Tobacco Documents Online

Biotechnology and the human genome project may not be being used purely for human good, especially if biotech firms have relationships with global public relations firms. In this letter, the director of media for Philip Morris' PR firm, Burson-Marstellar, invites PM to team up with an "advanced biotech research organization" in Britian that was involved in the human genome project. Burson-Marstellar (and apparently the biotech firm) proposed that perhaps through their human genome research they could locate a gene that predisposes people to smoking-related diseases. The Burson-Marstellar employee helpfully volunteers that this could be a way to ease Philip Morris' liability for making a deadly product:

"This work could be interesting to Philip Morris for at least three reasons:

--A simple test might eventually be devised to tell a smoker whether or not he is at risk. This would put the burden of any consequence from smoking on the individual, and would clear the way for the non-susceptible population to smoke with a clear conscience.

--Philip Morris would be seen to be contributing to research into the health effects of smoking...

--Finally, someone will eventually get around to this kind of research. Wouldn't it be better to be leading it?

In a strong denial of the public health role of the World Health Organization and the global health threat caused by their tobacco products, this Philip Morris International (PM) internal memo from Geoffrey Bible speaks of the "extraordinary influence" the World Health Organization has on government and consumers saying, "we must find a way to diffuse this and re-orient [the WHO's] activities to their prescribed mandate." Bible further discusses how PM can use its vast resources (like technology and access to food) to influence governments to turn against the WHO: "In addition, we need to think through how we could use our food companies, size, technology and capability with governments by helping them with their food problems and give us a more balanced profile with the government than we now have against WHO's powerful influence."

Bible mentions that a WHO initiative, a levy on tobacco sales in Victoria and South Australia to buy out tobacco sports and cultural sponsorships, "is a very effective strategy that we must stop."

Bible also speaks of "destroying" government attempts to regulate maximum constituent levels (MCL's) of toxic chemicals cigarette smoke, and links Philip Morris to the set-up of the smokers rights group Forest as well as a seemingly "independent" group called Libertad, which PM used to influence legislation. Bible proposes extending Libertad from France and Australia into other countries "so as to become a major influence in the formation of public policy."

This 1991 Philip Morris (PM) internal report outlines PM's strategic plans for combating the proliferation of smoking bans in Europe, particularly voluntary bans in workplaces and restaurants. It reveals a desperate company utterly unaware of the absurdity of many of its own contradictions. Rather than seeking out or acknowledging the truth about the health effects of environmental tobacco smoke (ETS), one of PM's objectives with regard to ETS science was to "Maintain the debate on the primary [health]issue and ETS."(from Page 2). Other goals were to "Minimize total smoke bans in European companies" and "position PM as a reasonable company and a credible source of information."

Despite wanting to position itself as a "credible source of information," Page 17 reveals that PM planned to commission "counter-surveys," whose pre-determined results would emanate from a different (presumably more credible)source:

"For example, if the [World Health Organization] claims that 75% of the people want smoking bans on international flights, we can counter with our own survey. Since the polling firm would be responsible for the dissemination, the poll would gain credibility."

PM realized that smoking bans were, in truth, popular enough that without the tobacco industry's interference, such bans would soon become widespread: "Left to chance, many companies will adopt the most restrictive type of smoking policies..." PM obviously felt it could not leave such matters to chance, yet one of the company's media strategies to fight the ETS issue was to "Promote the desires of employees to decide for themselves" about whether to ban smoking or not (from Page 3).

PM also targets airlines and trains: "Research shows that most people will accept smoke bans on short plane and train rides...PM must fight for its consumers' right to smoke on long plane and train rides." (From page 12)

Positioning itself as the height of rationality, Page 25 of the report urges a calm dialogue on the ETS issue. PM urges that "Relations between smokers and non-smokers must be guided by dialogue and tolerance." Yet fostering widespread social discontent was also on the other end of PM's to-do list: the same page states that an objective of PM's ETS Communication Plan was to "create a public backlash" (against the decreasing acceptability of smoking (from page 18). Part of PM's plan also included "Establish[ing] SRG's [Smokers Rights Groups] as counterpart of Anti-groups" (from page 25).

In this document, PM also establishes itself as the ultimate actor in the industry's struggle to de-fuse the damaging ETS issue, declaring that if other sectors of the industry fail to take action, PM itself will jump in:

"This plan is complete and ambitious...All aspects covered in this plan must be addressed in each market, but not necessarily by PM. Whenver possible, these issues should be handled by the industry. Nevertheless, in the absence of industry action, PM will fill the void."

Perhaps the necessary outcome of these contradictions is PM's ultimate failure, despite all these desperate measures, to stop the world from advancing towards a smoke-free society.

This 1995 budget for Philip Morris'(PM) Worldwide Regulatory Affairs office lists the company's activities to fight public health-tobacco control efforts around the globe during that year and what it cost PM to carry out these activities. It lists PM's consultants by name and/or company, tells how much PM budgeted to pay them, and lists the countries where PM applied this interference.

PM's activities included persuading restaurant owners, airport officials and employers around the world that they needed too install new ventilation equipment instead of banning smoking entirely, developing strategies and programs to protect smoking in the workplace, subsidizing construction and renovation of airport smoking lounges, working to prevent and pre-empt smoking restrictions, "slowing down the spread of smoking bans on international [airline] carriers," promoting acceptance of indoor air quality standards that would allow smoking, funding front groups like ARISE (Associate for Research in the Science of Enjoyment) and TASSC (The Advancement of Sound Science Coalition), funding of public relations groups like the Dolphin Group and Burson Marstellar to push their agenda, and much more. According to this document, in 1995 PM planned to implement the above activities in Brazil, Costa Rica, Japan, Sweden, Hungary, Switzerland, Hong Kong, Malaysia, Puerto Rico, Finland, Czech Republic, Korea, Belgium, Spain, Germany, Italy, Columbia, Poland, Norway, Gulf Council Countries (GCC), Argentina, United States and Australia.

PM's total budget for these activities in 1995 was over $17 million, which does not include legal costs for 1995, which are listed on Page 20 of the document. The total cost of legal assistance to PM's Worldwide Regulatory Affairs Department in 1995 was $25,785,000, which includes the costs of lawsuits against the ABC Television Network, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, and legal work on cigarette issues like ingredients disclosure and ignition propensity. The law firm of Shook, Hardy and Bacon alone was budgeted to make over $7.3 million from Philip Morris in this single year.

This Philip Morris (PM) document outlines strategies and tactics for fighting legislated and voluntary smoking restrictions in Italy, Holland, Spain and Germany in 1993. It reveals PM's intentions to undermine and overturn an existing Dutch law restricting smoking ("Strategies: To overturn the Dutch short-haul train smoking ban before its planned implementation on January 1, 1994" p. 2501140159). It shows that PM created smokers rights groups in Europe and worked through them to clandestinely oppose smoking restrictions ("Develop Smokers' Rights Group," and "Mobilize Smokers Rights Group against ban," pages 2501140160 and 2501140159, respectively). It shows that PM was a leader in organizing opposition to smoking restrictions in Europe ( "...Work through NMA's" [National Manufacturing Associations] to overturn Dutch train smoking ban, to defeat smoking restriction initiatives in Germany, etc.).

The document also proposes a list of possible strategies PM could use to orchestrate an economic attack on the French airline Air France for its decision to ban smoking on all its European flights under 2 hours starting January 1, 1993:

"- Have smokers in EC cancel reservations on basis of the ban.

- Mobilize PM travel agents and allies against ban. - Mobilize Smokers' Rights Groups. - PM companies boycott of Air France. - Initiate cigarette industry boycott of Air France."

Philip Morris' new Altria web site, www.altria.com, states, "As the manufacturer of a product intended for adults who smoke that has serious health effects, Philip Morris USA believes that it has a responsibility to help prevent kids from smoking...Philip Morris USA has a dedicated Youth Smoking Prevention department (YSP) that supports youth programs...and conducts ongoing research to help prevent youth smoking."

This memo by former Burson Marstellar employee-turned Philip Morris-consultant points out the real purpose of PM's youth anti-smoking and access programs, like Action Against Access (AAA):

"....By focusing on this [youth] approach, one can draw attention to the real reasons kids want to smoke, thereby robbing the other side of the ability to focus this issue on the wrong solutions..."

and

"...the real objective here, as nearly all the presentations [of youth anti-smoking programs] point out, is to rob the other side of their ability to use this issue as a generalized club which would hurt us."

This 1992 Philip Morris (PM) document about the funding of various research projects around the world indicates that there are a number of less-then-obvious reasons why PM funds research projects in various countries. The author of the document is Charles Wall, Vice President and Associate General Counsel for PM. According to the document, PM funded some research projects in part because the scientists performing them had good contacts with government officials and within the research community in that country: "While the research recommended for funding in 1993 through Tassin,Dusser, Molimard, Micheletti, Hirt and Symann is good, another reason for funding them is due to the importance of those researchers in their respective countries. For the most part, they have excellent contacts within the scientific community and the government and, therefore, are of assistance to Philip Morris..."

The document also makes it apparent that PM funded research simply to create a "presence" in a given country that might yield political benefit to the company:

"I view with some concern the research effort in Germany...Much of the research focuses on nicotine...There are a number of projects which could easily be canceled, or not started, that could save us several hundred thousand DM. ...Our scientists feel, however, that it is important to keep the research money in Germany, i.e., continue to support researchers in Germany... [W]hile Paul may not have any problem with the reduction [in funding], my guess is that he will feel that we should attempt to locate worthwhile research projects in Germany, so that we are in a position, in dealing with the German government, to point to ongoing research projects in that country. The relationship between the industry and the German government seems to be a good deal better than the relationship between the industry and the government in this country [the United States]. As I understand it, there are regular consultations between government and industry scientists, as well as constructive discussions regarding smoking-related laws and regulations. The industry in Germany appears to be more influential with the government than the industry in the U.S., and, for that reason, the industry feels it is important to maintain a substantial research presence [in Germany]."

PM also sponsored research in a given country in anticipation of litigation, in hopes of helping sway court decisions in their favor:

"Although I do not believe litigation is imminent in Germany, should it occur, the fact that we are sponsoring research...could be of substantial help in convincing a court that we are fulfilling our duty to conduct research."

This Philip Morris (a.k.a. Altria Group or PM) Corporate Affairs Plan for Europe (1994-96) is rich with corporate strategies to reverse the decline in social acceptability of smoking in Europe. In the Plan, PM reveals its understanding that a huge majority of Europeans actually favor smoking restrictions in public places:

"Europeans are highly in favor of smoking restrictions in public places (82%) and 88% are in favor of clear separation in the workplace."

Despite this, PM planned to fight smoking restrictions with all resources it could muster.

PM viewed laws to protect worker health and safety as a threat:

"A proposed Directive was issued in early 1993 with the aim of protecting transport worker's health and safety...This is the biggest threat at European Community level which needs to be addressed."

The Plan also reveals PM as the organizing and driving force behind Smokers Rights Groups (SRGs) all over Europe:

"Smokers' Rights Groups (SRG's) are an essential medium for presenting [the tobacco industry's] views in favor of reasonable solutions because a) they have no commercial interest and, as such, are more credible voice than the tobacco industry and b) they are able to position themselves as a large but discriminated "minority" of individuals who have rights. The Plan foresees continued support [to SRGs] provided by PM/industry to the groups in Italy, Spain, France, the Netherlands and Greece to help them expand in both number of members and in influence."

PM lamented the lack of organization among Smokers Rights Groups and anticipated the benefits that could accrue if the company assisted further in organizing them:

"The real weakness of the SRG network is the absence of any co-ordinating body or secretariat which can share information, techniques and ideas between the various SRG's. We should examine the feasibility of creating a pan-European SRG secretariat or Smokers' movement to... have an organization that can rightly claim to represent 100 million European smokers (and voters) which could function as a central media and lobbying "voice". Rothmans Int. have expressed their interest in this project and would co-fund with us."

PM also planned to foster and promote misunderstanding between the people of the United States and Europe to promote its own ends:

"Europeans believe that Americans tend to be fanatical extremists went it comes to public health issues. We shall take this opportunity to use US-sourced 'ETS excess stories' (dismissal from work over smoking, career discrimination due to smoking, etc.) to help discredit all anti-smoking initiatives -American as well as European."

And once again, PM reveals its strategy of hiding behind, and working through, third-party Libertarian groups to do its bidding:

"The Plan calls for using libertarian groups (e.g., Social Affairs Unit, Arise) whenever possible to communicate this message..."

PM's Plan also explains the logic behind its urgent efforts to preserve smoking on airplanes, despite the relatively small amount of time people actually spend on airplanes:

"Although the time a smoker may spend in the air and at the airport may not constitute a large amount of time relative to the amount of time spent in the workplace for example, bans on airlines are highly visible and may disproportionately contribute to the deterioration of the social acceptability of smoking."

Only a few of PM's planned strategies are listed in this summary or in the quotes below. The document contains much more information and, at only 13 pages, is worth a read in its entirety, especially for Europeans.

This 1994 Philip Morris (PM/Altria) presentation describes the cigarette maker's strategies to fight public health efforts in Europe to reduce secondhand smoke (SHS) exposure and counter activities of the International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC) and the World Health Organization (WHO). PM's objectives, clearly aligned with fighting public health, include "maintain debate on ETS science among EU legislators," "counter anti influence," "delay EU legislation," "interdict national legislation via [European Union] resolution on [Good Epidemiological Practices]," and "ensure legislation accommodates smokers."

The document also communicates PM's plans to use its typical hospitality allies to fight regulations on secondhand smoke:

"Build upon existing relationships with the International Hotel Association, European Restaurant Association and European Chefs Association to target advocacy on EU policymakers."

The plan's wording also suggests that public opposition to smoking bans in Europe was not forthcoming particularly among white collar workers and unions, and that therefore PM had to create opposition:

"Develop public opposition to bans among EU groupings of independent...white collar and public sector unions...using U.S. workplace kit."

PM strove to hide its overbearing influence from European media by using third parties:

"Create a European Tobacco Information Centre to disseminate third party news to EU influencers including policy makers and the media..."

The document further reveals PM as the driving force behind the creation of supposedly "independent" smokers rights groups:

"Create a European Smokers Rights Group to bring smokers' voice to EU legislative debate and to provide a network for coordinated actions and information sharing by national SRGs."

and

"... where gaps exist (Germany, Belgium, UK, Spain) create smokers rights groups to defend against ban threats direct[ly] with legislators and via the media."

PM was also behind the creation and touring of a bizarre front group called ARISE ("Associates for Research in the Science of Enjoyment"), an industry-funded "scientific" group out of the United Kingdom which toured Europe putting forth the message that a little pleasure is essential to stress relief and hence good health. In their public proclamations, ARISE members subtly grouped tobacco use in with benign, pleasurable and stress-relieving activities such as drinking tea, shopping, and eating chocolate.

The PM document further describes as a "THREAT" a European "directive for the protection of transport workers' health and safety" because it "provides for a de facto total smoking ban" on "all modes of transport operating within EU territory." The document further lists plans to fight this "threat."

The document also reveals PM's strategy of working through Libertarian groups to influence the media and to "communicate messages of tolerance and...extremism" about public health smoking restrictions.

Quotes:

EU legislative threat driven by IARC ETS activities • Introduce mechanism to prevent legislation on flawed epidemiology • Maintain debate on ETS science • Mobilize allies • Counter anti influence • Current EU transport threat EU - 1994/1997 THREAT

THREAT:

EU legislation to ban smoking in workplaces, public places and on transport, driven by IARC ETS study and monograph and ensuing media hype.

--Delay EU legislation

--Interdict national legislation via EU Resolution on GEP --Ensure legislation accommodates smokers --Maintain debate on ETS science among EU legislators... --Build support amongst Pan European groupings of business owners and employees for mobilisation against severe legislation --Build upon existing relationships with the International Hotel Association, European Restaurant Association and European Chefs Association to target advocacy on EU policy makers. --Encourage the European Trade Union Confederation to support accommodation vs bans via collaborating on a Pan European workers' attitude survey to demonstrate discriminatory nature of bans and wide support for tolerance in the workplace.

--Develop public opposition to bans among EU groupings of independent (CESI), white collar(CEC) and public sector (CEEP), Unions and the European Personnel Managers Association (EAPM) using US workplace kit.

--Collaborate with the European Tourism Action Group to promote economic impact of bans in Horeca and Transport sectors.

Counter influence of WHO, BASP and anti-cancer groupings.

--Create a European Tobacco Information Centre to disseminate third party news to EU influencers including policy makers and the media including positive scientific studies, public opinion data, favourable legislative developments, economic impact data, libertarian views.

• Expand ARISE network and through bi-annual attitude surveys (1995- stress in the workplace) generate maximum publicity for ARISE message of pleasure as beneficial to health.

• Create a European Smokers Rights Group to bring smokers' voice to EU legislative debate and to provide a network for coordinated actions and information sharing by national SRGs.

• Develop PM Communications tool on accommodation to support direct dialogue with legislators and allies.

• Encourage opposition to bans within EP.

• Encourage European Public Health Alliance and EP Health intergroup to prioritise non-tobacco health concerns with DGV.

THREAT: 1993 proposed Directive for the protection of transport workers' health and safety amended by the European Parliament to provide for a de facto total smoking ban with application to all modes of transport operating within EU territory.

OBJECTIVE: Obtain Commission withdrawal Of proposal in accordance with subsidiarity principle during German Presidency; ensure new proposal provides maximum flexibility in line with existing health and safety directives

STRATEGY:

. Reinforce and support German Government position to obtain withdrawal by promoting subsidiarity argumentation among other Governments.

• Mobilize international Transport/Health and Safety bodies using jurisdictional argumentation

• Reinforce UK Government position for withdrawal.

• Encourage through provision of legal argumentation, other governments to support German position (France, Holland, Italy and Denmark) via national transport groupings

• Determine feasibility of obtaining additional support from other governments

• Develop support for withdrawal among Commissioners and DG VII

THREAT:

Legislation banning Smoking in the workplace, public places and on transport driven by EPA, IARC activities, SCOTH (UK), ICAO and political opportunism

OBJECTIVES:

. Capitalise on EU Resolution on GEP to prevent governments legislating on basis of flawed epidemiology.

• Lock in and defend legislation that provides for accommodation.

• Defend against further airline bans and other key public impact ban threats in transport sector...

CONSUMERS:

• Support and expand existing SRGs and where gaps exist (Germany, Belgium, UK, Spain) create smokers rights groups to defend against ban threats direct with legislators and via the media.

MEDIA OUTREACH

--Communicate messages of tolerance, and US extremism both directly and via libertarian and smokers rights groups.

--Encourage a balanced coverage of ETS science via libertarian groups, independent scientists pre, during and post IARC study release.

--Promote examples of other low level risks, confounders arguments and other weaknesses of epidemiology via scientists and libertarian groups to undermine public confidence in science and to provide perspective.

--Educate targeted scientific editors on ETS science via scientific consultants.

--Encourage business owners to advocate accommodation via speaking opportunities.

This Philip Morris (PM) 5-year plan describes actions PM took to address smoking and health issues around the world between 1980 and 1984. Several passages of the Plan indicate that poorer and lesser-developed countries provide more favorable markets for cigarettes for several reasons: Firstly, people who are more desperate for their survival tend to pay less attention to smoking and health, and the governments and medical establishments of these countries tend to follow suit: [From Page 64]:

"Smoking and Health is not yet considered to be a crucial issue by the Egyptian Tobacco Industry...and Health is not an issue among the general Egyptian populace who are more concerned with day-to-day survival and consider smoking to be one of their few pleasures in life. The health question...is not considered to be a priority by the [Egyptian] medical profession."

The poorer economies of less-developed countries also help Philip Morris because the governments of these countries are more heavily dependent on tobacco taxes for income, and thus less apt to restrict tobacco marketing, use and advertising:

From Page 65-6:

"In general, little official governmental attention has been paid to smoking and health in Africa and the African Health Ministers, where they exist, have not taken a strong stand on this issue. This is in large part because most [African] governments are preoccupied by other priorities (economic and social development), and because cigarette advertising and tax revenues are important to the African economies. Therefore, governments are not inclined to impose restrictions which might jeopardize this income."

PM also understood that if religious leaders and doctors in Africa took a strong public health stand against tobacco use, it could affect cigarette consumption "because of the mentality of the Africans":

From Pg. 66:

"Smoking and health is of little concern to the African people and it seems not to be a popular issue among them. However, if an anti-smoking campaign supported by religious leaders and/or the medical profession is developed, this could seriously affect consumption because of the mentality of the Africans, and their faith in their religious leaders and doctors."

PM also recognized that a high rate of illiteracy means a populace will rely less on printed reports for health information, which benefits the tobacco companies. The following passage discusses the high rate of illiteracy in Nigeria and how health information from the "outside" was starting to affect "the upper class" (which presumably had higher literacy rates than the general population): From Page 68:

"As not less than seventy percent of the Nigerian population is illiterate, Nigerians form their opinions on smoking and health almost exclusively on the basis of rumor and superstition. The population is becoming more aware of the allegations against smoking largely because of press coverage from outside reports. The prevalent attitude in model developed countries has some impact on the upper class..."

PM also found that increasing levels of wealth and education in underdeveloped countries tends to work against cigarette manufactuers:

"Future Developments and Their Effect on Philip Morris' Activity

As Nigeria's wealth becomes more evenly distributed among its population and a greater number of Nigerians become educated, the spill-over effect as regards smoking and health may become more evident..."

This 1991 Philip Morris (PM) internal memo by Robert "Bobby" Kaplan of PM Public Relations department reveals an all-out plan by PM to "devise a campaign which would foster an environment in Europe where smoking remains a socially acceptable activity." Kaplan describes PM's strategy to undermine public health information about smoking:

"There was a basic agreement that we would need to move the public debate and resultant controversy on tobacco from health issues to social issues."

PM's program targeted not only the usual suspects--political groups and figures-- but also European business leaders, unions, the European entertainment industry (indcluding producers and directors, the television and recording industries, arts organizations, artists and government cultural ministries), "intellectuals," "sociologists" and "celebrities." PM planned to manipulate the European entertainment industry into helping preserve smoking by holding an "Entertainment Industry Conference" in Czechoslovakia about sponsorship that would feature major celebrities from the United States, Western and Eastern Europe. PM also planned to use its Nordic smokers rights group, "Smokepeace," to promote "solutions for peaceful co-existence between smokers and non-smokers without intervention and restriction." Another plan included producing a video that would portray "humerous spectrum of the 'anti'[through] exaggeration of restrictions on individual liberties."

Countries targeted for PM's campaign were Greece, Portugal, France, Germany, Belgium, Spain, Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia.

This document shows that PM carried out an organized campaign to undermine the effects of public health efforts to reduce smoking in Europe.

This 1977 "Report on Social Acceptability of Smoking" by ICOSI (the International Committee on Smoking Issues) outlines the global tobacco industry's need to implement "countermeasures" against public health tobacco control efforts worldwide. The document describes the remarkable public health progress authorities had made by then in educating the world's population about the dangers of tobacco use. Appendix A at back of the document lists these successes, country by country, and represents them as growing threats to the industry. Some examples: "SWEDEN: In the 13-year period, 1963 to 1976, the incidence of men smokers who account for the major part of cigarette consumption declined significantly...

UNITED KINGDOM: In 1977, 86% of the population (84% of the smokers) consider smoking bad for their health -- up from 48% in 1961...Incidence of smoking has declined sharply among men --from 59% of 1961 to 47% in 1975...Percentage of ex-smokers among males and females has steadily increased during the same period. Per capita consumption [of cigarettes] decreased in 1975 and 1976...Volunteer "public service" and "health" organizations against smoking are varied, numerous, widespread and effective...

AUSTRALIA: In 1977, 51% of the cigarette smokers feel that smoking is extremely harmful, up from 33% in 1968...Since 1971, the incidence of smoking has declined from 39% to 35% in Melbourne and Sydney... IRELAND ...The declining incidence of smoking by males, particularly in the younger age groups and higher social classes, has accelerated. The incidence of quitters has also accelerated..."

The industry describes this stunning public health progress as "a gloomy picture," and concludes that the "industry needs stronger countermeasures" to combat this progress. The report concludes that the industry needs to target smokers, opinion leaders and the general public with its countermeasures, instead of confining these efforts to only government, as the industry had long been doing until that point. It concludes that "the industry should launch sustained, long-term countermeasure programs" to fight progress against smoking.

The paper gives hints about why preserving the social acceptability of smoking is so key to preserving the indusry's other defenses:

"Until society believes that smoking does not harm the health of nearby nonsmokers, the industry will continue to run grave risks of further reverses on social acceptability issues. For example, the industry's critical 'freedom of choice' position cannot be maintained if people believe they are harmed simply by being near a smoker."

The paper links the social acceptability issue back to the "primary health issue," and concludes that "The Basic Smoking and Health Issue (Smoking Affects Smokers) is a root cause of Social Acceptability issues...Clearly if real progress is made toward resolving questions concerning smoking and health, much of the pressure against smoking in a social sense will be eased." The paper also observes other threats to the industry, specifically that "smoking is becoming a downscale social activity...there are relatively fewer smokers among better-educated, higher income, trend-setting segments of the population than there are among the balance," and "large numbers of today's children and young teenagers appear to have increasingly negative attitudes about adult cigarette smoking...anti-smoking propaganda seems to be conditioning a new generation to have a bias against smoking as socially acceptable behavior."

This document shows how tobacco companies from several countries around the world came together to created and implement "countermeasures" aimed at reversing the progress that governments and health groups had made against tobacco worldwide by 1977.

This Philip Morris (PM) document describes the strategies and tactics the company planned to use throughout Europe to defeat adverse legislation and "reinforce smoker confidence." Strategies include "fight[ing] to curtail anti-smoking lobby's most effective weapon (i.e. juvenile smoking)," developing and leveraging smokers rights groups throughout Europe to help reinforce smokers confidence, preserve PM's marketing ability, defeat taxes and "defuse pressure for mandatory changes" in warning labels on cigarettes.

A stated goal was to "Maintain the debate on ETS science among EU legislators." The document also states the company's intent to "Equip and politicize the European Horeca association - Hotrec" , "develop a 'hard core' group of businesses" to oppose government public health efforts.

Another goal is to "Capitalize on success of [industry-funded scientific front group] Associates for Research in the Science of Enjoyment (ARISE) in building recognition of the benefits of pleasure; expand scientific underpinning of 'pleasure' message through scientific roundtables..."

Yet another goal reveals the true purpose behind industry-sponsored youth programs:

"Continue to use voluntary industry codes and youth anti-smoking programs to pre-empt legislated restrictions."

At one point in discussing PM's activities regarding duty-free product, PM states "PM and tobacco industry to stay behind scenes but play driving role."

This document shows the depth and scope of Philip Morris' interference in European affairs.

In this letter, Michael Johnson, the Director of Media for Philip Morris' PR firm Burson-Marstellar in London, invites PM to team up with an "advanced biotech research organization" in Britain that is involved in the human genome project. Johnson proposes that perhaps through human genome research they could locate a gene that predisposes people to smoking-related diseases. Johnson helpfully suggests that this could both encourage smoking while relinquishing Philip Morris from liability for selling a deadly product: "This work could be interesting to Philip Morris for at least three reasons:

--A simple test might eventually be devised to tell a smoker whether or not he is at risk. This would put the burden of any consequence from smoking on the individual, and would clear the way for the non-susceptible population to smoke with a clear conscience.

--Philip Morris would be seen to be contributing to research into the health effects of smoking...

--Finally, someone will eventually get around to this kind of research. Wouldn't it be better to be leading it?"

This presentation describes the global tobacco industry's European front group "Associates for Research into the Science of Enjoyment," or ARISE. ARISE was funded primarily by Philip Morris, Rothmans, R.J. Reynolds, British American Tobacco and their food and drink subsidiaries like Kraft, Miller Beer and Nestle. The group was created as a direct response to the 1988 U.S. Surgeon General's report that compared the process of becoming addicted to nicotine to the processes of becoming addicted to heroin and cocaine. This public comparison of nicotine to heroin and cocaine statement sent up red flags in the global tobacco industry, who responded by forming ARISE (without letting the public know they were behind the formation of ARISE).

Page 5 of the presentation is entitled "How ARISE arose!" and says,

"In 1988 the U.S. Surgeon General said: 'Nicotine was as addictive as heroin or cocaine." The industry responded. A group of academics was identified and called together to: review the science of substance abuse, separate nicotine from these substances, act as a forum for scientists who think objectively."

ARISE participants were put forth as sociological experts who purportedly addressed the "science of 'pleasure." They stated that when people are pleased, their cortisol levels drop, and the immune system becomes more effective. When a person fails to experience pleasure, their immune system becomes depressed which leads to "increased disease levels including cancers, heart disease, ulcers and infections." Activities like drinking tea, eating chocolate, shopping and smoking tobacco, they rationalized, caused pleasure and hence enhanced good health. Participating in pleasurable activities like smoking, they claimed, thus gave people personal control over their lives which in turn reduced stress and improved health.

ARISE attacked the comparisons of nicotine to heroin and cocaine, railed against "forcing a 'uniform healthy society,'" and proclaimed that nicotine enhanced performance. They aligned smoking with use of food and drink, and activities like spending time with family, having sex and shopping. ARISE toured Europe generating newspaper headlines like

"HEALTH SCARES ARE BAD FOR YOUR HEALTH" http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/zhq37e00

"NINE THINGS MORE PLEASURABLE THAN SEX" http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/eko32e00

"HEALTH PURITANS ACCUSED OF RUINING QUALITY OF LIFE" http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/cld34e00

"PURITANS 'TRY TO RUIN QUALITY OF LIFE' " http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/pqc96e00

"THE EC AS A KILL-JOY PURITANS ARE DESTROYING PEOPLE'S ENJOYMENT OF LIFE" http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/oyh29e00

ARISE participants held conferences, published books, toured several continents, generated media events, newspaper articles, made video news releases, press releases, and wrote letters to the editor.

It was not disclosed that ARISE was formed and funded by the tobacco industry, or that the industry paid for extensive public relations campaigns for the group from 1988-99.

This confidential 1991 Philip Morris internal memo discusses a meeting of a PM task force established to address the decline in social acceptability of smoking in Europe. In the memo, Bobby Kaplan (Manager of Communications for Philip Morris International Corporate Affairs) writes,

"Our mandate was to devise a campaign which would foster an environment in Europe where smoking remains a socially acceptable activity. There was a basic agreement that we would need to move the public debate and resultant controversy on tobacco from health issues to social issues."

The tobacco company's strategies included targeting social and governmental groups to persuade them that smoking was a social, and not a health, issue. The targets groups included unions, government ministries, political parties, legislative assistants and aides to key parliamentarians, business leaders, and "intellectuals (i.e. sociologists)." Special emphasis was put on influencing the entertainment industry, in both the U.S. and Western Europe. The documents lists as targets the television and recording industries, artists, art organizations and movie producers and directors. Plans seem to include putting on a conference that would combine intellectuals with celebrities. The name "Caroline Kennedy" was handwritten in next to the words "Intellectuals/celebrities Conference." Also listed were businesses (which would be targeted through influencing chief executive officers, trade associations, and personnel managers).

A project's task was to create videos that would portray public health efforts to control smoking in a humorous light and that would "Exaggerate restrictions on individual liberties."

Countries targeted for this massive effort were Greece, Portugal, France Belgium, Spain, Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia.