Tobacco Documents Online

This Philip Morris document, found in file with the name "TASKFORCE ON UNDERAGE SMOKING ISSUES" appears to be a precursor to Philip Morris' "It's the Law" youth access program. Note the objectives of the program are to:

--Achieve a level of greater credibility --Blunt rhetoric --Elevate level of responsiveness to retailers --More global: Create a model for world-wide use and incorporate their ideas.

While later the document does proclaim that a goal is to reduce underage consumption of cigarettes, a page of the document entitled, "REASONS MINORS SHOULDN'T SMOKE" lists these reasons: "Smoking is an adult choice...Many adult choices involve risk which makes them adult choices."

Neither the addictiveness of cigarettes nor the detriment smoking poses to health are mentioned as "reasons minors shouldn't smoke."

ON another page, an objective of the program is that is should be "creditable [sic] with elected officials."

This 1988 Philip Morris (PM) marketing document shows how PM targeted its tobacco products to the Hispanic community.

In 1988, Philip Morris sought to deepen its relationship with the Hispanic community in the United States by sponsoring major soccer events, putting on Latin music events, giving away free samples of cigarettes, and attending Hispanic festivals. The proposed budget for targeting the Hispanic market in the U.S. in 1988 with promotions of the Marlboro brand name was $3.5 million.

By 1992 it was well established that cigarettes kill consumers. Yet even in face of conclusive evidence that its consumers were quite likely to suffer cruel and suffocating deaths, the Philip Morris Tobacco Company (PM) didn't want smokers to quit.

By 1992 a number of nicotine replacement therapies had entered the market. PM was clearly threatened by these "competitor" products which as they put it, would "accelerate decline of the cigarette industry" by "enhanc[ing] the success rate of quitters who permanently leave smoking." Moreover, PM kept track of what they termed the "Gross Industry Smoker Loss" they incurred due to the nicotine replacement products coming onto the market.

PM's recent advertisements portray the company as socially responsible: feeding the hungry, providing safe water to flood victims, supporting victims of domestic violence, helping educate the disadvantaged, etc. Perhaps a truly socially conscious company, however, would be just a little bit more receptive to the plight of their own consumers, the millions of addicted smokers out there who are desperately seeking ways to quit smoking and avert an early death?

Promotional material for Smokers Express Airlines; has a picture of a full-size airliner sporting a big "Marlboro" ad on the tail. Lists features of airline: "Real food for real people - Burgers and Subs, No screaming babies (members must be 21), full size ashtrays.

This report, found in the files of Victor Han (Director of Communications for Philip Morris Worldwide Regulatory Affairs) describes the threat that the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) 1993 rating of secondhand or environmental tobacco smoke (ETS) as a Group A Human Carcinogen posed to the cigarette industry.

"Indirectly, ETS will have considerable influence on all other tobacco-related legislation, including taxation, marketing freedoms, etc. Of critical importance will be the effect on consumers, practically deprived of more and more locations in which they can smoke, and psychologically given more incentive to quit."

The Philip Morris (PM) report characterizes the EPA as "at worst corrupt and controlled by environmental terrorists" and states that "...without an effort to build considerable reasonable doubt about [EPA's case against secondhand smoke]--particularly among consumers--then virutally all other efforts [to fight the ETS issue] will be diminished in effectiveness."

PM's strategy is laid out: not to fight the ETS issue on its merits, but instead to destroy the credibility of the government agency that declared it dangerous:

"The credibility of the EPA is defeatable, but not on the basis of ETS alone. It must be part of a larger mosaic that concentrates all of the EPA's enemies against it at one time."

The paper describes how the media's focus would be taken off of ETS by the generation of non-ETS stories, stories that focus on "general EPA bashing by credible, authoritative sources." and "EPA ineptitude and, when possible, corruption."

The 13-page report reveals Philip Morris' strategies for a full-bore attack on the U.S. EPA over its efforts to better inform American citizens about the health dangers posed by the company's ubiquitous and largely unregulated products.

This 142-page document appears to be a compilation (folder) containing documents about INFOTAB, the global group the tobacco industry formed to assist and coordinate their battles against public health efforts to control tobacco worldwide. The document contains discussions about the state of tobacco control many countries worldwide, and the industry's efforts to combat them. For example, one document is the charter of the Tobacco Industry Council of Zimbabwe (Page 202501769), whose objectives are listed as,

"...To make every effort to plan and provide for the protection of the interests of all sectors of the tobacco industry in Zimbabwe from any hostile or counter-productive force which may emerge both inside and outside Zimbabwe...[to reinforce] the organisation known as Infotab in its efforts to counter the worldwide campaign against the tobacco industry..."

The paper also discusses the state of industry affairs in Cameroon, Pakistan, Malaysia, Honk Kong, Addis Ababa and many other countries.

The document demonstrates the adversarial attitude of the tobacco industry against public health efforts worldwide. On page on Bates Page 2025013815, the paper states that the "overall objectives" of Infotab are to "join in an international effort to combat the worldwide threat to our business...," "to prevent, halt or slow down global adversary campaigns such as the WHO recommendations," and "to develop international strategies and action plans for implementation, as appropriate through NMAs [national manufacturer organizations], member companies and their affiliates and with allies."

This document shows how the tobacco industry organized itself globally to fight the effects of dissemination of accurate public health information about its products and to try and slow, stop or reverse the natural reactions to that information by governments and citizens throughout the world.

This 1982 scientific paper from Philip Morris' biological research lab, INBIFO (Institut for biologlsche Forschung) in Cologne, Germany reports on experiments done on groups of rats who for 21 days were made to inhale either mainstream or secondhand smoke (called "sidestream" smoke in the report) from cigarettes obtained from Philip Morris (PM).

The study reports that secondhand smoke exposure was more irritating than mainstream smoke, and most particularly to the upper airways (nasal cavities, olfactory membranes, etc.):

(From Page 11 of the report):

"All of the examined sidestream-exposed rats showed slight to severe atrophic or necrotic lesions of the olfactory epithelium, in some cases together with reactive inflammation. The ciliated epithelium of all sidestream exposed rats showed squamous-cell metaplasia, with cornification in some cases."

"Generally spoken, sidestream exposure induced more frequent and more severe epithelial lesons in the olfactory and ciliated epithelium of the nasal cavity than mainstream of equal TPM [total particulate matter] concentration..."

"Sidestream exposure induced much stronger irritative changes in the mucosa of the nasal cavity than mainstream of equal TPM [total particulate matter] dose..."

and

"If one extrapolates from the experience of previous mainstream inhalation studies (b), the mainstream TPM concentration of this study would have to be increased by a factor of 3 to produce similar strong reactions than seen with sidestream exposure in this study."

The report was written by Wolf Reininghaus, general manager of contract research at INBIFO, to Ragnar Rylander, a Swiss scientist who contracted with Philip Morris). It shows that Philip Morris was well informed by 1982 that secondhand smoke had the propensity to inflict harm on nonsmokers.

This 119-page Philip Morris document is a gold mine of internal information about the company's strategies to defeat smoking bans and excise taxes. Strategies inlcude encouraging tighter restrictions on the operation of nonprofit (health) organizations (for example, restricting how much of these groups' income could go to administrative and lobbying costs and creating minimum percentages of funding that they would have to put towards research), to use of PM's "Accommodation Program" as a "tactical weapon" to support preemptive state legislation.

In the document, PM laments that "Recent Polling Says Californians Want Smoking Restrictions," and that the "Industry's Economic Impact Arguments Losing Credibility as Glanz Studies Have More Credibility with Media."

On page 80, PM recounts the company's reasons for opposing bans:

"If smokers can't smoke on the way to work, at work, in stores, banks, restaurants, malls and other public places, they are going to smoke less. A large percentage of them are going to quit. In short, cigarette purchases will be drastically reduced and volume declines will accelerate."

Other parts of the document outline exactly how PM works with R.J. Reynolds to interfere in efforts to enact smoking bans: organizing smokers in its database to call city council members and testify at public hearing, convincing restaurant associations to oppose bans, setting up phone banks to assist people in making calls to oppose bans, pressing employees of PM subsidiaries into helping oppose smoking ordinances (Miller, Kraft, etc.)

This Philip Morris Europe (PME) interim scientific report shows that PME performed detailed testing to find out the quantities of dangerous and irritating chemicals that smoking of cigarettes puts into ambient air. A special airtight room was created just for the experiments: "Airtightness

It is extremely important that the experimental room be airtight to prevent smoke escaping or air entering during the experiments. Every possible precaution was taken to effectively seal the experimental room. All joints were sealed with silicone glue, the rivet holes were plugged with epoxide glue and a good seal was made at the door."

PME used a smoking machine to smoke beween 5 and 60 cigarettes in the room and then tested the air of the room for carbon monoxide, nicotine, hydrogen cyanide, ammonia, aldehydes, and other dangerous or irritating chemicals. Some of the testing was done using two different methods to verify accuracy, and some tests were done twice.

Charts in the appendix of the document indicate that the amount of carbon dioxide in the air of the experimental room increased almost linearly with the number of cigarettes smoked. The ammonia concentration also increased in almost perfect linear fashion proportional to the number of cigarettes smoked. The same was true with hydrogen cyanide. The report states that the concentration of hydrogen cyanide in the room failed to decrease for over an hour after smoking ceased:

"Five, 15, 30 and 60 cigarettes...were smoked in the experimental room under standard smoking conditions...Measured HCN concentrations were found to be proportional to the number of cigarettes smoked over the investigated range....It was found that HCN concentrations in the room did not decay over a period of one hour."

The report also states,

"In all cases investigated concentrations [of the investigated chemicals] were proportional to the number of cigarettes smoked, all deviations being with the range of experimental errors."

So the more cigarettes that were smoked in an enclosed space, the higher the concentrations of chemicals were put into the air.

All testing was done in overseas labs in Europe.

This 502-page scientific report was done at INBIFO, Philip Morris's biological research lab in Europe, and was sent to Ragnar Rylander, a scientist who worked on contract for PM. It is an extensive report on mouse skin painting tests done to determine the carcinogenicity of secondhand (sidestream or "SS") smoke compared with that of mainstream ("MS") smoke. For the test, solids (or "condensate)" were derived from the particulate matter in both mainstream and sidestream smoke and painted onto the skin of 2,625 mice over an 80-week period to gauge the biological reaction. On page 12, Bates No. 2026051129, under "Condensates," the report states that

"The concentrations of the nitrosamines NNN, NATB, NNK, NAB, NPY, and DMNA were between 0.01 and 1.9 milligrams/liter for [mainstream smoke]and between 0.08 and 6.1 milligrams/liter for [sidestream smoke]. The main differences between [mainstream] and [sidestream smoke] were the higher concentrations: of NNK, NPY, and DMNA for [sidestream]."

It also states that,

"The sum of all PAH [polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons] were 5-fold higher for [sidestream smoke] than for [mainstream smoke]."

and, on page 14, (Bates No. 2026051131) it states that "The number of mice with signs of intoxication was higher in the [sidestream] than in [mainstream] treated groups."

It also states that:

"The comparison of the mortality of [mainstream] and [sidestream] treated mice showed a statistically significantly higher mortality in the [sidestream]treated groups. This is considered to be biologically relevant."

The "Conclusions" section on page 22 (Bates No.2026051139) states that Sidestream Whole Smoke Condensate collected with an impaction trap (SWSC-I) showed 2 to 6 times higher skin tumorigenicity than Mainstream Whole Smoke Condensate collected in the same manner (MWSC-I). Here is the quote:

"SWSC-I assayed for complete tumorigenic activity, i. e., without DMBA pretreatment, showed a 2- to 6-fold higher skin tumorigenicity than MWSC-I."

The section entitled "Mortality" on Page 14 (Bates No. 2026051131) states that,

"The comparison of the mortality of the [mainstream] and [sidestream] treated CD1 and B6C3FI mice showed a statistically significantly higher mortality in the [sidestream] treated groups. This is considered to be biological relevant."

On Page 17 (Bates No. 2026051134), a section entitled "Skin Irritations" states,

"The comparison of skin irritations in [mainstream] and [sidestream] treated CD1 mice showed a statistically significantly higher number of mice with skin irritations in the [sidestream] treated groups. This is considered to be biologically relevant."

On Page 21 (Bates No. 2026051138) a section describing "Pathological Findings" states that,

"The relative skin tumor rate (b), was statistically significantly higher in

(1) [Sidestream treated mice] without and with DMBA pretreatment than in [mainstream treated mice] without and with DMBA pretreatment...These effects are considered to be biologically relevant."

NOTE: Some of the mice were pre-treated with an "initiator" (DMBA), a chemical that was believed to help tumors start forming, but which does not to promote them once they are formed.

The report, dated 26 October 1987, seems to show that Philip Morris had done biological testing on secondhand smoke and found that secondhand smoke was more biologically active than mainstream smoke.

This is yet another scientific report generated for Philip Morris by INBIFO on the effects of secondhand smoke exposure. The date of this report is unclear, but it references another study that was done at INBIFO in 1982, which places it after that date. It also states the date the "test substances" (cigarettes) were received at INBIFO (15 October 1982), placing the report near and after that date. This report, like the others done on this topic, was forwarded to Dr. Ragnar Rylander, who worked on contract to the Philip Morris tobacco company. In this experiment, one batch of rats were made to breathe various concentrations of secondhand smoke (given in a single "acute exposure" of 7 hours) and other rats were similarly exposed only to ammonia vapor. The objective was to "establish a dose-response relationship for the irritative capacity of sidestream cigarette smoke in comparison to pure ammonia vapor, which is supposed to be 1 of the main irritative factors in sidestream smoke."

The "Conclusions" section of the report states that diluted secondhand tobacco smoke is ten times more irritating than ammonia vapor alone:

"Inhalation of diluted sidestream smoke leads to strong short and long-term irritation...By and large, diluted sidestream smoke is 10 times more irritative than one would predict from its ammonia concentration."

The report concludes that "Ammonia is not the only irritative factor responsible for the relatively (as compared to mainstream smoke) high irritative capacity of sidestream smoke." It obligingly lists a few of the other chemicals in secondhand smoke which may be the cause of this high irritative capacity, specifically formaldehyde and acreolin which "seem to play an important role as far as the irritative capacity of sidestream smoke in concerned."

Page 21 of the report (Bates No. 2501592215) states the "test substances" used. The "cigarette code" is 2R1 and is a "standard reference" cigarette supplied by the Philip Morris. While no brand name is mentioned, the report does state that the 4,600 cigarettes used in the experiment arrived packed in "cartons with 200 cigarettes [of] 10 packages with 20 cigarettes/package," which is the same type of packaging used with their commercial brands.

The report indicates that by 1983 PM was in possession of detailed information describing the higher irritative characteristics of diluted secondhand smoke as compared to mainstream smoke.

This 1997 Philip Morris (PM) Corporate Affairs Plan discusses PM's activities in Asia. Page 5 (Bates No. 2074188965) lists PM's "Regional Opponent Groups," which include health groups in Malaysia, Taipei, Thailand, India and Hong Kong. Included on the list are the World Health Organization and Rural Doctors in Thailand. The document laments a low smoking incidence in Hong Kong and looming further restrictions:

"...And in Hong Kong, where the smoking incidence is 17 percent (among the lowest in the world), the FDA's assertions and PM USA's proposals to address youth smoking are now cited as a basis for further restrictions [on tobacco]..."

The document also describes the real reasons PM sponsors the arts in Asia: to gain access to senior government officials (from Page 19, Bates No. 2074188979):

"The Philip Morris Group of Companies ASEAN Art Awards--an art competition involving sevel ASEAN markets that provides Corporate Affairs and management with direct access to senior government officials in each country and [has] given us strong relationships at the ASEAN Secretariat..."

The document shows that secondhand smoke issues were a priority in Asia, and that PM strove to hide its authorship of materials regarding secondhand smoke so as to get a better reception:

[From Page 38, Bates No. 2074188998]:

"The ETS book, although written and worked on entirely by Philip Morris, was issued in the name of the Asia Tobacco Council. As a result, it has been used extensively by the industry in many countries--which certainly would not have been the case had it gone out only under the Philip Morris byline."

It also shows PM's boasting of control over the media [also from Page 38],

"Earlier in the year, when the Asia Pacific Association for the Control of Tobacco held its annual meeting in Bangkok, we monitored the event... We were also able, discreetly, to manage much of the media reporting of the Conference."

This 1985 marketing document prepared for Philip Morris International (PMI) reports on the results of interviews with West German smokers. It frequently employs the phrase "young adults," but respondents to the interviews were as young as 16 years old. The document discusses the need to create "youthful" brands for "entry level smokers" in Germany. Pg. 247 (Bates No. 2501027765) says the "current positioning of Marlboro Lights/Lights 100s is somewhat disturbing" because it appeals to "feminine" and "health conscious smokers." It laments that this positioning could "potentially weaken the masculine image of Marlboro," and discusses re-positioning the brand for "health conscious/ sports conscious smokers, i.e, promoted by tennis players, hikers, etc.". Page 249 (Bates No. 2501027767) highlights the importance of vending machines as a source of cigarettes for young smokers: "Vending machines are a very important sales outlet, particularly for young smokers." It further suggests that "Marlboro should therefore keep flexibility in pricing and number of sticks offered in order to continue to compete effectively in the vending machine for the younger market..."

A section entitled "A Younger Cigarette Brand" (Page 250, Bates No. 2501027768) also worries about the erosion of Marlboro's appeal to "very young smokers" and proposes a remedy for the problem:

"There is some evidence that as the Marlboro franchise grows...its specific appeal to very young smokers may lessen. There could be a significant opportunity for a new young masculine full flavor cigarette that provides an image of easy carefree living."

This document makes clear the emphasis placed on youth for the purposes of marketing cigarettes.

This 11-page Philip Morris (PM) document outlines the company's strategies to fight public health restrictions on secondhand smoke in hospitality, transport and workplace venues. The estimated date of the document is 1989, but it tracks very closely with the strategies PM uses today to fight regulation of secondhand smoke. Authorship is inferred from references to Philip Morris within the text. The document was found in a Philip Morris file called "Workplace Kit" in the area of employee Aurora Gonzalez, who was a member of PM's ETS Work Group. Page one of the document states that "specific goals" of PM are to "maintain the controversy" about secondhand smoke, to "pre-empt further public smoking restrictions" and "demonstrate to general public...that tobacco smoke is a minor contributor to the quality of indoor environments."

Yet another objective is to "Maintain research activity...to provide support for our positions." The document then discusses how PM must stay behind the scenes to accomplish their objectives. The methods described are the same ones PM still uses today to fight public health regulation of secondhand smoke:

"In most markets it is difficult to attain the overall objective directly as Philip Morris. Therefore, we have developed...allies/coalitions which in turn communicate our messages...The goal is to reach decision makers or those who can favorably influence decisions regarding public smoking environments."

Likewise, the "key messages" PM's lists for use with hospitality groups are still in use today:

"Legislated smoking restrictions/bans in the hospitality trade are undesirable.

• Such legislation can have negative impact on business.

• Owners and operators --not government-- are in the best position to determine what arrangements best accommodate their patrons preferences."

The document discusses strategies to pre-empt workplace bans on smoking, recruit and work through hospitality groups, and lists "key messages" to be used with each group to fight smoking restrictions. One key message is that "Tobacco smoke is a minor contributor to the indoor air environment." Another is designed to take the focus off of tobacco smoke entirely: "Expand the workplace smoking issue to a discussion of overall indoor air environment."

Yet another strategy calls for Philip Morris employees to begin infiltrating and influencing local community groups:

"Encourage appropriate Philip Morris personnel to become active members of local Chambers of Commerce, personnel management associations, business management associations and community groups. Utilize their forums, e.g., meetings and newsletters, to communicate key messages."

Also note the careful manner in which PM crafts its statement regarding the health effects of smoking on board aircraft,(minimizing but not completely ruling out the potential for harm from passive smoking):

"Health effects from exposure to tobacco smoke aboard aircraft are highly unlikely."

Buried in this 1985 Philip Morris (or PM, now Altria) Business Planning and Analysis report are subjects of interest to public health authorities and the general public. Among these are PM's plans to increase cigarette marketing to ethnic groups and minorities: [From page 27, Bates Page 2043599745]:

"...The use of black models will be expanded in POS [point-of-sale] displays for B&H [Benson & Hedges] and Virginia Slims to gain exposure in black markets...

...To more effectively reach ethnic smokers, advertising will be modified and targeted locally while sponsorship of ethnic promotional events will increase..."

The report also discusses the maintenance of tobacco farmers as a "valuable resource and political base for PM-USA and the industry...the U.S. tobacco growier is the most sympathetic voice of the tobacco industry."

Starting on page 33 {Bates Page 2043599751] however, is a startling section entitled "SOCIOPOLITICAL STRATEGY" in which Philip Morris (PM) reveals remarkably aggressive plans to "maximize industry volume by blunting attacks from anti-cigarette advocates and improving public perceptions of smoking." PM's plans include maintaining a tobacco leaf purchase program to help the company continue to manipulate U.S. Congressional representatives into supporting their company's objectives. PM also outlines its intent to circumvent campaign finance reform laws to help meet its ends:

"State political action conmittees will be created to make contributions to key political decision-makers in states where direct corporate contributions are not permitted."

PM also planned a comprehensive program to influence the public on smoking issues:

[From Page 34, Bates No. 2043599752]:

"Lobbying alone cannot stop the anti-smoking movement or influence an indifferent public and media that tolerate fanatical anti-smoking activities...Direct and aggressive action is required to combat the anti-smoking movement by enlisting public support. PM-USA is developing a comprehensive program of identification, education, recruitment, communication and mobilization to reach out to the smoking and non-smoking public."

Perhaps PM's most ambitious plans, however, involved manipulating the mass media in its favor. PM planned a massive program to monitor news coverage of tobacco issues nationwide and act on reporting it considered negative:

"The mass media, like political decision-makers, require a special program. The goal of PM-USA's program is to achieve a more balanced presentation of positions in the media. The target audience is the print and broadcast editors, who influence the general public. For the print media, PM-USA will develop a computerized "objectivity index" to monitor articles and editorials on smoking in daily newspapers throughout the U.S. This index will allow PM-USA to detect media that is imbalanced and respond accordingly."

Responses included "rebuttal pieces, letters to the editor from allies, meetings with editorial boards, special press briefings and cultivation of editors and journalists through special events."

This Philip Morris (PM) marketing strategy document carries some insights into how PM/Altria views its cigarette markets. For example, in discussing the Benson and Hedges (B&H) brand, it observes that "[relatively affluent, higher eduated smokers] have lower start rates and are quitting at faster rates than smokers with blue collar occupations," and, based on this information (which presaged the demise of the brand), PM planned to target future promotional efforts for Benson and Hedges cigarettes at younger adults, blacks and hispanics. PM/Altria also notes that a decline in the number of young smokers could affect future sales, saying

"The principal risk facing Marlboro during the plan period is the projected decline in the number of young smokers. From a total of 28 million now, the 18 to 24 age category is forecasted to decrease to approximately 125 million in 1991. Start rates for young adults are expected to remain relatively stable, but at a much lower level than ten years ago...These trends make it important that Marlboro continues building share among young smokers..."

PM/Altria also admits in this document that (rather than discouraging youth smoking) it actually depends on peer pressure to sell its brands:

"...Long test markets are especially necessary for image products targeted toward young smokers where word of mouth (peer exposure) remains an important method to generate brand recognition and unit volume growth."

This 1994 Philip Morris (PM/Altria) presentation describes the cigarette maker's strategies to fight public health efforts in Europe to reduce secondhand smoke (SHS) exposure and counter activities of the International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC) and the World Health Organization (WHO). PM's objectives, clearly aligned with fighting public health, include "maintain debate on ETS science among EU legislators," "counter anti influence," "delay EU legislation," "interdict national legislation via [European Union] resolution on [Good Epidemiological Practices]," and "ensure legislation accommodates smokers."

The document also communicates PM's plans to use its typical hospitality allies to fight regulations on secondhand smoke:

"Build upon existing relationships with the International Hotel Association, European Restaurant Association and European Chefs Association to target advocacy on EU policymakers."

The plan's wording also suggests that public opposition to smoking bans in Europe was not forthcoming particularly among white collar workers and unions, and that therefore PM had to create opposition:

"Develop public opposition to bans among EU groupings of independent...white collar and public sector unions...using U.S. workplace kit."

PM strove to hide its overbearing influence from European media by using third parties:

"Create a European Tobacco Information Centre to disseminate third party news to EU influencers including policy makers and the media..."

The document further reveals PM as the driving force behind the creation of supposedly "independent" smokers rights groups:

"Create a European Smokers Rights Group to bring smokers' voice to EU legislative debate and to provide a network for coordinated actions and information sharing by national SRGs."

and

"... where gaps exist (Germany, Belgium, UK, Spain) create smokers rights groups to defend against ban threats direct[ly] with legislators and via the media."

PM was also behind the creation and touring of a bizarre front group called ARISE ("Associates for Research in the Science of Enjoyment"), an industry-funded "scientific" group out of the United Kingdom which toured Europe putting forth the message that a little pleasure is essential to stress relief and hence good health. In their public proclamations, ARISE members subtly grouped tobacco use in with benign, pleasurable and stress-relieving activities such as drinking tea, shopping, and eating chocolate.

The PM document further describes as a "THREAT" a European "directive for the protection of transport workers' health and safety" because it "provides for a de facto total smoking ban" on "all modes of transport operating within EU territory." The document further lists plans to fight this "threat."

The document also reveals PM's strategy of working through Libertarian groups to influence the media and to "communicate messages of tolerance and...extremism" about public health smoking restrictions.

Quotes:

EU legislative threat driven by IARC ETS activities • Introduce mechanism to prevent legislation on flawed epidemiology • Maintain debate on ETS science • Mobilize allies • Counter anti influence • Current EU transport threat EU - 1994/1997 THREAT

THREAT:

EU legislation to ban smoking in workplaces, public places and on transport, driven by IARC ETS study and monograph and ensuing media hype.

--Delay EU legislation

--Interdict national legislation via EU Resolution on GEP --Ensure legislation accommodates smokers --Maintain debate on ETS science among EU legislators... --Build support amongst Pan European groupings of business owners and employees for mobilisation against severe legislation --Build upon existing relationships with the International Hotel Association, European Restaurant Association and European Chefs Association to target advocacy on EU policy makers. --Encourage the European Trade Union Confederation to support accommodation vs bans via collaborating on a Pan European workers' attitude survey to demonstrate discriminatory nature of bans and wide support for tolerance in the workplace.

--Develop public opposition to bans among EU groupings of independent (CESI), white collar(CEC) and public sector (CEEP), Unions and the European Personnel Managers Association (EAPM) using US workplace kit.

--Collaborate with the European Tourism Action Group to promote economic impact of bans in Horeca and Transport sectors.

Counter influence of WHO, BASP and anti-cancer groupings.

--Create a European Tobacco Information Centre to disseminate third party news to EU influencers including policy makers and the media including positive scientific studies, public opinion data, favourable legislative developments, economic impact data, libertarian views.

• Expand ARISE network and through bi-annual attitude surveys (1995- stress in the workplace) generate maximum publicity for ARISE message of pleasure as beneficial to health.

• Create a European Smokers Rights Group to bring smokers' voice to EU legislative debate and to provide a network for coordinated actions and information sharing by national SRGs.

• Develop PM Communications tool on accommodation to support direct dialogue with legislators and allies.

• Encourage opposition to bans within EP.

• Encourage European Public Health Alliance and EP Health intergroup to prioritise non-tobacco health concerns with DGV.

THREAT: 1993 proposed Directive for the protection of transport workers' health and safety amended by the European Parliament to provide for a de facto total smoking ban with application to all modes of transport operating within EU territory.

OBJECTIVE: Obtain Commission withdrawal Of proposal in accordance with subsidiarity principle during German Presidency; ensure new proposal provides maximum flexibility in line with existing health and safety directives

STRATEGY:

. Reinforce and support German Government position to obtain withdrawal by promoting subsidiarity argumentation among other Governments.

• Mobilize international Transport/Health and Safety bodies using jurisdictional argumentation

• Reinforce UK Government position for withdrawal.

• Encourage through provision of legal argumentation, other governments to support German position (France, Holland, Italy and Denmark) via national transport groupings

• Determine feasibility of obtaining additional support from other governments

• Develop support for withdrawal among Commissioners and DG VII

THREAT:

Legislation banning Smoking in the workplace, public places and on transport driven by EPA, IARC activities, SCOTH (UK), ICAO and political opportunism

OBJECTIVES:

. Capitalise on EU Resolution on GEP to prevent governments legislating on basis of flawed epidemiology.

• Lock in and defend legislation that provides for accommodation.

• Defend against further airline bans and other key public impact ban threats in transport sector...

CONSUMERS:

• Support and expand existing SRGs and where gaps exist (Germany, Belgium, UK, Spain) create smokers rights groups to defend against ban threats direct with legislators and via the media.

MEDIA OUTREACH

--Communicate messages of tolerance, and US extremism both directly and via libertarian and smokers rights groups.

--Encourage a balanced coverage of ETS science via libertarian groups, independent scientists pre, during and post IARC study release.

--Promote examples of other low level risks, confounders arguments and other weaknesses of epidemiology via scientists and libertarian groups to undermine public confidence in science and to provide perspective.

--Educate targeted scientific editors on ETS science via scientific consultants.

--Encourage business owners to advocate accommodation via speaking opportunities.

In September of 1981, tobacco industry public relations consultant Leonard Zahn infiltrated and recorded the proceedings of a tobacco control conference held in Sri Lanka. In his report on the conference, Zahn offers a dismal portrayal of the conference, saying:

"The overwhelming poverty of Sri Lanka seemed somehow to be reflected in the poor organization, management and quality of the conference. The oppressive heat in Colombo and the background of current racial tensions, which had resulted in several deaths just before the conference opened, undoubtedly were responsible for the failure of many scheduled speakers to show up."

However, Zahn highlighted an effort by the regional tobacco company to put a beneficial PR face on itself during the time the conference was ongoing:

"During the conference, the Ceylon Tobacco Company ran a full-page ad in a local newspaper on its expanding and profitable orchid growing project. The ad noted the company's "application of our vast agricultural experience to fields other than tobacco cultivation." The project was begun in 1979; more than 1500 growers are now raising orchids for export..."

This indicates how tobacco companies (especially in poorer countries) attempt to improve public opinion about their companies while not actually changing their corporate behavior with regard to public health.

Buried inside this mostly-dull 195-page Philip Morris (PM) marketing report is some important information that should be noted by public health groups and authorities:

In noting the decline of smoking rates in the U.S., PM lists the major factors that have proven particularly effective at decreasing the demand for cigarettes: "the declining social acceptability of smoking, increased smoking restrictions, particularly in the workplace [and] rising excise taxes and prices..." Confirming that higher cigarette prices effectively decrease smoking rates, the report also says that lower-priced (discount) cigarettes help "keep some consumers in the marketplace" who otherwise would have quit.

The document also describes PM's opposition to fire-safe cigarettes:

"Anti-smoking groups endorse the 'self-extinguishing', or 'Fire Safe', cigarette as a way to...cause all cigarettes to look and taste the same. Such mandates could cripple the competitive advantage of leading brands and intensify the erosion of the overall cigarette market."

PM describes its strategy to fight fire-safe cigarette legislation on Page 150, Bates No. 2051363574:

"ISSUE: Efforts by anti-smoking groups to mandate a 'fire safe' cigarette could destroy the competitiveness of leading brands and increase the cost of manufacturing cigarettes. STRATEGY: ...PM-USA will expand coalitions among the fire prevention community and public policy makers to diffuse support for 'fire-safe' legislation at the state and federal level..."

PM also considered nicotine-replacement therapy aids (like the patch and gum) to be direct competitors. To fight the incursion of these products into the nicotine market, PM planned to develop a "proprietary alternative smoking product" called "Beta," which would "be marketed in direct response to such products as nicotine-releasing skin patches and chewing gum." [Page 37, Bates No. 2051363461]

The report also reveals the extreme importance of smoker databases to cigarette companies' continued ability to promote smoking--something public health authorities have largely ignored. As legal restrictions tighten on advertising and promotions, cigarette companies increasingly turn to huge databases of information that they gather on smokers to continue actively marketing cigarettes to large numbers of people:

"The marketing environment is likely to become more restrictive during the plan period, including additional restrictions on outdoor and event sponsorship. This necessitates creating alternative avenues of reaching the consumer. Developing a smoker name database will enable us to effectively reach a large number of smokers..."

Smoker databases are of such importance as promotional tools that PM girded itself to deflect any legislation that might restrict the company's ability to gather personal information on smokers:

"As the database becomes more critical to our marketing plans, it becomes essential that we protect it from legislated restrictions..." [Page 107, Bates No. 2051363531]

The document also makes it clear that PM fights restrictions on event sponsorship at least in part because these events provide the company with venues in whcih they can gather personal data on smokers (the company refers to gathering smoker information as "name generation.") The says PM should "Increase [the company's] presence at major events and use as source for name generation."

Also of interest to health authorities should be the information on Page 145 (Bates No. 2051363569) that describes PM's strategy to divert health department funds away from tobacco control and towards "support[ing] other health programs (pre-natal care, half-way houses, etc.)" (areas which don't threaten cigarette sales):

"Long Term Goals

• Counter ASSIST Program in 17 states: - Work with grass roots organizations to divert state health department funds, equivalent to the amount of ASSIST funding, to support other health programs (pre-natal care, half-way houses, etc.).

(Note: ASSIST was a widespread public health effort in the early to mid 1990's in the U.S. to reduce smoking rates in 19 states)

PM's plans also included efforts to eliminate public health restrictions on tobacco that were already in place:

"Rollback Program:

- Particularly in localities, introduce legislation to reinstate marketing activities, such as sampling and couponing, that have been banned or restricted.

- Pass state preemption."

The report also refers to African Americans as an "important volume opportunity" while simultaneously describing how to fight the idea that the industry targets minorities in their promotions,

This and much more information within this document shows that far beyond simply making and selling cigarettes, Philip Morris actively worked on a number of fronts to fight efforts to reduce the many public health threats the company poses.

This public relations plan created by the public relations company Ruder Finn for Philip Morris France discusses how the company can work around a "difficult national siuation," specifically a French law called "loi Evin," which prohibits "all propaganda or publicity, direct or indirect, in favor of tobacco or tobacco products as well as their free distribution." The law also precluded sponsorship activities.

The author discusses how "the illness and death arguments used in anti-smoking campaigns [in the U.S.] have little effect on smokers and in particular young people [in France]," and how in France "the stressed non-smoker is still considered a fanatical trouble-maker when strongly defending his right to fresh air."

The Plan discusses how to influence legislators and opinion leaders in France, and states (on Page 25) that "defense of issues surrounding tobacco needs to be done in a third party context - non-tobacco linked experts, sources need to speak on behalf of tobacco interests." It also urges Philip Morris to "take the initiative in education programmes informing young people about the risks of smoking," reaffirming that PM's promotion of youth anti-smoking programs in France and elsewhere is done out of concern for public relations and the effects of these activities on legislators rather than out of concern for public health. .

Ruder-Finn proposes to help PM "establish a discrete, credible and effective voice and an institutionalised lobby...to defend its interests without being visible as Philip Morris," to "position Philip Morris as a concerned French citizen and a resource for factual information on both sides of the debate, and to "... highlight [PM's]...efforts to protect the environment; concern for health, youth and the quality of life in general."

Also of interest is the quote which which Ruder Finn introduces the paper (immediately below).