Tobacco Documents Online

Suggests getting around a Singapore ban on advertising and promotion of cigarettes by introducing a wine cooler of the same brand name as the cigarette. (Wine cooler to be manufactured by PM's winery in Australia).

Shows that Philip Morris intended to get around a total ban on advertising in Singapore by introducing a wine cooler (made by its winery in Australia) with the same brand name as the cigarette they wanted to introduce in that country.

This 1988 Philip Morris (PM) marketing document shows how PM targeted its tobacco products to the Hispanic community.

In 1988, Philip Morris sought to deepen its relationship with the Hispanic community in the United States by sponsoring major soccer events, putting on Latin music events, giving away free samples of cigarettes, and attending Hispanic festivals. The proposed budget for targeting the Hispanic market in the U.S. in 1988 with promotions of the Marlboro brand name was $3.5 million.

This one-page Philip Morris (PM) document from 1987 shows how the company preys on smokers' health anxieties and lack of information about about tar and nicotine to boost their market for "light" cigarettes:

"The mild/lights segment is the fastest growing segment in the Hong Kong market... ...There is definitely a growing health consciousness in the market due to regular Government anti-smoking campaign. However, consumers currently have a poor knowledge of tar and nicotine. Research shows that Lights = Mild = Less Harmful... Government's anti-smoking pressures will intensify ... This may further increase smokers' health concern and it is very likely that the mild/lights segment will continue its rapid growth..."

This Philip Morris (PM) document is a case study showing how PM uses cigarette advertising to help undermine public health messages about tobacco.

In 1995 PM planned to launch a new, humorous ad campaign for "Benson and Hedges" cigarettes. The launch was strategically timed to coincide with the opening of new (Philip Morris-sponsored) smoking lounges in Denver's new International Airport (DIA, 1995). The inclusion of smoking lounges at DIA was quite controversial at the time, and would have been expected to draw crticism of the company. Objectives of the ad campaign (and its timing) were to help keep PM in the driver's seat on smoking issues in Denver at that time:

"OBJECTIVES:

--Maintain control of the story and preempt potential activists' criticism of ads --Reinforce messages of accommodating smokers. --Preempt possible activists' claims of victory in 'changing the form of cigarette advertising"... --Frame appropriate messages regarding ETS and accommodation issues." The plan included training spokespeople in advance of the ad campaign "to counter activist positions [and]...incorporate accommodation messages into discussion of campaign."

The campaign even provided PM with "hooks" to create future positive stories and promotions for target audiences. Burson-Marstellar (B-M, the public relations company that generated the media plan) suggests that, in the wake of the ad campaign, "Specific accommodation storylines can be developed for pitch to women's book, gay books, restaurant magazines/inserts, etc." B-M also suggested that PM "[Develop] promotions to 'make smoker feel like a hero'".

PM has long held that the intent of its cigarette advertising is merely to convince smokers to switch brands, but this document shows an intent that is actually quite different. The cigarette company used this ad campaign:

1) To take the focus off tobacco as a public health problem and turn the discussion instead into one of economics and "accommodation,"

2) as a shield to pre-empt criticism of its actions and products,

3) To minimize public health messages about tobacco and secondhand smoke and prevent these messages from taking the forefront,

3) To provide the company with access to major media in a way that gave the company control over the coverage it received.

4) To launch other, similar efforts and campaigns around the country and to obtain further "positive" coverage for the company's brands and smoking in general.

This three year Philip Morris (PM) marketing plan for the United Kingdom discusses the threat to the industry posed by secondhand smoke, and PM's intent to fight this threat, saying (Page 18-19): "ETS [environmental tobacco smoke] is the major threat to the social acceptability of smoking, and the issue has taken root vigorously in the UK....[We] shall be involved in a major damage limitation programme throughout the Plan Period."

The "damage limitation" plan contained several elements including:

"--Maintaining the debate by not allowing the anti-smokers to allege that there is no further argument."

"--Creating 'marketable science' to contest the alleged risks to health," and

"--Deflecting criticism by putting ETS in the context of Sick Building Syndrome."

The plan indicates Philip Morris as an active player in these activities, stating, "This will be an industry programme managed by the TAC with full participation from Philip Morris."

This document provides an example of "cause marketing," a public relations tool and business strategy that links the purchase of a product to fundraising for a worthwhile charity, project, or cause. The cause evokes strong emotions in the target while providing the triple benefits of increasing sales, improving corporate image and benefiting a charity.

In this document, Philip Morris proposes a program called "Let 'em Run," a project to "help alleviate the plight of wild horses in the west." The actual plight the horses are suffering is not stated in the document, but the goals of the program do not involve them. Rather, the goals are to "generate awareness of the cause and Marlboro's involvement in the cause," to "begin word of mouth conversations among our smokers" and to "connect with our young adult smokers." The program would allow PM to "connect with the smoker by creating affinity with the brand and by providing those that are interested with a way to participate themselves."

Such a cause marketing program would also benefit PM by providing a continuing communication channel to its customers, and would help increase the spread of its feel-good corporate efforts by prompting smokers to bring friends to cause-related events:

"--Develop a follow-up communication stream that updates smokers on the progress [of the Let 'em Run" program]" --Create an event that mobilizes smokers to get others involved (i.e.: walk-a-thon)." This document shows Philip Morris contemplating linking its dangerous product to a positive emotional cause, and leveraging that emotion to stimulate sales among its younger targets.

Cause marketing is becoming increasingly common. Another example is the department store chain that offers to donate 1 or 2% of its sales of cosmetics to fight breast cancer. This effectively leverages women's strong emotions about breast cancer to increase sales of cosmetics.

Presentation about targeting a cigarette brand called "Harley Davidson" to low-income young blue collar males who have have a high school education or less, are outer-directed belongers and "wannabees," and who seek out a macho image. The brand would also be targeted women who have "men's interest."

This Philip Morris document provides insight into the creation of "Dave's" cigarettes, a discount brand targeted at "YAMS" (Young Adult Male Smokers). The idea was to create a discount brand that would make broke YAMS feel as though they were buying by choice, not because they were broke. This presentation, by the advertising firm Young and Rubicam, describes the plight of YAMS and the gap "Dave's" would strive to fill: "Economic reality forces a trade down...Nothing comes close to cigarettes in terms of a degrading trade-down...In a category that is supposed to be a reward and indulgence, a discount cigarette stands for the antithesis of what smoking is all about. Therefore YAMS can't feel good about purchasing discount cigarettes when they have to. In their heart of hearts, they would like to feel that when they buy a discount brand, it's because they choose to -- not because they happen to be cheap, broke or desperate."

Dave's was designed to be that magical brand that would make it okay for YAMS to buy discount cigarettes.

To sell "Dave's," Philip Morris created a fictional cigarette company run by a fictional, independent, honest, hard-working guy named "Dave" who got around in a down-to-earth 1957 yellow pickup truck. Ads for "Dave's" cigarettes touted "Dave" as a youthful renegade who got fed up with the establishment and struck out on his own. There was no hint in the ads that the product was made by Philip Morris.

(One ad read:

"Dave was fed up with cheap, fast burning smokes. Instead of just getting mad, he did something about it. He read some books, cleared twenty acres and got to work. He put a down payment on a tractor and traded his lawn mower for a weather radio. And then it was just a matter of waiting for the final frost of the season and a new moon. In early April, Dave sowed his first seeds. A few sunny days later, Dave's Tobacco Company was born. Word spread about Dave's "different smokes." His tobacco leaves were hand picked, then barn cured and barrel aged for rich taste. And to make sure they burned perfectly, each smoke was packed tight. People started buying these new smokes that didn't burn fast and tasted great. They told their friends..who told their friends. Now Dave works for nobody but himself. And it all started with a few tobacco seeds..and a dream." [See the ad, The tale of Dave's Original Blend Link: http://tobaccodocuments.org/pollay_ads/Dave01.06.html]

Focus group testing showed, though, that if and when YAMS did find out that "Dave's" cigarettes were really made by the Philip Morris Tobacco Company, the felt disappointed and betrayed. PM minimized the importance of this finding, however, and pressed ahead with the marketing brand [see the PM document Dave's Seattle Research (1994) http://tobaccodocuments.org/pm/2045165728.html]

Shortly after "Dave's" hit the market, humor columnist Dave Barry wrote a scathing column ripping "Dave's" cigarettes:

I want to stress that I'm not bitter about what the Philip Morris Corp. is trying to do with the name "Dave." In case you didn't know, Philip Morris is test-marketing a new brand of cigarettes called "Dave's." Over the past year I've seen big billboard advertisements for "Dave's" cigarettes in Seattle and Denver. These are folksy ads; one of them features a tractor. The message is that "Dave's" is a folksy brand of cigarette, produced by a down-to-earth, tractor-driving guy named "Dave" for ordinary people who work hard and make an honest living, at least until they start coughing up big folksy chunks of trachea. .." http://www.s-t.com/daily/07-96/07-28-96/e02li154.htm:

A 1995 Wall Street Journal article also ripped PM's effort to deceive smokers with "Dave":

"Dave's Cigarettes" has become a trend setter in anti-establishment marketing. The promotional literature describes Dave as "an entrepreneur who believes in the value of home made products and the concept of offering folks quality cigarettes at the right price." Dave is such a populist he tells store owners he doesn't even want his folksy cigs to "mix with the 'corporate' cigarettes." Now take a guess as to which $60 billion tobacco giant owns Dave's? If you said Phillip Morris you win a half case of Red Dog beer (also owned by PM). Nowhere does Phillip Morris, in it's self-described effort to "convey cutting edge hipness," acknowledge it's relation to "Dave." Just being "plain folks" I guess. (WSJ 3/2/95)

Today "Dave's" appears to be a failed brand, along with another brand PM proposed to be targeted at young men (but that never made it off the drawing board), "Barking Fish" cigarettes http://tobaccodocuments.org/landman/2041490669-0681.html )