Tobacco Documents Online

This 1998 internal Philip Morris (PM) email shows how PM strategically applies corporate philanthropy to smoothe the way for its cigarette promotions.

In 1998, Philip Morris started a promotion for Marlboro cigarettes called Party at the Marlboro Ranch, a sweepstakes wherein winners would get vacations at ranches in Montana and Arizona. Knowing that these type of cigarette promotions can stimulate protests in the parts of the country where they appear, Philip Morris sought to curry favor by engaging in strategic corporate giving in advance of the promotion:

"As you all know, Marlboro's newest promotion, Party at the Marlboro Ranch, will kick-off this summer with sweepstakes winners taking trips to ranches in Montana and Arizona.

The brand group would like to identify some local charities that we can provide some support to as a good will gesture in the communities we will be visiting...There was just a big article in today's NY Times about culture in Bozeman and how it's thriving but also has a lack of funds, etc... "

Some of the employees' suggestions for contributions included an organization called CODAC, which ironically assists women who are substance abusers, the Brewster House-Center for Family Violence, the Tucson Youth Center, and the Southern Arizona AIDS Foundation. (This information taken from a subsequent PM email on this topic)

Past cigarette promotions (like The Marlboro Adventure Team and the Marlboro Train) have stimulated protests along their routes. Philip Morris likely wanted to defuse such protests by engaging in this type of philanthropy in advance of the sweepstakes

This 1999 internal Philip Morris (PM) email describes PM's exhaustive behind-the-scene efforts to defeat a local smoke-free ordinance proposed in Santa Fe, New Mexico in 1999. The email reveals many of PM's strategies for fighting these measures while remaining unseen. Some tactics include:

1) Introducing many confusing amendments to the ordinance and getting a city council member to carry them.

2) Claiming afterwards that the ordinance is now so complicated that it must be postponed, sent to a work session or requires extra study.

3) Inserting ventilation language into the measure.

4) Having employees of Philip Morris and R.J. Reynolds flood city hall with calls against the ordinance.

5) Placing letters to the editor and op-eds in local papers.

6) Placing petitions in bars and restaurants,

7) Involving Philip Morris's front group, the National Smokers Alliance (NSA) in protesting the ordinance,

8) Keeping lobbyists from multiple cigarette manufacturing companies "on the ground" in the town where such a measure is being considered.

The email shows that even this gargantuan level of corporate interference can't decrease the popularity of smoke-free laws. The email indicates that despite all their efforts, the cigarette companies were still losing in Santa Fe:

"Councilors say they have been getting overwhelmed with calls, but still the yes calls outweigh the no. Both PM and RJR are calling..."

The measure ultimately passed in Santa Fe despite all the clandestine political interference from cigarette companies.

This November 2001 Philip Morris internal email between executives suggests that the company's name change from "Philip Morris" to "Altria" is to divert attention away from the company's ties to tobacco and pull attention instead towards a more positive image of "compliance, responsibility, philanthropy, environment...all the things we want Altria to be identified with." The email was written by James Spector, Vice President of Corporate Affairs at PM and was sent to Thomas Collamore, Vice President of Public Affairs at PM, and Steve Parrish, Senior Vice President and General Counsel for PM USA. Spector writes:

"I know we have shied away from setting a revised purpose/role for the Altria Group, but in the current environment this seems like a perfect time for us to define the 'new' Corporation the way we want to... While on the face of it, it is just a name change, we also have the opportunity to highlight many of the iniatives that were already in place under PMCos Inc., but were unable to breakthrough becaues of the name confusion. We can begin to focus attention away from tobacco, and on to compliance, responsibility, philanthropy, environment, etc., all the things we want Altria to be identified with..."

This 1999 Philip Morris (PM) email reveals the extent of the cigarette maker's interference in efforts to enact public health smoking regulations at the most local level.

In the email, PM's Arizona public relations consultant Joanne Ralston discusses efforts to defeat smoking ordinances in the southern Arizona towns of Tucson, Douglas and Tombstone and Pima County. Ralston says that county supervisors in Pima are "...hiding behind the 'health issue" and are "likely to go forward with a ban stronger than Tucson." She expresses frustration with the Arizona Restaurant Association (ARA) over their refusal to act as a PM third party ally, saying

"ARA Tucson is weak...and not wired into supervisors at all. We offered help with a phone bank and they rejected it because we'd have to say 'Philip Morris.' Tucson bars also offered to help and were rejected by ARA/Tucson, which didn't want to be connected to tobacco and alcohol...So that's why I'm having trouble getting op-eds signed by Tucson restaurant folks."

Ralston concludes that the Arizona Restaurant Association has "a serious head in the sand mentality," and complains about the restaurant owners' realization that they, and not PM, would be the ones to bear the cost of PM's proposed "ventilation" solutions:

"...We have a model ordinance, but it requires ventilation, negative airflow over smoking sections...and minimum size requirements. Tucson ARA won't buy it. Their attitude is that we'd [be] spending their money, sans facing cost reality of separate facility vs. ventilation."

Ralston continues,

"I have asked PM to bring in Will Fox and put him on the ground in Douglas and Tombstone to stir up a firestorm of local opposition and Ginny is working on it."

That a big corporation like Philip Morris would take the time and effort to clandestinely "stir up a firestorm of opposition" to a public health effort to control smoking in an isolated southwestern U.S. community of 1,300 (Tombstone, AZ) shows the incredible extent to which this company will go to manipulate lawmaking to benefit itself.

In the email, Ralston discusses efforts to defeat smoking ordinances in several southern Arizona towns and counties, including Tucson, Pima County, Douglas and Tombstone. Ralston says that county supervisors in Pima are "...hiding behind the 'health issue" and are "likely to go forward with a ban stronger than Tucson."

She expresses frustration with the Arizona Restaurant Association (ARA) because they would not become a PM ally, saying "ARA Tucson is weak...and not wired into supervisors at all. We offered help with a phone bank and they rejected it because we'd have to say 'Philip Morris.' Tucson bars also offered to help and were rejected by ARA/Tucson, which didn't want to be connected to tobacco and alcohol...So that's why I'm having trouble getting op-eds signed by Tucson restaurant folks."

Ralston concludes that the Arizona Restaurant Association has "a serious head in the sand mentality," and complains that restaurant owners have discovered that they, and not PM, would bear the cost of a "ventilation" solution to the smoking problem:

...We have a model ordinance, but it requires ventilation, negative airflow over smoking sections...and minimum size requirements. Tucson ARA won't buy it. Their attitude is that we'd [be] spending their money, sans facing cost reality of separate facility vs. ventilation."

Ralston indicates her desire to "stir up a firestorm of local opposition" to the ordinance, saying

"I have asked PM to bring in Will Fox and put him on the ground in Douglas and Tombstone to stir up a firestorm of local opposition and Ginny is working on it."

That a big corporation like Philip Morris would take the time and effort to clandestinely interfere in the goings-on in an isolated southwestern U.S. community of merely 1,300 to "stir up a firestorm of opposition" to a smoking ordinance (Tombstone, AZ) shows the incredible extent to which this company will go to manipulate lawmaking to benefit itself.

In the summer of 2000, Philip Morris (PM) introduced a new cigarette called "Merit PaperSelect," that was supposed to have a lower propensity to start fires. In the fall of 2000, PM ran a $20 million advertising campaign announcing that the new Merit was made with special paper and that it "may be less likely to ignite certain fabrics." An article in today's issue of the Wall Street Journal tells how the new Merit "PaperSelect" (banded paper) cigarettes actually pose more of a risk for fire injury than conventional cigarettes (Suit Alleges Philip Morris Hid Cigarette-Fire Risk, By Vanessa O'Connell, via Dow Jones Newswires, April 23, 2004 URL: http://framehosting.dowjonesnews.com/sample/samplestory.asp?StoryID=2004042303010005&Take=1). Internal emails from Philip Morris confirm that consumer complaints about Merit PaperSelect cigarettes indicated a distinct problem existed with Merit PaperSelect as early as 2000, the very year it was launched.

Today's document is a December 4, 2000 Philip Morris internal email discussing consumer complaints about the new cigarette. The email says PM received "105 complaint contacts for the weeks starting 11/27/2000 [about Merit PaperSelect cigarettes]...The 105 complaints are still 5 times normal levels." About complaints of lit coals dropping off the ends of the Merit cigarettes, the email states, "Normal Coal Drop off complaint levels are one complaint every two weeks and the 14 complaints last week [about Merit PaperSelect cigarettes] represents over 28 times normal levels."

The email also says,"...In 49% of the survey responses [smokers] are describing the entire lit section [of the Merit PaperSelect] as falling off the cigarette. The 86% of consumers are reporting the drop offs as frequent events. Over 67% of the incidents are reported while the cigarette is being held. In 74% of the incidents the consumers reported they were seated or driving." [Underlining emphasis added]. It also says "Alleged Property Damage" complaints from Merit PaperSelect cigarette "are still 10 times normal levels" for traditional cigarettes.

Despite these greatly elevated complaint rates about increased fire dangers from Merit PaperSelect, Philip Morris has issued no warning about the cigarette's increased fire danger. The WSJ article reports that the company has continued to market the cigarette, but has eliminated the "special advertising" about fire safety. As of this posting, (April 24, 2004) PM's web site still touts increased fire safety from the Merit PaperSelect, and carries no warning about the complaints indicating elevated fire danger. The web site says,

"Philip Morris USA has made significant progress in its efforts to develop a cigarette that is both reasonably acceptable to consumers and may be less likely to start fires if handled carelessly. Philip Morris USA's patented banded cigarette paper, PaperSelect™, is now available nationwide on the Merit brand family, and all Merit brand packs and cartons now bear the PaperSelect™ logo. ... using National Institute of Standards and Technology and other laboratory protocols, Philip Morris USA has evaluated cigarettes made with its banded cigarette paper and found them less likely than the same cigarettes made without this special paper to ignite certain test fabrics under specified test conditions." http://www.philipmorrisusa.com/policies_practices/legislation_regulation/reduced_ignition/pm_usa_position_reduced_ignition_propensity.asp

In 2001 Philip Morris contracted with Life Sciences Research Office in Bethesda, Maryland (a purported independent research organization) to do a study to evaluate "the health effects and relative risk of selected ingredients added to cigarettes" [from LSRO's Web site, http://www.lsro.org/air/frames_air_plan.html, 24 Jan 1005]. According to LSRO, PM would provide funding for the study, and LSRO would be responsible for assembling panels of experts. LSRO's "Overall Plan" for the project states, "In order to preserve the third party independence of the review, after the agreement has been executed, PM will have no further role in the design, conduct, deliberations, or the conclusions of the panels."

In 2004, LSRO announced the composition of the expert panel. It consisted of the following individuals:

Alwynelle Ahl, Ph.D., D.V.M., USDA (ret.) Carroll E. Cross, M.D. Shayne Cox Gad, Ph.D., D.A.B.T., F.A.T.S. Donald E. Gardner, Ph.D., F.A.T.S. Louis D. Homer, M.D., Ph.D. Rudolph Jaeger, Ph.D., D.A.B.T., B.C.F.M. Robert Orth, Ph.D. Emanuel Rubin M.D. James L. Schardein, M.S., F.A.T.S. Thomas Joseph Slaga, Ph.D. [http://www.lsro.org/air/frames_air_panel.html?content_air_panel_links.html] A review of the panel members shows that a substantial number of them have previous ties to the tobacco industry (which are not listed in their bios on LSRO's web site), either having worked as consultants for major tobacco firms, applied for and/or been recipients of grants from the Council for Tobacco Research (CTR), been affiliated with PM front groups like The Advancement of Sound Science Coalition (TASSC, see previous posting at http://tobaccodocuments.org/landman/158433.html) or the industry's Center for Indoor Air Research (CIAR, which was forced to disband under the 1998 Master Settlement Agreement).

This brief 2001 internal PM email shows that PM did indeed have input into the makeup of LSRO's panel, and screened them for candidates they felt were "biased against the industry."

This 1993 email from Philip Morris Issues Manager Josh Slavitt shows PM hiding in the shadows and investigating Colorado tobacco control groups and individuals, searching for information they can exploit or use to make trouble for these groups. Working through a surrogate public relations agency, Slavitt gave strict orders to hide PM's involvement in these activities. Slavitt instructed the Denver Public Relations firm of Russell, Karsh and Hagan (the contractor doing the investigating) to "be careful that nothing on [RKH employee] Lindsay's materials references her firm, or contains any other references to PM -- if there is a cover note, shred it. Please remember not to use a PM return address, or anything which indicates that he info emanated from us--PM postal stamp, etc."

This internal Philip Morris (PM) memo written by Greg Little (Associate General Counsel for PM) on 30 January 2000 indicates a strong and successful effort by PM to exert political influence over the course of the U.S. Department of Justice lawsuit against the American tobacco companies. Little credits PM's DOJ Team [Department of Justice Team] with silencing the White House on the suit, reducing federal funding for the suit, neutralizing political pressure around the suit and creating a beneficial atmosphere for the company during litigation.

The federal court ultimately found the tobacco companies guilty of racketeering, although the remedies imposed by the court were quite limited.

The entire text of Little's memo is below.

Roy Marden of PM Corporate Affairs explains in an email about how PM could partner with property rights groups to fight smoking restrictions. Outlines 4 types of potential coalition partners PM could approach using the argument that smoking is a property right: property rights groups, public interest legal foundations, public policy groups and business organizations, like chambers of commerce. States desire to "change the climate for debate" in the company's interest.

Email shows PM searching for ways to partner with property rights groups to oppose NY smoking ban.