "threats" are Europe's energy-saving programs designed to reduce admissions of greenhouse gases. "[T]he EU and many Member States have undertaken to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases. Among other things, this means reduction in the uses of energy. DG XVII [Directorate General for Energy & Transport] has a number of programs designed to encourage energy-saving..."

Initiatives to reduce energy use threaten the tobacco industry because the industry pushes ventilation as the solution to problems caused by indoor smoking (more ventilation = more energy use). This puts energy (and greenhouse gas) reduction programs directly in conflict with the tobacco industry's efforts to preserve the social acceptability of smoking.

The authors of this document (Jennifer Green and Charles Lister of the law firm Covington and Burling's London office) warn PM that smoking restrictions will meet several important goals of the European Commission:

"...[I]mproved indoor air and energy saving are generally competing goals...but the two goals are arguably consistent in one important respect -- both would arguably be served by additional smoking restrictions. You should expect that it will be argued that public and workplace smoking restrictions both contribute to improved [indoor air quality] AND reduce the higher ventilation rates (and energy usages) demanded for smoking areas."

Thus, smoking restrictions are a simple, inexpensive way to help meet a host of international goals: saving energy, reducing greenhouse gas emissions and improving indoor air quality.

One must wonder, since the Bush administration in the U.S. is known to be friendly to tobacco interests, could these facts have had any bearing on the Bush Administration's refusal to join other countries in the ongoing worldwide efforts to reduce greenhouse gases?

This document, estimated date 1978, is one of a growing number that describe the global tobacco industry's engagement in a massive, highly organized campaign to undermine common knowledge about the health hazards of smoking, slow the global quit rate, reverse the decline in smoking incidence, and directly counter global public health authorities' efforts to reduce tobacco use around the world. These efforts, astonishing in their scope and ambition, were carried out by ICOSI (the multinational tobacco industry's International Committee on Smoking Issues), whose members included British American Tobacco, Imperial Tobacco, Rothmans, Gallaher, R.J. Reynolds, Philip Morris and the German tobacco company Reentsma. The companies feared that society's then-new focus on the economic burdens caused by tobacco, or "social costs" (higher medical costs, absenteeism, cleaning costs, etc.) would create "economic incentives [for companies] to join anti-smoking efforts." They feared this would then lead to widespread, cascading efforts by businesses to decrease their operating costs by helping employees quit smoking. They feared this in turn would accelerate the decline in social acceptability of smoking, and further decrease cigarette consumption:

"If enough managers become convinced that anti-smoking efforts will help their company's profitability, then SAWP [the Social Acceptability Working Party of ICOSI] can visualize an avalanche of corporate-sponsored anti-smoking programs. If so, such programs could easily dwarf the present efforts carried out by governments and public interest groups...Considering just these...major implications, SAWP believes that the industry must begin to quickly and seriously address 'social costs' issues."

The document also shows that a goal of ICOSI was to "reduce to absurdity" public health conclusions about the social costs of smoking:

"Put [social cost arguments against smoking] in perspective and reduce them to absurdity - Demonstrate that overeating, coffee, sugar, lack of exercise, fats, alcohol, etc. are also alleged to generate 'social costs.' If tobacco use is subjected to attack, these other behaviors should also be indicted, taxed and otherwise discouraged."

This document, and others like it now being discovered, may be useful in undermining the tobacco industry's oft-used legal "common knowledge" defense that "everyone knew" the dangers of smoking. Such knowledge may at one point have indeed been widespread (at least in developed countries), as people were starting en masse to cut cigarette consumption, eliminate secondhand smoke in work places and public places, fewer people were taking up smoking and more people were quitting entirely. But rather than allowing societies to slowly wean themselves off smoking (as trends indicated could likely have been the case), the tobacco industry orchestrated a massive, behind-the-scenes campaign to undermine the success resulting from widespread dissemination of public health information about the dangers of smoking.

This 1990 Philip Morris document discusses the company's strategies to minimize the impact of the environmental tobacco smoke (ETS) issue within the European Economic Community (EEC).

Objectives listed in the document include,

--"Maintain the debate on primary [health] issue and ETS," --"Expose faulty logic of the WHO [World Health Organization] and anti-smoking groups." --"Minimize total smoke bans in European companies," --"Activate [European] restaurant trade against government smoking regulations," --"Minimize total smoking bans on airplanes and trains," --"Counter biased and damaging surveys by antis [public health officials]," --"Create public backlash against social engineering," --"Establish SRGs [Smokers' Rights Groups] as counterpart of Anti-groups," and --"Position PM as a reasonable company and a credible source of information." As a prelude to its combative strategies, PM states that "the public generally believes that ETS can harm the health of non-smokers. This false perception is the primary excuse for public and private initiatives to restrict or ban smoking in workplaces, restaurants, transportation vehicles and other public places..."

Today we know (from other documents that describe the industry's formation of smokers' rights groups, "countermeasures" against the World Health Organization, etc.) that PM acted on many of the strategies listed in this document. Evidence of the company's efforts to slow the European Community's progress towards protecting people from secondhand smoke is especially poignant today. Both PM's domestic and international corporate web sites now caution non-smokers about exposure to secondhand smoke, saying the "public should be guided by the conclusions of public health officials" that ETS causes disease. PM's web sites now refer visitors to "anti" (public health authority) web sites for more information, including the web site of the World Health Organization. No apology appears on PM's web sites for obstructing public health progress against secondhand smoke for so many decades, or for the cost--in money and lives-- to countries, governments, health ministries and public health organizations of fighting the the industry on secondhand smoke for so many decades.

This Philip Morris (PM) document describes the strategies and tactics the company planned to use throughout Europe to defeat adverse legislation and "reinforce smoker confidence." Strategies include "fight[ing] to curtail anti-smoking lobby's most effective weapon (i.e. juvenile smoking)," developing and leveraging smokers rights groups throughout Europe to help reinforce smokers confidence, preserve PM's marketing ability, defeat taxes and "defuse pressure for mandatory changes" in warning labels on cigarettes.

A stated goal was to "Maintain the debate on ETS science among EU legislators." The document also states the company's intent to "Equip and politicize the European Horeca association - Hotrec" , "develop a 'hard core' group of businesses" to oppose government public health efforts.

Another goal is to "Capitalize on success of [industry-funded scientific front group] Associates for Research in the Science of Enjoyment (ARISE) in building recognition of the benefits of pleasure; expand scientific underpinning of 'pleasure' message through scientific roundtables..."

Yet another goal reveals the true purpose behind industry-sponsored youth programs:

"Continue to use voluntary industry codes and youth anti-smoking programs to pre-empt legislated restrictions."

At one point in discussing PM's activities regarding duty-free product, PM states "PM and tobacco industry to stay behind scenes but play driving role."

This document shows the depth and scope of Philip Morris' interference in European affairs.

In this 1991 Philip Morris document, Helmut Gaisch (President of PM Europe's Science & Technology division) plots the ultimate scientific coup for a cigarette company: the formation of a public health institute whose expertise and authority would exceed that of the World Health Organization (WHO) and other respected existing European public health organizations. The goal was "to create a European foundation...whose goal is to become THE scientific authority on a wide range of human concerns, thus putting itself above the WHO, FAO [Food and Agriculture Organization] and other organisations who restrict themselves to narrower fields."

Troubled by difficulty getting mainstream scientists to agree with the company's point of view on secondhand smoke, Gaisch complained that mainstream science was actually the problem, saying "scientific thinking largely continues according to traditional patterns, whilst reality has changed fundamentally." He expressed a need for a scientific body that could "serve as a source of factual information and its political interpretation," "give politicians the necessary factual basis to re-adjust public policies wherever necessary," and "achieve a lasting impact on society."

Gaisch proposed modeling the organization after another PM front group, ARIA (Associates for Research in Indoor Air), and outfitting it with a prestigious board that would create "a political umbrella in the form of powerful patrons" who would help "put the Foundation out of reach from lowly political attacks and bestow it with authority." He believed that forming such a foundation would be "the best way for corporate PM to spend research money on a broad range of topics of true human importance AND to obtain political benefits by the same token."

This document shows a prominent European Philip Morris scientist desperate to find some way--no matter how far-fetched--to reconcile the industry's strained scientific beliefs with those of mainstream science.

This strategic plan by Philip Morris (PM) Corporate Affairs Department in Europe describes PM's strategies for fighting the progression of smoke-free laws in Europe between 1994 and 1996. PM labeled as "threats" both voluntary and legislated smoking restrictions in workplaces, public places and on public transport, as well as conferences held to discuss smoking and health. PM's "overall objectives" were to protect smoking as a permitted activity, prevent legislation the company believed was adverse to its interests, "promote private sector policies that accommodate smokers" and "mitigate [the] impact of [International Agency for Research on Cancer] ETS study," which PM anticipated would mirror conclusions already reached in the U.S. that exposure to secondhand smoke was harmful.

PM's attack plan included delaying smoking restrictions within the European Community (EC), "locking in" the company's own model legislation in multiple countries, promoting policies that preserve smoking in workplaces, "pre-empting sub-national bans with suitable national legislation," creating an information bureau in Brussels, Belgium to "counteract pressure of antis" by "disseminating favourable views" about tobacco, creating additional smokers' rights groups in Italy, Spain, France, the Netherlands and Greece, and increasing assistance to existing groups already set up in Denmark and the United Kingdom. Other activities included portraying U.S. efforts to control where people can smoke to the European media as "extremist, indicative of intolerance and health fascism," defeating an EC directive to eliminate smoking from public transport, and much, much more.

This document reveals not only the extent of PM's corporate strategies to fight public health efforts in Europe, but also demonstrates the depth of this American company's intent to interfere in European affairs.