Tobacco Documents Online

This 1985 speech from Philip Morris (PM) reveals much about PM's corporate manipulation of governments, the media and even smokers. According to the document, PM's relationship with newspaper magnate Rupert Murdoch (a long-time member of Philip Morris' board) went a long way towards erasing anti-tobacco coverage from newspapers around the world:

"...Another area we intend to exploit more fully is the ad agencies and media proprietors....As regard the media, we plan to build similar relationships to those we now have with Murdoch's News Limited with other newspaper proprietors. Murdoch's papers rarely publish anti-smoking articles these days...."

PM also cultivated "favorable press" about secondhand smoke by organizing journalists conferences where PM "educated" reporters on how to write "balanced" articles on secondhand smoke issues:

"...Turning now to primary and passive smoking...To get more favorable press, we are contemplating organizing another journalists' conference similar to the one we put together in Madrid for Latin American journalists in 1984."

In PM's evaluation of their enemies and their allies, the PM official who gave this speech acknowledged that the medical profession and government health ministers were their "formidable adversaries," and even acknowledged that most smokers wished they could stop smoking:

"I think we have to face up to the reality that the smoking and health lobby is winning. The anti-smoking zealots are becoming more vociferous, more experienced, better organized, and generally more effective. The medical profession is a formidable adversary. Health ministers sincerely believe smoking is bad. And, more important than all of this, is the fact that smokers wished they didn't smoke.

Perhaps we can't ever shift the balance back in favor of the industry but we have to keep trying..."

Despite acknowledging that most smokers would like to quit, rather than sympathize with this, PM believed they needed to use their control over smokers to organize them to help protect the tobacco industry:

First we must work harder at getting smokers to help the industry. If we are to have any success at changing the climate of opinion, we have to get the smokers more on our side, or at least enough of them to start to make a difference.

This document describes a tobacco industry plan to bolster the industry's credibility and fight public smoking bans in Australia.

One of the "overriding objectives" for the "ETS/Public smoking and credibility projects" were "to influence politiciants, legislators and regulators to take a more balanced view on smoking and the tobacco industry."

The phrase "a more balanced view" refers to the view that smoking isn't harmful and that smoking behavior shouldn't be regulated. A poltician or legislator who believes that smoking is harmful and that others shouldn't have to breathe tobacco smoke against their will maintains a viewpoint that the tobacco industry considers an "unbalanced view" on smoking and the tobacco industry.

The program lists the intended target audiences for its credibility campaign, and then states that the industry will "focus on the particular concerns and hot buttons for each individuals' group."

Perhaps most telling, however, is the section at the end of the paper that recommends budgeting in enough money to put on a "Juvenile Smoking" campaign.

Tobacco control advocates have long stated that the objective of industry "kids shouldn't smoke" campaigns is not to reduce youth smoking, but to bolster industry credibility, and give politicians continued cover to support an unpopular industry. This document clearly mentions a "juvenile smoking campaign" not in the context of concern for the health of Australian youth, but in the context of its ability "to influence politicians, legislators and regulators to take a more balanced view on tobacco smoking" and bolster the industry's credibility.

This internal Philip Morris Australia (PM) memorandum by Matthew Winokur of PM Worldwide Regulatory Affairs reveals a gold mine of corporate strategy to "head off regulations" in Australia. Winokur discusses PM's ownership of the Vegemite name, a brand strongly identified with Australia, and the Australian public's resentment of foreign ownership of the name. He discusses what PM may be able to do about it.

Adding to our already strong evidence that PM uses youth programs as tools to stave off regulation, Winokur identifies "concessions" that PM can use when negotiating with the Australian government, with one being "developing campaigns to prevent youth from smoking." Winokur says such a program "should be developed as ammunition if and when needed, since its clear that tobacco issues can move very quickly in Australia," saying "these shorts of projects [youth programs] could help 'move the needle.'"

Winokur considers using the Kraft General Foods name (KGF) to "help tobacco" in Australia, and considers whether doing so would "hamper KGF's agenda." He discusses which individuals could be recruited to help PM attack Australian Ministerial Councils "on the grounds that they 'waste taxpayers' money' and 'cost business.' "

Perhaps most tellingly, Winokur reiterates PM's strategy of broadening any debate on tobacco by shifting the focus off of health issues:

"The objective...is not only to create allies but 'shift the debate' from tobacco to broader issues and thus change the battleground. As long as we try to fight on the anti's agenda, we'll get nowhere."

In a strong denial of the public health role of the World Health Organization and the global health threat caused by their tobacco products, this Philip Morris International (PM) internal memo from Geoffrey Bible speaks of the "extraordinary influence" the World Health Organization has on government and consumers saying, "we must find a way to diffuse this and re-orient [the WHO's] activities to their prescribed mandate." Bible further discusses how PM can use its vast resources (like technology and access to food) to influence governments to turn against the WHO: "In addition, we need to think through how we could use our food companies, size, technology and capability with governments by helping them with their food problems and give us a more balanced profile with the government than we now have against WHO's powerful influence."

Bible mentions that a WHO initiative, a levy on tobacco sales in Victoria and South Australia to buy out tobacco sports and cultural sponsorships, "is a very effective strategy that we must stop."

Bible also speaks of "destroying" government attempts to regulate maximum constituent levels (MCL's) of toxic chemicals cigarette smoke, and links Philip Morris to the set-up of the smokers rights group Forest as well as a seemingly "independent" group called Libertad, which PM used to influence legislation. Bible proposes extending Libertad from France and Australia into other countries "so as to become a major influence in the formation of public policy."

In this 1983 marketing speech, Philip Morris (PM) President Hamish Maxwell cites the importance of PM's efforts to maintain the presence of smoking in the movies to help preserve the social acceptability of tobacco use. Maxwell states:

"RECENTLY, ANTI-SMOKING GROUPS HAVE ALSO HAD SOME EARLY SUCCESSES AT ERODING THE SOCIAL ACCEPTABILITY OF SMOKING. SMOKING IS BEING POSITIONED AS AN UNFASHIONABLE, AS WELL AS UNHEALTHY, CUSTOM. WE MUST USE EVERY CREATIVE MEANS AT OUR DISPOSAL TO REVERSE THIS DESTRUCTIVE TREND. I DO FEEL HEARTENED AT THE INCREASING NUMBER OF OCCASIONS WHEN I GO TO A MOVIE AND SEE A PACK OF CIGARETTES IN THE HANDS OF THE LEADING LADY. THIS IS IN SHARP CONTRAST TO THE STATE OF AFFAIRS JUST A FEW YEARS AGO WHEN CIGARETTES RARELY SHOWED UP ON CAMERA. WE MUST CONTINUE TO EXPLOIT NEW OPPORTUNITIES TO GET CIGARETTES ON SCREEN AND INTO THE HANDS OF SMOKERS. THE PMI CORPORATE AFFAIRS DEPARTMENT IS HELPING..."

This 1995 budget for Philip Morris'(PM) Worldwide Regulatory Affairs office lists the company's activities to fight public health-tobacco control efforts around the globe during that year and what it cost PM to carry out these activities. It lists PM's consultants by name and/or company, tells how much PM budgeted to pay them, and lists the countries where PM applied this interference.

PM's activities included persuading restaurant owners, airport officials and employers around the world that they needed too install new ventilation equipment instead of banning smoking entirely, developing strategies and programs to protect smoking in the workplace, subsidizing construction and renovation of airport smoking lounges, working to prevent and pre-empt smoking restrictions, "slowing down the spread of smoking bans on international [airline] carriers," promoting acceptance of indoor air quality standards that would allow smoking, funding front groups like ARISE (Associate for Research in the Science of Enjoyment) and TASSC (The Advancement of Sound Science Coalition), funding of public relations groups like the Dolphin Group and Burson Marstellar to push their agenda, and much more. According to this document, in 1995 PM planned to implement the above activities in Brazil, Costa Rica, Japan, Sweden, Hungary, Switzerland, Hong Kong, Malaysia, Puerto Rico, Finland, Czech Republic, Korea, Belgium, Spain, Germany, Italy, Columbia, Poland, Norway, Gulf Council Countries (GCC), Argentina, United States and Australia.

PM's total budget for these activities in 1995 was over $17 million, which does not include legal costs for 1995, which are listed on Page 20 of the document. The total cost of legal assistance to PM's Worldwide Regulatory Affairs Department in 1995 was $25,785,000, which includes the costs of lawsuits against the ABC Television Network, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, and legal work on cigarette issues like ingredients disclosure and ignition propensity. The law firm of Shook, Hardy and Bacon alone was budgeted to make over $7.3 million from Philip Morris in this single year.

This 1992 Philip Morris (PM) document about the funding of various research projects around the world indicates that there are a number of less-then-obvious reasons why PM funds research projects in various countries. The author of the document is Charles Wall, Vice President and Associate General Counsel for PM. According to the document, PM funded some research projects in part because the scientists performing them had good contacts with government officials and within the research community in that country: "While the research recommended for funding in 1993 through Tassin,Dusser, Molimard, Micheletti, Hirt and Symann is good, another reason for funding them is due to the importance of those researchers in their respective countries. For the most part, they have excellent contacts within the scientific community and the government and, therefore, are of assistance to Philip Morris..."

The document also makes it apparent that PM funded research simply to create a "presence" in a given country that might yield political benefit to the company:

"I view with some concern the research effort in Germany...Much of the research focuses on nicotine...There are a number of projects which could easily be canceled, or not started, that could save us several hundred thousand DM. ...Our scientists feel, however, that it is important to keep the research money in Germany, i.e., continue to support researchers in Germany... [W]hile Paul may not have any problem with the reduction [in funding], my guess is that he will feel that we should attempt to locate worthwhile research projects in Germany, so that we are in a position, in dealing with the German government, to point to ongoing research projects in that country. The relationship between the industry and the German government seems to be a good deal better than the relationship between the industry and the government in this country [the United States]. As I understand it, there are regular consultations between government and industry scientists, as well as constructive discussions regarding smoking-related laws and regulations. The industry in Germany appears to be more influential with the government than the industry in the U.S., and, for that reason, the industry feels it is important to maintain a substantial research presence [in Germany]."

PM also sponsored research in a given country in anticipation of litigation, in hopes of helping sway court decisions in their favor:

"Although I do not believe litigation is imminent in Germany, should it occur, the fact that we are sponsoring research...could be of substantial help in convincing a court that we are fulfilling our duty to conduct research."

This 20-page Australian tobacco industry document from 1976 outlines how the industry grappled with the declining social acceptability of smoking and the passive smoking issue. It shows that the industry refused to accept public health conclusions about the harms caused by tobacco and that the industry further acted on this opinion by planning detailed schemes, programs and activities to affect public, political and media opinion of its products and reverse the decline of smoking. The Australian tobacco industry had the lofty goal of reversing well-accepted public opinion about the link between tobacco and health, and actually re-creating and preserving controversy on the subject:

"...[W]hat positive action should to taken to change the smoking and health question from one that already has been decided, to one which is still open to debate?... What should [the industry] do to guard against more effective attacks by its opponents and what should it do to prevent the habit itself becoming socially unacceptable?"

The document also shows that the Australian tobacco companies colluded in their efforts to oppose public health:

"In January, 1975, a Co-ordinating Committee, comprising representatives of the three Australian manufacturers, was re-activated and a mutually acceptable set of objectives established.

The agreed objectives are:

(i) Preserve an outward face of unanimity of approach to all problems and/or situations affecting the questions of smoking and health.

(ii) Agree on an overall Industry policy and philosophy as a framework within which the Co-ordinating Committee will work.

(iii) Accept the fact that smoking and health is an industry problem in the face of which the three companies must operate in complete concert."

The industry's strategy of "buying time" and avoiding medical arguments is disclosed, as well as its clandestine manipulation of sports organizations to help it oppose public health activities in Australia:

[From Page 5] "PAST STRATEGIES AND TACTICS

...The fundamental policy of the Industry up until 1974 was to buy time and avoid where possible confrontation with Governments or anti-smoking organizations on strictly medical arguments..."

[From Page 6, under section entitled "POLITICAL AREA"]

"...Pressure from sporting organisations was vital in protecting their right, and the industry's, to continue negotiating sponsorships...The Industry has played its part in the sportsmen's protests by acting as behind-the-scenes initiator and advisor. Industry representatives have taken part in nearly all discussion, but have carefully avoided public projection. So far our opponents have been able to voice no more than suspicion that the Industry is playing a part..."

This document discusses a wide range of tobacco industry strategies for influencing public and political opinion about tobacco products, many of which have been employed not just in Australia, but around the world, and many of which were long-employed by the industry and may still in use today:

"Other activity worthy of extension or development includes:

"--Continuing involvement in activities representative of good corporate citizenship, i.e., activities seen by the public as beneficial in that they enhance or bring about cultural, sporting or other social events which would not have been possible or as successful without our support..."

"--Active encouragement of well-known personalities who smoke, to speak up in support of the benefits and pleasure they derive from smoking."

"--Establish a closer association with fashion houses, shows...and fashion parades and encourage their use openly of our products..."

"...--[Encourage] the use of cigarette brands in films, T.V., productions, newspapers, photographs of prominent people and advertisements for make and female fashion garments..."

This document from British American Tobacco (and found in Philip Morris' files) discusses the decline in social acceptability of smoking and what might be done about it.

The document discusses the long-term threat to the industry of the passive smoking issue, saying there is a "need to provide reassurance to existing smokers and employees and to counter the long-term impact of propaganda from the anti-smoking lobby which threatens to undermine smokers' confidence and to dissuade people not to take up the habit."

The industry also saw that declning social acceptability of smoking was affecting morale among tobacco industry employees and the paper proposes ways to deal with that situation as well, proposing to start "A programme of employee reassurance... which would demonstrate confidence and pride in the Tobacco Industry."

This 1985 speech by John Dollisson (Vice President of Corporate Affairs for Philip Morris Asia) demonstrates how PM's efforts to mislead and confuse people (particularly smokers) on the relationship between smoking and disease reached PM's highest executive levels at their corporate offices around the world, even as late as 1985. Viewed through the lens of historical retrospect, a speech like this ought to be a museum piece, as the callous denials of this Philip Morris' executive (even to the point of practically joking) show an astounding lack of sensitivity to the pervasiveness of human suffering and destruction this company alone was causing. Some passages from Dollisson's speech:

"Good morning ladies and gentlemen. I find it somewhat ironical that I am to talk about smoking and health while next door the Colonial Mutual Life and the Great Eastern Life Insurance companies are discussing smoking life insurance policies!"

"...Statistical associations cannot establish cause and effect...What anti-smokers have done is to turn good data into poor science. They use statistics like the drunkard uses a lamp post-- more for support than illumination; and remember statistics are like a bikini costume--what they reveal is interesting, what they conceal is of vital importance!"

"...One thing you can say about smoking is that it causes statistics...Remember that the vast majority of people die in bed, therefore should you ban sleep?"

"...The medical profession and the scientific community have not been responsible...It is time for some lateral thinking...more attention should be addressed to those smokers who don't get the so-called tobacco related diseases and to non--smokers who do get these diseases."

In February 1993 Philip Morris held an "ETS World Conference" at the Macklowe Hotel in New York City. According to a pamphlet about it, the event appears to have been primarily for Philip Morris employees worldwide: http://www.pmdocs.com/getallimg.asp?if=avpidx&DOCID=2023544793/4810

The following document is a follow-up memo about the corporate objectives and strategies for dealing with secondhand smoke issues apparently put forth at the meeting, along with assignments as to who was to handle which tasks.

Tasks listed include:

"Development of a global coalition against 'junk science' as a parallel to PM USA coalition now underway...

Shift concern over ETS to slippery slope argumentation and/or tolerance...

How to package comprehensive improvements in ventilation to forestall tobacco specific bans...

Shifting debate from ETS [environmental tobacco smoke] to IAQ [indoor air quality]...

[I]dentifying other risk parallels...cellular phones, chlorinated water; identify currently regulated carcinogens for which acceptable levels have been set...

...Shift concern over ETS in the workplace from the health issue to one of annoyance.

...Shift the concern over ETS in restaurants from bans to accommodation.

...Develop an 'ETS Task Force' with global PM representation to develop strategies to combat smoking restrictions.

People very high up in the company were involved in the conference, including Steve Parrish (VP of External Affairs and General Counsel at PM USA), Clare Purcell (Manager, Legal Issues, PM USA), Mary "Mopsy" Pottorff (Manager, PM Corporate Scientific Affairs), Matthew Winokur (Director, Corporate Affairs, PM International), and Robert Pages (Director, Science and Technology, PMUSA).

This "private and strictly confidential" R. J. Reynolds document describes the global tobacco industry's 1980 Project Mayfly, an ambitious, highly organized and all-encompassing plan to "influence, modify or change public opinion to the industry, smokers and smoking, to create a more favourable climate [for smoking and the industry], however directly or indirectly."

Objectives for Project Mayfly were to:

"--Protect smokers and their behavior --Separate smokers and non-smokers from anti-smokers --Discredit the anti's."

The plan sought to promote the "social benefits of smoking," "expose anti-smoking groups" and portray "smoking as normal behavior."

Project Mayfly's remarkably wide-ranging plans included influencing politicians and the media through multiple channels, surveillance of public health groups, organizing and publicizing tightly controlled scientific symposia, running advertising campaigns focusing on individual freedoms, development of an "Allies Project" to recruit a wide range of non-tobacco parties to speak on behalf of the tobacco industry. It also included recruiting National [Tobacco]Manufacturers' Associations worldwide, "who would bear the major costs of implementation work."

Provisional ideas included a "fair play" competition for press and media, smokers' short stories that would highlight smoking as a social benefit, cartoon campaigns, "awards for personalities displaying an active role on tolerance and courtesy issues," and "image campaigns" highlighting freedom of choice by individuals.

The document contains an organizational chart showing the member-companies of ICOSI (the International Committee on Smoking Issues): British American Tobacco, Imperial Tobacco, Philip Morris, Reentsma (German tobacco industry), R.J. Reynolds and Rothmans International. A subcommittee of ICOSI called the Social Acceptability Working Party, or SAWP, organized Project Mayfly.

This 1977 "Report on Social Acceptability of Smoking" by ICOSI (the International Committee on Smoking Issues) outlines the global tobacco industry's need to implement "countermeasures" against public health tobacco control efforts worldwide. The document describes the remarkable public health progress authorities had made by then in educating the world's population about the dangers of tobacco use. Appendix A at back of the document lists these successes, country by country, and represents them as growing threats to the industry. Some examples: "SWEDEN: In the 13-year period, 1963 to 1976, the incidence of men smokers who account for the major part of cigarette consumption declined significantly...

UNITED KINGDOM: In 1977, 86% of the population (84% of the smokers) consider smoking bad for their health -- up from 48% in 1961...Incidence of smoking has declined sharply among men --from 59% of 1961 to 47% in 1975...Percentage of ex-smokers among males and females has steadily increased during the same period. Per capita consumption [of cigarettes] decreased in 1975 and 1976...Volunteer "public service" and "health" organizations against smoking are varied, numerous, widespread and effective...

AUSTRALIA: In 1977, 51% of the cigarette smokers feel that smoking is extremely harmful, up from 33% in 1968...Since 1971, the incidence of smoking has declined from 39% to 35% in Melbourne and Sydney... IRELAND ...The declining incidence of smoking by males, particularly in the younger age groups and higher social classes, has accelerated. The incidence of quitters has also accelerated..."

The industry describes this stunning public health progress as "a gloomy picture," and concludes that the "industry needs stronger countermeasures" to combat this progress. The report concludes that the industry needs to target smokers, opinion leaders and the general public with its countermeasures, instead of confining these efforts to only government, as the industry had long been doing until that point. It concludes that "the industry should launch sustained, long-term countermeasure programs" to fight progress against smoking.

The paper gives hints about why preserving the social acceptability of smoking is so key to preserving the indusry's other defenses:

"Until society believes that smoking does not harm the health of nearby nonsmokers, the industry will continue to run grave risks of further reverses on social acceptability issues. For example, the industry's critical 'freedom of choice' position cannot be maintained if people believe they are harmed simply by being near a smoker."

The paper links the social acceptability issue back to the "primary health issue," and concludes that "The Basic Smoking and Health Issue (Smoking Affects Smokers) is a root cause of Social Acceptability issues...Clearly if real progress is made toward resolving questions concerning smoking and health, much of the pressure against smoking in a social sense will be eased." The paper also observes other threats to the industry, specifically that "smoking is becoming a downscale social activity...there are relatively fewer smokers among better-educated, higher income, trend-setting segments of the population than there are among the balance," and "large numbers of today's children and young teenagers appear to have increasingly negative attitudes about adult cigarette smoking...anti-smoking propaganda seems to be conditioning a new generation to have a bias against smoking as socially acceptable behavior."

This document shows how tobacco companies from several countries around the world came together to created and implement "countermeasures" aimed at reversing the progress that governments and health groups had made against tobacco worldwide by 1977.

Media magnate Rupert Murdoch served for several years on Philip Morris' (PM) board of directors. This relationship served PM well, as indicated by this document which shows that information that could negatively affect the tobacco industry's bottom line was routinely withheld from Murdoch-owned newspapers worldwide:

"As regards the media, we plan to build similar relationships to those we now have with Murdoch's News Limited with other newspaper proprietors. Murdoch's papers rarely publish anti-smoking articles these days."

Thsi week marked the public release of a film called "Outfoxed," which examines how media empires, led by Rupert Murdoch's Fox News, have been running a "race to the bottom" in television news. (www.moveon.org) This film provides an in-depth look at Fox News and the dangers of ever-enlarging corporations taking control of the public's right to know.

A book about newspaper mogul Rupert Murdoch (Murdoch: The Making of a Media Empire, by William Shawcross) credits Murdoch with nothing less than having "invented the modern media empire." A synopsis of the book on Amazon.com says (of Murdoch's extensive ownership of media outlets worldwide),

"Now [Murdoch's] reach includes two thirds of the Earth's population."