Tobacco Documents Online

Today's document is the text of a 1988 speech given to the Tobacco Institute's Executive Committee expliaining how the Institute was handling an onslaught of proposals across the country to restrict public smoking. The speaker says that the Institute intends to change from "its current reactive posture to...a new, aggressive stance." He points out that opportunities exist "to put the anti-tobacco groups on the defensive" and an Institute objective is to "make THEM react and respond to OUR issues, to expend THEIR efforts and dollars to try and protect what is already on the books. The strategy includes "new approaches of repealing/modifying/rolling back existing legislation . . . of promoting ventilation . . . or IAQ [Indoor Air Quality] legislation . . . and smokers' rights legislation."

IN disucssing smokers' rights legislation, the speaker points out that smokers, in actuality, have few rights, are not a protected class and are unmotivated themselves to argue for places to smoke:

"As Stan Temko [a company attorney] will tell you later, smokers have few legal 'rights.' Smokers are not a protected class as are the aged, handicapped and minorities...Smokers, up to now, have been less than willing to stand up for themselves and argue for places to smoke..."

He also admits that the tobacco industry, working behind the scenes, formed a front group to protest smoking restrictions enacted by the Massachusetts Transportation Authority. The industry called the group "Commuters for Fair Treatment" and organized it to use to protest the smoking ban "in the media and before the legislature."

The speaker also says that the Tobacco Institute plans to "set the legislative agenda" in states it worked in, and "push public percpetion back" to allowing smoking in public areas.

This 1988 Tobacco Institute political strategy document describes how the tobacco industry operates politically in Colorado, Kansas, Missouri, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Texas and Wyoming. "Proactive legislation" refers to legislation the tobacco industry drafts and pushed through states in order to stop public health tobacco control activity at the local level.

In Colorado, the tobacco industry noted that widespread sentiment existed for a statewide smoking law, and that even the Colorado Restaurant Association favored such legislation. To head this off, the industry planned to introduce weak measure ("with moderate provisions") that would "institutionalize certain smokers' rights and dramatically weaken one of the strongest statewide GASP organizations in the country."

The current (2003) governor of Colorado, Bill Owens, is identified as a "friendly member of the House Local Government Committee (consistently favorable to tobacco interests) who could "offer a substitute bill with desireable provisions with a good chance of having it adopted and passed out of committee..."

The writer of the memo states,

"Publicly, tobacco industry advocates should express the position that NO smoking restriction law is desireable. If pressed, they should acknowledge that uniform regulation throughout the state is preferable to the state of confusion which now exists. Privately, our lobbyists would of course encourage legislators' support of the substitute bill."

This is a progress report from an R.J. Reynolds (RJR) field coordinator for the company's "Partisan Movement," a project to develop a massive "grassroots" lobbying network by tapping into and recruiting smokers, employees who worked for the industry and its allies (retailers, growers, advertisers etc.). This document shows that RJR actively organized smokers rights groups in states throughout the southwestern United States. The field coordinator reports some successes, but the document also describes the difficulty the company had in organizing smokers:

"Mike Skelly... said he is growing very frustrated with his group because all they want to do is gripe but do nothing about it..."

"Becky McKoon finally gave up on her group. She resigned as the President because she couldn't deal with a bunch of old people who just wanted to sit around and get drunk..."

"We only have 5 people in the [Flagstaff] area that could help out...Maybe I can persuade one of these guys to take an active role in getting a group more organized..."

"Billy Allison is growing leary of his group. It seems like they have 20 attenders at every monthly meeting but nobody wants to do anything. All they do is bitch..."

Successes: one group held a "Smokers Rights Ball" that raised $100, another group held a "Great American Smoke-In," and two other groups were successful at getting smoking rooms reinstated on the ground floors of local hospitals (one was a Veteran's hospital) and were forging ahead to get them reinstated on all floors.

One way Philip Morris (PM) curries favor among legislators is by inviting them to lavishly catered parties in nice places. Today's document shows just such activity in the state of Colorado. It is an invoice from the Epicurean Catering company to PM's Government Affairs Department for a catered party given on Sunday, October 31, 1999 in a Penthouse Suite at Mile High Stadium, during a Bronco game. Handwriting on the invoice shows that the party was attended by key Colorado legislators, as well as PM lobbyists and members of PM's legal department. The menu included: Spiced Jumbo shrimp Smoked baby back ribs Herb-crusted beef tenderloin Scalloped potatoes Caesar salad Haagen Dazs ice cream bars Mini cheesecakes Bar service One of the Colorado legislators who attended the party was State Senator Norma Anderson, who introduced Colorado's bill to divvy up the Master Settlement Agreement funds. Senator Anderson's bill called for a level of funding for tobacco prevention that was far below the amount recommended by the U.S. Centers for Disease Control for each state (25%). Sen. Anderson's bill recommended that the rest of the money be diverted to non-tobacco-related programs such as a reading program for elementary school-aged children, the Veteran's Fund, nursing programs, and other non-tobacco-related causes.

Similar invoices available among the documents show that Philip Morris holds such parties in Colorado fairly regularly and will easily spend $3,000-$4,000 for food alone on each occasion.

This speech by Roger Mozingo (Senior Vice President of the Tobacco Institute) reveals the power of the Institute as a bulwark against public health throughout the United States. The speech reveals that a sizeable number of U.S. states tried to get workplace smoking restrictions enacted in 1988, but failed due to the industry's opposition. Mozingo mentions the tactics of delaying, weakening and, wherever possible, killing smoking restriction bills at the local level:

"Locally, we continue to face numerous and difficult challenges on the smoking restriction front. As you know, we are often successful in delaying and weakening local measures, but it is tough to obtain what I would call a final 'kill' locally..."

Mozingo also mentions a tactic the Institute used to get smoking cars added back on to Connecticut trains (portraying smoking as a "state's rights" issue rather than a health issue):

"...the most significant thing is that the issue has been couched not as a smoking issue, but as one of states' rights. That enabled us to obtain a committee vote of 22-0 in favor of adding a smoking car."

Mozingo also reveals a tactic the Institute used to stop a measure that would have banned smoking in hospitals in Washington state:

"This year in Washington state, we defeated every anti-tobacco proposal under review. Of particular interest was our work with one relatively minor measure...a bill that would have banned the use of tobacco in hospitals. ... The measure originally had the full support of hospital administrators and the medical community. With the assistance of Gray Robertson's ACVA Atlantic and Covington & Burling, we drafted an amendment to the bill that would have required hospitals to meet rigid and specific ventilation standards in every operating theater, intensive care unit and other hospital areas.... At this turn of events, hospital officials became unglued and openly broke with the medical community, dropping support for the measure and ensuring its defeat. This work should help us in the future as we continue to...oppose more significant anti-smoking legislation in Washington."

Mozingo also discusses the industry's overall strategy of "taking the initiative and putting the anti's [public health authorities] on the defensive."

This brief speech reveals the widespread, pervasive interference of the Tobacco Institute at virtually every level of government in the U.S.

This Philip Morris (PM) document is a case study showing how PM uses cigarette advertising to help undermine public health messages about tobacco.

In 1995 PM planned to launch a new, humorous ad campaign for "Benson and Hedges" cigarettes. The launch was strategically timed to coincide with the opening of new (Philip Morris-sponsored) smoking lounges in Denver's new International Airport (DIA, 1995). The inclusion of smoking lounges at DIA was quite controversial at the time, and would have been expected to draw crticism of the company. Objectives of the ad campaign (and its timing) were to help keep PM in the driver's seat on smoking issues in Denver at that time:

"OBJECTIVES:

--Maintain control of the story and preempt potential activists' criticism of ads --Reinforce messages of accommodating smokers. --Preempt possible activists' claims of victory in 'changing the form of cigarette advertising"... --Frame appropriate messages regarding ETS and accommodation issues." The plan included training spokespeople in advance of the ad campaign "to counter activist positions [and]...incorporate accommodation messages into discussion of campaign."

The campaign even provided PM with "hooks" to create future positive stories and promotions for target audiences. Burson-Marstellar (B-M, the public relations company that generated the media plan) suggests that, in the wake of the ad campaign, "Specific accommodation storylines can be developed for pitch to women's book, gay books, restaurant magazines/inserts, etc." B-M also suggested that PM "[Develop] promotions to 'make smoker feel like a hero'".

PM has long held that the intent of its cigarette advertising is merely to convince smokers to switch brands, but this document shows an intent that is actually quite different. The cigarette company used this ad campaign:

1) To take the focus off tobacco as a public health problem and turn the discussion instead into one of economics and "accommodation,"

2) as a shield to pre-empt criticism of its actions and products,

3) To minimize public health messages about tobacco and secondhand smoke and prevent these messages from taking the forefront,

3) To provide the company with access to major media in a way that gave the company control over the coverage it received.

4) To launch other, similar efforts and campaigns around the country and to obtain further "positive" coverage for the company's brands and smoking in general.

Like Philip Morris (with its National Smokers' Alliance), the R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company (RJR) also engaged in a massive effort to organize smokers into a seemingly "independent" grassroots movement and motivate them to defend the industry's interests. RJR called its effort "The Partisan Project" or "Partisan Movement." RJR's rationale for the program is couched in hysterical anti-public health rhetoric:

"Currently, anti-smoking extremists are dominating the media and slowly but surely seizing control of the legislative process, resulting in more rules and regulations that unfairly discriminate against those who choose to smoke..."

Through its Partisan Project, RJR planned to use a massive database of information it had accumulated about its customers to contact specially-selected smokers, help them "develop an affinity with other individuals [smokers]," "create awareness of discriminatory situations" against smoking and "present avenues for opposition" for them to protest public smoking restrictions. The Partisan Project was aimed at "instilling and reinforcing feelings of effectiveness" in smokers, and creating the appearance of a massive number of smokers suddenly and spontaneously speaking out of "their own volition" to oppose public health measures. As part of the project, RJR also planned to press its sales force into service as "an 'alert network on local anti-smoking issues' " ( see http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/cgi/getdoc?tid=iiv44d00&fmt=pdf&ref=results )

Also as part of the Project, RJR planned to send a magazine to smokers called "CHOICE," that would contain "true stories of smokers who have been discriminated against." They planned to test two different versions of the publication: one would come directly from RJR, and another version would appear to come from an unrelated organization called "People for Smokers' Rights," which RJR would present "not as a national lobbying organization...but as a coalition of all smokers who believe in individual freedom of choice and will speak out to protect that right." The document adds, "As a smoker, they already belong, free of charge." Once the Partisan program was in place, RJR planned to use "a public relations program [to communicate] to the general public that opposition to smoker discrimination is growing..."

RJR test-marketed its Partisan Project in Colorado, Texas and Florida. The company hired state and local field coordinators in these states, established toll-free 800 "hot line" numbers and urged the smokers they contacted to provide the company with the names of other smokers who would be interested in joining. The company planned to expand the program to all 50 states. The Partisan Project "grass-roots operation center" was located in Winston-Salem, RJR's company headquarters. RJR planned to put $37 million into the plan by 1990. (See http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/cgi/getdoc?tid=hyv44d00&fmt=pdf&ref=results)

This document (and the others cited here) show how organized, clandestine, pervasive and well-funded RJR's efforts were to interfere with public health efforts to control the health threats caused from smoking.

This memo was written around the time that Arizona and Colorado were pursuing tobacco tax increases in 1994. It shows how the tobacco industry works behind the scenes to defeat tobacco tax increases. The memo describes a group called the National Coalition Against Crime and Tobacco Smuggling, and is clear about the industry's sole hand in forming this group and subsequent funding of its activities, saying "RJR made the initial grant to get the organization formed and to pay for its first activity -- a major study of the current U.S. contraband tobacco situation." The memo describes use of Rod Stamler, a former assistant commissioner of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, to conduct a study of cigarette smuggling in Arizona and Colorado and disseminate the results to the media in those states. The memo describes other ways how Mr. Stamler could be used to help defeat the tax efforts in Colorado and Arizona. A section on Page 2 is entitled "Avoiding Direct Ties To 'The Tobacco Industry' " and explains how the National Coalition Against Crime and Tobacco Contraband (NCACTC) would be used as a front to avoid connecting the smuggling studies and their dissemination back to the tobacco industry.

Further investigation into the NCACTC's budget reveals a "highly confidential" internal industry Q&A document about the nature of the organization. The document was apparently a briefing for members about how to respond to questions about the organization and the tobacco industry's involvement in its formation. In response to a question about whether the tobacco industry IS the NCACTC, the paper denies that the organization "is" the tobacco industry. In response to a question asking how the organization is funded, the paper says the answer is, "Members fund the organization through membership fees, grants and contributions." [RJR 512544485, http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/cgi/getdoc?tid=jll33d00&fmt=pdf&ref=results]. However, another document, a "highly confidential" 1999 estimated budget for NCACTC, reveals no estimated income from membership dues is even listed. The only income projected for the organization comes from contributions made by Brown & Williamson and RJR, at $225,000 each, and from interest [RJR 522917843/7847, http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/cgi/getdoc?tid=veu60d00&fmt=pdf&ref=results ]

In this 1994 Lorillard memo, James Cherry (Associate General Counsel for Lorillard) describes the industry's strategy to defeat a citizen-led ballot initiative in Colorado to increase the tobacco tax and earmark funds for tobacco control. The industry's "alternative initiative strategy" invloves placing a slightly smaller tobacco tax measure on the ballot whose funds are earmarked specifically to non-tobacco related programs that the industry feels are "worthy and attractive," in order to keep any money from going to tobacco control. Cherry says,

"In Colorado [to fight the citizen-led1994 tax proposal], our choices are three:

1) Mount a campaign in opposition to the proposition,

2) Gather petition signatures, qualify for the ballot and campaign for a competing proposition which, though it would involved volunteering for some additional tax, would be much less tax than one which would be earmarked for crime prevention (or some other worthy and attractive purpose), but not for antitobacco programs;

3) Do nothing and accept the tax and the activity it may fund."

Thought it's now ten years old, this same exact tobacco industry strategy is being used right now in 2004 to fight a citizen-led tax initiative in the very same state: Colorado. Colorado citizens have proposed a ballot measure that would raise the cigarette tax by 64 cents per pack and put 16% of the funds toward tobacco control programs. After that effort became public, Colorado State Representative Bob Hagedorn introduced a competing bill (HB 1410) that would raise the tobacco tax by 50 cents and fund a temporary Medicare drug discount card reimbursement program, childrens' health care and a state insurance plan called Cover Colorado. Hagedorn's bill scrupulously avoids funding tobacco education and cessation, or other tobacco-related public health programs.

Cherry also acknowledges that, left alone, voters tend to vote approximately 70 to 30 percent in favor of measures regulating tobacco, and that the "immediate voter attitude" is that "the taxation of tobacco in order to fund health care is a proposition of almost mathematical elegance..." The memo discusses how the industry can overcome this huge number of voters favoring tobacco control measures.

In a May 1991 letter, Federico Peña (the mayor of Denver, Colorado) writes to Louis Sullivan, the Secretary of the United States Department of Health and Human Services, about his efforts to reduce or eliminate people's exposure to secondhand smoke from tobacco products. Mayor Peña talks about the difficulties he encountered from the tobacco industry in trying to make the city's new airport (then in the planning stages) 100% smoke-free. Revealing a major tobacco industry tactic, Mayor Peña says "The tobacco industry targeted the airport restrictions with a massive lobbying effort which included an 800 number the industry set up so that people from throughout the country could call members of [Denver's] city council at no expense. City Council bowed to the pressure and passed an ordinance repealing the restrictions at the airport."

Mayor Peña discussed how restricting smoking in the existing airport made a "significant difference in the indoor air quality compared to other airports throughout the country." He urges the Secretary to support efforts throughout the country to restrict smoking in airports saying, "It's clearly a matter of health."

This 1996 memo from the city of Arvada, Colorado (USA) shows how a tobacco company's largesse towards a city can potentially influence public health policy in that city. On February 9, 1996 the Jefferson County (Colorado) Department of Health went before the Arvada city council to urge them to enact a unilateral ban on smoking within the city's restaurants. At an August 2 City Council meeting, the council held a study session to talk about how to proceed in improving the city's smoking restriction law.

The (then) Acting City Manager of Arvada sent this memo to Arvada's Mayor and City Council members to make them aware of the potential impact that a stricter smoking ordinance might have on a lucrative rental contract the city held with Philip Morris (PM). PM rented the Arvada Performing Arts Center as venue to hold 13 concerts a year. As part of the rental contract with the city, PM also generously promised to pay for substantial capital improvements to the Center.

The City Manager stated that while reviewing an updated ordinance city staff will

"...be keeping in mind any potential impacts the [updated] smoking ordinance may have on the rental agreement between the Arvada Center and Philip Morris U.S.A. This agreement encompasses a series of thirteen private concerts from April through October 1997, held in the Arvada Center amphitheater for contest winners who participated in a national sweepstakes contest. All winners must be smokers and over the age of 21...

In addition to substantial revenue for amphitheater rental and food and banquet services, the Arvada Center will benefit from over $100,000 of capital improvements to the facility under the terms of the agreement.

Please do not hesitate to contact me should you have any questions."

This 1993 email from Philip Morris Issues Manager Josh Slavitt shows PM hiding in the shadows and investigating Colorado tobacco control groups and individuals, searching for information they can exploit or use to make trouble for these groups. Working through a surrogate public relations agency, Slavitt gave strict orders to hide PM's involvement in these activities. Slavitt instructed the Denver Public Relations firm of Russell, Karsh and Hagan (the contractor doing the investigating) to "be careful that nothing on [RKH employee] Lindsay's materials references her firm, or contains any other references to PM -- if there is a cover note, shred it. Please remember not to use a PM return address, or anything which indicates that he info emanated from us--PM postal stamp, etc."