Abstract
This 1969 Brown & Williamson (B&W) document discusses using cigarette advertising to "counter the anti-cigarette forces" by including defensive editorial text in the ads. The document states,
"Doubt is our product, since it is the best means of competing with the 'body of fact' [linking smoking with disease] that exists in the mind of the general public. It is also the means of establishing a controversy...if we are successful in establishing a controversy at the public level, there is an opportunity to put across the real facts about smoking and health."
An educated guess is that this document was authored by R.A. Pittman, Senior Brand Marketing Supervisor at B&W from 1968-70, with help from B&W marketing executives John Blalock, Charles I. McCarty and Corny Muije. This assumption is based on a memo ordering the project written by J.W. Burgard, Executive Vice President of Sales and Public Relations at B&W in 1969. This memo has a Bates number adjacent to the "Smoking and Health Proposal" (Bates Number: 690010960/0961 URL: http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/sgy93f00)
The objectives of the proposal (found in another adjacent document) are remarkable for the callous attitude towards public health and the tragedy upon humanity that they represent:
"Objective No. 1: To set aside in the minds of millions the false conviction that cigarette smoking causes lung cancer and other diseases; a conviction based on fanatical assumptions, fallacious rumors, unsupported claims and the unscientific statements and conjectures of publicity-seeking opportunists.
Objective No. 2: To lift the cigarette from the cancer identification as quickly as possible and restore it to its proper place of dignity and acceptance in the minds of men and women in the marketplace of American free enterprise.
Objective No. 3: To expose the incredible, unprecedented and nefarious attack against the cigarette, constituting the greatest libel and slander ever perpetrated against any product in the history of free enterprise...
Objective No. 4: To unveil the insidious and developing pattern of attack against the American free enterprise system, a sinister formula that is slowly eroding American business with the cigarette obviously selected as one of the trial targets."
[Taken from Starting Bates Number: 690010962, URL: http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/tgy93f00)
Fields
- Notes
The ads discussed in these documents were developed. They were ads for KOOL cigarettes that contained editorial text about smoking and disease. The ads were called "Adios II with Side Copy" and "Adios II with Bottom Copy." Documents show B&W did extensive copy testing of these ads with focus groups:
Title: KOOL PRINT ADVERTISEMENTS "ADIOS IT WITH SIDE COPY""ADIOS IT WITH BOTTOM COPY"REPORT B+W-69-22 EXTENDED SERVICE
Document Date: 19690000
Document Type: MRPT, MARKETING REPORT;ADVE, ADVERTISEMENT;CHAR, CHART;ENVE, ENVELOPE;FILE, FILE FOLDER/BINDER COVERS/BLANK PAGES;FOOT, FOOTNOTES;OUTL, OUTLINE;QUES, QUESTIONNAIRE, ADVERTISEMENT;FORM;FILE;LIST;GRAPHIC;REPORT;CORRESPONDENCE
Bates Number: 690006218/6316
Secondary Bates Number: MRDMR196980;MRD6922
Page Count: 100
Collection: Brown and Williamson
Bookmark as: http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/enm40f00
2 Title: KOOL PRINT ADVERTISEMENTS "ADIOS II WITH SIDE COPY" "ADIOS II WITH BOTTOM COPY" REPORT B&W-69-22 EXTENDED SERVICE
Document Date: 19690000
Document Type: MRPT, MARKETING REPORT;CHAR, CHART;QUES, QUESTIONNAIRE, FORM;GRAPHIC;REPORT
Bates Number: 689016814/6922
Secondary Bates Number: MRDBW6922;MRD196980
Page Count: 109
Collection: Brown and Williamson
Bookmark as: http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/wxm40f00
We were unable to find actual copies of the ads or where they ran.
Thanks to Ray Goldstein of San Francisco for forwarding today's document, the "Smoking and Health Proposal."
- Quotes
[From the bottom of Bates Page 690010953]
In thinking over what we might do to improve the case for cigarettes, I have looked at the problerm somewhat like the marketing of a new brand. Here is a chart where I have defined the basic marketing elements which I see in the smoking and health problem. Our consumer I have defined as the mass public, our product as doubt, our message as truth -- well stated, and our competition as the body of anti-cigarette fact that exists in the public mind. We have chosen the mass public as our consumer for several reasons:
- This is where the misinformation about smoking and health has been focused.
- The Congress and federal agencies are already being dealt with--and perhaps as effectively as possible--by the Tobacco Institute.
- It is a group with little exposure to the positive side of smoking and health.
- It is the prime force in influencing Congress and federal agencies--without public support little effort would be given to a crusade against cigarettes. Doubt is our product since it is the best means of competing with the "body of fact" that exists in the mind of the general public. It is also the means of establishing a controversy. Within the business we recognize that a controversy exists. However, with the general public the consensus is that cigarettes are in some way harmful to the health. If we are successful in establishing a controversy at the public level, then there is an opportunity to put across the real facts about smoking and health. Doubt is also the limit of our "product". Unfortunately, we cannot take a position directly opposing the anti-cigarette forces and say that cigarettes are a contributor to goo health. No information that we have supports such a claim.
- Company
- Brown & Williamson
- Region
- United States
- Named Person
- Blalock, John V. (BW Public Relations Head; TI PR Committee)
B&W Executive: TI PR Committee
- Foote, Emerson (Ad exec.; Promoted Lucky Strikes in 1930s)
- Muije, Corny S. (BW Market Research Manager)
Manager, Market Research
- Yeaman, Addison Y. (BW VP & General counsel; CTR Chairman of Board)
General counsel for B&W. CTR Chairman/President 1975-1981
- Named Organization
- Tobacco Institute
- Litigation
- 10004026
- 10004045 05583
- 10003108 00933
- 10004026 04295
- 10004026 04660
- 10004042 11536
- 10004042 00069
- 10004013 00069
- 10004027 00015
- Type
- SPCH, SPEECH/PRESENTATION
- MEETING MATERIALS
- Subject
- Corporate strategy
- advertising campaign
- industry activity
- industry strategy
Document Images
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• I
SNLOKING AND HEALTH PROPOSAL
What we want to do this morning is to take a summary look at the
L---~/~------smoking and health question and then make a proposal to you for a B&W
project to counter the anti-cigarette farces. ~-
-JThis is a chronological table of smoking and health activitics, "Not all
the activities by any means• We have been selectivc in making up this
• chart -- just picked those events that caused headlines to be made and
probably left strong impressions with the public• As we look at it I
believe we can see how we became an harassed and restricted industry
~/~ and how we came to conflict with the awesome forces of the federal
government.
It is also a sort of key to the characteristics and processes involved in
the smoking and health question• Looking at the individual elements we
see... (eonlment).
To summarize the anti-cigarette activities I think we can say that:
First - They have managed to bring us from a simple
. conflict of attitudes to a state of condemnation and
severe restriction.
Second - Their efforts have been aggressive while ours
have been defcnsive.
Third - The anti activities are rather orderl~ -- almost
as if they had a plan working for them.
&l

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!
Fourth - Their activities are accelerating and becoming
znore damaging io us all the time ....
Over the past three weeks I have been reading vast amom]ts of material
from Mr. yeaman's and John Blaloekfs files and it has given me a
picture of what the anti-cigarette forces are like and what the pro-
cigarette forces are like. I think the antl-clgarette forcas can be
¢har$cterlzed as dedicated opportun~ists. They are quick to act and
seem to be totally unprincipled in the type of information th6y use to
• attac~the industry.
The pro force~, on the other hand, and ltm speaking primarily of the
Tobacco Institute, seem to be slow to act,)mainly defenstve~ and rather
narrow in the area of defense~. The Tobacco Institute has probably done
a good job for us in the area of politics and as an industry we also seem
to have done very well in turning out scientific information to counter
the anti-smoklng claims. There is no question, though, that we have
~.been inept i0 getting our side of the story.:]good though it raay be,
_.across to the news media and to the public• I an% convinced that the
nature of the institute, the way it is organized and the way it operates,
snakes it practically impossible for the Tobacco Institute to speak
effectively to the ~ews merlin. It has uo personality mad is not f~rnous, ~
It just can't compete with the anti-cigarette forces who can make their ]~
pronouncements through Emerson Foote or the.Surgeon General. Those
men have news value just on the basis of their names.

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This whole problem of getting our story across to the raass public
provokes tW1s q~estion: "Should B~/ t~ke sorae independent ~nd
unilateral action to counter the anti cigarette forces? ,r Arld ~'Carl we
afford it?"
What is the justification for taking unilateral aciinn? Here is a chart
that I think justifies such a program. It ~Kys we are losing our commercial
freedom. We are restricted in terms of ability to sell -- in colleges and
in vending machines. Our products are branded with a warning label.
Our ability to advertise has been attacked on all t~'onts and has consistently
deteriorated. First there were restrictions on health advertising imposed
by the Cigarette Advertising Code and the N. A. 1~. Code. [Yhese codes
also included restrictions regarding television time and prograln selection.
We have been classified as a public menace by the F. C.C. and are obliged
to suffer public eondemt~atlon along with litter bugs and forest fires. In
%he near f~It~Ire ~ve "¢~ill %~thdraw frOnl the brosdcas% medi%inl and already
pressures are growing to limit our advertising activities in print. Addition-
ally, nearly every state in the Union is ready to pounce on us with restrictive
legislation as soon as Congress opens the door on this possibility.
In thinking over what we might do to improve the case for cigarettes, I
have looked at the problern somewhat like the marketing of a new brand.
Here is a chart wb,ere I have defined the basic marketing elements which ~'I
I see in the smoking and health problera. Our consumer I have defined

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]
- 4 -
--as the mass public, our product as doubt, our message as truth --
well stated, and our compgtition as the body of anti-cigarette fact that
exists in the public mind.
We have chosen the mass public as our consumer for several reasons:
- This is where the misinformation about smoking
and health has been focused.
- The Congress and federal agencies are already
being dealt with -- and perhaps as effectively as
possible -- by the Tobacco Institute.
- It is a ~woup with little exposure to the positive
side of smoking and health.
- It is the prime force in influencing Congress and
federal agencies -- without public support little
effort would be given to a crusade against cigarettes•
~" Doubt is'our product since it is the best means of competing with the
"body of fact" that exists in the mind of the.general public• It is also
the means of establishing a controversy, Within the business we
recognize that a controversy exists. However, with the general public
the consensus is that cigarettes 8re in some way harmful to the health.
If we are 5~eessf~l in establishing ~ controversy ~t the public level,
then there is an opportunity to put across the real facts about smoking
and health. Doubt is also the lin~it of our "product". Unfor£unalely,
C

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- 5 -
we cannot take a position directly opposing the anti-cigarette forces
and say that cigarettes are a contributor to good health. No information
that we have supports such a claim.
Truth is our message because of its power to withstand a conflict and
sustain a controversy. If in our pro-cigarette efforts we stick to
well documented fact, we c~n dominate a controversy and operate wi~
the confidence of justifiable self-interest.~
Now, how can we get started on an independent program of action? Here
is one idea. I% is tentntive ~nd ske%chy but it is ~ Starting place. I donlt
even have a time element in this but that comes later when a thorough
study of this subject is made and a detailed plan developed around this
idea ... (comment on pl~n).
We have seen research this morning which indicates that there is at
least a potential for using put owll ads to eommunlcste the other side of
the clgarette story. Before putting this type effort into practice, however,
we ~vould want to bc absolutely certain that there is no damage to our
advertising or to the consumer ~eceptance of our brands. So the first
step for the ~mmediate future would he research. We are recommending
basic research to unearth specific problems in smohing and health that
we can deal directly with.
Corny Muije will describe the type of research we think is needed . , ,
l
(Corny Muijeh
0
&1

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L
JAThat was shown today specifically demonstrates what happend when a
certain type of information was supplied with the KOOL Adios IIad.
indications are that the KOOL copy effectiveness was enhanced• We need
more evidence that this is true. Furthernlore~ we need fo establish
whether this solely hinges'on the Adios II ad and the specific body copy
--used.
Also, is this an effective approach when the information is supplied with
ads for VICEROY, RALEIGII, and BELAIR?
For these reasons we are proposing what I will call Phase I of this
research program . . . (Chart I and comment).
Since we, at this time, do not know which RALEIGH and BELAIR adver-
tising copy will be in future use -- KOOL and VICEROY testing should
precede RALEIGH and BELAIR testing.
The testing cost of Phase I should not exceed $60, 000. It would be
substantislly less if results o~ KOOL and VICEROY were unfavorable
and we therefore cancelled the RALEIGH and BELAIR portion.
Success in Phase I should lead to Phase II . . . (Chart II and comment).
It is essential that we ascertain w}ich type of.anti-cigarette information
has most affected the smoking public. What claimed health hazard's are
currently accepted by the general public.
A gener~1 survey ~vith detailed questioning should establish %his.
0~

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/
- 7 -
During Phase II we should also investigate consumer reaction to at
leas{ three distinct anti-cigarette approsehes. In addition, consumer
re~ctiot~s to maybe ~. dozen specific anti-cigarette claims could be probed.
The purpose of Phase II is to establish v~hieh pzsi information rand %vhich
current anti-cigarette claims are most damaging, prom this we should
learn which information should be of greatest interest to the public. We
could then tailor ou~ efforts more precisely to achieve the greatest effect.
Without specific detail the cost of Phase II cannot be estimated accurately.
But, assuming a general survey of 1,000 respondcnts, copy research on
three commercials and copy claim research on twelve claims, the costs
~" for Phase II should not excced $40, 000.
Successful completion of Phases I and II leads us to Phase III -- test
me.rket or test m~rkcts . . . (Chart lll and comment).
None of the research, up to %his ?oint, ~vill have le% us know the effect
of sustained repeated exposure of B&W cigarette ads with body copy
of different content.
prior to a nation-wide eoln*nitment, one or more test markets would
be called for.
At this point it is impossible to say whether one or morc test markets
would be desirable.
~J

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Regardless, in each instance we recommend that a consumer survey be
,conducted prior to the start of the test market and anotheT o~e at the end
of the test market.
A comparison of the pre and post surveys will enable us to evaluate
the effect of the total campaign,
We would like to have the Executive Committeers approva/ to initiate the
research program that Corny has jusl explained and at the same time
to start a task force study of the Smoking and health quest/on and
develop a detailed plan of action for B&W.
Such a plan would cover:
- Sources of information about sxaoking and health.
- The selectlon and clearance of information to be
used by B&W.
- The developnleni of new information about smoking
and health.
- Means of anticipating and countering the release
of misinfornxation.
- Channels other than our own advertising for getting
messages to the public.
- Ways to use and perhaps focus industry efforts in
support of our own program.
CD
CD
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- 9 -
' - Agency participation in the program.
- Internal administration and implementation of the
program.
- Thorough evaluation of potential advantages and dis-
advantages of public action on B&W and its brands.