Tobacco Documents Online

This Philip Morris (PM) Corporate Affairs plan discusses the company's goals, objectives and strategies for achieving them during 1994-1996 in the areas of Eastern Europe, Middle East and Africa (EEMA). One objective of PM's Corporate Affair plan was nothing short of "Stop the decline in, and start re-building to social acceptability of smokers and smoking in society." Reasons given for PM's concern about the declining social acceptability of smoking were the threat this situation posed to PM's profits, as well as the effect it had on the company's ability to recruit allies and influence government:

"While the ultimate threat is widespread public smoking bans...we also risk consumption decreases due to shrinking possibilities to smoke at the workplace as well as a deterioration of the social acceptability of smokers and smoking. With the lack of social acceptability, we will face further problems in ally-building and Government Relations work."

As part of its '94-96 plan on the secondhand smoke issue in this region, PM hoped to "...influence the setting of indoor air quality and ventilation standards."

PM also sought to take the focus of the secondhand smoke issue off of science and health: "The messages on ETS related issues will focus on solutions and accommodation, rather than on a scientific debate," and "We will encourage [Philip Morris Inc.] to initiate and fund research into the causes and consequences of social intolerance, aiming at broadening the political debate about bans / laws / tolerance in our societies."

The document also discusses PM's corporate activities on topics of excise taxes, fighting restrictions on advertising and sponsorship, strategies for corporate contributions and more, in the countries of Switzerland, Sweden, Norway, the Czech Republic, the Slovak Republic, Poland, Egypt, Denmark Austria, Hungary, Russia, Kazakhstan, the Gulf Council Countries (GCC), Baltic States and Syria.

This 1988 Philip Morris document, marked "Personal and Confidential" describes PM's "ETS Project" [Environmental tobacco smoke project] for the European Economic Community (EEC), Eastern Europe, Middle East and Asia (EEMA). The author is David H. Remes, an attorney with the tobacco industry law firm of Covington and Burling, which carried out PM's International ETS Consultant Program (also known as the "Whitecoat Project"). Remes describes the objective of PM's ETS Program clearly:

"The objective of the PM EEC/EEMA ETS Project is to prevent the imposition of smoking restrictions in the EEC/EEMA regions based on the asserted health hazards of ETS to nonsmokers."

Remes describes the difficulties involved in the project:

"As long as anti-smoking forces can maintain a suspicion of risk [of the health effects of ETS], regulatory authorities and the general public are likely to choose to err on the side of caution and support smoking restrictions."

That regulatory authorities would err on the side of caution in public health issues regarding smoking was apparently undesirable to PM.

Remes lays out another problem facing PM, specifically that no one except members of the tobacco industry believes that tobacco smoke is harmless, and that therefore they will have to develop information that says ETS is harmless:

"The argument against smoking restrictions based on the existence of 'controversy' on the ETS health issue also is unlikely to prove persuasive because it is so reminiscent of the industry's argument on the primary [smoking and] health issue, which virtually no-one outside of the industry accepts. Thus, the industry will have to establish affirmatively that ETS presents no significant health risk to non-smokers."

Remes further describes a mission of the project: "to provide the scientific ammunition with which to meet threatened smoking restrictions in that market."

These minutes of a 1987 meeting held between Philip Morris' (PM) European executives and John Rupp of Covington and Burling (industry attorney) discuss bringing strategy for fighting governments, public health authorities and scientific conclusion on the health effects of secondhand smoke (SHS) to Europe. PM lists "end goals" for the strategy: "Resist smoking restrictions" and "Restore smoker confidence."

Lofty pre-requisites needed to achieve the above goals are also listed:

"--Reverse scientific and popular opinion --Restore social acceptability of smoking --Preserve product liability defences." The first item above indicates PM's awareness that the accumulated scientific evidence about SHS had concluded beyond a doubt that SHS was harmful to health, and reveals the cigarette company's hubris on this topic. The last item, "Preserve product liability defences," suggests that PM believed it needed to create a body of scientific studies casting doubt on the health effects of secondhand smoke to preserve its own defenses against personal injury suits that could potentially arise over SHS exposure. This concern is reflected again on page 3 (Bates No. 2046754739), where PM cautions, "The product liability implications of what is said...in the course of media breifings and elsewhere must be borne in mind."

Later in the paper, PM discusses how to portray its relationship with a company called ACVA (Air Conditioning and Ventilation Associates Atlantic). ACVA was run by a ventilation engineer named Gray Robertson, who toured the U.S. giving seminars about indoor air quality. In these seminars, Robertson introduced the public and press to the notion of "sick building syndrome," a theory that blamed building occupants' health complaints on virtually all components except tobacco smoke (dust, cleaning chemicals, construction materials, poor ventilation, etc. ). Gray Robertson's tours and speaking engagements were paid for by Philip Morris.

PM needed to hide its affiliation with ACVA in order for their "indoor air expert" to maintain credibility. Thus these minutes say,

"ACVA must be perceived to be at arm's length from the industry, including in media briefings. Its role at most should be seen as yet another third party expert amongst others."

The document also makes clear that PM was the leader of worldwide efforts to obscure the link between secondhand smoke and health. Section #4 of the minutes, titled "Industry Coordination," states,

"It is preferable to build up a coordinated, international industry effort [to deal with the secondhand smoke issue]. Ideally this would be under the auspices of INFOTAB ...Nevertheless is was understood that PM must forge on and lead/act unilaterally whilst the industry coordination is being established individual markets."

This 35-page document from Philip Morris' (PM) Corporate Affairs Office describes in detail the company's vas, wide-ranging strategies to fight public health tobacco control efforts in countries across Europe and the Middle East. Topics discussed include fighting tax increases, countering the decrease in social acceptability of smoking, influencing legialators and officials from standards-setting bodies, and much more.

Not unexpectedly, one strategy was to influence government:

"...A FIRST STEP [to fight proposed restrictions on cigarette advertising in Poland] WAS A MEETING BETWEEN PM MANAGEMENT AND THE [Polish] MINISTER OF AGRICULTURE, AFTER WHICH THE LATTER BECAME AN ACTIVE SUPPORTER OF A VOLUNTARY CODE OF CONDUCT AS A VIABLE ALTERNATIVE TO STRINGENT RESTRICTIONS..."

Another strategy was to push a voluntary advertising code to legislators as a substitute for real restrictions on advertising:

"OUR THIRD STRATEGY POINT IS ALSO TO PRESENT AN INDUSTRY COUNTER-PROPOSAL IN THE FORM OF A VOLUNTARY ADVERTISING CODE...PM WILL EVALUATE THE BEST WAY TO PRESENT AND DEFEND THE CONCEPT OF A VOLUNTARY ADVERTISING AND PROMOTIONS CODE AS OPPOSED TO A LEGISLATIVE BAN."

Another strategy was to use sports sponsorships to influence the media, government officials and opinion leaders:

"IN TERMS OF PM SPONSORED SPORTING EVENTS SUCH AS F1, RALLYING, MOTORBIKING, BOATING AND GOLF, WE WILL BEGIN ACTIVELY USING THESE EVENTS TO FURTHER STRENGTHEN TIES WITH THE MEDIA, GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS, AND OPINION LEADERS."

PM also planned to work through smokers' rights groups. PM planned to increase funding for recruitment for these groups (like "Smokepeace" in northern Europe), to use them to create the appearance of a grassroots uprising against smoking restrictions, and use them as a vehicle to fight public health organizing around tobacco issues (e.g., with events like "World Smokepeace Day"). These events were planned to counteract the activities and influence of groups like the World Health Organization and the International Union Against Cancer.

This Philip Morris (PM) 5-year plan describes actions PM took to address smoking and health issues around the world between 1980 and 1984. Several passages of the Plan indicate that poorer and lesser-developed countries provide more favorable markets for cigarettes for several reasons: Firstly, people who are more desperate for their survival tend to pay less attention to smoking and health, and the governments and medical establishments of these countries tend to follow suit: [From Page 64]:

"Smoking and Health is not yet considered to be a crucial issue by the Egyptian Tobacco Industry...and Health is not an issue among the general Egyptian populace who are more concerned with day-to-day survival and consider smoking to be one of their few pleasures in life. The health question...is not considered to be a priority by the [Egyptian] medical profession."

The poorer economies of less-developed countries also help Philip Morris because the governments of these countries are more heavily dependent on tobacco taxes for income, and thus less apt to restrict tobacco marketing, use and advertising:

From Page 65-6:

"In general, little official governmental attention has been paid to smoking and health in Africa and the African Health Ministers, where they exist, have not taken a strong stand on this issue. This is in large part because most [African] governments are preoccupied by other priorities (economic and social development), and because cigarette advertising and tax revenues are important to the African economies. Therefore, governments are not inclined to impose restrictions which might jeopardize this income."

PM also understood that if religious leaders and doctors in Africa took a strong public health stand against tobacco use, it could affect cigarette consumption "because of the mentality of the Africans":

From Pg. 66:

"Smoking and health is of little concern to the African people and it seems not to be a popular issue among them. However, if an anti-smoking campaign supported by religious leaders and/or the medical profession is developed, this could seriously affect consumption because of the mentality of the Africans, and their faith in their religious leaders and doctors."

PM also recognized that a high rate of illiteracy means a populace will rely less on printed reports for health information, which benefits the tobacco companies. The following passage discusses the high rate of illiteracy in Nigeria and how health information from the "outside" was starting to affect "the upper class" (which presumably had higher literacy rates than the general population): From Page 68:

"As not less than seventy percent of the Nigerian population is illiterate, Nigerians form their opinions on smoking and health almost exclusively on the basis of rumor and superstition. The population is becoming more aware of the allegations against smoking largely because of press coverage from outside reports. The prevalent attitude in model developed countries has some impact on the upper class..."

PM also found that increasing levels of wealth and education in underdeveloped countries tends to work against cigarette manufactuers:

"Future Developments and Their Effect on Philip Morris' Activity

As Nigeria's wealth becomes more evenly distributed among its population and a greater number of Nigerians become educated, the spill-over effect as regards smoking and health may become more evident..."

This 1995 Philip Morris (PM) document lists six "principal threats" that European initiatives posed to the tobacco industry. Listed among the "threats" are Europe's energy-saving programs designed to reduce admissions of greenhouse gases. "[T]he EU and many Member States have undertaken to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases. Among other things, this means reduction in the uses of energy. DG XVII [Directorate General for Energy & Transport] has a number of programs designed to encourage energy-saving..."

Initiatives to reduce energy use threaten the tobacco industry because the industry pushes ventilation as the solution to problems caused by indoor smoking (more ventilation = more energy use). This puts energy (and greenhouse gas) reduction programs directly in conflict with the tobacco industry's efforts to preserve the social acceptability of smoking.

The authors of this document (Jennifer Green and Charles Lister of the law firm Covington and Burling's London office) warn PM that smoking restrictions will meet several important goals of the European Commission:

"...[I]mproved indoor air and energy saving are generally competing goals...but the two goals are arguably consistent in one important respect -- both would arguably be served by additional smoking restrictions. You should expect that it will be argued that public and workplace smoking restrictions both contribute to improved [indoor air quality] AND reduce the higher ventilation rates (and energy usages) demanded for smoking areas."

Thus, smoking restrictions are a simple, inexpensive way to help meet a host of international goals: saving energy, reducing greenhouse gas emissions and improving indoor air quality.

One must wonder, since the Bush administration in the U.S. is known to be friendly to tobacco interests, could these facts have had any bearing on the Bush Administration's refusal to join other countries in the ongoing worldwide efforts to reduce greenhouse gases?

This 1987 Philip Morris (PM) plan discusses recruitment of ETS [environmental tobacco smoke] witnesses in European countries (ones who can "campaign" on a "ticket" that points the finger in another direction, e.g., diesel fumes). It states that PM's objectives are to restore smoker confidence and preserve product liability defence. Lofty sub-objectives include "the reversal of scientific and popular opinion that ETS is harmful to health" and "restoration of the social acceptability of smoking." PM planned to do this by "developing expert opinion in order to influence and direct popular attitudes, political attitudes, professional institutions." The plan relates PM's intent to concentrate its anti-public health ETS efforts on Finland and Sweden.