Abstract
This document, estimated date 1978, is one of a growing number that describe the global tobacco industry's engagement in a massive, highly organized campaign to undermine common knowledge about the health hazards of smoking, slow the global quit rate, reverse the decline in smoking incidence, and directly counter global public health authorities' efforts to reduce tobacco use around the world.
These efforts, astonishing in their scope and ambition, were carried out by ICOSI (the multinational tobacco industry's International Committee on Smoking Issues), whose members included British American Tobacco, Imperial Tobacco, Rothmans, Gallaher, R.J. Reynolds, Philip Morris and the German tobacco company Reentsma. The companies feared that society's then-new focus on the economic burdens caused by tobacco, or "social costs" (higher medical costs, absenteeism, cleaning costs, etc.) would create "economic incentives [for companies] to join anti-smoking efforts." They feared this would then lead to widespread, cascading efforts by businesses to decrease their operating costs by helping employees quit smoking. They feared this in turn would accelerate the decline in social acceptability of smoking, and further decrease cigarette consumption:
"If enough managers become convinced that anti-smoking efforts will help their company's profitability, then SAWP [the Social Acceptability Working Party of ICOSI] can visualize an avalanche of corporate-sponsored anti-smoking programs. If so, such programs could easily dwarf the present efforts carried out by governments and public interest groups...Considering just these...major implications, SAWP believes that the industry must begin to quickly and seriously address 'social costs' issues."
The document also shows that a goal of ICOSI was to "reduce to absurdity" public health conclusions about the social costs of smoking:
"Put [social cost arguments against smoking] in perspective and reduce them to absurdity - Demonstrate that overeating, coffee, sugar, lack of exercise, fats, alcohol, etc. are also alleged to generate 'social costs.' If tobacco use is subjected to attack, these other behaviors should also be indicted, taxed and otherwise discouraged."
This document, and others like it now being discovered, may be useful in undermining the tobacco industry's oft-used legal "common knowledge" defense that "everyone knew" the dangers of smoking. Such knowledge may at one point have indeed been widespread (at least in developed countries), as people were starting en masse to cut cigarette consumption, eliminate secondhand smoke in work places and public places, fewer people were taking up smoking and more people were quitting entirely. But rather than allowing societies to slowly wean themselves off smoking (as trends indicated could likely have been the case), the tobacco industry orchestrated a massive, behind-the-scenes campaign to undermine the success resulting from widespread dissemination of public health information about the dangers of smoking.
Fields
- Quotes
BACKGROUND
In SAWP's first report to ICOSl (October 1977), it was pointed out that social acceptability challenges to the industry arise on three basic levels:
a. The public (passive) smoking level -- smoking is asserted to be socially unacceptable because it allegedly is damaging to the health of others who happen to be in the presence of smokers. During 1978, work on this public smoking level has been a central focus of SAWP's work.
b. The courtesy level -- smoking is alleged to be socially
unacceptable because it is annoying to others who happen to be in the presence of smokers...
c. The social costs level -- smoking is asserted to be socially unacceptable because it allegedly raises society's insurance, health care tax and other public costs. Smokers are asserted to be sick more often, require more medical treatment, and die earlier. They allegedly require others in society to pay higher taxes and insurance premiums to "subsidize" the social costs and expenses supposedly generated by smokers...
[Page 3]
KEY IMPLICATIONS FOR THE INDUSTRY
Given today's favorable climate and the ominous shape of the issue, SAWP perceives several very serious implications for the industry. The first is that "social costs" issues add a broad, new economic thrust and rationale to anti-smoking efforts. In practical terms, society would try to make smokers pay for alleged damages to society. While cigarette taxes are already high
in most jurisdictions, this new rationale would furnish a basis for raising them even higher. Smokers would pay these taxes not just to enjoy the pleasures of smoking, but to reimburse society. Paying higher taxes is one serious implication. Another is that corporate managers (as well as public leaders) could feel economic pressures and...incentives to join anti-smoking efforts. Today
all businesses are seeking ways to cut spiraling medical and hospitalization costs. If enough managers become convinced that anti-smoking efforts will help their company's profitability, then SAWP can visualize an avalanche of corporate-sponsored anti-smoking programs. If so, such programs could easily dwarf the present efforts carried out by governments and public interest groups. They could have more scope, more depth, and more persuasiveness. At some point in the future, directors of corporations may be asked to publicly justify their employee smoking policies. Shareholders who oppose smoking could open questions of fiduciary responsibility and force directors to explain why they haven't discouraged employees from smoking when doing so would apparently lower insurance costs and other related business expenses.
Considering just these two major implications, SAWP believes that the industry must begin to quickly and seriously address "social costs" issues...
[Page 4]
AVENUES TO EXPLORE FOR A COUNTERMEASURE STRATEGY
In considering strategic possibilities, there are three avenues that seem to be well worth exploring. At this stage, they are only possibilities. One or more of them could ultimately prove to be a deadend alley rather than an
avenue to effective countermeasures. However, they are not mutually exclusive; so perhaps one or more of the following would form the basis for industry
countermeasures:
1. Refute the charges - Demonstrate that the numbers and assertions are false; i.e., there are no "social costs", just bad "social accounting" and/or "bad statistics."
2. Put them in perspective and reduce them to absurdity - Demonstrate that overeating, coffee, sugar, lack of exercise, fats, alcohol, etc. are also alleged to generate "social costs." If tobacco use is subjected
to attack, these other behaviors should also be indicted, taxed and otherwise discouraged.
3. Benefits outweigh any costs - Demonstrate that even if smokers do generate extra "social costs," (which we deny), these are far outweighed by the social "benefits" they most certainly generate - i.e., smoking is concentrated in those age and occupational groups that are the true "producers" in our society, the ones who lead economic production and generate much of society's total economic output. In this approach the other economic benefits of the industry (taxes, jobs, etc.) would also be stressed.
NEXT STEPS
In SAWP's opinion, the seriousness of the issue and the industry's unorganized position demand that ICOSI's approach be strong and swift. Of necessity, it will be expensive. Within a short period, the industry must stake out a strong and secure position. This will require development of new resources, research materials, and reservoirs of expertise from several disciplines. The industry can draw on some of its traditional legal and health science resources, but it will also need inputs from economists, other social scientists, and statisticians. As quickly as possible, a position paper must be prepared; strategies decided upon; and countermeasures set into motion, particularly through national trade associations.
- Company
- British American Tobacco
- Imperial
- Carrera Rothmans
- Gallaher
- R.J. Reynolds
- Philip Morris
- Author
- ICOSI- International Committee on Smoking Issues
- SAWP- Social Acceptability Working Party
- Recipient
- ICOSI
- Region
- United States
- Europe
- United Kingdom
- Litigation
- Minnesota AG
- Operation/Project
- Social Acceptability
Industry efforts to counteract the decline in social acceptability of smoking worldwide.
- Countermeasures (Efforts by global tobacco indsutry to restore the social acc)
Through ICOSI, the global tobacco companies worked in concert to undermine public health education about tobacco use, reverse the declining social acceptability of smoking, slow quit rates and preserve smoking as normal and accepted human behavior.
- Named Organization
- International Committee on Smoking Issues (ICOSI)
Was formed to address and reverse the global decline in social acceptability of smoking occurring in the 1970s Consisted of the major tobacco manufacturers worldwide, was created to deal with the global decline in social acceptability of smoking. ICOSI was created
- SAWP, Social Acceptability Working Party (Subcommittee of ICOSI, Int'l Committe on Smoking Issues)
Monitored health groups, developed countermeasures to fight their efforts
- Type
- REPORT
- Subject
- Social Acceptability (Social acceptability of smoking)
The industry fought the decline in social acceptability of smoking through public relations campaigns, legislation, etc.
- social cost
- Countermeasures
Strategies & tactics the industry used to counter public health efforts to control tobacco
- industry activity
- industry influence
- industry response
- industry sponsored conference
- industry sponsored research
- industry strategy
- industry surveillance (Intelligence-gathering on public health forces)
Document Images
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SECTION V ~ r~,O~ ~,~',L-F~
ICOSI APPROACHES TO "SOCIAL COSTS" ISSUES
BACKGROUND
In SAWP's first report to ICOSl (October 1977), it was pointed out that
social acceptability challenges to the industry arise on three basic levels:
a. The public (passive) smoking level -- smoking is asserted
to be socially unacceptable because i~egedly is damaging to
the health of others who happen to be in the presence of smokers.
During 1978, work on this public smoking level has been a central
focus of SAWP's work.
b. The courtesy level -- smoking is alleged to be socially
unacceptable because it is annoying to others who happen to be in
the presence of smokers. The work that SAWP has done on the public
smoking level can be tied directly to any future ICOSI work on the
courtesy level.
c. The social costs level -- smoking is asserted to be socially
unacceptable because it allegedly raises society's insurance, health
care tax and other public costs. Smokers are asserted to be sick more
often, require more medical treatment, and die earlier. They allegedly
require others in society to pay higher taxes and insurance premiums
to "subsidize" the social costs and expenses supposedly generated by
smokers.
In SAWP's second report (February 1978), it was pointed out that social
acceptability issues on the social costs level were rising rapidly. SAWP
went on to recommend that ICOSI focus special efforts on "social costs" during
1979. ICOSI ratified SAWP's February 1978 recommendation and asked SAWP to
suggest appropriate ICOSI approaches to "social costs" issues.
EMERGENCE AND CURRENT STATUS OF THE ISSUE
"Social costs" attacks on the industry seem to have originated first in Sweden
in the 1960's. Since then, there have been a small, but growing number
of studies on various aspects of "social costs" These have appeared in
"
professional journals and government documents often in comparison with the
social costs of alcohol consumption. These studies remained largely unpublicized
until recently. Today, more and more opponents of smoking are beginning to
emphasize "social costs" themes..~.
This current emphasis on "social costs" comes at a time when taxpayers are
rising up in strong protest against taxes, costs of government, costs of medical
care and other social service expenses. Thus, for opponents of smoking, "social
costs" is clearly an idea whose time has come. Certainly "social costs" issues
are developing with even more strength and across an even wider front than SAWP
was able to predict as recently as last autumn in their October 1977 report to
ICOSI.
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IcosI APPROACHES TO "SOCIAL COSTS" ISSUES
CURRENT SHAPE OF THE ISSUE
The present shape that "social costs" issues are taking in public debates can
be gauged from statements made by Secretary Califano when he launched his most
recent attack against smoking in the U. S, The launching was made from a "social
costs" platform. Some Califano testimony before the U. S, Congress is typical
of statements being made by smoking opponents in many arenas in many countries.
Here is the shape of the issue as described by Califano.
"Cigarette smoking is harmful to individuals and is a
multimillion dollar public health problem for the Nation.
It is also a major problem for the Federal Government
which in fiscal 1.976 paid approximately $40 billion of
the Nation's $139 billion health bills--. .... "
"The economic toll that these diseases impose on the
country is enormous. It has been estimated that in 1975,
$5 to $7 billion were required to treatsmoking-
related illnesses. Another $12 to $18 billion were lost
in productivity in the workplace due to absentees as
related to smoking. These costs do not reflect wages
or productivity lost due to early death nor do they reflect
the cost of household fires--about 13% of which are
estimated to be related to smoking."
Notice four critical outlines in the shape of the issue as set out by Califano:
a. Smoking is characterized as a p~dblem of public finance
rather than personal lifestyle.
b. The argument against smoking is based on a strange amalgam
of unproven medical assumptions, dubious social accounting techniques,
unbalanced economic rationales, and untested assertions based on
statistical association.
c. Smoking is being held responsible for a large part of
today's high taxes, medical expenses and other social service costs.
d. No mention is made of any benefits generated by the
tobacco industry.
.... Smoking opponents in ~ther countries could be cited, but their arguments
would take the general outline as Califano's.
Government officials are not alone in trying to shape the "social costs"
issues. Many businesses are also doing it directly or indirectly. For example,
insurance companies in the U. S. are advertising that they give lower rates
to nonsmokers. Upon investigation this turns out to be more a marketing ploy
than an actuarial fact, but nonetheless, the advertisements continue. In
addition, U. S. asbestos manufacturers are attempting to have cigarettes taxed
to help pay compensation to disabled asbestos workers. Finally, some companies
and units of local government are refusing to hire smokers on the basis that
they generate extra expenses.
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ICOSI APPROACHES TO "SOCIAL COSTS" ISSUES
SAWP believes t~at the current shape of the issue is ominous, However, it
appears that the issue is still at a stage where the right kind of industry
response and countermeasure could influence the ultimate shape that the issue
takes in public discussion and debate.
KEY IMPLICATIONS FOR THE INDUSTRY
Given today's favorable climate and the ominous shape of the issue, SAWP
perceives several very serious implications for the industry. The first is
that "social costs" issues add a broad, new economic thrust and rationale to
anti-smoking efforts. In practical terms, society would try to make smokers
pay for alleged damages to society. While cigarette taxes are already high
in most jurisdictions, this new rationale would furnish a basis for raising
them even higher. Smokers would pay these taxes not just to enjoy the pleasures
of smoking, but to reimburse society.
Paying higher taxes is one serious implication.
Ano%her is that corporate managers (as well as public leaders) could feel
economic pressures and economic incentives to join anti-smoking efforts. Today
all businesses are seeking ways to cut spiraling medical and hospitalization
costs. If enough managers become convinced that anti-smoking efforts will help
their company's profitability, then SAWP can visualize an avalanche of corporate-
sponsored anti-smoking programs. If so, such programs could easily dwarf the
present efforts carried out by governments and public interest groups. They
could have more scope, more depth, and more persuasiveness. At some point in
the future, directors of corporations may be asked to publicly justify their
employee smoking policies. Shareholders who oppose smoking could open questions
of fiduciary responsibility and force directors to explain why they haven't
discouraged employees from smoking when doing so would apparently lower insurance
costs and other related business expenses.
Considering just these two major implications, SAWP believes that the industry
must begin to quickly and seriously address "social costs" issues.
CURRENT POSITION OF THE INDUSTRY ON "SOCIAL COSTS" ISSUES
Considering the strength, shape and implications of the issue, the industry's
current position is not a strong one. True,there is industry awareness that
the issue exists and some work done pointing out the tax, economic and job
benefits that the industry provides to society. Also the industry is aware
that social costs arguments against smoking are based on shaky ground. However,
there has been no systematic industry approach to the issue, no body of organized
research, no expertise, no experience in dealing with the issue in the public
arena. In other words, no strategy for countermeasures on "social costs" issues.
By contrast, when dealing with public smoking issues, the industry has had
a firm systematic grasp of all research studies, strong marshalling of experienced
legal talent, and much experience in publicly coping with the issue. In short,
the industry knew where it was coming from and where it would like to go. Not
so with "social costs" issues.
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ICOSI APPROACHES TO "SOCIAL COSTS" ISSUES
AVENUES TO EXPLORE FOR A COUNTERMEASURE STRATEGY
In considering strategic possibilities, there are three avenues that seem to
be well worth exploring. At this stage, they are only possibilities. One
or more of them could ultimately prove to be a deadend alley rather than an
avenue to effective countermeasures. However, they are not mutually exclusive;
so perhaps one or more of the following would form the basis for industry
countermeasures:
I. Refute the charges - Demonstrate that the numbers and assertions
are false; i.e., there are no "social costs", just bad "social accounting"
and/or "bad statistics."
2. Put them in perspective and reduce them to absurdity - Demonstrate
that overeating, coffee, sugar, lack of exercise, fats, alcohol, etc.
are also alleged to generate "social costs." If tobacco use is subjected
to attack, these other behaviors should also be indicted, taxed and other-
wise discouraged.
3. Benefits outweigh any costs - Demonstrate that even if smokers
do generate extra "social costs" '(which we deny), these are far outweighed
by the social "benefits" they most certainly generate - i.e., smoking is
concentrated in those age and occupational groups that are the true
"producers" in our society, the ones who lead economic production and
generate much of society's total economic output. In this approach
the other economic benefits of the industry (taxes, jobs, etc.) would
also be stressed.
NEXT STEPS
In SAWP's opinion', the seriousness of the issue and the industry's unorganized
position demand that ICOSI's approach be strong and swift. Of necessity, it
will be expensive. Within a short period, the industry must stake out a strong
and secure position. This will require development of new resources, research
materials, and reservoirs of expertise from several disciplines. The industry
can draw on some of its traditional legal and health science resources, but it
will also need inputs from economists, other social scientists, and statisticians.
As quickly as possible, a position paper must be prepared; strategies decided
upon; and countermeasures set into motion, particularly through national trade
associations.
I~ is reco~ended that ICOSI authorize SAWP to retain consultants, co~ission
research studies, involve company personnel, and take such other steps as are
needed to develop a "social costs" position paper, plus recommended strategies
and countermeasures for the industry. Included in this effort would be appro-
priate contacts with national trade associations and other traditional sources
of expertise for the industry.
SAWP believes that it should begin immediately on this work. It is estimated
that approximately $45,000 (U.S.) would be needed during the balance of 1978.
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ICOSI APPROACHES TO "SOCIAL COSTS" ISSUES
These funds would be used to contact and retain consultants for planning,
reviewing past work, defining the problem, firming up avenues for future
research, and developing detailed actions plans.
The bulk of the "social costs" work for ICOSl would be accomplished during 1979.
A final report outlining findings, conclusions, possible strategies, and counter-
measures recommendations would be presented to ICOSI in winter/spring 1980.
Prior to that, SAWP would provide ICOSI with periodic progress reports. Most
importantly, the research effort would generate a position paper on "social
costs" prior to the Stockholm World Conference in June 1979.
In addition to the $45,000 (U.S.) needed now, SAWP recommends that ICOSl also
make a 1979 budget appropriation of $330,000 (U.S.) to carry out the work
planned during the balance of 1978.
The $330,000 (U.S.) estimate is high. However, the problem is large and serious,
and the deadlines are pressing. Every effort will be made to reduce final cost
fugures below estimate. Commitments to spend the $330,000 (U.S.) would not
be made until SAWP checks its plans and proposed~ action program with ICOSI.
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