Tobacco Documents Online

This Philip Morris (PM) Corporate Affairs plan discusses the company's goals, objectives and strategies for achieving them during 1994-1996 in the areas of Eastern Europe, Middle East and Africa (EEMA). One objective of PM's Corporate Affair plan was nothing short of "Stop the decline in, and start re-building to social acceptability of smokers and smoking in society." Reasons given for PM's concern about the declining social acceptability of smoking were the threat this situation posed to PM's profits, as well as the effect it had on the company's ability to recruit allies and influence government:

"While the ultimate threat is widespread public smoking bans...we also risk consumption decreases due to shrinking possibilities to smoke at the workplace as well as a deterioration of the social acceptability of smokers and smoking. With the lack of social acceptability, we will face further problems in ally-building and Government Relations work."

As part of its '94-96 plan on the secondhand smoke issue in this region, PM hoped to "...influence the setting of indoor air quality and ventilation standards."

PM also sought to take the focus of the secondhand smoke issue off of science and health: "The messages on ETS related issues will focus on solutions and accommodation, rather than on a scientific debate," and "We will encourage [Philip Morris Inc.] to initiate and fund research into the causes and consequences of social intolerance, aiming at broadening the political debate about bans / laws / tolerance in our societies."

The document also discusses PM's corporate activities on topics of excise taxes, fighting restrictions on advertising and sponsorship, strategies for corporate contributions and more, in the countries of Switzerland, Sweden, Norway, the Czech Republic, the Slovak Republic, Poland, Egypt, Denmark Austria, Hungary, Russia, Kazakhstan, the Gulf Council Countries (GCC), Baltic States and Syria.

These minutes of a 1987 meeting held between Philip Morris' (PM) European executives and John Rupp of Covington and Burling (industry attorney) discuss bringing strategy for fighting governments, public health authorities and scientific conclusion on the health effects of secondhand smoke (SHS) to Europe. PM lists "end goals" for the strategy: "Resist smoking restrictions" and "Restore smoker confidence."

Lofty pre-requisites needed to achieve the above goals are also listed:

"--Reverse scientific and popular opinion --Restore social acceptability of smoking --Preserve product liability defences." The first item above indicates PM's awareness that the accumulated scientific evidence about SHS had concluded beyond a doubt that SHS was harmful to health, and reveals the cigarette company's hubris on this topic. The last item, "Preserve product liability defences," suggests that PM believed it needed to create a body of scientific studies casting doubt on the health effects of secondhand smoke to preserve its own defenses against personal injury suits that could potentially arise over SHS exposure. This concern is reflected again on page 3 (Bates No. 2046754739), where PM cautions, "The product liability implications of what is said...in the course of media breifings and elsewhere must be borne in mind."

Later in the paper, PM discusses how to portray its relationship with a company called ACVA (Air Conditioning and Ventilation Associates Atlantic). ACVA was run by a ventilation engineer named Gray Robertson, who toured the U.S. giving seminars about indoor air quality. In these seminars, Robertson introduced the public and press to the notion of "sick building syndrome," a theory that blamed building occupants' health complaints on virtually all components except tobacco smoke (dust, cleaning chemicals, construction materials, poor ventilation, etc. ). Gray Robertson's tours and speaking engagements were paid for by Philip Morris.

PM needed to hide its affiliation with ACVA in order for their "indoor air expert" to maintain credibility. Thus these minutes say,

"ACVA must be perceived to be at arm's length from the industry, including in media briefings. Its role at most should be seen as yet another third party expert amongst others."

The document also makes clear that PM was the leader of worldwide efforts to obscure the link between secondhand smoke and health. Section #4 of the minutes, titled "Industry Coordination," states,

"It is preferable to build up a coordinated, international industry effort [to deal with the secondhand smoke issue]. Ideally this would be under the auspices of INFOTAB ...Nevertheless is was understood that PM must forge on and lead/act unilaterally whilst the industry coordination is being established individual markets."

In this 1990 speech by John Dollison (Vice President of Philip Morris' International Corporate Affairs Department) before a marketing conference, Dollison clearly describes public health as PM's opponent in a "guerilla war. " He describes public health officials as "snipers" who have "laid their minefields," and even makes biblical references to the fight: "Our opponents sit and wait, watching our every move, every new product and every new marketing project... Like the proverbial lion in the Bible, they are poised to devour us whenever we give them an opportunity, and sometimes even when we don't....Today we are engaged in a "war" against our industry... The kind of war we are engaged in is a guerrilla war.. the most difficult kind of all. Our enemy might not be invisible but it often seems that way. Their tactics are to hit and run and then hit again...They have positioned their snipers and laid their minefields it is the job of Corporate Affairs to discover where these threats are,and to warn you."

In a bold and revealing description of PM's under-the-radar corporate tactics, Dollison boasts about how PM created and completely controlled a supposedly "independent" coalition called "The Committee for Freedom of Commercial Expression" in Denmark to oppose a tobacco ad ban directive. Dollison boasts about how this coalition was able to convince no less than the Danish Ministry of Health into opposing a tobacco ad ban, lists other countries where PM has used this secret tactic, and proposes that PM expand this tactic further to other countries:

"In Denmark, for example, we have created a coalition known (in English) as the Committee for Freedom of Commercial Expression...we were able to recruit more than 50 prominent Danes...The group has conducted media briefings, participated in debates, and written articles and conducted and publicized an opinion poll...Members of Government (including the Minister of Health) now regularly...consult with coalition members...The coalition was instrumental in securing the commitment and public declaration of the Minister Of Health to oppose an advertising ban...And, finally, the functioning of the coalition is managed at arms length - distanced from P.M., although completely controlled by P.M....We have set up similar coalitions in Holland, New Zealand and EEC for sport. Many more are required..."

Dollison also describes how voluntary, self-imposed "advertising codes" (which, he admits, make no more concessions than PM has already made in most countries in which they operate) help deflect further restrictions on tobacco advertising:

"What I am talking about is a list of self-imposed [advertising] constraints which will enable us to more plausibly claim the high moral ground in future controversies and, not least, to more easily manage and possible triumph in future crises...Such a regime, effectively implemented and sold, I believe, have the inestimable advantage of repositioning Philip Morris in the world-wide debate over the rights and wrongs of tobacco. It would gain us support from those with no affection for our enemies but who also harbour deep suspicion of our motives and methods. It would give us just that little bit more breathing space, just that little bit more room to maneuver. Believe me, we need it."

This 35-page document from Philip Morris' (PM) Corporate Affairs Office describes in detail the company's vas, wide-ranging strategies to fight public health tobacco control efforts in countries across Europe and the Middle East. Topics discussed include fighting tax increases, countering the decrease in social acceptability of smoking, influencing legialators and officials from standards-setting bodies, and much more.

Not unexpectedly, one strategy was to influence government:

"...A FIRST STEP [to fight proposed restrictions on cigarette advertising in Poland] WAS A MEETING BETWEEN PM MANAGEMENT AND THE [Polish] MINISTER OF AGRICULTURE, AFTER WHICH THE LATTER BECAME AN ACTIVE SUPPORTER OF A VOLUNTARY CODE OF CONDUCT AS A VIABLE ALTERNATIVE TO STRINGENT RESTRICTIONS..."

Another strategy was to push a voluntary advertising code to legislators as a substitute for real restrictions on advertising:

"OUR THIRD STRATEGY POINT IS ALSO TO PRESENT AN INDUSTRY COUNTER-PROPOSAL IN THE FORM OF A VOLUNTARY ADVERTISING CODE...PM WILL EVALUATE THE BEST WAY TO PRESENT AND DEFEND THE CONCEPT OF A VOLUNTARY ADVERTISING AND PROMOTIONS CODE AS OPPOSED TO A LEGISLATIVE BAN."

Another strategy was to use sports sponsorships to influence the media, government officials and opinion leaders:

"IN TERMS OF PM SPONSORED SPORTING EVENTS SUCH AS F1, RALLYING, MOTORBIKING, BOATING AND GOLF, WE WILL BEGIN ACTIVELY USING THESE EVENTS TO FURTHER STRENGTHEN TIES WITH THE MEDIA, GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS, AND OPINION LEADERS."

PM also planned to work through smokers' rights groups. PM planned to increase funding for recruitment for these groups (like "Smokepeace" in northern Europe), to use them to create the appearance of a grassroots uprising against smoking restrictions, and use them as a vehicle to fight public health organizing around tobacco issues (e.g., with events like "World Smokepeace Day"). These events were planned to counteract the activities and influence of groups like the World Health Organization and the International Union Against Cancer.

This 1987 Philip Morris (PM) plan discusses recruitment of ETS [environmental tobacco smoke] witnesses in European countries (ones who can "campaign" on a "ticket" that points the finger in another direction, e.g., diesel fumes). It states that PM's objectives are to restore smoker confidence and preserve product liability defence. Lofty sub-objectives include "the reversal of scientific and popular opinion that ETS is harmful to health" and "restoration of the social acceptability of smoking." PM planned to do this by "developing expert opinion in order to influence and direct popular attitudes, political attitudes, professional institutions." The plan relates PM's intent to concentrate its anti-public health ETS efforts on Finland and Sweden.