Abstract
This presentation by the German cigarette industry begins by saying it "...would become a deadly threat to the long-term survival of our industry if passive smoking could be proven to be a real health hazard." It discusses the effectiveness of the ties the German industry forged with "eminent" independent scientists and describes how these affiliations gave the industry "credit and trust in its responsibility and sincerity" in German society and politics. It describes how the German cigarette industry then used these ties to undermine the Health Ministry's effort to pass a law protecting non-smokers from secondhand smoke (in 1983), and how the industry succeeded in changing the originally-proposed law into a "programme of mere recommendations with no binding effects." The presentation describes how these efforts further helped the German cigarette industry marginalize health advocacy groups in Germany:
"Industry's tactic to isolate them [public health advocates] from the serious scientific community and to uncover their quasi-religion fanaticism proved to be successful."
The presentation describes the German cigarette industry's initiation of a public relations campaign to preserve a "positive consumption climate" in inns and restaurants, and a campaign to preserve the social acceptability of smoking by running a "smokers welcome" campaign on taxi cabs. A final tactic described is that of putting on a entertaining public forum in a "wine restaurant" which "experts" were brought in to discuss the social benfits if smoking. Some 80 "high ranking" public personalities were invited to the event, including the State Ministers of Finance and Economics. The paper links this activity back to the original INFOTAB project, the organization of global tobacco manufacturers who came together to fight the problem of declining social acceptability worldwide.
Fields
- Quotes
Ladies and Gentlemen,
You all know the importance of the "Passive Smoking" issue for our prime PR-problem which is the social acceptability of smoking. The war declared on smoking and the tobacco manufacturers at the 5th World Conference on Smoking and Health in Winnipeg would become a deadly threat to the long-term survival of our industry if passive smoking could be proven to be a real health hazard. Our adversaries could easily mobilize not only the non-smokers themselves but also the media and the law-makers to cry out for severe restrictions on smoking on behalf of the non-smoking "victims." Actually, this is exactly the strategic base-line our anti-tobacco lobby in Germany followed since the beginning of the seventies...
[From Page 2]
The government then concluded that inspite of lacking scientific evidence "it would be irresponsible to wait until passive smoking had in fact produced sickness, absenteeism, and death." This was -- though in a rather cryptic way -- practically a political declaration of will to work on a non-smokers' protection law. The German cigarette industry, of course, could not let this dangerous development simply go on...
- Company
- Philip Morris
- Author
- Verband der Cigarettenindustrie
- Recipient
- Participants in the National Manufacturers Association Workshop in Washington, D.C. 20-22 September 1983
RegionGermany
Named OrganizationAmerican Forces Network
Bavarian Academy Occupational Social
Board of Directors
Chamber of Commerce
Federal Health Ministry
Federal Health Office
German Hotel + Restaurants Assn
German Parliament
German Society for Occupational Medicine
Hessian Parliament
International Tobacco Information Inc. (INFOTAB) (Int'l Tobacco Information Clearinghouse for industry, NMAs)ICOSI (International Commission on Smoking Issues) was formed around 1978. It was reorganized in 1980 or 1981 as INFOTAB. Infotab is an information clearinghouse that collects articles and legislatlve information. Data Is funnelled to Infotab by members of the industry. The founding companies are R.J. Reynolds International, BAT, Philip Morris, Reemtsma, Rothmans, Imperial andGallaher. The last three companies dropped in and out. A company had to give three years' notice to resign. BAT gave its notice to resign in late 1987 in conjunction with B&W's resignation from TI. BAT and B&W's resignations were partially because of the Barclay controversy. The companies pay the Infotab dues, but the beneficiaries include the national manufacturing associations(NMAs) . NMAs worldwide receive newsletters from Infotab. They can call and get information on various topics. G.C. Hargrove of BAT was on Infotab.
Munich Medical Weekly
State Ministers of Finance + Economics
Tobacco Forum
Verband
Winnipeg Conference
5th World Conference on Smoking + Health
LitigationStmn/Produced
Named PersonGarfinkel
Hirayama, Takeshi, M.D., M.P.H. (Inst. of Preventive Oncology, Japan)Produced a major study that linked secondhand smoke to an increased risk of lung cancer
Lehnert
Trichopoulos
TypeSPCH, SPEECH, PRESENTATION
SubjectSocial Acceptability (Social acceptability of smoking)The industry fought the decline in social acceptability of smoking through public relations campaigns, legislation, etc.
social behavior
social influence
legislation
secondhand smoke strategy (Corporate strategy to deal with ETS issue)
Document Images
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7.1
PASSIVE SMOKING
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PRESENTATION
BY THE
VERBAND DER CIGARETTENINDUSTRIE
AT THE OCCASION OF THE NMA'S WORKSHOP IN WASHINGTON D.C.
20. - 22. SEPTEMBER 1983
Ladies and Gentlemen,
You all know the importance of the "Passive Smoking" issue
for our prime PR-problem which is the social acceptability
of smoking. The war declared on smoking and the tobacco manu-
facturers at the 5th World Conference on Smoking and Health
in Winnipeg would become a deadly threat to the long-term
survival of our industry if passive smoking could be proven to be
a real health hazard. Our adversaries could easily mobilize
not only the non-smokers themselves but also the media and
the law-makers to cry out for severe restrictions on smoking
on behalf of the non-smoking "victims". Actually, this is
exactly the strategic base-line our anti-tobacco lobby in
Germa ny followed since the beginning of the seventies. In
a so-called emergency programme against cigarette smoking
published in early 1971 they asked among other things for
legal protection of the non-smokers under the pretext of health
damages caused to them by passive smoking. This specific claim
got a wide media reception. In a rather frank statement a year
later the "antis" revealed the true political rationale of
their using the passive smoking issue. They regarded it as

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a tool to protect the non-smoker, to reduce the consumption
of the smoker, and to denounce smoking as a major source of
air pollution, The stage was set and soon passive smoking be-
came an issue in official health politics which was not by
chance because the anti-smoking lobby at that time had a strong
influence on the Health Ministry.
In 1-974 the German Federal Government had to answer a Parlia-
mentary Question on the health effects of cigarette smoking.
It was no surprise to the insider that as a by-product passive
smoking had also been dealt with at some length. The government
then concluded that inspite of lacking scientific evidence
"it would be irresponsible to wait until passive smoking had
in fact produced sickness, absenteeism, and death". This was
- though in a rather cryptic way - practically a political de-
claration*of will to work on a non-smokers' protection law.
The German cigarette industry, of course, could not let this
dangerous development simply go on. However, the industry was
well aware of the fact that it could not speak up for itself
being a party in a question which was regarded to be a scientific
one. But it could mobilize independent scientists to take up
the issue and dispute the effects of passive smoking. This was
only possible because the German industry pursued and still does
pursue a policy of co-operation with the scientific community out-
sioe the industry. This had given it credit and trust in its respo.,-
sibility and sincerity. It was on this basis that in an open
dispute between the anti-smoking lobby and those serious N
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scientists the German Society for Occupational Medicine in o
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1977 took the side of science and disputed the health effects
of passive smoking because of lack of evidence. Since there
were most alarming signals from inside the Health Ministry
that a draft law on non-smokers' protection was in preparation
the industry decided to have the issue of passive smoking de-
bated on a high level scientific conference in Munich in 1977.
The official organizer was the Bavarian Academy for Occupational
.
and Social Medicine. The active participants were eminent
medical scientists and lawyers. The conference was attended
by high ranking personalities of the health scenery including
health officials from the Ministry. As a result it was con-
firmed that passive smoking was not harmful to the non-smoker
and hence no special legislative action was needed. This result
did impress the Health Ministry. The intended law was changed
into a programme of mere recommendations with no binding effects.
Even in its official language the government abandoned its
former position. When asked in 1980 whether passive smoking
would cause lung cancer in non-smokers the Health Ministry's
spokesman in Parliament answered that the actual state of
epidemiological research did not support such a relationship.
This answer reflected at the same time a fading influence of
the anti-smoking lobby on the Ministry. Industry's tactic to
isolate them from the serious scientific community and to
uncover their quasi-religious fanatism proved
to be successful. The debate on passive smoking heated up again
when in early 1981 HIRAYAMA published his findings. They got
wide and spectacular media coverage not only in scientific
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papers but in the public press as well. They made the cover
stories in the most influential weekly magazines of "stern"
and "Spiegel". Industry's immediate reaction was to counter
this attack with an ad running in the most important and
influential dailies and citing those scientists who disputed
HIRAYAMA's results. The headline of the ad said: "What you
could not read in stern". Meanwhile GARFINKEL published his
study. With his results in hands which contradicted HIRAYAMA's
industry persuaded the Munich Medical Weekly, one of the most
renowned German medical journals, to pick up the controversy.
After giving both side a chance to present its case the story
ended with the authoritative conclusion of Prof. LEHNERT, then
head of the German Society for Occupational Medicine,who stated
that no proof has been offered that passive smoking increases
the risk of lung cancer. This, for the time being, did neutralize
the impact of HIRAYAMA's findings, However, industry is well
aware of the fact that this state is in a very delicate ba-
lance and that only further co-operation with serious scientists
can help to stabilize the situation. So industry by its research
branch engaged itself in a research programme on passive smoking
done by the highest health authority in Germany which is the
Federal Health Office in Berlin. This co-operation, though
rather new, is bearing already some fruit: In a recent state-
ment on passive smoking in the Hessian Parliament the Hessian
State Government cited from a letter of the Federal Health Office
to the Federal Health Ministry. It said that inspite of the
findings of HIRAYAMA and TRICHOPOULOS there is not sufficient
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evidence to support the assumption that passive smoking causes
lung cancer in non-smokers. To further strengthen this view
industry has successfully persuaded renowned medical organi-
zations of occupational and social medicine in Germany and
Austria to hold a joint scientific workshop on passive smoking
in April next in Vienna. Hopefully this workshop will turn out
as a replica of the Munich Conference in 1977.
The health aspect of passive smoking is only half of the story.
There is another side of the same phenomenon, namely
the annoyance aspect, which turns the issue
of passive smoking into one of public smoking. As the Winnipeg
Conference only recently demonstrated there is a growing ten-
dency among the anti-tobacco lobby to shift the problem of
passive smoking to this social aspect under the heading of
non-smokers' rights. Perhaps they feel that it might be difficult
to get further scientific backing for their course. Consequently
they concentrate on the annoyance aspect proclaiming the right
to breathe unpolluted smoke-free air. This switch of topic opens
a new battle ground which lies in the political and legal area.
One cannot deny the fact that tobacco smoke might be an annoyance:
Yo can see the tobacco smoke filling a room puff by puff, you
can smell it, your eyes and nose might even be irritated, you
can see the butts lying everywhere around and, of course, there
is the ugly view of an over-filled ashtray. Now, if you
were a non-smoker you
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may ask indeed why a small bunch of addicts - and smokers
are a minority, and their habit is often understood as
addiction - should be entitled to spoil your environment
and why you should tolerate this. Although there is no such
basic right in our law like a right to breathe unpolluted air
the notion seems by far too attractive and tempting not to be
taken into account even by high court judges. In a recent case
where a city councillor of a small city council in Northrhine-
Westfalia asked for a smoking ban during the sessions the high
administrative court of Northrhine-Westfalia ruled that smoking
might be banned if only one of the city councillors asked for
it on grounds that he personally felt annoyed by the smoke.
This verdict is still open for appeal but it shows the fasci-
nation of the issue which is even greater to politicians and
lawmakers.
To cope with this problem our industry decided to follow a
double-strategy: On one hand we try to show that smokers - though
admittedly being in a minority's position - are one of the bigges,
and respectable minorities within the community, so that neither
judges nor lawmakers could simply overgo their rights. On the
other hand we try to show that smoking is a deep-rooted cultural
habit with eminent social benefits and at the same time a source
of individual enjoyment.
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May I now briefly give you some examples of how the industry
translated this basic philosophy into PR-actions. In early
1982 we were alarmed by certain attempts within the catering
trade to intensify the promotion of non-smoker facilities in
inns and restaurants. This would have had fatal PR-consequences
for the tobacco industry. There are few places where smoking
is so widely and unanimously accepted and where there is such
a positive consumption climate. In a market survey which we
commissioned we could prove that smokers spend more money of
their personal budget to go into inns and restaurants than non-
smokers. This was a persuasive argument for the German
hotel and restaurants' association to start a campaign under
the motto "Smokers are better guests". They presented the re-
sults of the market research at the occasion of the association's
annual meeting in Hamburg and at various press conferences there-
after. The association furthermore publicly endorsed to a policy
that non-smoker facilities - having been proven as an economic
failure - should not be promoted and that every government
recommendation in this direction would be rejected. There was
a wide press coverage. Practically all comments were in favour
of this campaign so that it got strong public support, This en-
couraged us to extend a little bit on this line and to help
establish Germany's first tobacco inn called "Fidibus".
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Fidibus is the ancient name of the wooden span with which
you light up a pipe or a cigarette. The interior of this inn
is decorated in the style of the Golden Twenties and all to-
bacco oriented. A highly classified tobacco shop where you
can get your own pipe tobacco mixture is integrated in
the ensemble of the inn. Again the media coverage at the
opening of this inn was enormous. Fears that the concept
of this inn might be misunderstood as a new form of smoker's/
non-smoker's apartheid proved to be groundless. The idea was
unanimously welcomed in the public,and much to our satisfaction
the tobacco inn is up to now an economic success.
Another campaign which followed very much the same line is
the taxi-drivers' campaign "Smokers welcome". It started in
March this year and will run throughout the rest of it. The
basis for this campaign was, again, a market survey which
showed that smokers spend more money on taxi-driving than ~
0
non-smokers. With this result at hand we persuaded several a
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important regional taxi-drivers' associations to pitch for ~
this target group in this special promotional effort. The ti
pre-requisites for our success were favourable: On one hanc,
the taxi-drivers are suffering a severe economic crisis, on
the other hand they offer the only public transportation system
where smoking is allowed - at least in smokers' cabs. The taxi-
drivers' associations in turn asked their members who drive
smokers' cabs to openly advertise for their cabs by putting
the smiling smoker's sticker on it which we provided for.

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As I told you already the first campaign started in March
this year in Frankfurt, with the Berlin association following
on the lst September and the Hamburg and Munich taxi-drivers
in October of this year. The media reaction in Frankfurt which
was a sort of a pilot project was inspite of some critics over-
whelmingly favourable to this campaign and got wide attention.
Even the American Forces Network reported on it. And in our
leading daily BILD-Zeitung with a circulation of 6.4 million
the action was welcomed with a headline over
the full page reading "In Frankfurt's taxis again: 'Smokers
welcome' ". To get support among the taxi-drivers the taxi-
drivers' association advertised the campaign in its members'
journal with a series of testimonials of those who had already
taken part in the action. According to a quick survey we did
in Frankfurt the ratio of smokers' taxis showing the pro-smoker
sticker is by now as high as those bearing the non-smoking sign.
While it is much too early to juage the second campaign in Berlin
we find it encouraging that at the beginning of it
about 2.000 drivers of smoking cabs declared themselves ready
to participate. Of course, this action was and still is not
without any risk. When we discussed it for the first time
there were some reservations about a possible public outcry
in the media. However, up to now these reservations seem to
be unfounded. To my mind this could be explained with the fact
that in Germany we have a public climate of moderation con-
cerning smoking issues. Great part of it we owe to our constant
basic press and PR-work which, so to speak, prepares the soil
where such PR-actions could grow favourably:
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Now let me turn to a last PR-G-ction in the field of public
smoking. It will take place on the 7th October of this year
in the town of Treves. It is called "Tobacco Forum" and
is a discussion between experts about the social benefits
of smoking. The format of this evening event is a mixture
between a classical talk-show and some elements of entertain-
ment. It is hosted by the President of the Chamber of Commerce
of Treves and it will take place in the comfortable atmosphere
of a wine restaurant. Invited are some 80 guests of high ranking
public personalities including the State Ministers of Finance
and Economics, The Verband will be represented by members of
its Board of Directors. The whole idea of this Tobacco Forum
goes back to an original INFOTAB project which the Verband
tried to adapt to the German situation. Hopefully it will
bring over the basic message that in an atmosphere of mutual
tolerance,which is a corner stone of modern mass society,
smokers and non-smokers can live together peacefully,
Ladies and gentlemen, this is the end of my presentation,
Thank you very much for your attention.
