Tobacco Documents Online

This remarkable memorandum, written by lawyer Thomas Silfen of Philip Morris' law firm Arnold and Porter, comes about as close to soul-searching as a tobacco industry operative probably could. In the memo, Silfen muses about what can be done "to relieve the industry's long agony over health issues--to get the industry out of the 'it hasn't been proven' trap once and for all." Silfen mulls over the utility of the "hasn't been proven" stance, but discloses its shortfalls when it comes to litigation and public health:

"In litigation, we have sought to defuse the issue by adopting the slightly softened risk factor position: i.e., there is a statistical association which could possibly be causal, but the evidence is still not conclusive. Out of court, and especially before Congress, that position will not suffice. When the issue is public health not scientific proof, admitting that tobacco is a 'risk' actually highlights the hard questions. How big is the risk: is it 20% proven or 40% proven or 55%?... Given that risk, how many people die from smoking: if not 350,000, is it 200,000 or 100,000? What would it take to convince us that it is proven; are we waiting until every doctor in the world agrees? And what are we going to do once we are finally convinced; will we stop selling the, product, as some company officials have said in the past?"

Despite this, Silfen argues against admitting causation, putting higher priority on the image and liability problems that would be caused if the industry admitted that cigarettes kill people. Silfen counsels that abandoning the industry's long-standing "case isn't proven" stance without a sizeable scientific event

"...would look bad in the public forum and, perhaps, in court as well. More importantly, admitting causation leaves the really significant public health questions unanswered: What do we do next? Do we stop selling cigarettes altogether or stop advertising or submit to FDA jurisdiction? We are right back on the spot, maybe worse off."

Silfen envies the model of the alcohol industry, since their product has similar problems. He says,

"Why do we tolerate alcohol sales and promotion, despite the attendant death, crime and misery. Several elements seem to contribute. Everybody knows the danger of alcohol (or at least, we all assume that everybody knows). The alcohol manufacturers do not deny the negative aspects of their product and, in fact, counsel both moderation and adult use....as a matter of law, alcohol use is restricted to adults. Finally, we tried prohibition in this country and it was a miserable failure. That is the position we want for tobacco. Once a product is used only by fully informed, competent adults, all that remains (we would say) is prohibition."

However, Silfen recognizes a major difference from the "alcohol model":

"Cohen tells us that we have created an inconsistent information environment in which vulnerable smokers are able to disbelieve even the best known health warnings. This is, of course, a major difference from the 'alcohol model.' "

This is a fascinating look into the ruminations of an industry attorney who knows well the tobacco industry's track record for deception and who is left trying to find ways to get the industry out of the difficulties it created for itself by its history of denial.

This document from British American Tobacco (and found in Philip Morris' files) discusses the decline in social acceptability of smoking and what might be done about it.

The document discusses the long-term threat to the industry of the passive smoking issue, saying there is a "need to provide reassurance to existing smokers and employees and to counter the long-term impact of propaganda from the anti-smoking lobby which threatens to undermine smokers' confidence and to dissuade people not to take up the habit."

The industry also saw that declning social acceptability of smoking was affecting morale among tobacco industry employees and the paper proposes ways to deal with that situation as well, proposing to start "A programme of employee reassurance... which would demonstrate confidence and pride in the Tobacco Industry."

In this 1990 speech by John Dollison (Vice President of Philip Morris' International Corporate Affairs Department) before a marketing conference, Dollison clearly describes public health as PM's opponent in a "guerilla war. " He describes public health officials as "snipers" who have "laid their minefields," and even makes biblical references to the fight: "Our opponents sit and wait, watching our every move, every new product and every new marketing project... Like the proverbial lion in the Bible, they are poised to devour us whenever we give them an opportunity, and sometimes even when we don't....Today we are engaged in a "war" against our industry... The kind of war we are engaged in is a guerrilla war.. the most difficult kind of all. Our enemy might not be invisible but it often seems that way. Their tactics are to hit and run and then hit again...They have positioned their snipers and laid their minefields it is the job of Corporate Affairs to discover where these threats are,and to warn you."

In a bold and revealing description of PM's under-the-radar corporate tactics, Dollison boasts about how PM created and completely controlled a supposedly "independent" coalition called "The Committee for Freedom of Commercial Expression" in Denmark to oppose a tobacco ad ban directive. Dollison boasts about how this coalition was able to convince no less than the Danish Ministry of Health into opposing a tobacco ad ban, lists other countries where PM has used this secret tactic, and proposes that PM expand this tactic further to other countries:

"In Denmark, for example, we have created a coalition known (in English) as the Committee for Freedom of Commercial Expression...we were able to recruit more than 50 prominent Danes...The group has conducted media briefings, participated in debates, and written articles and conducted and publicized an opinion poll...Members of Government (including the Minister of Health) now regularly...consult with coalition members...The coalition was instrumental in securing the commitment and public declaration of the Minister Of Health to oppose an advertising ban...And, finally, the functioning of the coalition is managed at arms length - distanced from P.M., although completely controlled by P.M....We have set up similar coalitions in Holland, New Zealand and EEC for sport. Many more are required..."

Dollison also describes how voluntary, self-imposed "advertising codes" (which, he admits, make no more concessions than PM has already made in most countries in which they operate) help deflect further restrictions on tobacco advertising:

"What I am talking about is a list of self-imposed [advertising] constraints which will enable us to more plausibly claim the high moral ground in future controversies and, not least, to more easily manage and possible triumph in future crises...Such a regime, effectively implemented and sold, I believe, have the inestimable advantage of repositioning Philip Morris in the world-wide debate over the rights and wrongs of tobacco. It would gain us support from those with no affection for our enemies but who also harbour deep suspicion of our motives and methods. It would give us just that little bit more breathing space, just that little bit more room to maneuver. Believe me, we need it."

This 1976 report describes the efforts of the Canadian tobacco industry to reverse the effects of dissemination of public information about tobacco. While the document is from the Philip Morris collection, it appears to be a product of the Imperial Tobacco Company. The report describes the industry's concerns about the impact the decline in social acceptability of smoking will have on their future, and their intent to "take measures" to reverse declining smoking rates by "giving reassurance to smokers":

"We are concerned with the long range impact of adverse publicity on the continuance of smoking by smokers, and on potential smokers who may be persuaded not to begin smoking. We believe that measures must be taken which will have the effect if giving reassurance to smokers."

Imperial classified as "Adverse Publicity" public health information that "smoking in injurious to health of the smoker" and "smoking is injurious to the health of non smokers who unvoluntarily inhale smoke."

The paper quotes an Imperial Tobacco Marketing Division internal memorandum which says,

"With the increasing weight of anti-smoking publicity jeopardizing the future of the industry in Canada, we recommend that the industry plan and implement a concerted programme to counter adverse publicity and to reassure the smoker." [Underlining emphasis in original.]

The report then lists the objectives of a plan to reverse smoking rates:

OBJECTIVE: To initiate a programme of action which will

1) Reassure smokers in their determination to enjoy smoking.

2) Defend the smoker's right to smoke.

3) Correct or refute erroneous statements about smoking and its effects.

4) Defend the tobacco industry.

5) Communicate positive aspects of smoking.

The report places the industry distinctly at odds with public health authorities and efforts to educate the Canadian populace about the dangers of smoking. While the document sounds very similar to documents produced by ICOSI (the International Committee on Smoking Issues), this document was dated several years prior to ICOSI's work on the social acceptability issue. Still, it shows that the Canadian tobacco industry (like the U.S. industry), considered public health information about smoking to be a threat to the industry's future. It also shows the industry fought public health authorities' efforts to educate the public on smoking issues, that they planned their campaigns to minimize "back-lash" from public health authorities, and that the industry's goal was to reverse declining smoking rates.

This 1977 "Report on Social Acceptability of Smoking" by ICOSI (the International Committee on Smoking Issues) outlines the global tobacco industry's need to implement "countermeasures" against public health tobacco control efforts worldwide. The document describes the remarkable public health progress authorities had made by then in educating the world's population about the dangers of tobacco use. Appendix A at back of the document lists these successes, country by country, and represents them as growing threats to the industry. Some examples: "SWEDEN: In the 13-year period, 1963 to 1976, the incidence of men smokers who account for the major part of cigarette consumption declined significantly...

UNITED KINGDOM: In 1977, 86% of the population (84% of the smokers) consider smoking bad for their health -- up from 48% in 1961...Incidence of smoking has declined sharply among men --from 59% of 1961 to 47% in 1975...Percentage of ex-smokers among males and females has steadily increased during the same period. Per capita consumption [of cigarettes] decreased in 1975 and 1976...Volunteer "public service" and "health" organizations against smoking are varied, numerous, widespread and effective...

AUSTRALIA: In 1977, 51% of the cigarette smokers feel that smoking is extremely harmful, up from 33% in 1968...Since 1971, the incidence of smoking has declined from 39% to 35% in Melbourne and Sydney... IRELAND ...The declining incidence of smoking by males, particularly in the younger age groups and higher social classes, has accelerated. The incidence of quitters has also accelerated..."

The industry describes this stunning public health progress as "a gloomy picture," and concludes that the "industry needs stronger countermeasures" to combat this progress. The report concludes that the industry needs to target smokers, opinion leaders and the general public with its countermeasures, instead of confining these efforts to only government, as the industry had long been doing until that point. It concludes that "the industry should launch sustained, long-term countermeasure programs" to fight progress against smoking.

The paper gives hints about why preserving the social acceptability of smoking is so key to preserving the indusry's other defenses:

"Until society believes that smoking does not harm the health of nearby nonsmokers, the industry will continue to run grave risks of further reverses on social acceptability issues. For example, the industry's critical 'freedom of choice' position cannot be maintained if people believe they are harmed simply by being near a smoker."

The paper links the social acceptability issue back to the "primary health issue," and concludes that "The Basic Smoking and Health Issue (Smoking Affects Smokers) is a root cause of Social Acceptability issues...Clearly if real progress is made toward resolving questions concerning smoking and health, much of the pressure against smoking in a social sense will be eased." The paper also observes other threats to the industry, specifically that "smoking is becoming a downscale social activity...there are relatively fewer smokers among better-educated, higher income, trend-setting segments of the population than there are among the balance," and "large numbers of today's children and young teenagers appear to have increasingly negative attitudes about adult cigarette smoking...anti-smoking propaganda seems to be conditioning a new generation to have a bias against smoking as socially acceptable behavior."

This document shows how tobacco companies from several countries around the world came together to created and implement "countermeasures" aimed at reversing the progress that governments and health groups had made against tobacco worldwide by 1977.

These minutes of a 1979 ICOSI/SAWP meeting link the social acceptability issue to declining cigarette sales volume. (ICOSI/SAWP is the International Committee on Smoking Issues' Social Acceptability Working Party. ICOSI was the industry's global organization to fight public health efforts worldwide). The minutes discuss implementation of "global countermeasures" to fight public health efforts to reduce tobacco use [From Page 4]:

"Vogel [Christian Vogel of Reentsma, the German tobacco company] noted that it was important to stress to the national associations the impact the social acceptability issue is having on market volume volume...2. Development of Global Countermeasures: Hind reported...the Executive Committee has charged SAWP with the development of global countermeasures (which might then be adopted to the needs of individual countries) to counteract the public opinion trends."

Representatives of the following tobacco companies/countries attended this ICOSI meeting:

RJR (USA) BAT (UK) Imperial (Canada) Gallaher (UK) PM (U.S.A.) Reentsma (Germany)

Media magnate Rupert Murdoch served for several years on Philip Morris' (PM) board of directors. This relationship served PM well, as indicated by this document which shows that information that could negatively affect the tobacco industry's bottom line was routinely withheld from Murdoch-owned newspapers worldwide:

"As regards the media, we plan to build similar relationships to those we now have with Murdoch's News Limited with other newspaper proprietors. Murdoch's papers rarely publish anti-smoking articles these days."

Thsi week marked the public release of a film called "Outfoxed," which examines how media empires, led by Rupert Murdoch's Fox News, have been running a "race to the bottom" in television news. (www.moveon.org) This film provides an in-depth look at Fox News and the dangers of ever-enlarging corporations taking control of the public's right to know.

A book about newspaper mogul Rupert Murdoch (Murdoch: The Making of a Media Empire, by William Shawcross) credits Murdoch with nothing less than having "invented the modern media empire." A synopsis of the book on Amazon.com says (of Murdoch's extensive ownership of media outlets worldwide),

"Now [Murdoch's] reach includes two thirds of the Earth's population."

This report on the effects of cigarette advertising on consumer behavior was commissioned by Imperial Tobacco and RJR-Macdonald of Canada. It was written by Joel B. Cohen, Ph.D. (Distinguished Service Professor of Marketing, Adjunct Professor of Anthropology and Director, Center for Consumer Research) of the University of Florida. In the report, Dr. Cohen disputes the industry's oft-repeated claim that its advertising is aimed only at getting existing adult smokers to switch brands. Cohen says,

"The need to replace smokers who either quit or are casualties of smoking has led many to question cigarette industry claims that their advertising is intended primarily to encourage brand switching...the U.S. evidence indicates that the tobacco industry spends about $9 per person per day for advertising and promotion, and only 10% of smokers switch brands in an average year...Accordingly, such expenditure--purely for brand switching--would seem to be difficult to justify economically...." [Pages 3-4] In Section 1.40 Cohen poses the question, "Couldn't the advertising only make the particular cigarette attractive for existing smokers?" Response: "The answer is essentially 'No,'" and explains why this is the case.

Cohen ridicules the industry's claim that cigarette advertising would only appeal to adults who already smoke, saying,

"Nonsmokers, and particularly adolescents, cannot be made immune to advertising effects...[the industry's argument] is as if a magic curtain could be put in place to shield children, teenagers and others from the impact of these appeals. No convincing theoretical argument or empirical evidence has yet been introduced by the cigarette industry to demonstrate that otherwise effective advertising is mysteriously ineffective for adolescents who have yet to become smokers. Until such evidence is provided, this proposition cannot be taken seriously." [Page 8]

Thus it appears that RJR-Macdonald and Imperial hired an advertising expert who concluded that the companies' most common arguments about the reach and effects of their advertising cannot not possibly be true.

1995 ad placed by Canadian tobacco manufactuers announcing the implementation of a voluntary advertising code. Lists virtually all provisions on advertising enacted in the MSA in the U.S. 3 years later. In a (separate) letter to the Canadian Minister of Health about the code, the industry stated, "We are convinced that any greater restriction would be superfluous, unlikely in any common sense or logic to achieve any social good." The industry also stated it was willing to accept comments and suggestions from the government about the code. Thus the industry put itself in charge of tobacco control restrictions. http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/uhg33a00