Abstract
Even today, the tobacco industry is still hard pressed to frankly admit that their products kill. They insist that the warning on the package come from a third party ("The Surgeon General says...") instead of them. Given all the time they spent insisting that their products were safe, if the tobacco companies really believed their products didn't kill people, then why did the Tobacco Institute find it necessary in 1989 to include in its strategic plan to: "Defeat all state legislative and regulatory proposals to include specific reference to smoking or tobacco use on death certificate forms"" and... "Seek opportunities through federal action to preempt placement of such references on state forms"" It's chilling for citizens to discover multinational corporations are working behind the scenes to restrict what physicians are able to report as causes of death, especially when it relates directly to their products. Title: Strategic Plan for the Tobacco Institute, September, 1989 Type of Document: Report Date: 19890900 Author: Corporate author (the Tobacco Institute) Page Count: 44 Site: Lorillard Tobacco Company document site http://www.lorillarddocs.com/ Bates No. 87717230/7273 URL of entire document: http://www.lorillarddocs.com/getallimg.asp'DOCID=87717230/7273 Quote (from page 43 of the document, or Bates No. 87717272) Objective: To represent and protect the tobacco industry's legitimate common interests in other significant and emerging issues. Strategies: 1. Tobacco Use on Death Certificates a. Defeat all state legislative or regulatory proposals to include specific reference to smoking or tobacco use on death certificate forms. b. Repeal or modify current state regulations which have places references to smoking or tobacco use on death certificate forms. c. Monitor federal agency activity that could lead to inclusion of tobacco use questions on model death certificates. d. Seek opportunities through federal action to preempt placement of such references on state forms.
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STRATEGIC PLAN
FOR
THE TOBACCO INSTITUTE
September, 1989
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY TAB 1
THE ENVIRONMENT TAB 2
THE INSTITUTE'S STRENGTHS TAB 3
ORGANIZATION OF THE TOBACCO
INSTITUTE TAB 4
MISSION AND OPERATION OF THE
TOBACCO INSTITUTE TAB 5
ISSUE STRATEGIES
- Tax Issue TAB A
- Public Smoking Issue TAB B
- Advertising Restrictions TAB C
- Fire Safety Issue TAB D
- Trade Issue TAB E
- Social Cost Issue TAB F
Other Industry Issues TAB G
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Executive Summary
The Tobacco Institute's long-range strategic plan
has been designed to fulfill The Institute's mission as
defined by its members: to lead and direct the tobacco
industry's resources in defending the industry against
unwarranted restrictions and promoting acceptance of the
role of tobacco in society. The strategies reflect The
Institute's assessment of the most effective approaches
to issues currently facing the industry, as well as
those only now emerging.
Unlike The Institute's short-term, tactically
oriented plans, this document is intended to represent a
broad blueprint for activities over the long term. At
the same time, the plan must be dynamic to some degree:
that is, subject to modification as required by the
shifting sands of politics and societal attitudes.
By nature, a strategic plan for a trade association
such as The Tobacco Institute differs in certain ways
from plans that might be developed by its members for
their own organizations. The most notable difference,
perhaps, is in terms of measurable targets.
A strategic plan for business frequently sets
specific targets for increases in sales volume, market
share and return on investment. The Tobacco Institute,
like most trade associations, is concerned with
legislative proposals, regulatory action, and the
perceptions of the industry and its products by the
media, opinion leaders and the public. Here the
specific objectives and strategies deal with issues and
concepts, allies and audiences. Therefore, quantifiable
targets do not represent themselves in the strategic
plan, but are more properly addressed in The Institute's
annual planning and budgeting documents (or more
frequently if appropriate).
A second distinction is the absence of strategies
designed specifically to combat the various "risk
factors," i.e., major unforseen events that would impact
The Institute's focus. Again, the many risks and
contingencies in the volatile environment of tobacco
issues are more effectively addressed in The Institute's
short-term plans. Importantly, however, The Institute's
ongoing strategies, as well as its structure and
internal resources -- with regard to both legislative
matters and public affairs -- are designed to establish
a foundation on which an effective response, regardless
of the threat, can be rapidly devised and implemented.
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The following pages provide an overview of the
environment in which the tobacco industry operates and
its strengths. That is followed by the organization of
The Institute, its mission and operation.
Finally, this document summarizes The Institute's
strategic plan to address six priority issues. They
are:
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1. Excise Taxes
2. Public smoking restrictions
3. Advertising restrictions
4. Fire safety regulation
5. International trade restrictions
6. "Social cost" claims
In addition, the plan touches briefly on strategies.
for five other significant and emerging issues:
1. Indication of tobacco use on death certificates
2. Tobacco manufacturer liability
legislation/regulation
3. Tort and product liability reform
4. Toxic substances regulation
5. Packaging taxes and restrictions
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s
9
The Environment
When the first Surgeon General's report on smoking
and health was released 25 years ago, it was received by
a small army of relatively unknown anti-smoking
activists. It wasn't until former Surgeon General C.
Everett Koop announced in the mid-1980s his goal of "a
smoke-free society by the year 2000" that the myriad of
organizations, government agencies and individuals who
make up the anti-smoking movement were able to rally
their forces. This goal has been a unifying force for
the anti-smoking movement in its efforts to eradicate
smoking.
Whether on Capitol Hill, in state and local
legislative chambers, or in public buildings, offices
and private homes around the country, the effects of the
anti-smoking movement are evident. Many people can no
longer smoke at the office or in other publi'c places
including restaurants; some are prohibited from smoking
even at home. _
Federal, state and local lawmakers, influenced by
apparent anti-smoking sentiment among their
constituents, are passing laws which restrict the use of
tobacco products and the industry's legitimate business
activities. And the "watchdog" of our society, the news
media, exhibit a growing bias against smoking and the
tobacco industry.
This change in public opinion is largely the result
of a change in the anti-smoking movement itself. A
movement that once was small and poorly organized.has
grown into a well financed and well coordinated effort
by a growing -- and increasingly sophisticated --
community of anti-smoking organizations and individuals.
The Anti-Smoking Movement: Who Are They?
The anti-smoking efforts are led in part by major
medical and health-related organizations, such as the
American Cancer Society, American Heart Association, and
American Lung Association, the three of which also
compose the Coalition on Smoking OR Health, chaired by
Scott D. Sallin. Another key player to emerge in recent
years is the Smoking Control Advocacy Resource Center
(SCARC) of the Advocacy Institute, led by former FTC
Chairman Michael Pertschuk.

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. _ . 4 __..........:.~:.,~:~.
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Several smaller organizations, such as John Banzhaf's
Action on Smoking and Health (ASH), the Group Against
Smokers' Pollution (GASP) and Citizens Against Tobacco
Smoke (CATS), have been formed at the grassroots level,
as well as organizations created to battle the tobacco
industry on the legal front, e.g., the Tobacco Products
Liability Project.
A number of other diverse organizations also are
represented, including various scientific and consumer
groups, governments, federal agencies, and even certain
individuals who are leaders of their own anti-smoking
efforts. Additionally, 37 anti-tobacco members of
Congress recently formed a bi-partisan caucus, the
Congressional Task Force on Smoking and Health,
dedicated to eliminating or restricting tobacco use.
All of these groups and individuals play a role in
shaping the anti-smoking movement's activities.
These groups are motivated primarily by their
shared opinion that tobacco, in all forms, is
detrimental to health and should not be available to
consumers who choose to use it. Aware that an outright
ban on tobacco is not politically feasible, they seek
rather to destroy the tobacco industry through other
means, i.e., increasing excise taxes and placing a wide
array of restrictions on tobacco use, sales, advertising
and promotion. Their crusade is extremely emotional
and, often, irrational.
For example, although anti-smokers assert that
environmental tobacco smoke causes 46,000 nonsmoker
deaths per year in the U.S. -- a figure with no
scientific basis -- the justification for that figure is
rarely, if ever questioned publicly. As a result, it is
becoming widely accepted as conventional wisdom. At a
congressional hearing on smoking in commercial
airliners, flight attendants were not challenged by the
panel on their emotional testimony that serious health
problems, including cervical cancer, had been directly
caused by ETS.
In addition, it is illustrative to recognize that
the anti-smoking business is a considerable industry in
itself, involving hundreds of millions of dollars and
countless jobs. Organizations like the American Medical
Association (with PAC resources over $1 million) use
their anti-smoking projects to rally members and
donations -- and to demonstrate a degree of "social
responsibility."

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!
Many of the anti-smoking spokespeople seem to enjoy
their newfound celebrity status, and are attracted to
the publicity accompanying their efforts, and the image
of "David" taking on "Goliath." Congressman Richard
Durbin and Senator Frank Lautenberg, in their quest for
airline smoking bans, are good examples of this.
In the past, the anti-smoking movement was divided
by differing agendas, each group competing for the same
money and recognition. But the change in the public's
attitudes toward smoking reflects, in large part, the
movement's discovery that strength comes with unity.
The Anti-Smoking Movement: A New Agenda
The anti=smoking movement now realizes that to be
truly successful, it must fight and win battles on
several fronts. It has developed an inundation strategy
in which the industry is barraged with proposed
restrictions -- from public smoking to taxes to
advertising to trade -- at every level of government.
In addition to maximizing its opportunities for success
by sheer numbers, this strategy seeks to diffuse the
industry's resources and attention.
On a larger front, the movement has recognized that
to reach its goal of a smoke-free society, it must
persuade the general public that smoking is unacceptable
and harmful behavior. Legislators do not act in a
vacuum. It is public opinion that ultimately will
dictate the winner in these battles.
So, too, must the anti-smoking movement target the
media in its message, utilizing.this tool for public
opinion and agenda-setting with increasing success.
In January of this year, the American Medical
Association, the American Lung Association, the American
Cancer Society, the American Heart Association, key
members of Congress, and many other citizens and
organizations convened in Houston, TX, for a two-day
summit to develop a common agenda.
The Houston conference was much like the 1981
gathering of anti-smoking activists in New York for the
National Conference on Smoking OR Health, which
developed the first "blueprint" for action. Although
the focus of the discussion in Houston was somewhat
similar, the anti-smoking movement has chosen new
targets and arenas for its efforts in the 1990s.

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The dominant issue at the Houston conference was how to
reduce smoking among our nation's children, young women,
minorities and those less-educated Americans.
Anti-smoking efforts based on the issue of smoking by
these individuals can be seen in the separate agendas
set forth by a number of organizations.
The major recommendations from the Houston
conference include:
- giving the U.S. Food and Drug Administration
authority over all tobacco products;
- restricting tobacco advertising and promotion
activities;
- raising excise taxes on tobacco products to raise
revenues and price cigarettes out of reach of most
individuals;
- eliminating all federal support for the growth and
sale of tobacco; -
- "protecting" nonsmokers from so-called "involuntary
smoking" in public places, trains, planes and buses, and
ia the workplace; and ~
- restricting the U.S. Trade Representative from
opening up tobacco markets in other nations.
Current Trends
A.number of trends are shaping the direction.of the
anti-smoking movement of the future. Primarily, its
growing pragmatism and political savvy have provided a
tremendous boost to its efforts to eliminate the use of
tobacco products.
When blanket public smoking bans were considered in
earlier years, most Americans thought that type of
action was too harsh. After losing many of these
legislative battles, the anti-smoking movement
compromised on designated smoking sections, waiting
until the climate became more favorable to stricter
bans. As a result, over recent years, we have witnessed
a slow but steady erosion of smoking rights in public
places and the workplace, and a move to ever-harsher
restrictions.
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The anti-smoking movement's newfound political finesse
also is evident in its attempts to ban advertising and
promotion of tobacco products. When initial censorship
efforts failed to garner enough support from the public,
First Amendment advocates and policy-makers, the
movement quickly adopted a variety of backdoor methods
("content only" advertising, curtailing the deduction
for advertising expenses, banning sponsorship of
cultural and athletic events, etc.) to achieve similar
ends.
The legislative challenge by the anti-smoking
movement continues to grow in scope. The number of
anti-tobacco proposals introduced in Congress each year
has increased from a total of 28 in the 96th Congress
(1979-80), to 150 in the 100th Congress and 95 to date
this year. The number of annual state tobacco proposals
has grown by more than 250 percent -- from 250 measures
in 1980 to more than 900 this year. At the local level,
the amount of activity against tobacco has quadrupled --
from about 90 proposals in 1980 to 364 measures last
year.
While smoking restriction proposals clearly are
driven by anti-smoking forces, tax-related legislation
usually is sponsored by those concerned with more
general budget needs. However, anti-smoking leaders are
quick to align themselves with proponents of these tax
measures.
Additionally, anti-tobacco strategists have begun
to more fully understand and utilize the initiative and
referendum process. California's Proposition 99, and
its 25-cent per pack increase in the cigarette excise
tax, was used successfully by anti-tobacco elements as a
means of bypassing legislative and constitutional
roadblocks to tax increases. Similar efforts are
underway in other states.
Another trend has been the anti-smoking movement's
turn to the development of coalition allies in its fight
against the tobacco industry. Seeking the help of -
parents, teachers, businesses, minority groups, and even
the media, among others, the new anti-smoking movement
is borrowing successful strategies used by the tobacco
industry.
