Tobacco Documents Online

This 1988 Philip Morris (PM) marketing document shows how PM targeted its tobacco products to the Hispanic community.

In 1988, Philip Morris sought to deepen its relationship with the Hispanic community in the United States by sponsoring major soccer events, putting on Latin music events, giving away free samples of cigarettes, and attending Hispanic festivals. The proposed budget for targeting the Hispanic market in the U.S. in 1988 with promotions of the Marlboro brand name was $3.5 million.

This 142-page document appears to be a compilation (folder) containing documents about INFOTAB, the global group the tobacco industry formed to assist and coordinate their battles against public health efforts to control tobacco worldwide. The document contains discussions about the state of tobacco control many countries worldwide, and the industry's efforts to combat them. For example, one document is the charter of the Tobacco Industry Council of Zimbabwe (Page 202501769), whose objectives are listed as,

"...To make every effort to plan and provide for the protection of the interests of all sectors of the tobacco industry in Zimbabwe from any hostile or counter-productive force which may emerge both inside and outside Zimbabwe...[to reinforce] the organisation known as Infotab in its efforts to counter the worldwide campaign against the tobacco industry..."

The paper also discusses the state of industry affairs in Cameroon, Pakistan, Malaysia, Honk Kong, Addis Ababa and many other countries.

The document demonstrates the adversarial attitude of the tobacco industry against public health efforts worldwide. On page on Bates Page 2025013815, the paper states that the "overall objectives" of Infotab are to "join in an international effort to combat the worldwide threat to our business...," "to prevent, halt or slow down global adversary campaigns such as the WHO recommendations," and "to develop international strategies and action plans for implementation, as appropriate through NMAs [national manufacturer organizations], member companies and their affiliates and with allies."

This document shows how the tobacco industry organized itself globally to fight the effects of dissemination of accurate public health information about its products and to try and slow, stop or reverse the natural reactions to that information by governments and citizens throughout the world.

This 1995 budget for Philip Morris'(PM) Worldwide Regulatory Affairs office lists the company's activities to fight public health-tobacco control efforts around the globe during that year and what it cost PM to carry out these activities. It lists PM's consultants by name and/or company, tells how much PM budgeted to pay them, and lists the countries where PM applied this interference.

PM's activities included persuading restaurant owners, airport officials and employers around the world that they needed too install new ventilation equipment instead of banning smoking entirely, developing strategies and programs to protect smoking in the workplace, subsidizing construction and renovation of airport smoking lounges, working to prevent and pre-empt smoking restrictions, "slowing down the spread of smoking bans on international [airline] carriers," promoting acceptance of indoor air quality standards that would allow smoking, funding front groups like ARISE (Associate for Research in the Science of Enjoyment) and TASSC (The Advancement of Sound Science Coalition), funding of public relations groups like the Dolphin Group and Burson Marstellar to push their agenda, and much more. According to this document, in 1995 PM planned to implement the above activities in Brazil, Costa Rica, Japan, Sweden, Hungary, Switzerland, Hong Kong, Malaysia, Puerto Rico, Finland, Czech Republic, Korea, Belgium, Spain, Germany, Italy, Columbia, Poland, Norway, Gulf Council Countries (GCC), Argentina, United States and Australia.

PM's total budget for these activities in 1995 was over $17 million, which does not include legal costs for 1995, which are listed on Page 20 of the document. The total cost of legal assistance to PM's Worldwide Regulatory Affairs Department in 1995 was $25,785,000, which includes the costs of lawsuits against the ABC Television Network, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, and legal work on cigarette issues like ingredients disclosure and ignition propensity. The law firm of Shook, Hardy and Bacon alone was budgeted to make over $7.3 million from Philip Morris in this single year.

This 1991 budget from the Philip Morris (PM) collection describes tobacco industry activities to "maintain the controversy" on secondhand smoke. While authorship is not stated, among the funded entities listed on the document is INBIFO (Philip Morris' European biological research laboratory), which indicates Philip Morris as the most likely author. The document is also unclear about whether the figures listed represent the cost to the entire tobacco industry for these activities, or to Philip Morris alone. We assume the figures listed are in dollars. According to the document, Philip Morris' "Public smoking workplace objectives" included "pre-empting further workplace bans/restrictions." Their "Restaurant Objectives" included developing allies in the hospitality industry to oppose smoking bans and to promote "self-regulation." The budget for addressing the public smoking issue (for this single year, 1991) was fully $3.95 million, and for their work with restaurants alone was $1.2 million.

"Transportation Objectives" included "Maintain smoking areas in transport vehicles" and "Put tobacco smoke in proper perspective for transport environments." The budget for transportation objectives alone was $465,000.

"Science Objectives" were estimated to cost a whopping $16,688,400 and included "Develop and support activities and research which maintain the controversy..." about seonchand smoke and "Maintain research activity...to provide support for our position."

Among the "Science Objectives" were "Develop[ing] and support[ing] activities and research which maintain the controversy" about tobacco smoke.

This Philip Morris (PM) document is a case study showing how PM uses cigarette advertising to help undermine public health messages about tobacco.

In 1995 PM planned to launch a new, humorous ad campaign for "Benson and Hedges" cigarettes. The launch was strategically timed to coincide with the opening of new (Philip Morris-sponsored) smoking lounges in Denver's new International Airport (DIA, 1995). The inclusion of smoking lounges at DIA was quite controversial at the time, and would have been expected to draw crticism of the company. Objectives of the ad campaign (and its timing) were to help keep PM in the driver's seat on smoking issues in Denver at that time:

"OBJECTIVES:

--Maintain control of the story and preempt potential activists' criticism of ads --Reinforce messages of accommodating smokers. --Preempt possible activists' claims of victory in 'changing the form of cigarette advertising"... --Frame appropriate messages regarding ETS and accommodation issues." The plan included training spokespeople in advance of the ad campaign "to counter activist positions [and]...incorporate accommodation messages into discussion of campaign."

The campaign even provided PM with "hooks" to create future positive stories and promotions for target audiences. Burson-Marstellar (B-M, the public relations company that generated the media plan) suggests that, in the wake of the ad campaign, "Specific accommodation storylines can be developed for pitch to women's book, gay books, restaurant magazines/inserts, etc." B-M also suggested that PM "[Develop] promotions to 'make smoker feel like a hero'".

PM has long held that the intent of its cigarette advertising is merely to convince smokers to switch brands, but this document shows an intent that is actually quite different. The cigarette company used this ad campaign:

1) To take the focus off tobacco as a public health problem and turn the discussion instead into one of economics and "accommodation,"

2) as a shield to pre-empt criticism of its actions and products,

3) To minimize public health messages about tobacco and secondhand smoke and prevent these messages from taking the forefront,

3) To provide the company with access to major media in a way that gave the company control over the coverage it received.

4) To launch other, similar efforts and campaigns around the country and to obtain further "positive" coverage for the company's brands and smoking in general.

Discusses targeting black market, esp. w/ menthol (Pg. 21). Contains statement that "very few low tar smokers actually know the specific delivery level [of tar]." Discusses objective to "arrest the trend of cigarette smoking changing from a socially acceptable pleasure to a socially repugnant habit." Says PM's govt' affairs & legislative departments are established to aid in this fight.r

A law enacted in France in 1991 (commonly referred to as the "Loi Evin") restricted some forms of tobacco advertising and sponsorship. In 1993 French legislators considered tightening the Loi Evin to prohibit virtually all forms of tobacco advertising, with only very limited exceptions. The French legislature also proposed removing an exception that had permitted tobacco companies to continue to sponsor sporting events in France even after the Loi Evin had initially been enacted.

This proposal set off an alarm at Philip Morris. The company feared that if they allowed this measure to pass in France, the same type of restrictions would quickly spread to other European countries.

Not surprisingly, PM fought the measure. This report describes how Philip Morris France (PM) planned to manipulate the French government to preserve tobacco company sponsorship of sporting events.

Not unexpectedly, PM's strategy was multi-pronged: The company planned to use the deteriorating state of France's inner-cities (called "suburbs") to its advantage by offering the government what was, in essence, a bribe. PM planned to offer to build sporting facilities and purchase equipment for the poorer sections of French cities in exchange for the government inserting an exception into the new law that would continue to allow tobacco company sponsorship of sporting events:

"[PM will] offer sponsorship activities by tobacco companies [to the French government] as one solution for the severe urban problems."

Another tactic was to threaten French legislators by upsetting their "political equilibrium." PM says,

"[should Government officials move to restrict tobacco sponsorship of events] mobilization can take place and cause problems to the political equilibrium."

PM also proposed "using the problems of the inner-cities as a political cover" for politicians to insert an amendment favoring tobacco companies into a bill about the law.

Research by PM's Corporate Affairs department showed that manipulating French legislation through an Omnibus Bill was the way to go. PM preferred working through an Omnibus bill because they are introduced very late in the French legislative session, are usually rushed through parliament and laden with many different subjects, making discussion of individual measure in the bill very difficult. Omnibus bills thus avoid scrutiny by consumer groups and health authorities. In a section entitled "How to amend the Loi Evin," PM says,

"The easiest way to amend the Loi Evin to allow the sponsorship of motor vehicle competitions by the tobacco industry is to obtain the inclusion of an article dealing with this question in an Omnibus Bill. ..Omnibus bills have two advantages:

-- They are generally a long list of very different articles amending very different laws, and are therefore difficult to discuss.

-- They are generally voted during the last two days of parliamentary sessions, and are therefore not scrutinized by the press and public interest groups."

PM further says,

"[Omnibus bills] provide the Government with an opportunity to adjust laws voted previously without having to re-open a political debate. They provide an opportunity to placate special-interest groups without having to do it openly, or even to reverse the Government's previous position at the cost of minimal political exposure..."

The Plan also indicates PM cultivated strong allies within the French government, and implies the companies could control these public servants to their advantage, saying "It will...be necessary to mobilize MP's and Senators" to propose such an amendment.

This document shows how Philip Morris works to alter laws in ways that make the company's involvement difficult to detect, and purposely tries to keep health authorities and consumer groups from discovering and discussing what the company is doing in that regard.

This document is a privileged and confidential Philip Morris Tort Reform Project Budget from 1995-96. It shows how well-funded and widespread the tobacco industry's plan to alter the American judicial system is. It lists all the consultants, organizations, individuals and law firms the industry funded to promote alteration of the legal system in 1995-96.

In 2002, the consumer advocacy organization Public Citizen investigated the roots of the U.S. "tort reform" movement and found that the "movement" was actually a massive national PR effort initiated by the tobacco industry to reduce or eliminate exposure to liability law suits. The tobacco industry enlisted the participation of other industries like chemical manufacturers, pharmaceutical companies, automobile manufacturers, insurance companies and others to alter the U.S. system laws ("tort") that give sick and injured consumers access the court system. Today's document reveals that the tobacco industry--alone--budgeted fully $21.8 million for the effort in the single year of 1995. (Public Citizen's report can be seen among the industry's documents at http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/cgi/getdoc?tid=qka22c00&fmt=pdf&ref=results) Today's featured document also shows that the industry paid an international public relations firm called APCO Associates almost $1 million in 1995 to implement behind-the-scenes tort reform efforts. APCO's job was to create chapters of "grassroots" citizens' groups called Citizens Against Lawsuit Abuse (CALAs). Another Philip Morris document about tort reform efforts states, "APCO has been setting up...Citizens Against Lawsuit Abuse chapters...I would argue that it is important to continue because grass roots agitation for tort reform helps us to protect [our interests in SB 241 (a tort reform bill before the California legislature]." http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/cgi/getdoc?tid=kjr67d00&fmt=pdf&ref=results

A January 1995 "privileged and confidential" memo from Covington and Burling (a long-time tobacco industry law firm) states that, to be effective, media activities promoting tort reform "must not be linked to the tobacco industry." http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/cgi/getdoc?tid=lao00e00&fmt=pdf&ref=results

Yet another "highly confidential" 1994 Philip Morris memorandum states,

"Our success in the tort battles in the past two years has resulted in part from our ability to find non-tobacco industry messengers to head the fight. Our success in battling [Florida-type Medicaid legislation] will come in part from our ability to [use] the more acceptable public face of key business association or coalition leaders." http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/cgi/getdoc?tid=hym22a00&fmt=pdf&ref=results

States how PM has the most to lose from public health successes, saying [Page A-27]: "PM-USA is taking a major role in defending the cigarette industry since our leadership position in terms of market share and profitability implies that we have the most to lose if the industry is radically altered by the aggressive attacks of anti-smoking forces." States [on Page A-28] how the industry used the supposedly independent Center for Indoor Air Research, or CIAR: "We will continue the scientific battle over the effects of ETS through the Center for Indoor Air Research [2055014059]." Also discusses how PM planned to manipulate state legislative processes for corporate advantage: "We will use the legislative process to compel accommodation as opposed to outright bans."

On Page 91 (203084913) describes PM's strategy of "a sustained holding action with agressive counterattacks" against public health efforts. Describes plans to exploit American anti-tax, anti-government interference and pro free-speech sentiments to "maximize industry volume by aggressively blunting attacks" from public health forces. States goal to "improve public perceptions of smoking." States strategy of "going beyond simply defending ourselves" to forming "proactive groups" to "campaign for repeal of anti-smoking legislation" and to "force anti-smoking advocates to defend their gains rather than seeking to expand them." Describes plans to "create local smokers' rights associations throughout the U.S." with a "network of 50,000 'block captains' who will monitor local smoking issues and serve as a grass roots voice for smokers' rights, lans to "create a self-sustaining membership organization similar to the National Rifle Association." Describes Operation Downunder, and its goals,

"Increase the industry's leverage in legislatures by showing a more reasonable approach to the issue..."

"...to compel the accommodation of smoking in all public places."

"...To isolate the anti-smoking forces by making the industry appear reasonable on the issue while they [public health advocates] are irrational in their demands." States Downunder was based on an assumption that "Science has not established a health risk to non-smokers from environmental tobacco smoke."

"Finally, we need to consider the long-term consequences for Philip Morris U.S.A. if even our best efforts to address the shrinking U.S. cigarette market fail. One approach is to try to replace domestic sales with export sales. Under that approach, we need to consider the social and political ramifications of exporting a product for which there is no domestic market." Page-3007

This confidential 1993 Philip Morris memo shows that TIME magazine entered into an agreement with Philip Morris to merge its customer database with PM's smoker database to help PM sell cigarettes. An objective "was to create 'smoker' editions of TIME's publications" and to help PM "speak to smokers in innovative and highly targeted ways."

Selective binding is a computerized, database-driven binding process allows publishers to break out regional or interest-specific advertising and/or editorial editions of a given issue. Presumably, such a system would enable TIME to remove cigarette ads from issues of the magazine going to schools, however apparently TIME has not done this, as many issues of the magazine arriving at school libraries continue to carry cigarette advertisements. Photos of TIME magazine issues carrying tobacco ads that were mailed to schools can be seen at http://whyquit.com/ads/Time_Warner.html

TIME Inc., is the publisher of more than 125 magazines that carry tobacco ads, and five that don't.

Recently, the American Legacy Foundation (the organization set up by the 1998 Master Settlement Agreement to fight tobacco use) held a $500 a plate award dinner where it presented TIME magazine with a prestigious tobacco control award for “helping the American Legacy Foundation reach a national audience in support of the foundation’s educational and awareness campaigns.”

Several public health physicians strongly criticized Legacy's giving TIME this award in an article published in the March 4, 2005 edition of The Cancer Letter. [Legacy Foundation Calls Time Inc. "Hero" Of Tobacco Control, But Activists See Villain, By Kirsten Boyd Goldberg, The Cancer Letter, March 4, 2005 (Vol. 31 No. 9)www.cancerletter.com ] Legacy was also criticized for its action by the American Council on Science and Health in a February 4 editorial entitled, "TIME is not on our side," by Rivka Weiser, who said,

"While Time, Inc. has taken some steps to support tobacco control, it is shocking that the corporation is being given a high-profile award for its advancement of the cause. Time, Inc.’s four most highly-circulated magazines -TIME (its flagship magazine), Family Circle, People, and Sports Illustrated - which reach a paid circulation of over 15 million readers combined (and therefore bring in much advertising revenue), all promote smoking through their cigarette ads." http://www.acsh.org/factsfears/newsID.510/news_detail.asp

In this application for funding, Professor David M. Warburton of the University of Reading in the United Kingdom asks Philip Morris for £32,000 to perform a study on the human use of legal substances (like alcohol, caffeine, chocolate, food, tea, tobacco). Warburton believed the outcome of the study would "show that it is the total abstainer from substance use who is abnormal." Philip Morris had previously funded Warburton from 1991-93 in the amount of $250,000 (see the budgets in document Bates Nos. 2023160927 & 2023160930/0931). Warburton also organized and implemented the tobacco industry-funded front group ARISE ("Associates for Research in Substance Enjoyment"), which toured Europe between 1988 and 1997 touting that smoking was good for people and actually boosted immunity because it relieved stress and people enjoyed it.

In 2001 Professor Warburton released a study showing that people are intimidated by television chefs, who elevate pressure on regular people to produce excellent dishes at dinner parties. These fears were causing a new syndrome to emerge that Professor Warburton called "Kitchen Performance Anxiety" (KPA). The physical symptoms of KPA, according to Warburton, included mental blocks during cooking, a rapid heart rate, difficulty in breathing, nausea, and headaches. Warburton concluded that KPA was causing fewer people to hold dinner parties. BBC did a news report on KPA that highlighted the following comment from Prof. Warburton: "It is interesting that many guests don't expect perfect food and would prefer that their host or hostess concentrated on good company and wine."

Not coincidentally, Warburton's study was commissioned by the makers of the wine Piat d'Or wine. (http://www.piatdor.com/). See the BBC report on KPA at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/england/1709429.stm

Shows the industry always loses when the debate remains about health. Urges changing the debate away from health: Page 104-5:

"Arguments against smoking and the tobacco industry are almost exclusively founded on the reported adverse health effect of smoking. Opponents of tobacco always use the health argument as justification for any and all restrictions, from public smoking bans to punitive taxation. They do their best to create an emotional public reaction rather than a serious scientific and economic debate. When the tobacco industry involves itself in the health debate, it almost invariably loses. The reason the industry loses isn't so much based on who's right or wrong, but on who has the "higher moral ground". Objectives: Force proponents of anti-tobacco legislation to justify their positions on grounds other than health alone. (Only by bringing the debate past health and into the social arena can we effectively attack such measures and protect a harmonious relationship between smokers and non-smokers)."

"...Actively promote science which contradicts recurring anti-smoking themes and messages."

This 6 page planning document, found in the files of Ted Lattanzio (Director of Philip Morris Worldwide Regulatory Affairs c. 1994), lists strategies and budgets for fighting public health efforts to end smoking in workplaces and public places. Page 4 describes a strategy for dealing with public knowledge about how childrens' health is disproportionately affected by exposure secondhand smoke: "Shift the debate on ETS [environmental tobacco smoke] and children to: Are our schools and day care centers making children sick?"

Tactics proposed for making the public believe that schools and day care centers are making children sick (instead of secondhand smoke) include:

"Feed available information to National School Board Association in D.C. Feed information to Oprah, et. al. Get sick children on the shows. Research newspaper clippings of parents who keep children at thome because of school environment--pass those on. Why? Shift the debate. Why is EPA not spending research dollars on solving school problem?? I have the research budget for next year--not very much is going to identify or solve the school problem. Get information to EPA Watch."

Philip Morris' estimated budget for the blaming program was $100,000.

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