Tobacco Documents Online

Today's document is the text of a 1988 speech given to the Tobacco Institute's Executive Committee expliaining how the Institute was handling an onslaught of proposals across the country to restrict public smoking. The speaker says that the Institute intends to change from "its current reactive posture to...a new, aggressive stance." He points out that opportunities exist "to put the anti-tobacco groups on the defensive" and an Institute objective is to "make THEM react and respond to OUR issues, to expend THEIR efforts and dollars to try and protect what is already on the books. The strategy includes "new approaches of repealing/modifying/rolling back existing legislation . . . of promoting ventilation . . . or IAQ [Indoor Air Quality] legislation . . . and smokers' rights legislation."

IN disucssing smokers' rights legislation, the speaker points out that smokers, in actuality, have few rights, are not a protected class and are unmotivated themselves to argue for places to smoke:

"As Stan Temko [a company attorney] will tell you later, smokers have few legal 'rights.' Smokers are not a protected class as are the aged, handicapped and minorities...Smokers, up to now, have been less than willing to stand up for themselves and argue for places to smoke..."

He also admits that the tobacco industry, working behind the scenes, formed a front group to protest smoking restrictions enacted by the Massachusetts Transportation Authority. The industry called the group "Commuters for Fair Treatment" and organized it to use to protest the smoking ban "in the media and before the legislature."

The speaker also says that the Tobacco Institute plans to "set the legislative agenda" in states it worked in, and "push public percpetion back" to allowing smoking in public areas.

This document from the R.J. Reynolds site, Status and Campaign Plan for Tobacco Tax Initiative, is a detailed description of the tobacco industry's game-plan to scuttle citizen-led ballot initiatives. We see here that the tobacco industry and the firms it hires to defeat initiatives go far beyond simply lobbying for their own side. They work behind the scenes to undermine support already won for the initiative by the proponents. They threaten groups that support the initiative financially (for example, here they threatened the California Medical Association by telling them they would push 'anti-medicine' legislation if they backed the initiative), they intimidate legislators by letting them know that getting behind the initiative could damage their future political future. They tie up professional signature-gathering firms with other business to keep the proponents from retaining their services. They employ lawyers to seek out ways to legally harass nonprofit organizations, threaten their charitable status, and make them expend their resources on work that is unrelated to their missions, and more.

This document gives tremendous insight into how the tobacco industry and its operatives interfere with the democratic system.

This report, prepared in 1994 for Philip Morris by a company called Marketing Perceptions, Inc. relates the results of focus group testing done to evaluate two names proposed for a new brand of cigarette targeted at young men: "Barking Dog" and "Barking Fish" brand cigarettes.

The name "Barking Dog" was meant to convey images of loyalty, "tried and true," "never bites" and "man's best friend."

It backfired completely. Instead, the document says in each focus group,

"Most of the men rejected the positioning. They weren't certain if, these days they could think of their cigarettes as 'my best friend.'... Some also suggested that there could be a 'negative spin' in interpreting the positioning, 'being dependent on your DOG'...In each group, men noted that a Barking Dog is angry, vicious, noisy, annoying or an intrusion."

As for "Barking Fish" cigarettes, as might be expected, "...Most found the images unsettling."

"There was general agreement that the pack with the fish graphic was 'the worst," immediately bringing to mind smelly, fishy, wet-tasting cigarettes."

Well, duh.

Kudos to the young men who recognized that cigarettes are far from "man's best friend," and to those who refused to swallow the "Barking Fish" hook.

This document is a proposal to the Tobacco Institute from a California consultant which discusses a plan to help the industry defeat cigarette tax proposal in California in 1982-83. The consultant discusses mobilizing Libertarians on behalf of the tobacco industry, a technique that the industry has been using increasingly in the late 1990's and into early 2000's: "Assuming the cooperation of leadership in the Libertarian Party, we can stimulate at least a modest letter writing program among Libertarian activists throughout the state. We recommend some financial assistance directly to the Party to help offset the cost of mailings to their members requesting action on the legislation in question. It would also be wise to employ a key Libertarian leader as a consultant to this effort..."

The proposal also discusses how the industry could clandestinely persuade citizens who are anti-tax (but who may also oppose tobacco on the grounds of their religion) to vote against the proposed tax:

"D. MOBILIZING TAX OPPONENTS

There is a great body of persons in California who are against taxes...period.

...We believe this group is a ripe target for a program which asks them to contact members of the legislature.

The key to success among this group is to stay away from the specific issue of taxes on tobacco products. Many of these persons are fundamental Christians or members of the Church of Jesus Christ Latter Day Saints. Discussing the tobacco aspect of the proposal would be counterproductive.

Therefore, a mailing to this group would attack the waste in government today and the need to cut existing excesses, rather than continue the tax-and-spend syndrome of the past. It would also give examples of how some excise taxes are particularly cruel on the elderly, etc."

This 1991 Tobacco Institute memo outlines the tobacco industry's strategy to combat what it perceived as the "unprecedented threat of workplace and restaurant smoking ban actions at the local level in California." The memo is from Robert McAdam, Vice President of Special Projects at the Tobacco Institute, and was sent to Kurt Malmgren, Senior Vice President of State Activities at the Tobacco Institute.

McAdam discusses the industry's coordination of local opposition efforts, which includes using "surrogates," or front organizations that the industry creates to do it bidding at the local level:

"In each of the jurisdictions where we have engaged in battle, our coalition has consiste of grassroots smokers, restauranteurs, a small number of local office building owners, bowling alley proprietors, bar and tavern owners, vending company proprietors, a small number of hospitality industry members, and other tobacco family members... While the industry has coordinated the process, we have effectively used surrogates throughout this effort, and we have several organizations started which serve to facilitate the organization of local interests."

McAdam then names organizations that the industry created to carry out their opposition to local smoking ordinances in California:

"First, we have created Californians for Fair Business Policy, which is the name given to our operation that has conducted the various referenda, and it is clearly identified as a 'tobacco organization.' Then there is the California Business and Restaurant Alliance (CBRA). This organization has a tax exempt status and is operated by The Dolphin Group with assistance from our consultant, Joe Justin. Finally there is Restaurants for a Sound Voluntary Policy (RSVP) operated by Rudy Cole..."

McAdam also credits the R.J. Reynolds tobacco company for creating several "smokers rights" groups specifically to fight local ordinances:

"A variety of RJR-sponsored local smokers' rights organizations have been created for specific battles to assist in the grassroots efforts."

McAdam explains how the tobacco companies themselves actually come into local venues (cities and towns) and organize people to oppose smoking ordinances:

"On several occasions, we have mobilized grassroots smokers for both appearance at local government hearings and phone calls and letters to elected representatives. This operation has been managed by both PM and RJR and has yielded some positive results."

The language of the memo belies the industry's mentality of undertaking an all-out "war" against public health. Throughout the memo, McAdam uses phrases like "our defensive strategy," "Our strongest weapon in this battle" or "Our weapon of last resort."

This letter from T.K. Cahill of the R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company public relations department was apparently written in response to a 5th grade elementary school class in Santa Monica, California, who wrote RJR protest a Winston cigarette advertisement that appeared in the Los Angeles Times. Cahill assures the children that cigarette advertising is not directed at youth, but also brazenly tells them that "medical science has not found any conclusive evidence that an element in tobacco or tobacco smoke causes any human disease." (The first major Surgeon General's report linking cigarette smoking with disease was issued in 1964, eight years before this letter was written).

Then, in a classic example of the industry's application of its Council for Tobacco Research for public relations, Cahill tells the children that,

"... in a sincere attempt to determine what harmful effects, if any, smoking might have on human health, established The Council for Tobacco Research..."

and

"...The answers to the many unanswered smoking and health questions--and the true causes of human diseases--can, we believe, be determined by scientific research. Our Company intends, therefore, to continue to support such research until the truth is known."

This 27-page Philip Morris (PM) strategy document from 1993 outlines how PM successfully fought a proposed smoking ban in Austin, Texas. Among PM's core objectives stated in the document is to "Manage external and internal perceptions to benefit our business."

PM laments the effect smoking bans have had on its business:

"Smoking restrictions have been estimated, this year alone, to have decreased PM profits by $40 million."

The document discusses the company's application of its "Accommodation Program" as a tool to help prevent or delay the enactment of laws restricting public smoking.

Page 21 of the document indicates that PM is fighting popular sentiment towards smoking restrictions: ,

"--Antis continue to seek smoking bans on the local level. --Recent polling says Californians want smoking restrictions."

PM's strategies against public health efforts are revealed on the next pages:

"Introduce legislation to scatter anti's resources...pursue numerous accommodation bills...Pass language which allows smoking in California and preempts localities from approving more onerous laws..."

PM also reveals plans to attack and hobble the charitable health organizations that pursue smoking restrictions:

"Regulate charitable organizations... [pass laws requiring] reporting requirements for percent of funds used for research vs. salaries. Cap administrative costs, salaries, lobbying expenditures. Establish minimum percentage of funds for research..."

And more strategies for PM's use of its Accommodation program to "refocus antis" are revealed:

"--Seek local level Accommodation laws in a limited number of localities to refocus antis and show accommodation is acceptable."

In addition to revealing how PM "played" the city council in Austin to defeat the proposed smoking ban there, the document also discusses the company's strategies for defeating excise taxes.

This speech by Roger Mozingo (Senior Vice President of the Tobacco Institute) reveals the power of the Institute as a bulwark against public health throughout the United States. The speech reveals that a sizeable number of U.S. states tried to get workplace smoking restrictions enacted in 1988, but failed due to the industry's opposition. Mozingo mentions the tactics of delaying, weakening and, wherever possible, killing smoking restriction bills at the local level:

"Locally, we continue to face numerous and difficult challenges on the smoking restriction front. As you know, we are often successful in delaying and weakening local measures, but it is tough to obtain what I would call a final 'kill' locally..."

Mozingo also mentions a tactic the Institute used to get smoking cars added back on to Connecticut trains (portraying smoking as a "state's rights" issue rather than a health issue):

"...the most significant thing is that the issue has been couched not as a smoking issue, but as one of states' rights. That enabled us to obtain a committee vote of 22-0 in favor of adding a smoking car."

Mozingo also reveals a tactic the Institute used to stop a measure that would have banned smoking in hospitals in Washington state:

"This year in Washington state, we defeated every anti-tobacco proposal under review. Of particular interest was our work with one relatively minor measure...a bill that would have banned the use of tobacco in hospitals. ... The measure originally had the full support of hospital administrators and the medical community. With the assistance of Gray Robertson's ACVA Atlantic and Covington & Burling, we drafted an amendment to the bill that would have required hospitals to meet rigid and specific ventilation standards in every operating theater, intensive care unit and other hospital areas.... At this turn of events, hospital officials became unglued and openly broke with the medical community, dropping support for the measure and ensuring its defeat. This work should help us in the future as we continue to...oppose more significant anti-smoking legislation in Washington."

Mozingo also discusses the industry's overall strategy of "taking the initiative and putting the anti's [public health authorities] on the defensive."

This brief speech reveals the widespread, pervasive interference of the Tobacco Institute at virtually every level of government in the U.S.

This short Philip Morris (PM) memo written by Ellen Merlo (Senior Vice President of Corporate Affairs) in 1994 shows how the cigarette company abuses state legislative processes. The memo describes strategies the cigarette company used to combat local smoking restrictions and increased cigarette taxes (Proposition 99) in California in 1994. One strategy was to "create a flurry of legislative activity to confound the antis by introducing various bills and measures to put them on the defensive..."

This indicates that Philip Morris will tie up entire state legislatures with essentially meaningless bills aimed solely at antagonizing public health advocates (the "anti's"). It also indicates the company's ability to introduce legislation at will, showing how the company wields far more power than citizens.

This memo was circulated to executives at the highest levels of Philip Morris.

In this 1998 letter, Meyer Friedman M.D. (of the eponymous Meyer Friedman Institute of the University of California San Francisco-Mt. Zion Medical Center) thanks Philip Morris for a check to fund the medical Institute's Coronary/Cancer Prevention project. A 1996 internal PM memo actually shows PM planning to endow a chair in preventive medicine at the Meyer Friedman Institute http://tobaccodocuments.org/pm/2063612693.html

That a tobacco company would finance a cancer prevention project or endow a chair in preventive medicine doubtless strikes some people as bizarre. It also seems counterintuitive that a medical school would accept such funding from a tobacco company. But tobacco companies have fostered financial relationships with prominent medical and academic institutions for decades. The companies have used these relationships to gain prestige by association, and boost their corporate credibility. This letter is emblematic of the debate over the ethics (or lack thereof) of academic medical institutions accepting research funding from tobacco companies.

Recognizing the contradictory nature of accepting tobacco industry funding, some medical schools have divested themselves of tobacco holdings and adopted policies against accepting tobacco industry funding. A recent paper in the journal Academic Medicine by document researchers (and Doc-Alert subscribers) Nathaniel Wander, Ph.D. and Ruth Malone, R.N., Ph.D., of UCSF explores the status of medical school divestment, which schools have divested their tobacco holdings, which have refused to do so and which have done so quietly (and why they have kept it quiet). Their article can be found at http://www.academicmedicine.org/cgi/content/abstract/79/11/1017