Abstract
Project Rainbow" was conceived by Philip Morris' lawyers in 1990-91 in the wake of the Rose Cipollone case in the United States. The idea was to pass federal legislation that would confer immunity on the tobacco industry from future personal injury lawsuits in exchange for accepting severe marketing and advertising restrictions--and even a total ban--on advertising and promotion of tobacco products.
The tobacco industry has long felt that increasingly severe restrictions on advertising, and even a total ban on all forms of advertising and promotion of cigarettes, was inevitable. This document makes it clear, though, that they would not concede to such restrictions without extracting something very valuable in return.
[From Page 3, Bates No. 2023027867]:
"Clearly, if we felt it was inevitable that Congress is likely to pass an ad ban or other major restrictions on advertising in the future, then it would make sense to seek a legislative compromise now while we still have bargaining power and leverage..."
Among other things, PM considered Project Rainbow as a way to defuse growing criticism of the company and the tobacco industry as a whole:
[From page 3, Bates No. 2023027867]:
"II. Possible Objectives of Project Rainbow
...D. To reduce the level of criticism directed toward Philip Morris and the rest of the industry... the elimination or severe restriction of cigarette advertising would diminish one of the principal focal points of our antagonists' criticism. This could lead to a diminution of the attacks against us and of the level of hostile rhetoric..."
Philip Morris was prepared in 1991 to accept a total ban on advertising: [From Page 4, Bates No. 2023027868]:
"Bill Campbell has some concerns about agreeing to major concessions that might hamper our marketing efforts. Nevertheless, he and the other members of the working group are prepared to recommend all of the concessions set forth on the attachment, including a total ban on advertising and event promotions -- provided that any ban be phased in over a five-year period."
This memo shows that PM has long recognized the tremendous value that society and governments put on strong advertising restrictions--or even a total ban--on the advertising and promotion of tobacco products. That value is derived from the tremendous amount of suffering and death that society could be spared if the industry ceased promoting their deadly products. Clearly PM knows the damage they do to mankind by continuing to advertise and promote their products, and how desperately society would like them to stop. But this memo points out that PM will not stop advertising and promoting cigarettes unless they get major concessions in return.
This is a particularly important point now, during efforts to pass the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control. The U.S. government is claiming that a complete ban on tobacco advertising may violate the U.S. Constitution. Interestingly, nowhere in today's memo does Mr. Bring, senior counsel for PM, state a concern that a ban on advertising would violate the company's rights under U.S. Constitution. It only discusses how the company would accept a ban on advertising in return for concessions by government to protect its business.
Fields
- Notes
Information on Project Rainbow was first posted on Doc Alert on 23 April 2001.
- Quotes
[From Page 1, Bates No. 2023027865]:
This memorandum and the attachment are being sent to you in anticipation of our meeting on February 4 to discuss Project Rainbow... Essentially, we have agreed to recommend to you that we initiate steps to explore with appropriate Congressional leaders the possibility of achieving a legislative compromise in this session which would, with our acquiescence, impose significant future restrictions, on cigarette advertising, and event promotions, in return for which Congress would, in the same legislation, reaffirm the preemption of alleged tort claims related to smoking...We would also anticipate a five-year period of "legislative peace" with respect to marketing issues.
[From Page 2, Bates No. 2023027866]:
Possible Objectives of Project Rainbow
We have identified four possible objectives of Project Rainbow; they are listed below...
A. Reaffirmation of Preemption -- We believe that this is the most important objective and the only one which would justify making significant advertising and promotion concessions...
B. To forestall legislative action that would be at least as bad or worse than the concessions we are contemplating...
C. To secure a competitive advantage...
D. To reduce the level of criticism directed toward Philip Morris and the rest of the industry...
[From Page 4, Bates No. 2023027868]:
III. Recommendation
Attached to David Greenberg's memorandum is an appendix which sets forth three possible scenarios, including a description of the specific concessions that will likely be required under each scenario. The working group has reached a consensus as to the concessions we should be willing to make in return for a reaffirmation of preemption and a five-year period of "legislative peace" with respect to advertising and marketing restrictions. The working group is not unanimous in its recommendations. One member, Guy Smith, believes it would be a mistake for us to offer any concessions that are not absolutely necessary at this time. In addition, Bill Campbell has some concerns about agreeing to major concessions that might hamper our marketing efforts. Nevertheless, he and the other members of the working group are prepared to recommend all of the concessions set forth on the attachment, including a total ban, on advertising and event promotions -- provided that any ban be phased in over a five-year period.
- Company
- Philip Morris/Altria Group
- Author
- Bring, Murray H. (PM Attorney, Sr. VP & Counsel, Board of Directors)
Senior Vice President and General Counsel of PM, 1994; former partner of Arnold & Porter in Washington, D.C. Defended PM in the Cipollone case.
- Recipient
- Maxwell, Hamish (PM President c.1984)
Took over at time of Cippolone. Cleaned house. Carried company into a strong defensive position.
- Murray, R. William "Bill" (PM Pres. & CEO, PM Companies Inc.)
President and Chief Operating Officer, Philip Morris Companies Inc., USA. Served on Board of Directors for PM from 1987-89. Vice Chairman of Philip Morris Companies in 1990. Australian.Was President and CEO in 1992; Chairman 1994.
- Named Organization
- RJR, R.J.Reynolds
- Supreme Court
- PM, Philip Morris
- TI, Tobacco Inst
- Congress
- Type
- MEMO, MEMORANDUM
- Litigation
- Okag/Privilege Withdrawn
- Okag/Produced
- Named Person
- Smith, Guy L. IV (VP of Corp. Affairs at PM c.'85-90; Chair, TI Communications)
Guy Smith was employed with PMI. Smith was Chairman of the TI Communications Committee. (Source: CNM Tobacco Companies Personnel List). Headed PR company "Smith Worldwide" c. 1996.
- Murray, R. William "Bill" (PM Pres. & CEO, PM Companies Inc.)
President and Chief Operating Officer, Philip Morris Companies Inc., USA. Served on Board of Directors for PM from 1987-89. Vice Chairman of Philip Morris Companies in 1990. Australian.Was President and CEO in 1992; Chairman 1994.
- Campbell, William Ian (PM, CEO and President, 1986, & 1991-95)
VP of PM Inc. from 1984 to 1985. President and CEO of PM in 1986 and then again from 1991 to 1995. He was on the Board of Directors for Philip Morris, Inc. from 1986 to 1987 and then again from 1992 to 1995. He stated, "I believe that nicotine is not addictive, yes."
- Cipollone, Rose Defrancesco (Lung Cancer Victim, Plaintiff in Cipollone v. Liggett))
- Dingle
- Gerstner
- Goldberg, M.
- Greenberg, David I. (PM Gov't Affairs VP 1990, VPCorp. Affairs, PM EEMA Region 9)
Vice President PM USA 1989
- Maxwell, Hamish (PM President c.1984)
Took over at time of Cippolone. Cleaned house. Carried company into a strong defensive position.
- Rose
Document Images
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PHIiUP MORRIS COIWIPANIES INC. IN'TER~~-OFFICE CO'RRESPONDENiCE -
' PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL 120 PARK AWENUE, NEW YORK, N.Y. 1100175i92
TO: Messrs. H1. Maxwell DATE: January 24, 1991
R. W. Murray
FROM: Murray H. Bring -.17z)
REJ Ely Eu.
SUeUECt: PROJECT RAINBOW
JdN', 2'ai 1991
H'. W: MURRAY
PM C©MPAiM3;") INC.
This memorandum and the attachment are.being sent to you in
anticipationi of our meeting, on February 4' to discuss Project
Rainbow. The working, group, consisting of Messrs. Campbell,
Goldberg, Greenberg, Smith and myself, hashad two meetings, and'we
have developed a consensus about how we shouldiproceed. A proposedi
plan of action is set forth in the attached memorandum that has
been prepared by David Greenberg.
Essentially, we have agreed to recommend to you that' we
initiate steps to explore with appropriate Congressional leaders
the possibility of achieving a legislative compromise in this
Session, which would, with our acquiescence, impose significantt
future resttrictions on cigarette advertising and event promotions,
in return: for which Congress would, in the same legislation,
reaffirm the preemption of alleged tort claims related to smoking..
We wouldialso anticipate a, five-year period of "legislative peace"
with respect to marketing issues. This recommendation is
conditioned oni our first being able to, persuade Reynolds to, join us
in this effort. Accordingly, if' you concur, the next step in the
process should be for us to contact Reynolds at a very high level
( e cr. , Maxwell to Gerstner) , to determine whether they are prepared
to cooperate with us in this undertaking.
For reasons detailed in Greenberg's memorandum, time is of
the essence, since the strategy, if it is to be successful, would
require passage of the legislation prior to an anticipated Supreme
Court diecision, on preemption toward the end of this year, assuming
that the Court agrees to review the Cipollone case. (If the Court
should deny review in Cipollone,, the time pressure would be
relieved, and we would probably be focusing! on a two-year
legislative time frame. We should know whether the Court will
review CiAolloney by mid-March. However, because.we cannot afford
tolwaste!approximately two months until the Court acts, we should
make the contact with Reynolds as quickly as possible, assuming you
decide that we should go forward at all.)
By way of background, the following is a brief summary of the
principal conclusioms we have reached thus far:
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Messrs. H. Maxwell
R. W. Murray
January 24, 1991
Page - 2 -
I
Underlvina Cbnsiderations
A. Although the social and political environment with,
respect to smoking is still hostile:, the situation doess
not appear to be cnuite as bleak as it did a year ago when,
consideration of Project Rainbow was initiated.
Nevertheless, we recognize that we are facing a volatile
situation and that the environment could deteriorate more
rapidly almost any time.
B. The industry probably has more political leverage t'han, we
previously thought with respect to some of', the
concessions we are: considering. Some concessions thatt
may not be very important to us are probably quite
important to our antagonists (,e.cr.,, bans on vending
machines and sampling) . Therefore, we may be able to
achieve a compromise without offering th~e most we are
willinqto concede.
C. Image advertisingi and some event promotions are extremely
important to ourr marketing plans and capabilities; they
may be more important to us than to our competitors.
Accordingly, we should be willing to make significant
concessions in these areas only if we get something
equally significant in return, such as a reaffirmation of
preemption.
D~. We must assess any possible concession in terms of the
international implications it may have.
II. Possible O'bjectives of Proiect Rainbow
We have: identified four possible objectives of Project
Rainbow; they are listed below in d~escending order of'
importance and priority:
A. Reaffirmation of Preemntio,n -- We believe that this is
the most important objective and the only one which wouldd
justify making significant advertising, and promotion
concessions. David Greenberg believes that we stand at
leas.t a 50/50 chance of accomplishing this obiectiye if
we move quickly and are prepared, along with Reynolds, to
make major concessions. ~
~
~.
CJ
~
~
f~
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Messrs. H. Maxwell
R. V. Murray
January 24, 1991
Page - 3 -
J
B~. To forestall learislativeaction, that would beatleastasbad'or worse than the concessions we are
contemAlatina.
-- Clearly, if we felt it was.inevitable that Congress is
likely tolpass an ad ban or other major restrictions on
advertising in the future, then, it would make sense to
seek a legislative compromise now while we still have
bargiaining, power and leverage. However, David Greenberg
does not believe that.Congress is likely to adbpt an ad
ban or impose other onerous advertising limitations
within the next few years. Accordingly, this objective
is presently of limited importance.
C. To secure.a competitive advantaae. -- It is difficult to
assess whether a legislative compromi~se involving
significant restrictions: advertising and promotions is
likely to providle Philip Morris with a competitive
advantage. That might be the case if we thought that
Congress might impose those restrictions in any event
before we hadi fulily implementedi a competitive strategy
designed to!comb.at the threat from Camel and to bolster
the growth of Marlboro. However, Bill Campbell believes
that we should be able to! implement such, a strategy
within the time frame that David Greenberg thinks
Congress is likely to take such, action. Moreover, if it
were obvious that the concessions we are proposing would
result in a significant competitive advantage for Philip
Morris, then, it is extremely unlikely that Reynolds
would be willing to j'oin with us in the project.
Accordingly, we do not believe that this objective would
justify undertaking this project.
D. To!reduce the level of criticism!directed'toward Philip
Morris and the rest of the: indiustry.. -- We db not
believe that a: legislative compromise involving
"~ significant advertising andi promotion restrictions is
ke u
~' likel
t
mo
e
la
eith
i
Co
i
y
o ma
s
popu
er
r
r
n
ngress or
n
the country generally. However, the elimination or
severe restriction of cigarette advertising would
diminish one of the principal focal points of our
antagonists' criticism. This couldilead to a diminution
of the attacks against us and of the level of' hostile
rhetoric. However, we believe that any such result is
too speculative to warrant, by itself, the initiation of
Proj'ect Rainbow.
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Messrs. H. Maxwell
R. W. Murray
January 24!, 1991
Page - 4 -
i/
Accordingly, we conclude that the only objective which is
specific and tangible enough to justify our, going forward is the
first objective of trying to obtain a reaffirmation of preemption.
III. Recommendation
Attached to David Greenberg's memorandum,is an appendix whichh
sets forth three possible scenarios, including, a description of the
specific concessions that will likely be required under each
scenario. The working group has reached a consensus as to the
concessions we should be willing to make: in returni for a
reaffirmation of preemption and a five-year period of'"legislative
peace" with respect to advertising and marketing restrictions. The
working group is not unanimous in its recommendation,. One member,
Guy Smith,, believes it would be a mistake for us to offer any
concessions that are not absolutely necessary at this time. In
addition, Bill Campbell has some concerns about agreeing to major
concessions that might hamper our marketing efforts. Nevertheless,,
he and~ the other members of the working group are prepared to
recommend all of the concessions set forth on the attachment,,
including a, total bani on advertising and'! event promotions --
provided that any banibe phased in over a five-year period.
It will not be possible to determine whether a compromise can
be achieved, and on, what basis, until discussions witla, key
congressional leaders are initiated. However, because it may be
necessary early in those discussions to advise Cbng,ressmen such asDingle and'Rose of how far we
are: prepare to go, we are all of the
opinion that we should not embark on this exercise unless a firm
decision is made by you that we would be wiLling to make major
concessions, including a total ad ban if that is necessary to:
achieve our objective.
In any event, the entire working group is of the opinion that,
once we have decided whether we are prepared to go forward, wee
should take the next step promptly of contacting Reynolds and
determining whether they are willing to:join with us.
Attachments
cc: W. Campbell
M.
D.
G. Goldberg
Greenberg
Smith
