Tobacco Documents Online

This Philip Morris (PM) Corporate Affairs plan discusses the company's goals, objectives and strategies for achieving them during 1994-1996 in the areas of Eastern Europe, Middle East and Africa (EEMA). One objective of PM's Corporate Affair plan was nothing short of "Stop the decline in, and start re-building to social acceptability of smokers and smoking in society." Reasons given for PM's concern about the declining social acceptability of smoking were the threat this situation posed to PM's profits, as well as the effect it had on the company's ability to recruit allies and influence government:

"While the ultimate threat is widespread public smoking bans...we also risk consumption decreases due to shrinking possibilities to smoke at the workplace as well as a deterioration of the social acceptability of smokers and smoking. With the lack of social acceptability, we will face further problems in ally-building and Government Relations work."

As part of its '94-96 plan on the secondhand smoke issue in this region, PM hoped to "...influence the setting of indoor air quality and ventilation standards."

PM also sought to take the focus of the secondhand smoke issue off of science and health: "The messages on ETS related issues will focus on solutions and accommodation, rather than on a scientific debate," and "We will encourage [Philip Morris Inc.] to initiate and fund research into the causes and consequences of social intolerance, aiming at broadening the political debate about bans / laws / tolerance in our societies."

The document also discusses PM's corporate activities on topics of excise taxes, fighting restrictions on advertising and sponsorship, strategies for corporate contributions and more, in the countries of Switzerland, Sweden, Norway, the Czech Republic, the Slovak Republic, Poland, Egypt, Denmark Austria, Hungary, Russia, Kazakhstan, the Gulf Council Countries (GCC), Baltic States and Syria.

This 1994 trip report by R.J. Reynolds chemist David J. Doolittle relates information on a multi-company operation called BESSE (Biological Effects of Sidestream Smoke Exposure), a project carried out conjointly by Philip Morris, R.J. Reynolds, British American Tobacco, the Verband (German cigarette industry), Austrian Tobacco and Swedish Tobacco. The goal of BESSE was "to strengthen our efforts to initiate and support science on biological effects of sidestream smoke exposure; to cooperate among the companies participating in the group; to switch from a reactive to a proactive approach in dealing with these [sidestream smoke] matters." (http://tobaccodocuments.org/pm/2023049185-9187.html) The report says that one meeting participant (Dr. Franz Adlkofer) discusses a "wonderful, state-of-the-art" 90-day study on rats which revealed that secondhand smoke exposure caused "increased chromosome aberrations." The writer points out that this study, however, was never published in a peer-reviewed journal and was "unknown in the scientific world." According to Doolittle, Dr. Adlkofer then "told us that he wanted to do a 2-year study in rats, but the industry would not support the study because they were afraid of the results."

Doolittle talks about a proposed study "involving exposure of non-smokers to real life ETS in a bar for four hours." Doolittle says such a study would "not only be unhelpful, but would...leave the door open for prohibitionists to interpret it in a malicious manner...Therefore, I feel strongly that this study should not be done."

Doolittle mentions that it would be "ideal...to develop a data set which shows...the biological activity of NNK [a carcinogen in secondhand smoke] is inhibited by nicotine and cotinine...[and] the level of nitrosamines received by an individual following ETS exposure is insignificant compared to nitrosamine exposures from other sources, such as food."

Doolittle also relates a discussion about the "major problem" of international regulatory agencies considering ventilation standards that would require separate ventilation for smoking areas. He says:

"These draft regulations suggest that smoking not be banned, but areas that do have smoking would require separate ventilation. Thus, building owners would then have to decide whether or not they would provide separate ventilation for their smoking areas. Higher ventilation always results in more cost, both capital and operating. The problem is that owners of most establishments may decide to ban smoking, rather than pay a monetary penalty for enhanced ventilation equipment. Therefore, smoking would be a legal indoor activity, but no indoor locations could be found that meet the ventilation standards necessary to allow smokers to smoke. This is a very clever backdoor move by the prohibitionists, which must be aggressively countered with sound engineering, chemical and biological data."

This Philip Morris (PM) 5-year plan describes actions PM took to address smoking and health issues around the world between 1980 and 1984. Several passages of the Plan indicate that poorer and lesser-developed countries provide more favorable markets for cigarettes for several reasons: Firstly, people who are more desperate for their survival tend to pay less attention to smoking and health, and the governments and medical establishments of these countries tend to follow suit: [From Page 64]:

"Smoking and Health is not yet considered to be a crucial issue by the Egyptian Tobacco Industry...and Health is not an issue among the general Egyptian populace who are more concerned with day-to-day survival and consider smoking to be one of their few pleasures in life. The health question...is not considered to be a priority by the [Egyptian] medical profession."

The poorer economies of less-developed countries also help Philip Morris because the governments of these countries are more heavily dependent on tobacco taxes for income, and thus less apt to restrict tobacco marketing, use and advertising:

From Page 65-6:

"In general, little official governmental attention has been paid to smoking and health in Africa and the African Health Ministers, where they exist, have not taken a strong stand on this issue. This is in large part because most [African] governments are preoccupied by other priorities (economic and social development), and because cigarette advertising and tax revenues are important to the African economies. Therefore, governments are not inclined to impose restrictions which might jeopardize this income."

PM also understood that if religious leaders and doctors in Africa took a strong public health stand against tobacco use, it could affect cigarette consumption "because of the mentality of the Africans":

From Pg. 66:

"Smoking and health is of little concern to the African people and it seems not to be a popular issue among them. However, if an anti-smoking campaign supported by religious leaders and/or the medical profession is developed, this could seriously affect consumption because of the mentality of the Africans, and their faith in their religious leaders and doctors."

PM also recognized that a high rate of illiteracy means a populace will rely less on printed reports for health information, which benefits the tobacco companies. The following passage discusses the high rate of illiteracy in Nigeria and how health information from the "outside" was starting to affect "the upper class" (which presumably had higher literacy rates than the general population): From Page 68:

"As not less than seventy percent of the Nigerian population is illiterate, Nigerians form their opinions on smoking and health almost exclusively on the basis of rumor and superstition. The population is becoming more aware of the allegations against smoking largely because of press coverage from outside reports. The prevalent attitude in model developed countries has some impact on the upper class..."

PM also found that increasing levels of wealth and education in underdeveloped countries tends to work against cigarette manufactuers:

"Future Developments and Their Effect on Philip Morris' Activity

As Nigeria's wealth becomes more evenly distributed among its population and a greater number of Nigerians become educated, the spill-over effect as regards smoking and health may become more evident..."

This Philip Morris (PM) document describes the strategies and tactics the company planned to use throughout Europe to defeat adverse legislation and "reinforce smoker confidence." Strategies include "fight[ing] to curtail anti-smoking lobby's most effective weapon (i.e. juvenile smoking)," developing and leveraging smokers rights groups throughout Europe to help reinforce smokers confidence, preserve PM's marketing ability, defeat taxes and "defuse pressure for mandatory changes" in warning labels on cigarettes.

A stated goal was to "Maintain the debate on ETS science among EU legislators." The document also states the company's intent to "Equip and politicize the European Horeca association - Hotrec" , "develop a 'hard core' group of businesses" to oppose government public health efforts.

Another goal is to "Capitalize on success of [industry-funded scientific front group] Associates for Research in the Science of Enjoyment (ARISE) in building recognition of the benefits of pleasure; expand scientific underpinning of 'pleasure' message through scientific roundtables..."

Yet another goal reveals the true purpose behind industry-sponsored youth programs:

"Continue to use voluntary industry codes and youth anti-smoking programs to pre-empt legislated restrictions."

At one point in discussing PM's activities regarding duty-free product, PM states "PM and tobacco industry to stay behind scenes but play driving role."

This document shows the depth and scope of Philip Morris' interference in European affairs.

This Philip Morris (PM) Regional Corporate Affairs plan lists as an objective to "Stop the decline in, and start re-building the social acceptability of smokers and smoking in society," thus revealing PM's internal corporate goal of reversing the gains made by public health authorities against tobacco use since the 1964 Surgeon General's report. PM worried that the EPA's looming classification of environmental tobacco smoke (ETS, or secondhand smoke) as a Class A carcinogen could cause "the ultimate threat" of "widespread smoking bans." In this report, PM also links public concern about secondhand smoke to the double threat of declining cigarette sales and reduced influence with policymakers: "We also risk consumption decreased due to shrinking possibilities to smoke at the workplace as well as a deterioration of the social acceptability of smokers and smoking. With the lack of social acceptability, we will face further problems in ally-building and government relations work."

A PM strategy was to shift discussion about ETS away from science, saying "The messages on ETS-related issues will focus on solutions and accommodation rather than on a scientific debate." PM also worked to influence indoor air quality and ventilation standards in part to "focus more on standards and regulations and less on scientific base work." The report also discusses the emergence of concern about "the primary issue" [smoking-induced illness] in less developed countries of Africa and Eastern Europe, saying the information had been "channeled effectively to the global media by our opponents."

The document reveals PM's internal corporate policies were squarely at odds with the goals of governments around the world to reduce tobacco use. It describes PM's vast activities to derail and minimize public policy attempts to regulate tobacco in Switzerland, Finland, Sweden, Norway, Austria, Poland, Hungary, Russia, Turkey, the Gulf Council Countries, Egypt, the Czech Republic and North Africa.