Tobacco Documents Online

This document is a proposal to the Tobacco Institute from a California consultant which discusses a plan to help the industry defeat cigarette tax proposal in California in 1982-83. The consultant discusses mobilizing Libertarians on behalf of the tobacco industry, a technique that the industry has been using increasingly in the late 1990's and into early 2000's: "Assuming the cooperation of leadership in the Libertarian Party, we can stimulate at least a modest letter writing program among Libertarian activists throughout the state. We recommend some financial assistance directly to the Party to help offset the cost of mailings to their members requesting action on the legislation in question. It would also be wise to employ a key Libertarian leader as a consultant to this effort..."

The proposal also discusses how the industry could clandestinely persuade citizens who are anti-tax (but who may also oppose tobacco on the grounds of their religion) to vote against the proposed tax:

"D. MOBILIZING TAX OPPONENTS

There is a great body of persons in California who are against taxes...period.

...We believe this group is a ripe target for a program which asks them to contact members of the legislature.

The key to success among this group is to stay away from the specific issue of taxes on tobacco products. Many of these persons are fundamental Christians or members of the Church of Jesus Christ Latter Day Saints. Discussing the tobacco aspect of the proposal would be counterproductive.

Therefore, a mailing to this group would attack the waste in government today and the need to cut existing excesses, rather than continue the tax-and-spend syndrome of the past. It would also give examples of how some excise taxes are particularly cruel on the elderly, etc."

This Lorillard document is a graph that plots the nicotine content of cigarettes against sales, and relates how higher levels of nicotine (up to a point) mean greater acceptance sales of the cigarettes.

This 1977 "Report on Social Acceptability of Smoking" by ICOSI (the International Committee on Smoking Issues) outlines the global tobacco industry's need to implement "countermeasures" against public health tobacco control efforts worldwide. The document describes the remarkable public health progress authorities had made by then in educating the world's population about the dangers of tobacco use. Appendix A at back of the document lists these successes, country by country, and represents them as growing threats to the industry. Some examples: "SWEDEN: In the 13-year period, 1963 to 1976, the incidence of men smokers who account for the major part of cigarette consumption declined significantly...

UNITED KINGDOM: In 1977, 86% of the population (84% of the smokers) consider smoking bad for their health -- up from 48% in 1961...Incidence of smoking has declined sharply among men --from 59% of 1961 to 47% in 1975...Percentage of ex-smokers among males and females has steadily increased during the same period. Per capita consumption [of cigarettes] decreased in 1975 and 1976...Volunteer "public service" and "health" organizations against smoking are varied, numerous, widespread and effective...

AUSTRALIA: In 1977, 51% of the cigarette smokers feel that smoking is extremely harmful, up from 33% in 1968...Since 1971, the incidence of smoking has declined from 39% to 35% in Melbourne and Sydney... IRELAND ...The declining incidence of smoking by males, particularly in the younger age groups and higher social classes, has accelerated. The incidence of quitters has also accelerated..."

The industry describes this stunning public health progress as "a gloomy picture," and concludes that the "industry needs stronger countermeasures" to combat this progress. The report concludes that the industry needs to target smokers, opinion leaders and the general public with its countermeasures, instead of confining these efforts to only government, as the industry had long been doing until that point. It concludes that "the industry should launch sustained, long-term countermeasure programs" to fight progress against smoking.

The paper gives hints about why preserving the social acceptability of smoking is so key to preserving the indusry's other defenses:

"Until society believes that smoking does not harm the health of nearby nonsmokers, the industry will continue to run grave risks of further reverses on social acceptability issues. For example, the industry's critical 'freedom of choice' position cannot be maintained if people believe they are harmed simply by being near a smoker."

The paper links the social acceptability issue back to the "primary health issue," and concludes that "The Basic Smoking and Health Issue (Smoking Affects Smokers) is a root cause of Social Acceptability issues...Clearly if real progress is made toward resolving questions concerning smoking and health, much of the pressure against smoking in a social sense will be eased." The paper also observes other threats to the industry, specifically that "smoking is becoming a downscale social activity...there are relatively fewer smokers among better-educated, higher income, trend-setting segments of the population than there are among the balance," and "large numbers of today's children and young teenagers appear to have increasingly negative attitudes about adult cigarette smoking...anti-smoking propaganda seems to be conditioning a new generation to have a bias against smoking as socially acceptable behavior."

This document shows how tobacco companies from several countries around the world came together to created and implement "countermeasures" aimed at reversing the progress that governments and health groups had made against tobacco worldwide by 1977.

This 1972 Philip Morris Research Center (PM) scientific report was used as a trial exhibit in Minnesota, Florida, Missouri and Texas, and in the Broin case (the flight attendants' suit for injuries due to secondhand smoke exposure in aircraft cabins). It describes experiments done at Philip Morris that showed the number of cigarettes smokers smoke can be manipulated by varying the nicotine levels in cigarettes. The report confirmed a theory that smokers develop a "daily nicotine intake quota" and that they "tend to modify their consumption rate in order to maintain their normal quota."

The report states:

"Cigarette consumption rate, i.e., number of cigarettes smoked per day, was found to vary as a function of the nicotine delivery of these cigarettes. Specifically, as nicotine increased, cigarette consumption rate decreased. This finding supports the notion that smokers develop a daily nicotine intake quota and that when smoking cigarettes differing in nicotine delivery from that which they are accustomed they tend to modify their consumption rate in order to maintain their normal quota."

This 1981 Philip Morris (PM) marketing research report discusses the importance of teenage smokers as young as 12 to PM's financial future. It has been used as a trial exhibit in Florida, Missouri, Minnesota, and Texas. The document discusses smoking rates among children as young as 12. It was authored by Myron Johnston of PM's marketing research department, and was approved by Carolyn J. Levy, who in the mid-1990s was appointed to head PM's Youth Smoking Prevention Department. Johnston states,

"For over fifteen years certain demographic and social trends have been moving in a direction favorable to industry growth. No, one by one, these powerful social and demographic factors are turning against us...

The trends are:

1. After increasing for over a decade, the prevalence of teenage smoking is now declining sharply.

2. After increasing for over a decade, the average daily consumption of teenage smokers is declining sharply....

...While this news is not good for the industry, I believe we can use these data and other data I plan to report on to good advantage in order to minimize the adverse effect on Philip Morris."

Johnston concludes that "the industry can no longer rely on an ever increasing pool of teenage smokers to replace adult smokers lost through natural attrition."

He says, "It is important to know as much as possible about teenage smoking patterns and attitudes. Today's teenager is tomorrow's potential regular customer, and the overwhelming majority of smokers first begin to smoke while still in their teens..." Johnston concludes that peer pressure among teens NOT to smoke is a major reason why so many teenagers were staying nonsmokers, and states that perceived peer disapproval of teenage smoking had increased sharply in 1980. He also attributes this public health success "in large part to the anti-smoking propaganda," which had apparently been successful in convincing teens that they incur great risk from smoking. The document clearly portrays the decline in teenage smokers as a threat to the industry, and discusses positioning Philip Morris to incur the least harm by gaining the most market share. This document may indicate reasons why PM became such an aggressive company at gaining market share worldwide.

The document shows the importance of young smokers to the industry and particularly to Philip Morris, who manufactures the leading starter brand among youth(Marlboro). It also shows how well public health efforts to cut smoking were working (particularly among youth) prior to the industry's becoming involved in youth smoking prevention issues (in the mid-1980s). It also shows the importance to the industry of continuing to collect data on trends, attitudes and preferences among youth, which the industry's current multitude of "youth smoking prevention" programs now allows them to do openly.

Mock-up of ad promoting life insurance to smokers of PM's low tar brand Merit.